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EDITORS' NOTE
Global climate change affects human lives. Low-income communi-
ties, people of color, and indigenous societies are particularly affected by
social and cultural disruptions, impaired health, and unjust financial bur-
dens. In every country, city, and town across the globe, the poor suffer
more than the affluent from the effects of global climate change. In U.S.
cities, wealthier citizens mitigate the effects by their choices in jobs and
housing. They can afford to relocate or insure their property and their
health. They work and live in air-conditioned offices that shut out bad-
pollution days, and not on construction sites or in contaminated
neighborhoods. Low-income Americans are three times more likely to
die from respiratory ailments and two times more likely to die from a
heat wave than their wealthier neighbors. Around the world, the effects
of climate change are felt disproportionately by poorer countries, espe-
cially those at the equator and the poles. Lack of infrastructure and re-
sources constrain their ability to cope with the consequences. Yet, they
are the least likely to have contributed to the greenhouse gas emissions
that caused them.
Global climate change is among the most compelling and complex
concerns of today. As world leaders struggle to address this issue, the
disproportionate impact on the poorer communities of the world must be
part of their discourse. The climate change policies that are adopted,
whether at the local, state, regional, national, or global level, must ad-
dress this disparate impact. Whether shaping policies related to green-
house gas emissions, transportation, housing, energy production, or in-
dustry, policymakers must consider the effects of these policies on
poorer communities.
The Denver University Law Review Symposium "Global Climate
Change: Integrating Environmental Justice into Policy, Regulation, and
Litigation" was held on February 15, 2008. The Symposium brought
together some of the most distinguished scholars and practitioners in this
field to discuss how lawyers concerned with climate change and social
justice can raise these issues in shaping legislation, influencing regula-
tion, and pursuing litigation. The articles in this Issue are a result of that
inspiring and powerful discourse.
First, Colorado State Attorney General John Suthers' keynote ad-
dress takes the position that activist state attorneys general have over-
stepped their roles in pursuing many of the climate change cases, primar-
ily due to their political ambitions. Next, Professor Federico Cheever
explores the lawyer's role in addressing global warming and reminds us
to think like a lawyer in finding the parties responsible and holding them
accountable. Professor Alice Kaswan's article describes California's
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efforts to do just that, and proposes a cooperative federalist structure in
which the states and the federal government can work together.
Professor Anita Halvorssen discusses the issue on a global scale,
analyzing the international agreements, their effectiveness, and amend-
ments anticipated when the world leaders meet in Copenhagen in 2009.
Next, Professor Sarah Krakoff explores the disproportionate impact of
climate change on Native Americans, who contribute very little to global
warming but suffer its effects in a particularly painful way because of
their cultural attachment to the land.
Professor Marilyn Averill reviews how the courts have dealt with
climate change issues, emphasizing that these types of cases allow ex-
amination of ethical and social issues within the particular factual context
of a legal case. Professor James May examines how the courts have used
the political question doctrine to avoid hearing these cases and argues
that the doctrine should not serve as a bar to judicial resolution.
Professor Gary Bryner then describes the market's failure to ac-
count for carbon emissions and argues that capturing these costs in the
price of goods is essential to improving the quality of our environment.
Professor Robert Hardaway discusses the inputs to the climate change
equation and argues that while certain economic policies such as a car-
bon tax or a cap-and-trade system may have some effect on reducing
greenhouse gases, we may be just "rearranging deck chairs on the Ti-
tanic" until we get population growth under control. Finally, Professor
Ved Nanda uses the European Union's Gas Emissions Trading Scheme
as a template for a market-based solution that can provide incentives for
curbing greenhouse gas emissions.
We are honored to have these contributors to this Issue of the Law
Review. We would also like to thank the other speakers that participated
in the Symposium. Luke Cole, Director of the Center for Race, Poverty,
and the Environment, began our Symposium with the fascinating and
heartrending story of the Inupiat people in the tiny Alaskan village of
Kivalina. Their simple way of subsistence living from hunting and fish-
ing is being destroyed by climate change, and they are pursuing compen-
sation in the courts. Other speakers made excellent contributions to our
panels: Robert R. Nordhaus, Member, Van Ness Feldman, LLC, Wash-
ington, D.C.; Vickie Patton, Deputy General Counsel, Environmental
Defense Fund; Eric Toder, Ph.D., Senior Fellow, Urban Institute, Senior
Staff, Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center; Professor Ed Ziegler, Univer-
sity of Denver Sturm College of Law; and our other keynote speaker, Jim
Holtkamp, Manager of both the Global Climate Change and Environ-
mental Practice Groups at Holland & Hart LLP.
The 2008 Symposium would not have been as successful without
the support and contributions of many people at the University of Denver
Sturm College of Law. Professor Cheever, who was our Symposium
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advisor and host, provided much-appreciated advice and guidance
throughout the process. We would also like to thank the faculty mem-
bers who served as moderators of the Symposium panels: James van
Hemert, Director, Rocky Mountain Land Use Institute; Professor Robert
Hardaway, University of Denver Sturm College of Law; Jay Tutchton,
Director, Environmental Law Clinic, University of Denver Sturm Col-
lege of Law; Professor Cheever, University of Denver Sturm College of
Law; and Professor Mark Hughes, University of Denver Sturm College
of Law. In addition, our Assistant Symposium Editors, Adam Aldrich,
Page Crowther, and Joshua Nathaniel, were instrumental in putting each
of the panels together. Thank you also to the various staff members at
the Sturm College of Law that helped with logistics and marketing, espe-
cially Continuing Education Consultant Giselle Diaz, Director of Events
Lauri Mlinar, and Law Review Office Coordinator Gracie Aguirre. We
also appreciate the financial support and sponsorship of the Rocky
Mountain Mineral Law Foundation and the law firm of Holland & Hart
LLP. Finally, we also thank Michael Smith, Justin Curry, and Forrest
Plesko, incoming Editor-in-Chief, Managing Editor, and Senior Articles







THE STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S ROLE IN
GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE
JOHN W. SUTHERSt
Thank you for the invitation to join you and participate in this law
review Symposium on a very timely topic. While I have no scientific
expertise whatsoever on the subject of global climate change, as a state
attorney general I do have some knowledge about the legal efforts of
various state AGs to deter global warming. So I will discuss that and,
perhaps in doing so, inject a point of view into the Symposium that will
be sufficiently controversial to spice things up a little bit.
You should know that, while I take pride in the fact that I can and
do work effectively with both sides of the political aisle and that I be-
lieve I have been successful conducting the work of the Colorado Attor-
ney General's Office on the basis of what the law requires as opposed to
what politics suggests, I am, nevertheless, a pretty conservative Republi-
can. I am a big fan of capitalism and market economics. Given my phi-
losophical bent, it may not surprise you that I have not seen the Al Gore
movie, "An Inconvenient Truth" and that I do not presently subscribe to
the "sky is falling" school of thought when it comes to global warming.
But while I do not personally keep a carbon score card and purchase car-
bon credits, I do accept as fact that the earth has experienced a discern-
able warming over the last several decades. Whether it is due to in-
creased human-generated greenhouse gas emissions or is a cyclical event
of the sort the earth has previously experienced, I suspect I am less cer-
tain about than most of the rest of you here today. But I am convinced
that the emission of large amounts of carbon dioxide and other pollutants
into the atmosphere is not a good thing for the environment and, there-
fore, I am wholly supportive of efforts by public policy makers to curb
such pollution. And, to the extent greenhouse gases are causing global
warming, we should do something about it.
So that leads me to the essence of my remarks this afternoon. What
should be the proper role of state attorneys general in regard to global
climate change? I will first give you my answer to that question, and
then elaborate on my response. I believe the proper role of state attor-
neys general in combating global warming is to enforce the civil and
criminal laws passed by their respective state legislatures to protect envi-
ronmental quality, to cooperate in the enforcement of federal laws de-
signed to combat the problem, to contest federal positions that are con-
t Colorado State Attorney General.
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trary to states' rights and principles of federalism, and to properly repre-
sent the state health and environment agencies that are clients of the state
attorney general.
Now as self-evident as that may sound, I would suggest to you that
my view of the proper role of state AGs in this effort would be regarded
with some disdain by a few of my AG colleagues, and certainly so
among many environmental groups in this country who believe that state
AGs have the very broad authority and responsibility to act in whatever
the AGs believe is the broader public interest, whether or not they are
statutorily vested with the authority to do so. You see, as to the state
attorneys general, the global warming debate is a microcosm of a much
larger debate about the proper role of state attorneys general. Let me
frame the debate for you by alluding to my own experience.
When I was sworn in as attorney general of Colorado in January of
2005, I understood my role would be significantly different than my
work as a district attorney or as United States Attorney. Those public
offices did virtually nothing but litigation. The district attorney's office
prosecuted criminal cases and had limited civil jurisdiction in consumer
protection and public health areas. As U.S. Attorney, my office did all
the criminal and civil litigation for the United States in the District of
Colorado. As attorney general, I understood I would be legal advisor to
all departments, agencies, boards, and commissions in Colorado State
government. My office would issue legal opinions, both formal and in-
formal, on a wide variety of subjects pertinent to the operation of the
State. I also understood I would be involved in a broad range of civil
litigation on behalf of the State of Colorado, both as plaintiff and defen-
dant, in addition to the criminal prosecution responsibilities I had had.
But as to my role as the protector of the broad public interest, pri-
marily in regard to Colorado's civil and criminal statutes relating to con-
sumer protection and environmental protection, I still saw myself as as-
suming the familiar role of a law enforcer. In fact, I would be the chief
law enforcement officer in Colorado. It would be my job to enforce
criminal and civil laws passed by the state legislature to protect consum-
ers from fraud and deception and to enforce a variety of statutes enacted
to protect the public from air and water pollution and other health haz-
ards.
And I do not believe I was naive. I was well aware that state attor-
neys general had been involved in some controversial litigation, includ-
ing the massive civil suit against tobacco companies that had culminated
in a settlement agreement in 1999 involving as much as $240 billion,1
1. See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, MASTER SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENT, available at http://www.naag.org/backpages/naag/tobacco/msa/msa-pdf/ 1109185724
1032468605_cigmsa.pdf.
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and that many free market conservatives questioned whether that was a
proper exercise of the State police power.2 I knew that several attorneys
general, like Eliot Spitzer of New York, had made quite a name for
themselves taking on corporate America, and that many on Wall Street
and elsewhere thought they were overreaching. No, I was not naive, but
neither was I fully prepared for what I found when I joined the ranks of
state attorneys general.
In March of 2005 I attended my first meeting of the National Asso-
ciation of Attorneys General (NAAG) in Washington, D.C. In the weeks
prior to the meeting I was flooded with invitations to go to elegant pri-
vate dinners and social receptions hosted by law firms for various inter-
est groups while I was in Washington. That is not something that oc-
curred when I went to district attorney or U.S. Attorney meetings. I was
also invited to a meeting of the Republic Attorneys General Association
(RAGA), which would take place the day before the NAAG meeting. I
was informed that the Democrat attorneys general would be attending a
meeting of DAGA, the Democrat Attorneys General Association. I
learned that many companies and interest groups contributed to both
RAGA and DAGA. I recall being a bit perplexed. What was the propri-
ety and necessity of such an effort to influence attorneys general?
When I came into the room for my first NAAG meeting, the scene
looked very much like what I experienced at National District Attorneys
Association meetings and at meetings where all the U.S. Attorneys got
together. Tables were assembled to create a rectangle and a name card
and a Colorado State flag marked the place I was to sit. But when the
NAAG president called the meeting to order, I noticed that, in addition to
the attorneys general sitting around the table, there were about 150 peo-
ple sitting at tables in the rear of the room. I whispered to a colleague
sitting adjacent to me. "Who are all the people in the back?" I asked.
He glanced at me in a way to suggest it was a dumb question and then
smiled. "They're here to lobby you," he said.
And indeed they were. I found that the attorneys general are subject
to intense lobbying in much the same fashion as legislators. But instead
of seeking your vote, the lobbyists are hoping that you will or will not
sign on to amicus curiae briefs in the appellate courts, or more impor-
tantly, that they can convince you to refrain from initiating or joining a
lawsuit against their company or their interests. In rare instances, an
attorney general will be encouraged to join a litigation that is regarded as
helping the lobbyist's client. Lobbyists spend a great deal of time and
money educating attorneys general about various issues that may become
fodder for litigation in the future. Interest groups are now investing mil-
2. Michael DeBow, Restraining State Attorneys General, Curbing Government Lawsuit
Abuse, POLICY ANALYSIS, May 10, 2002, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa437.pdf.
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lions of dollars in attorney general races in the various states in an at-
tempt to protect their interests.
How did it come to this? Fifteen years ago no one cared much
about state attorney general races. There was no RAGA and DAGA.
NAAG meetings were quiet affairs largely free from outside pressures.
A few of my attorney general colleagues who had held office for a long
time lived through the transition and probably have a better perspective
than mine. But from what I have been able to ascertain and personally
observe, the current situation is a confluence of interrelated trends. The
bottom line is that state attorneys general have become more litigious,
more high profile, and more politically ambitious. Precisely in which
order these occurred or which trend led to others, I am not certain. But I
do know that the current situation coincides with a phenomenon knowl-
edgeable observers refer to as attorney general "activism."
Now what exactly is attorney general activism? Is it capable of
definition or is it simply a case of "you know it when you see it"? Let
me give you a few "I knew it when I saw it" examples and then try to
define it.
In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in 2005, gas prices rose
sharply. The public was angry, perceiving that the rise in price was more
the result of corporate opportunism than market forces. The state AGs,
all wanting to be perceived as diligent problem solvers, weighed in with
their concerns. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and several AGs
initiated investigations. 3 Colorado had initiated gas pricing investiga-
tions in approximately eight out of the previous dozen years.4 I distinctly
recall a nationwide phone conference in which the FTC gave the AGs a
preview of the report they were issuing the next day. Essentially, the
FTC found no systematic wrongdoing. 5 It concluded that the rise in
prices was attributable to market forces, including the highly volatile
spot and futures markets.6 Various AG investigations reported similar
3. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, INVESTIGATION OF GASOLINE PRICE MANIPULATION AND
POST-KATRINA GASOLINE PRICE INCREASES (2006), available at http://www.fte.gov/reports/
060518PublicGasolinePricesInvestigationReportFinal.pdf; see, e.g., CONSUMER PROTECTION UNIT
CIVIL LITIGATION DIVISION, STATE OF IDAHO OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, REPORT ON
POST-HURRICANE KATRINA GASOLINE PRICES IN IDAHO, available at http://www2.state.id.us/
ag/newsrel/2006/GasReport2006.pdf, CALIFORNIA STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL BILL LOCKYEAR,
REPORT ON GASOLINE PRICING IN CALIFORNIA, UPDATE MARCH 2004, available at
http://ag.ca.gov/antitrust/gasoline/pdf/gasoline.pdf; STATEMENT FROM THE OFFICE OF THE ILLINOIS
ATTORNEY GENERAL LISA MADIGAN, RISE IN GAS PRICES INVESTIGATED IN WAKE OF HURRICANE
KATRINA, available at http://www.illinoisattomeygeneral.gov/consumers/gasjprices.html#more_
info.
4. See, e.g., ATTORNEY GENERAL SALAZAR ANNOUNCES RESULTS OF YEAR-LONG GAS
PRICE FIXING INVESTIGATION IN GRAND JUNCTION AREA (2000), available at
http://www.ago.state.co.us/press-detail.cfin?pressfD=536.
5. See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 3, at viii.
6. Id.
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conclusions.7 I thought that would be the end of the matter and expected
the phone call to wrap up quickly. But a veteran attorney general from
the Midwest interjected and made what I considered an amazing asser-
tion. In fact, I had to write it down. "Just because we haven't found
anything illegal, doesn't make it right and doesn't mean we shouldn't do
anything about it," he said. "We need to do something about these ob-
scene profits."
Folks, that is the mindset of an activist AG. Luckily, market forces
shifted a short time later and attorney general interest in the issue de-
clined at the same rate as gas prices.
As to AG activism on the issue of global warming, let me cite you
to two cases. In 2006, shortly before he left office, California Attorney
General Bill Lockyer filed suit against the world's six largest car mak-
ers.8 In this suit California sought to recover damages for all environ-
mental damage caused by automobiles since their invention.9 In Califor-
nia v. General Motors Corp., it was California's contention that cars are
a "public nuisance" the manufacturers inflicted upon it.'0 The suit ig-
nored the fact that the California legislature long ago passed the nation's
strictest auto emission standards and that the companies had specially
equipped a significant portion of their fleet in order to comply with those
standards. The suit also did not deal with the reality that California con-
structed an enormous highway system to accommodate this alleged pub-
lic nuisance. The suit was eventually dismissed by the federal district
court in the fall of 2007 on the grounds it raised political questions out-
side the jurisdiction of the courts."1 Folks, I believe this was a case of
AG activism.
Several Eastern attorneys general, including Eliot Spitzer and his
successor Andrew Cuomo, do not like coal fired power plants. So
Spitzer, Richard Blumenthal in Connecticut, and several fellow state
AGs sued the nation's five largest coal burning utilities, even though
none of the utilities were located in their states.'2  In Connecticut v.
American Electric Power Co., Inc. the AGs sought a reduction in carbon
dioxide emissions. 13 The AGs viewed these emissions as a public nui-
sance and claimed they needed to bring the case because the federal gov-
ernment and coal burning utility companies had failed to implement any
7. See CONSUMER PROTECTION UNIT CIVIL LITIGATION DIVISION, supra note 3, at 50-51;
CALIFORNIA STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL BILL LOCKYEAR, supra note 3, at 2-3; STATEMENT FROM
THE OFFICE OF THE ILLINOIS ATTORNEY GENERAL LISA MADIGAN, supra note 3, at paras. 2-3.
8. Complaint, California v. General Motors Corp., 2007 WL 2726871 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17,
2007) (No. C06-05755 MJJ).
9. Id. at *2.
10. Id.
11. California v. General Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 17, 2007).
12. See Connecticut v. American Elec. Power Co., Inc., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
13. Id. at 260.
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meaningful measures to address this matter of national and worldwide
significance.' 4 The U.S. District Court in the Southern District of New
York dismissed the action as raising non-justiciable political questions.15
Ladies and gentlemen, therein lies the rub. Unlike some of my col-
leagues, I do not believe that state AGs have the authority to act in what-
ever they believe is the broader national or international interest and to
usurp the jurisdictional authority of Congress and federal regulatory
agencies in the process. I believe many of these are in fact political or
policy questions to be resolved by legislative bodies.
I also believe basic principles of federalism are being undermined.
Over the last year, Andrew Cuomo, Eliot Spitzer's successor as Attorney
General of New York, has taken creative legal steps in an attempt to de-
ter new coal fired utility plants in Kansas and Colorado. To me, the no-
tion that the attorney general of New York has the jurisdictional author-
ity to attempt to block utility plants in Kansas and Colorado is an affront
to the most basic tenets of federalism. If the attorneys general of a few
Eastern states want to control carbon emissions in Colorado and Kansas,
they need to lobby the legislators and regulators in those states and/or
fight and win battles in Congress that will result in national air quality
standards applicable to every state. Otherwise, they should leave it to the
people of Colorado to regulate their own utilities. And incidentally, the
new coal fired utility unit in Colorado had been approved as part of an
agreement between industry and environmentalists because two older
coal units would also be retrofitted as part of the deal and the three of
them together would have less total emissions than the two currently
operational units.
My definition of AG activism is this: It is when a state attorney
general attempts to remedy a real or perceived problem through means
other than that intended by those elected to make public policy. My test
in determining whether to exercise state power to sue someone is simply
this: Has a law been violated and is there sufficient evidence to prove it
in court? I will not bring a legal action to stop conduct if a legislature
has not provided me a means to do so either by express statutory author-
ity or by statutory recognition that I retain certain common law powers.
Now, do I lobby the legislature if I believe they should change the
law and give me broader jurisdiction? You bet I do. Do I join multi-
state actions? You bet I do, if I believe the defendant has violated Colo-
rado law. For example, we recently caught pharmaceutical companies
whose patents on certain products were about to expire paying off poten-
tial generic competitors to stay out of the market. That is a violation of
the anti-trust laws of Colorado and a multi-state action is a very efficient
14. Id. at 271.
15. Id. at 274.
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and effective means to resolve it. In fact, culpable corporate defendants
often view this as the preferred method for resolution of such issues.
The aggressive litigation posture taken by some of my fellow state
attorneys general has led critics to question whether they are engaged in
a violation of the separation of powers. By using perceived common law
powers to achieve public policy objectives they deem desirable, they are,
in essence, legislating and regulating by litigation. They are shaping
public policy, traditionally the legislative function. But the consent de-
crees by which they resolve the litigation and secure policy changes are
not subject to either legislative or executive approval.
The aggressive litigation pursued by the state AGs has caused them
to assume a much higher public profile. Mainstream media have gener-
ally reported the attorney general activism favorably and many attorneys
general have assumed a populist image that plays very well with voters.
State attorneys general are now routinely running for higher office. That
in turn has, in my opinion, attracted more lawyers who have primarily a
political background rather than a legal background, to run for the office.
It is very common now for successful state legislators to run for attorney
general. They may or may not have extensive legal backgrounds in
prosecution or in the private sector. Not surprisingly, in many of the
meetings I have been in with fellow attorneys general that included dis-
cussions of actual or potential litigation or expressions of frustration
about social or economic problems facing the country, some of my breth-
ren sound a lot more like policy-making legislators than law-enforcing
prosecutors.
So the bottom line is this: When it comes to commencing litigation,
whether environmental or otherwise, I still believe my only appropriate
consideration should be whether Colorado law has been violated or
whether federal law gives me jurisdiction to pursue prescribed remedies.
I believe attorneys general should seek to solve problems only through
remedies provided by the Constitution and by the legislature of their re-
spective state or by Congress. That can include common law remedies
the legislature recognizes within the attorney general's jurisdiction. I do
not believe it is appropriate for attorneys general to pursue consumer
protection or environmental litigation that does not derive from constitu-
tional or legislative authority, but rather represents the attorney general's
personal view of what constitutes the broad public interest. By the way,
in utilizing available state and federal legislative remedies, including the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act, 16 my office is engaged in a significant amount of environmental
litigation to protect air and water quality in Colorado.
16. See 42 U.S.C. § 103 (2006).
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And to emphasize that these jurisdictional issues are not simple
ones, I will tell you that my office is willing, if directed by our clients in
the executive branch, to join California, New York and other states in
suing the federal government to preserve the right of states to set emis-
sion standards for cars purchased and driven in their state. Regardless of
my personal views as to the wisdom of doing so, I believe that is a proper
exercise of state power. I also acknowledge that it was the right of sev-
eral states to sue the Environmental Protection Agency and challenge its
determination that it lacked authority under the Clean Air Act to regulate
carbon dioxide as a pollutant.' 7 That was a question that needed to be
answered and I saw the suit as an acknowledgement that this is a prob-
lem that needs a national and international solution.
Ironically, I believe some of my more activist colleagues are facing
the prospect of losing some front page exposure. I am pleased that it
appears the federal government is becoming more engaged in the global
warming debate and what to do about it. If there is a coherent national
policy on the issue, it is my hope that my state brethren will be less
tempted to run roughshod over the basic framework of federalism. But
then again, I would not be surprised to see the Attorney General of Cali-
fornia or the Attorney General of New York up the ante in the near future
and bring a suit against China and India. After all, why should interna-
tional boundaries stand in the way of what they believe is good for the
citizens of California or New York? When you want to be governor,
senator, or perhaps President, sometimes your ambition knows no
boundaries.
17. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).
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EVERYONE COMPLAINS ABOUT THE WEATHER, BUT No
ONE EVER DOES ANYTHING ABOUT IT:
INTERJURISDICTIONAL FAILURE TO DESIGNATE
RESPONSIBLE PARTIES FOR THE CLIMATE CRISIS
FEDERICO CHEEVERt
INTRODUCTION
The evolving response to the approaching climate crisis challenges
the assumptions on which many groups of policymakers rely to make
sense of the world around them. It has dramatically broadened our no-
tion of what constitutes an environmentally significant transaction. It has
altered our view of the relationship between developed and developing
countries.' It shows every sign of transforming our notions of interna-
tional governance and, within the United States, our ideas of federalism.
2
In biodiversity preservation, it has called into question the "reserve sys-
tem strategy," which has been-without question-the dominant ap-
proach to preservation for decades. 3 It may alter our understanding of
the meaning ofjustice. The whole thing makes us dizzy.
t Professor of Law and Director of the Environmental and Natural Resources Law Program,
University of Denver Sturm College of Law. I would like to thank the editors and staff of the Den-
ver University Law Review, particularly Erik Lemmon, Editor-in-Chief. I would also like to thank
my research assistant Dulcinea Hanuschak without whom this essay would have been impossible.
I. Cinnamon Carlarne, Climate Change-The New "Superwhale" in the Room: Interna-
tional Whaling and Climate Change Politics-Too Much in Common?, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 753, 767-
70 (2007) (discussing the refusal of major greenhouse gas emitters-the developed U.S. and the
rapidly developing China and India-to embrace emissions restrictions, unlike many European
countries); Paul G. Harris, The European Union and Environmental Change: Sharing the Burdens
of Global Warming, 17 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 309, 315-19 (2006) (discussing develop-
ing countries' desire to be treated as equals with developed countries during international climate
change negotiations, and the philosophical differences in how developed and developing countries
view the greenhouse gas problem: that is, that developed countries see it as an environmental prob-
lem while developing countries see it as a human-welfare concern).
2. Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental Law,
56 EMORY L.J. 159, 177-81 (2006) (opining that an effective means of addressing climate change is
to maintain "overlapping" state and federal jurisdiction over environmental issues); Kirsten H.
Engel, The Dormant Commerce Clause Threat to Market-Based Environmental Regulation: The
Case of Electricity Deregulation, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 243 (1999) (explaining that state market-based
environmental regulations could potentially result in Commerce Clause violations and suggesting
means by which states may be able to carry out efficient market-based environmental regulations
without risking constitutional violations); Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting:
Is There a "Race" and Is It "To the Bottom"?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271, 359, 367-69 (1997) (discuss-
ing the need for some form of federal environmental regulation in order to avoid the tendency of
some states to impose relaxed environmental standards so as to increase their competitive edge in
interstate industry).
3. See generally CLIMATE CHANGE AND BIODIVERSITY (Thomas E. Lovejoy & Lee Hannah
eds., Yale Univ. Press 2006) (describing climate change biology in light of social concerns, conser-
vation, and public policy); Cornelia Dean, The Preservation Predicament, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29,
2008, at Fl ("Conservation organizations that work to preserve biologically rich landscapes are
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Lawyers, as a profession, have been particularly disoriented by this
dramatic change in the shape of the projected future. Our traditional
skills seem quaint in a world of impending global cataclysm and pro-
spective gee-whiz technology. Faced with the unknown we are, as al-
ways, prisoners of popular culture. Lawyers-as lawyers-never play a
significant role in disaster movies. The best we have ever been able to
hope for in the face of an asteroid strike, alien epidemic, or monster from
the deep is the authority that comes from the fact that most elected offi-
cials are lawyers.4 Legal skills have never seemed important when the
fictional President or Prime Minister decides to evacuate New York or
calls out the army to stop Godzilla. This image of lawyers in times of
fictitious disaster has shaped the legal academic response to the real cli-
mate crisis: We exercise our judgment, playing economist,5 social scien-
tist,6 moral philosopher,7 atmospheric scientist, 8 or all four, as we con-
sider what to do, but we do not "lawyer."
However, lawyers-as lawyers-are central to fashioning a re-
sponse to the climate crisis not only for our judgment and ability to give
inspiring speeches in times of crisis but also for our traditional legal hab-
its of mind. When we, as lawyers, face a new threat or cost that society
will bear we endeavor to: (1) identify responsible parties to bear that
cost; (2) identify mechanisms to spread that cost equitably among those
responsible parties; and (3) identify measures to reduce that cost to the
confronting a painful realization: In an era of climate change, many of their efforts may be insuffi-
cient or beside the point.").
4. LEE HANNAH ET AL., BIODIVERSITY AND CLIMATE CHANGE IN CONTEXT, CLIMATE
CHANGE AND BIOD1VERSITY 3, 7-13 (Thomas E. Lovejoy & Lee Hannah, eds., Yale Univ. Press
2005); Dean, supra note 3, at F1.
5. E.g., Ari Bessendorf, Games in the Hothouse: Theoretical Dimensions in Climate
Change, 28 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 325, 347-49 (2005) (describing the problem of green-
house gas emissions in terms of market systems and game theory).
6. E.g., Kirsten H. Engel, Mitigating Global Climate Change in the United States: A Re-
gional Approach, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 54, 60-62 (2005) (opining that while state efforts to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions appear irrational when examined under standard economic theory, other
motivations have nonetheless caused some state and local governments to take action to reduce
emissions).
7. Eg, Mary Christina Wood, Keynote Address: Government's Atmospheric Trust Respon-
sibility, 22 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 369 (2007) (opining that the government has a moral trust respon-
sibility to protect the environment from a "climate emergency"); Mary Christina Wood, Nature's
Trust: A Legal, Political and Moral Frame for Global Warming, 34 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 577,
598, 603 (2007) (discussing the seriousness of global warming and suggesting that the government
has a moral obligation to protect the environment).
8. E.g., William C. Bums, Global Warming-The United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change and the Future of Small Island States, 6 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. POL'Y 147, 150-66
(1997) (discussing the scientific causes of global climate change and the validity of computerized
climate models for forecasting the effects of climate change); William C. Burns, The Second Session
of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change:
More Heat than Light?, 8 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 153, 154-56 (1997) (discussing the
scientific basis for the greenhouse effect).
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degree possible. On items two and three, we are wise to work with ex-
perts in other disciplines. On item one, we tend to ride alone. 9
To date, the legal debate regarding climate change has been driven
largely by items two and three in the list above: the search for mecha-
nisms to spread costs among responsible parties and measures to mitigate
those costs. It has deemphasized, most remarkably at the federal level
and the international level, the identification of responsible parties.
The identification of responsible parties, however, is an essential
first step toward any workable legal mechanism. Both the processes of
identifying mechanisms to spread cost and measures to reduce cost de-
pend, to a significant degree, on identifying who is responsible, why they
are responsible, and what they can do about it.
Professor Daniel Farber initiated a related inquiry in his 2007 article
Basic Compensation for Victims of Climate Change.10 However, his
preliminary discussion focused primarily on using existing liability doc-
trines as tools for providing compensation for the victims of the climate
crisis. In contrast, I suspect that the unprecedented nature of the crisis
will force the evolution of unique theories of responsibility, whatever
traditional labels we endeavor to affix to them. Without a doubt, legisla-
tures (international, national, and intra-national), will play an essential
role in shaping the structure of responsibility. Courts undoubtedly will
play a role as well. They will engage in a complex dance that defies easy
prediction.
As Professor Farber observes, "[t]he tort system-and, by exten-
sion, other compensation schemes-has several goals. Probably the two
most important are deterring harmful conduct (the efficiency or deter-
rence rationale) and corrective justice (that is, restoring moral balance by
rectifying harm)."" These policy considerations extend beyond compen-
sation schemes to any structure of responsibility. Questions of "deter-
rence" and "corrective justice" cannot be answered without identifying
responsible parties.
Still, there is a temptation to treat climate change as "the weather":
to treat climate change as something which is no one's responsibility
and, therefore, to treat its consequent costs-be they costs of prevention
or adaptation-as something we should all bear equally. In fact, the re-
sponsibility for the climate crisis does not fall equally on all entities in
society and we should not pretend that it does. Some entities have
9. See Palsgraff v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 101 (N.Y. 1928) (holding that a party
is not liable for negligence unless damage was caused by a reasonably foreseeable risk).
10. See generally Daniel A. Farber, Basic Compensation for Victims of Climate Change, 155
U. PA. L. REV. 1605 (2007).
11. Id. at 1640.
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gained far more from the creation of the current crisis than most of us.
Some entities have far more power to stop or limit it.
This temptation to treat climate change as the weather-and thereby
sever our discourse about it from the designation of responsible parties-
may explain the wild popularity of tradable permit ("cap and trade") pro-
grams as proposed legislative solutions. In more than four decades of
environmental law, the United States Congress has mandated only one
national cap and trade program for pollutants-the sulfur dioxide trading
regime initiated in Title IV of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990.12
However, as far as I have been able to ascertain, every significant na-
tional legislative proposal to deal with climate change is built around a
cap and trade system. Others, including Al Gore in his Nobel Lecture in
December 2007,13 have compared the effectiveness of cap and trade sys-
tems with the effectiveness of carbon tax proposals (and found carbon
tax proposals superior).14 I am interested in the designation of responsi-
ble parties. In my frame of reference, tradable permit schemes are sig-
nificant primarily as a symptom of our desire to avoid designating re-
sponsible parties.
Among political structures in the United States, it is the states 5 that
have been willing to start the inquiry into what to do about the climate
crisis with the process of identifying responsible parties) 6 In public nui-
12. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7651 (West 2008) (establishing the sulfur dioxide trading program). See
generally Peter Berck & Gloria E. Helfand, The Case of Markets Versus Standards for Pollution
Policy, 45 NAT. RESOURCES J. 345 (2005) (discussing the sulfur dioxide permitting process insti-
tuted by Title IV of the Clean Air Act); Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Emissions Allowance Trading Under the
Clean Air Act: A Model for Future Environmental Regulations?, 7 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 352 (1999)
(examining the context and effectiveness of the Title IV legislation).
13. Al Gore, Nobel Lecture, Oslo (Dec. 10, 2007), available at
http://nobelprize.org/nobel prizes/peace/laureates/2007/gore-lecture-en.html ("And most important
of all, we need to put a price on carbon-with a C0 2 tax that is then rebated back to the people,
progressively, according to the laws of each nation, in ways that shift the burden of taxation from
employment to pollution. This is by far the most effective and simplest way to accelerate solutions
to this crisis.") (emphasis added).
14. Christina K. Harper, Climate Change and Tax Policy, 30 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
411,454-60 (2007).
15. According to the magnificent climate change litigation chart prepared by Arnold & Porter
under the direction of Michael Gerrand, there also have been two instances of common law tort
litigation involving climate change. The two cases, Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-
436 (S.D. Miss. 2006) (dismissed August, 2007) (appeal pending) and Korsinsky v. EPA, 2005 WL
2414744 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (dismissed), aff'd 2006 WL 2255110 (2d Cir. 2006), were summarily
dismissed. See html:http://www.amoldporter.com/resources/documents/Climate Change_ Litiga-
tionChart 123107.mht!ClimateChangeLitigation Chart 123107_files/slide0004.htm.
16. See, e.g., California ex rel. Lockyer v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 17, 2007), available at
http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/cand/judges.nsf/61fffe74f99516d088256d480060b72d/61c396eab91-
211868825735900798cf7/$FILE/5755orderdism.pdf (dismissing plaintiff's public nuisance claim
for damages against automobile manufacturers which generate huge volumes of greenhouse gas
emissions and allegedly contribute to global warming); Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F.
Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (dismissing public nuisance suits filed by the states of Connecticut,
New York, California, Iowa, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin, as well as the City
of New York and non-profit land trusts against electric utility companies seeking that the companies
abate their emission of greenhouse gases because of the gases' contribution to global warming).
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sance suits brought by a variety of states, most notably Connecticut and
California, plaintiffs have alleged the existence of specific classes of
responsible parties. To date, these cases have been dismissed in federal
court in deference to past and future federal legislative processes which
offer little or no promise of designating responsible parties. This is un-
fortunate. If allowed to proceed, the fact-finding process these suits
would require could inform decision making at every level of govern-
ment. The current gestational process regarding our national response to
the climate crisis needs to incorporate the states' responsible party analy-
sis into the policymaking process.
I. WHAT'S A LAWYER TO Do?
I have wondered about my role in fashioning a response to the ap-
proaching climate crisis. The literature I dutifully read seems unevenly
divided between: (1) statements of the need for radical global reductions
of greenhouse gas emissions based on dire predictions generated by fan-
tastically complex computer models; 17 (2) assessments of mind-
bendingly advanced technologies which may (or may not) be part of a
solution but which always require twenty minutes (and a diagram) to
explain;' 8 and (3) economic analyses proving beyond any doubt that all
the wonderful technologies may not be cost effective but that solving the
problem is. 19
My role as a citizen is fairly straightforward. As a matter of per-
sonal choice, I do what Al Gore tells me to do: Endeavor to reduce my
personal carbon footprint and vote for candidates who are willing to ad-
mit the problem exists and willing to do something about it.
Someday there will be rules-a very complex set of rules by all in-
dications. We lawyers will be able to battle over their meaning and ap-
plication ("Mr. Brown invested $50,000 in carbon credits under the as-
sumption that. . . ."). Right now, however, in the essential gestational
phase of what promises to be one of the most significant social-legal
regulatory structures in at least a generation, what are we good for?
17. See, e.g., NICHOLAS STERN, STERN REVIEW ON THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE,
available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/independent-reviews/stem review economics
climate change/stem review report.cfm (last visited Mar. 26, 2008); UK- METEOROLOGICAL
OFFICE, HADLEY CENTRE CLIMATE MODELS, available at
http://www.metoffice.gov.uk/research/hadleycentre/models/modeltypes.htm (last visited Mar. 26,
2008) [hereinafter OFFICE]; INT'L INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, REPORTS,
available at http://www.ipcc-wg2.org [hereinafter PANEL].
18. See, e.g., Alan Carlin, Global Climate Change Control: Is There a Better Strategy than
Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions?, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1401, 1401 (2007) (proposing that the
optimum means of addressing climate change problems is to decrease radiation by "adding particles
optimized for this purpose to the stratosphere to scatter a small portion of the incoming sunlight back
into space" and also to reduce acidification in the ocean).
19. See, e.g., STERN, supra note 17.
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What do most of us know about liquefied carbon dioxide,2° oceanic
acidification, 21 or global dimming?
22
My question is-of course-rhetorical. It is rhetorical both in the
sense that I think I already have an answer and rhetorical in the sense that
it sets up the point I am trying to make. I think we have a lot to add at
this stage, and I think we have not been doing our job.
II. THINKING LIKE A LAWYER (ABOUT CLIMATE CHANGE)
Before I can explain the role we lawyers should play, there is a nec-
essary preliminary step: a reorientation. Rather than applying legal
analysis to scientific or political formulations about the climate crisis, I
think we can (and must) reformulate the problem in traditional legal
terms. This I will now-modestly-attempt to do.
First, if the scientists are right, climate instability poses the greatest
threat to the global ecosystem, human liberty, private property, and "dis-
tinct investment-backed expectations' 23 over the next few centuries.
In 2007, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), in re-
sponse to a petition from the Center for Biological Diversity, published a
proposed rule to list the Polar Bear as a threatened species under the En-
dangered Species Act.24  It did this not because the species was being
hunted, or because humans were occupying more of its habitat, but be-
cause of "the [potential] decrease of sea ice coverage., 25 The proposed
rule explained that:
Although some [polar bear] females use snow dens on land for birth-
ing cubs, polar bears are almost completely dependent upon sea ice
for their sustenance. Any significant changes in the abundance, dis-
tribution, or existence of sea ice will have effects on the number and
behavior of these animals and their prey.
26
Although well buried in the proposed rule, FWS admits:
20. See David G. Hawkins, Daniel A. Lashof & Robert H. Williams, What to Do About Coal,
SC. AM., Sept. 2006, at 68-75 (discussing geologic carbon sequestration during coal processing).
21. See generally GERMAN ADVISORY ON GLOBAL CHANGE (WBGU), THE FUTURE
OCEANS-WARMING UP, RISING HIGH, TURNING SOUR, SPECIAL REPORT (2006), available at
http://www.wbgu.de/wbgusn2006 en.pdf; THE ROYAL SOCIETY OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, OCEAN
ACIDIFICATION DUE TO INCREASED ATMOSPHERIC CARBON DIOXIDE, Policy Doc. 12/05 (June
2005), available at http://www.royalsoc.ac.uk/displaypagedoc.asp?id= 13539.
22. See Gerald Stanhill & Shebtai Cohen, Global Dimming: A Review of the Evidence for a
Widespread and Significant Reduction in Global Radiation with Discussion of Its Probable Causes
and Possible Agricultural Consequences, AGRIC. & FOREST METEOROLOGY, Apr. 2001, at 255
(discussing the possible causes, effects, and need for future research regarding the reduced levels of
solar radiation that are reaching the surface of the earth).
23. Penn-Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
24. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service-Alaska, Proposal to List the Polar Bear as Threatened
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Climate trends are not occurring evenly or in a linear fashion
throughout the world; Arctic regions are being disproportionately af-
fected by higher levels of warming. . . . Observations of Arctic
changes, including diminishing sea ice, shrinking glaciers, thawing
permafrost, and Arctic greening, validate earlier findings....
[P]revious projections regarding the rate and extent of climate change
underestimated the temperature trend, reductions to annual sea ice
during the summer and winter periods, reductions to multi-year pack
ice, and reductions in thickness ... indicated that the Arctic is mov-
ing toward a new "super interglacial" state that falls outside of natu-
ral glacial-interglacial periods that have characterized the past
800,000 years.... There is no paleoclimatic evidence for a season-
ally ice-free Arctic during the past 800,000 years.
27
As FWS makes clear, the costs of the climate crisis will not be
evenly distributed. Scientists all over the world have documented the
potential damage to ecosystems, not just in the Arctic but also in warmer
climes. In April 2007, the United Nations' Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change predicted "widening droughts in southern Europe and
the Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa, the American Southwest and Mex-
ico, and flooding that could imperil low-lying islands and the crowded
river deltas of southern Asia.,
28
The damage will affect more than ecosystems. In their letter in Na-
ture in 2005, prominent Indian scientists Sujatha Byravan and Sudhir
Chella Rajan identified one of the "ironies" of climate change 29 as the
probability that "although wealthy countries are responsible for most of
the accumulated greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, they will ... face
less damage than poor countries., 3 ° Many of the areas of the globe that
are projected to be most affected by the climate crisis are also home to
the poorest human populations.
No lawyer who represents underprivileged human communities-in
the Arctic, in the tropics or elsewhere--can imagine for a moment that
his or her clients will be spared the brunt in the social reshuffling that
"adaptation" to the climate crisis will require. Arguably, the climate
crisis is already having an effect on the immigration debate in Europe
and the United States, and the politics are not encouraging. Nicholas
Stem's The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review estimates
that by the middle of the twenty-first century, 150 to 200 million people
27. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, 72 Fed. Reg. 1064, 1071 (Jan. 9, 2007)
(to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17), available at http://alaska.fws.gov/fisheries/mmm/polarbear/
pdf/Polarbear_proposed rule.pdf.
28. James Kanter & Andrew C. Revkin, Scientists Detail Climate Changes, Poles to Tropics,
N. Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2007, at Al.
29. Sujatha Byravan & Sudhir Chella Rajan, Immigration Could Ease Climate-Change Im-
pact, NATURE, Mar. 24, 2005, at 435.
30. Id.
2008]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
may have become permanently displaced by climate change. 3 The pros-
pect of the legal institutions we may create to control the 200 million
refugees projected to result from unchecked climate instability chills the
blood.
At the same time, the climate crisis will do what the Fifth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution forbids: It will "take" property,
both by physical invasion (e.g., floods and mudslides) and by depriving
owners of all reasonable use of their property. It will also take property
without compensation. The Stern Review estimates that a continuation of
"business as usual" will result in an average reduction in global per cap-
ita consumption of a minimum of 5.5 percent by 2200.32 According to
The Stern Review, adding the reduction of measurable per capita con-
sumption to the estimated costs of direct impacts on human health and
the environment ("non-market" impacts) increases that cost to 13.8 per-
cent of per capita consumption. 33 Adding these estimates to the pro-
jected costs of amplifying feedback loops and the disproportionate share
of the burden falling on developing countries less well positioned to
adapt leads The Stern Review to estimate a 24.4 percent reduction in cur-
rent per capita consumption, 34 "now and forever." Whether a five per-
cent or a 24 percent reduction, the projected multi-trillion dollar reduc-
tions in global consumption estimated in The Stern Review signify some-
thing like the collapse of civilization. A lot of things just will not be
worth what they used to be. A lot of property will not be worth anything
at all.
Addressing the problem immediately and effectively does not make
issues of cost and responsibility evaporate. If the Stern economists are
right, addressing the problem (and thereby protecting, to the degree pos-
sible, those rights we hold dear) will also be expensive. The Stern Re-
view indicates that aggressively addressing climate change will be cost
effective-averting between a five percent and 24 percent loss in global
consumption-at the cost of only about one percent world Gross Domes-
tic Product (GDP) annually.35 A good bargain, surely. Still, one percent
of the roughly 48 trillion dollar current annual global GDP36 is a little
under 500 billion dollars a year. That is roughly what the war in Iraq has
cost the United States so far.37 Who should pay that cost?
31. STERN, supra note 17, at 77.
32. Id. at 144.
33. Id. at 155-56.
34. Id. at 144.
35. Id. at 249.
36. WORLD BANK, TOTAL GDP 2006 4 (2007), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GDP.pdf.
37. NATIONAL PRIORITIES PROJECT, THE WAR IN IRAQ COSTS, http://www.nationalpriorities.
org/costofwar home (last visited Mar. 26, 2008).
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The costs of the climate crisis-be they the costs of climate instabil-
ity or the costs of averting climate instability and most probably both-
will initially be borne by a variety of people who, through no fault of
their own, find their islands underwater, 38 their farms too parched to
yield a crop, 39 their city neighborhoods repeatedly battered by hurri-
canes, 40 their prime Florida condominium development sites turned into
wetlands,4' or their planned coal fired power plants delayed or stopped.42
Should these victims of the human-caused climate crisis be forced to
bear these catastrophes without compensation? If they are entitled to
compensation, from whom should they seek it?
As Professor Farber puts it:
In a country whose political process is only now awakening to the re-
ality of the climate change issue, it may seem almost utopian to
worry about compensation. Current litigation is likely to attract more
attention to the issue, as will some current endorsements of the idea
in international law. If the issue is not in the forefront today, it seems
safe to predict that it will be soon.43
So the climate crisis is, after all, a constellation of very familiar
kinds of legal problems. It is about avoiding harms, protecting rights and
expectations, marshaling resources to fix a problem, and compensating
those injured by the conduct of others. It is about justice. Lawyers,
breathe a sigh of relief. We are back on solid ground.
38. Tuiloma Neroni Slade, The Making of International Law: The Role of Small Island
States, 17 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L. J. 531, 531, 540 (2003) (discussing the vulnerability of small
island nations to climate change, citing rising sea levels as the "most critical threat" from climate
change and referencing Maldives President Gayoom's 1987 statement to the U.N. General Assembly
that unless the international community takes steps to mitigate climate change, it would prove to be
'the death of [Maldives].'").
39. Richard A. Kerr, Warming Indian Ocean Wringing Moisture from the Sahel, SCIENCE,
Oct. 10, 2003, at 210 (suggesting that severe drought in the Sahel may be the result of climate
change increasing the temperature of the Indian Ocean).
40. P.J. Webster, G.J. Holland, J.A. Curry & H.R. Chang, Changes in Tropical Cyclone
Number, Duration, and Intensity in a Warming Environment, SCIENCE, Sept. 16, 2005, at 1844
(noting a possible correlation between global climate change and increased hurricane characteristics
in the North Atlantic region); Kevin Trenberth, Uncertainty in Hurricanes and Global Warming,
SCIENCE, June 17, 2005, at 1753 (discussing factors contributing to an increase in hurricanes in the
North Atlantic during the last decade).
41. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, WORKING GROUP II FOURTH
ASSESSMENT REPORT 100 (2007), http://www.mnp.nl/ipcc/pages-media/FAR4docs/
finalpdfsar4/Chapter0 I.pdf (projecting a rise in sea level due to climate change); Lester R. Brown,
Rising Sea Level Forcing Evacuation of Island Country, EARTH POL'Y INST., Nov. 15, 2001,
http://www.earth-policy.org/Updates/Update2_printable.htm (noting that the projected rise in sea
level threatens Florida beachfront properties to the extent that such properties "are becoming unin-
surable.").
42. John Hanna, John Milburn & Carl Manning, Kansas Regulator Rejects New Power
Plants, CBS NEWS/ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 19, 2007, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/
2007/10/19/tech/main3387356.shtml?source=search story (discussing Kansas' "Secretary of Health
and Environment" Ron Benby's decision to reject air permits for two new coal-fired power plants
because of the plants' greenhouse gas emissions).
43. Daniel A. Farber, Responses to Global Warming: The Law, Economics, and Science of
Climate Change, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1605, 1608 (2007).
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III. RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CLIMATE CRISIS (IN THEORY)
From a traditional lawyer's point of view, one of the keys to an-
swering the now familiarly formulated questions regarding our response
to the climate crisis turns on the meaning of a single word-
responsibility. Responsibility is a word at the heart of our legal tradition.
The climate crisis is not just bad weather-it is a human-caused
thing44 like a car accident, a polluted lake, or a bankrupt company.
When we deal with human-caused crises-be it the Exxon Valdez oil
spill or the Enron collapse--our first questions address: (1) who is going
to pay the necessary response costs; (2) who has been injured; and (3)
how and if we can redress those injuries. Sometimes, we agree that those
costs should be borne by the injured themselves, and sometimes we de-
termine that the injuries be redressed by society at large, but more often
than not we identify responsible parties and get them to pay. Taken from
another point of view, the question is: Who should we designate as re-
sponsible in order to avoid similar future harms and reset the "moral bal-
ance" through "corrective justice"? Generally, we make people we des-
ignate responsible pay damages. Even when we do not make them pay,
or do not make them pay the full cost of compensation, we let them
know their conduct is unacceptable, in order to discourage them and oth-
ers like them from doing it in the future.
Responsibility does not necessarily mean fault. It just means re-
sponsibility. To illuminate slightly, let us consider four relevant types of
responsibility. We can even diagram them in two sets-responsibility
for past action and responsibility for future action as opposed to respon-
sibility to pay and responsibility to do (or not do).
44. See PANEL, supra note 17; OFFICE, supra note 17; GABRIELE C. HEGERL ET AL.,
UNDERSTANDING AND ATTRIBUTING CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL
SCIENCE BASIS 663, 665-66 (David J. Karoly et al. eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2007), available at
http://ipcc-wgl.ucar.edu/wgl/Report/AR4WGlPrint Ch09.pdf (providing a scientific examination
of the likelihood that humans have induced climate change).
Action for the Past-) Responsibility to Act (or Re-
Responsibility to frain from Acting) to Remedy Existing Problems
Act
Action for the Future-) Responsibility to Act (or




Payment for the Past-) Responsibility to Pay to
Responsibility to Remedy Existing Problems.
Pay
Payment for the Future-) Responsibility to Pay to
Prevent/Mitigate Future Problems
So, for example, in the "Action for the Past" box, we might place
the Endangered Species Act take prohibition, which prevents anyone
from engaging in an action that will injure members of a particular spe-
cies of "fish or wildlife," not because each animal is inherently valuable
but because past conduct has pushed that species to the brink of extinc-
tion.a5 Someday, according to the Fourth Circuit in Gibbs v. Babbitt, we
may again be able to hunt red wolves, but we cannot hunt them now be-
cause there is only a handful left.46 We are all, in theory, responsible to
refrain from such conduct, but the burden falls disproportionately on
farmers and ranchers who might want to kill red wolves to protect live-
stock. They are responsible in a way the rest of us are not.
In the "Action for the Future" box we can place classic off-street
parking requirements.4 7 Under the zoning codes of most American cit-
ies, if you undertake a land use, you are obligated to provide sufficient
off-street parking to support it. Many of us who have strayed into the
world of parking regulation have been amazed by the simplicity of off-
street parking mandates. In many cities, they are little more than a blunt
statement that the user of a piece of land is responsible for providing the
off-street parking his or her activity requires. 48 Still, these generic state-
ments of responsibility have resulted in the investment of tens of billions
of dollars in parking lots and structures.49
In the "Payment for the Past" box, we can place CERCLA-type ret-
roactive owner and operator responsibility-the obligation to pay money
to clean up releases of hazardous substances that have already taken
place. Absent a very narrow range of defenses, the Comprehensive En-
vironmental Compensation, Response and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA)50 renders all "owners and operators",51 of lands contaminated
45. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1538(a) (West 2008).
46. See Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 498 (4th Cir. 2000).
47. See generally DONALD C. SHOUP, THE HIGH COST OF FREE PARKING (APA Planners
Press 2004).
48. See, e.g., DENVER, COLO., DENVER ZONING CODE art. VI, § 59-582 (2008).
49. Keith Bawolek, What Drives Parking Investments, COM. INV. REAL EST., April 2004,
available at http://www.ciremagazine.com/article.php?article id=66 (noting that the parking indus-
try gets over 20 billion dollars in parking revenues each year).
50. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(b) (West 2002) (providing statutory defenses that preclude CERCLA
liability).
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with "hazardous substances" responsible for the costs of clean up.52 Fa-
mously, CERCLA liability is not based on knowledge of wrongdoing or
the illegality of any act at the time it was committed. Liability is limited
to "response costs.
53
In the "Payment for the Future" box we can place local "develop-
ment impact fees"-the obligation to pay money to mitigate conditions
that will result from a development as yet un-built.54 When developers
pay development fees in order to receive approval for a development
from a local land use authority, what they pay is supposed to approxi-
mate the burden their development will impose on the jurisdiction grant-
ing approval and receiving the fee.
These categories are imperfect, but I think you will find them handy
because, if you keep them in mind, you will discover that many current
proposed responses to the climate crisis avoid holding anyone responsi-
ble for the problem in any of these four ways.
According to the synthesis report of the International Panel on Cli-
mate Change (IPCC) in 2007, there are now measurable changes in the
world climate. The damage caused by the climate crisis is both in the
past and in the future. In the scientific/bureaucratic jargon of the IPCC:
"Of the 29,000 observational data series, from 75 studies that show sig-
nificant change in many biological systems, more than 89 percent are
consistent with the direction of change expected as a response to warm-
ing.",55 These changes can be traced to emissions of greenhouse gases
(most significantly carbon dioxide) dating back to the beginning of the
industrial revolution.
5 6
The climate crisis has deep roots. However, greenhouse gas emis-
sions are not like slavery and child labor (in the developed world): We
cannot simply blame them on the dead. Annual emissions of greenhouse
gases increased 70 percent between 1970 and 2004. 57 There are enti-
ties-major greenhouse gas emitters-around right now that we can hold
51. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(20)(A) (West 2002) (defining "'owner or operator' for the purposes
of CERCLA).
52. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607 (West 2008).
53. Kenneth P. Dobson, Methods and Motives for Imposing Strict Liability on Parties Hiring
Independent Contractors to Transport Hazardous Materials in the State of Florida, 24 VT. L. REV.
1297, 1301 (2000) (explaining that "CERCLA's strict liability covers only 'response costs,"' holding
former and current facility owners or operators liable for releasing hazardous substances into the
environment); Kurt M. Brauer, Acushnet Company v. Coaters, Inc.: Defining the Role of Causation
for CERCLA Response Cost Liability, 44 WAYNE L. REV. 1465, 1466 (1998) (explaining that
CERCLA is a "strict liability" statute that allows parties to recover response costs for "releases, or
threatened releases, of hazardous substances").
54. See DEVELOPMENT IMPACT FEES IN THE ROCKY MOUNTAIN REGION (J. Bart Johnson &
James van Hemert eds., The Rocky Mountain Land Use inst. 2006).
55. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007:





responsible for a significant portion of the current stock of greenhouse
gases. Using our "Payment for the Past" CERCLA responsibility model,
we could make them pay to mitigate past emissions. Using our "Action
for the Past" Endangered Species Act responsibility model we can make
them modify their conduct to avoid making existing problems worse.
The greenhouse gas emissions problem is projected to get much
worse. The IPCC Special Report on Emission Scenarios (2000) projects
an increase of greenhouse gas emissions of between 25 and 90 percent
between 2000 and 2030. 58 There are entities around today that we can
hold responsible for those projected emissions. Using our "Payment for
the Future" development fees responsibility model, we can make them
pay money to mitigate the impact of their future emissions. Using our
"Action for the Future" off-street parking responsibility model we can
make them do things to reduce and offset their future emissions.
But should anyone be held responsible for the climate crisis? After
all, are we not all responsible? In the past few hours I have vented both
carbon dioxide and methane. Have my emissions been offset by my of-
fice plants? While we all may be nominally responsible, some actors in
society are far more responsible than others. Imposing legal responsibil-
ity on them is far, far easier, morally and politically.
Even if justice does not interest us, the designation of responsible
parties is still necessary to fashion effective remedial mechanisms. A
simple hypothetical should illustrate this point.
In 2004, the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
released a national greenhouse gas inventory. Carbon dioxide consti-
tuted 84.6 percent of greenhouse gases emitted in the United States.
59
The inventory lumps the vast majority of United States carbon dioxide
emissions (almost 95 percent) in one category, fossil fuel combustion.
60
The inventory then divides fossil fuel combustion by sector. Transporta-
tion and electrical generation are by far the two largest sectors, with in-
dustry coming in a distant third.61 The bulk of greenhouse gas emissions
in a developed country like the United States come from energy genera-
tion and transportation. While these sectors play a smaller role in the
global inventory,62 they are still significant.
Now imagine it were otherwise. Imagine that the primary source of
greenhouse gases in the United States was meat eating. In fact, meat
58. Id. at 7.
59. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, CLIMATE ACTION REPORT 2006 21 (2007).
60. Id. at 22.
61. Id at 25.
62. For 2004, the IPCC divides the sources of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions glob-
ally into sections: Energy Supply (25.9 percent), Industry (19.4 percent), Forestry (including defor-
estation) (17.4 percent), Agriculture (13.5 percent), Transport (13.1 percent), Residential and Com-
mercial Buildings (7.9 percent), and Waste (2.8 percent). IPCC, supra note 55.
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eating is a source when you consider the indirect costs of raising, slaugh-
tering, and transporting cattle, and transporting and refrigerating meat.
In 2007, Britain's prestigious medical journal The Lancet reported that a
reduction in global meat consumption would slow climate change.63
This hypothetical is not far fetched. Still, it is a hypothetical.
If the primary cause of climate change were carnivory, would we
approach the problem in the same way? Would a "cap and trade" system
seem as appealing? Might a tax seem more attractive? How about an
outright ban? I cannot tell you what your response to carnivory-caused
climate change would be, but I am confident that it would be different
than your response to climate change caused by vehicles and electric
utilities.
What causes climate change, who is doing it, and what they can do
about it must be near the foundation of any effective system to identify
mechanisms to spread that cost equitably among those responsible par-
ties, and identify measures to reduce those costs to the degree possible.
Who should be held responsible for greenhouse gas emissions from
transportation and energy generation? Following the tenets of our envi-
ronmental law tradition, the answer is energy generators and vehicle
manufacturers. In 1970, in the Clean Air Act, we, as a nation, decided
that air pollution was not everyone's responsibility, but rather the re-
sponsibility of major emitters of relevant air pollutants; they would be
subjected to the now dreaded "command and control" requirements of
that pioneering effort of environmental legislation. At the same time and
in the same law, we decided that the manufacturers of motor vehicles
should be held responsible for the emissions from the vehicles they
manufactured and subjected to "command and control" standards. 64 Tra-
ditional air pollution is a "flow problem":65 unlike greenhouse gases,
traditional air pollutants do not accumulate over long periods of time so
it does not matter what you emitted last week-just what you emit to-
day.66 As a result, the Clean Air Act subjected these two classes of par-
ties to a form of responsibility akin to the "Action for the Future" off-
street parking requirement-box two in our handy chart. They were not
required to pay anything, directly. They were required to modify their
63. Maria Cheng, Eating Less Meat May Slow Climate Change, ENVTL. NEWS NETWORK,
Sept. 13, 2007, http://www.enn.com/pollution/article/2301 1.
64. RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 70-71 (Univ. of Chicago
Press 2004) (discussing the implications of the Clean Air Act for the automotive industry).
65. SCHLUMBERGER EXCELLENCE IN EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, GLOBAL CLIMATE
CHANGE AND ENERGY: STOCK AND FLOW,
http://www.seed.slb.com/en/scictr/watch/climate change/stock.htm (last visited March 26, 2008).
66. ARNOLD W. REITZE JR., AIR POLLUTION CONTROL LAW: COMPLIANCE & ENFORCEMENT
411 (Envtl. Law Inst. 2001) (noting that greenhouse gases are unlike many other pollutants because
efficient combustion does not prevent greenhouse gas formation); see also id. at 12-39 (providing a
legal history of the Clean Air Act).
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manufacturing processes to reduce emissions both from the processes
themselves and from the products they manufactured.
These choices turned out to be wise. Air pollution regulation in the
United States has been effective. According to EPA's 2003 "Draft Re-
port on the Environment," between 1970 and 2001, while the United
States Gross Domestic Product increased 161 percent, emissions of the
six regulated "criteria" air pollutants (lead, particulates, nitrous oxides,
sulfur dioxide, ozone, and carbon monoxide) decreased 25 percent.
67
The choices have also been cost effective. Section 812 of the Clean
Air Act Amendments of 1990 requires EPA to periodically assess the
effect of the Clean Air Act on the "public health, economy and environ-
ment of the United States. 68 In 1997, EPA generated its first such re-
port: The Benefits and Costs of the Clean Air Act, 1970 to 1990. The
Report found the total monetized benefits of the Clean Air Act during
that 20 year period to be between 5.6 and 49.4 trillion dollars with a cen-
tral estimate of 22.2 trillion dollars.69 The report found the total direct
compliance expenditures (imposed on responsible parties) to be 0.5 tril-
lion dollars. 70 In 1999, EPA prepared a second report entitled The Bene-
fits and Costs of the Clean Air Act, 1990 to 2010. This new report esti-
mated a cost-benefit ratio of one to four.7'
Rendering this limited group of entities responsible has encouraged
innovation, limited economic dislocation, and offended few people's
moral sensibilities. It has not, however, made those designated responsi-
ble parties happy.
IV. AVOIDING DESIGNATING RESPONSIBLE PARTIES FOR THE CLIMATE
CRISIS (IN PRACTICE)
When it comes to legislating about the climate crisis, our federal
elected officials (overwhelmingly lawyers) appear to leave their tradi-
tional legal thinking at home and act more like the bit part players in a
disaster movie.
According to Professor Victor Flatt, as of October 17, 2007, there
were at least ten legislative proposals in Congress to address climate
67. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, DRAFT REPORT ON THE ENVIRONMENT 2003, at ii, 1-3 (2003),
available at http://www.epa.gov/indicate/roe/html/roePDF.htm.
68. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2691 (1990) (codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. § 7612 (2006)).
69. ENvTL. PROT. AGENCY, THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT, 1970 TO
1990, at ES-8 (1997), available at http://www.epa.gov/air/sect812/1970-1990/812exec2.pdf.
70. Id.
71. ENvTL. PROT. AGENCY, THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT, 1990 TO
2010, at iii (1999), available at http://www.epa.gov/air/sect812/1990-2010/chapl 130.pdf.
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change-all proposed "cap and trade" approaches.72 I will mention only
a few representative examples.
The most prominent piece of proposed climate change legislation
currently before Congress is Senator Joseph Lieberman and Senator John
Warner's "America's Climate Security Act of 2007" (S. 2191)-
approved by the Senate Environmental and Public Works Committee on
December 5, 2007. The bill, characterized on Senator Lieberman's web-
site as creating "an economy-wide cap and trade program that provides
maximum flexibility for the marketplace to meet a level of emission re-
ductions that is environmentally credible," 73 goes to some lengths to
avoid designating anyone responsible for greenhouse gas emissions.
While the bill's Section 2 "findings" declare that "prompt, decisive
action is critical" and that "it is possible and desirable to cap greenhouse
gas emissions," it never actually states that greenhouse gas emissions are
the cause of climate change.74 The closest the bill comes to acknowledg-
ing this causal connection is in its Section 3 "Purposes," in which it de-
clares that the purpose of the Act is to "establish the core of a Federal
program that will reduce United States greenhouse gas emissions sub-
stantially enough between 2007 and 2050 to avert the catastrophic im-
pacts of global climate change. 75
The bulk of the 214 page bill describes a mind-numbingly complex
allowance trading system whereby greenhouse gas emitters trade "emis-
sion allowances" under slowly lowering emission allowance caps. In a
"cap and trade" system, the primary opportunity for identifying any
group of emitters as actually responsible for the projected climate catas-
trophe is in the allocation of emission allowances. If emitters were re-
quired to pay-prospectively and proportionally-for the right to push us
all closer to the brink of catastrophic climate instability, then we would,
at least, have a form of responsibility akin to "Payment for the Future" or
development impact fees.
A responsibility analysis would suggest that the cost of emission al-
lowances is dictated by the cost of eliminating or adapting to the conse-
quences of those emissions. In fact, the Lieberman-Warner bill offers no
link between the costs of emission allowances and the cost of responding
to the consequences of those emissions. This absence of connection be-
tween the regulatory burden and the prospective costs of climate change
is the primary missing link in the responsibility designation.
72. Victor B. Flatt, Taking the Legislative Temperature: Which Federal Climate Change
Legislative Proposal Is "Best"?, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 123, 123, 135 (2007), available at
http://colloquy.law.northwestem.edu/main/2007/12/taking-the-legi.htmi.
73. Website of Senator Joe Lieberman of Conn., Climate Change,
http://lieberman.senate.gov/issues/globalwarming.cfm (last visited March 26, 2008).
74. America's Climate Security Act of 2007, S. 2191, 110th Cong. § 2(2), (4) (2007).
75. Id. § 3(1).
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The primary identification of who is affected by the legislation ap-
pears in the bill's definition of "covered facility," which includes large
fossil fuel fired electric generating units, large industrial carbon dioxide
emitters, major producers and importers of coal or petroleum-based
transportation fuel, and producers and importers of chemicals that emit
large quantities of greenhouse gases.76 This seems a promising list. It
includes most of the major sources of greenhouse gases in the United
States.
Section 1202 of the bill bears the promising title: "Compliance Ob-
ligation., 77 The section requires the owner or operator of a "covered
facility" to submit to EPA emission allowances, or a variety of other
rough equivalents, to cover greenhouse gas emissions for the previous
78year. But how do "covered facilities" get these emission allowances?
The bill grants 12 percent of "emission allowances" free of charge to
covered facilities on the basis of past emissions (rewarding past bad con-
duct) and allocates the rest (by shifting formula) to states, Indian tribes,
and a newly created Climate Change Credit Corporation to auction off.
79
Referring back to our handy chart, the Lieberman-Warner cap and
trade system does not require potentially responsible parties (admirably
identified in the definition of "covered facilities") to do anything to rem-
edy past or prevent/mitigate future problems. They can continue to emit
greenhouse gases. Eventually, the bill would require that they pay some-
thing for the right to emit. But the connection between that payment and
any remedy for an existing problem or solution to a future problem is
tenuous. While not a complete subsidy for emitters, the structure-
through its complexity if nothing else-avoids making a significant des-
ignation of responsibility.
Representative Henry Waxman's bill, H.R. 1590, the "Safe Climate
Act of 2007," introduced on March 20, 2007, is more forthright and one
tenth as long. Waxman's findings state that "decisive action is needed to
minimize the many dangers posed by global warming" and that "with
only 5 percent of the world population, the United States emits approxi-
mately 20 percent of the world's total greenhouse gas emissions and
must be a leader in addressing global warming., 80 Waxman's bill spe-
cifically requires that emission "allowances" be issued through auctions
in most cases.81 Still, Waxman's bill is largely bereft of language indi-
cating responsibility for climate change or the causal link between cli-
76. Id. § 4(7).
77. Id. § 1202.
78. Id. § 1202(a).
79. Id. § 3301; see Website of Senator Joe Lieberman of Conn., S. 2191 Emission Allowance
Allocation Table, http://lieberman.senate.gov/documents/acsaemission.pdf (last visited March 26,
2008).
80. Safe Climate Act of 2007, H.R. 1590, 110th Cong. § 2(a)(7) (2007).
81. Id. § 704(a), (d)(1)(A).
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mate change and greenhouse gas emissions. Again, there is no explicit
relationship between the costs of emission allowances and the projected
costs of responding to the consequences of those emissions.
Another approach to responsibility appears in Senator Diane Fein-
stein's "Electric Utility Cap and Trade Act of 2007" (S. 317). Senator
Feinstein's bill deals explicitly with the electric utility industry, defining
an "affected unit" as "an electric generating facility. 82 The bill regulates
emissions from that group of potentially responsible parties alone. Am-
biguity arises from the fact that it is not clear what others groups of re-
sponsible parties would be subject to similar treatment. As Professor
Victor Flatt puts it:
The difficulty with cap-and-trade enforcement may be why two of
the proposals (Feinstein-Carper and Alexander-Lieberman) only ap-
ply to the electricity sector. It has already been demonstrated that
this sector can be efficiently regulated in a cap-and-trade system.
However, limiting the law to this one sector means that overall emis-
sions reductions cannot be as large. Moreover, it raises fairness con-
cers .... [These proposals] could be seen as compromise proposals
that anticipate further legislation in other sectors .... 83
The process in the international sphere is also remarkably free of
meaningful responsible party designations. While the responsibility of
developed world nations for the projected climate crisis affects every
aspect of the negotiations, the negotiated documents do not address re-
sponsibility directly.
The 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change designates 36
Annex I nations deemed "developed" and subject to more obligations in
responding to climate change. 84 The nature of those obligations, how-
ever, is diffuse and the basis for the obligations is largely unstated. To
the degree that the document deals with the basis of the developed
world's obligation, it implies something more akin to noblesse oblige
than responsibility:
Each of these [Annex I] Parties shall adopt national ... policies and
take corresponding measures on the mitigation of climate change, by
limiting its anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases and protect-
ing and enhancing its greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs. These
policies and measures will demonstrate that developed countries are
taking the lead in modifying longer-term trends in anthropogenic
emissions consistent with the objective of the Convention, recogniz-
ing that the return by the end of the present decade to earlier levels of
anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse
82. Elec. Util. Cap and Trade Act of 2007, S. 317, 110th Cong. § 701(l) (2007).
83. Flatt, supra note 72, at 137-38 (2007) (footnotes omitted).
84. UNITED NATIONS, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE 6-
7,23 (1992), available at http://unfccc.int/not assigned/b/items/1417.php.
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gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol would contribute to
such modification, and taking into account the differences in these
Parties' starting points and approaches, economic structures and re-
source bases, the need to maintain strong and sustainable economic
growth, available technologies and other individual circumstances, as
well as the need for equitable and appropriate contributions by each
of these Parties to the global effort regarding that objective.
85
The much discussed 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change is also based on an implicit,
but unstated, notion of responsibility. Forty-one Annex I nations, devel-
oped countries in Europe and North America with the exception of Aus-
tralia, Japan, New Zealand, bind themselves to meet specific greenhouse
gas emissions targets.86 The other nations of the world have no specific
emission limitation obligations. The imposition of specific obligations
on only 41 countries has been justified in terms of their historic responsi-
bility for the currently high levels of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere,
and also on the fact they contain the lion's share of the world's techno-
logical economy and therefore emit the lion's share of the world's green-
house gases. China and India's exclusion from the Annex I nations, in
the absence of any statement about responsibility-prospective or retro-
spective-has provided the United States with an excuse to avoid ratify-
ing the Kyoto Protocol.87
The documents adopted as part of the "Bali Roadmap" and "Action
Plan" after the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Bali in
December 2007, seem, if possible, a retreat from the idea of designating
responsible parties.
Perhaps the strongest statement of "differentiated responsibilities"
appears in United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change:
The First Ten Years:
The Convention laid down the foundation for these policies by both
developing and developed countries, recognizing their common but
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. Although
the most immediate responsibility for cutting greenhouse gas emis-
sions lies with the richer and more industrialized countries, the de-
veloping countries too need to establish climate-friendly patterns of
85. Id. at 6.
86. See UNITED NATIONS, KYOTO PROTOCOL To THE UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE 3, 20 (1998), available at
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf.
87. David Sanger, Bush Will Continue to Oppose Kyoto Pact on Global Warming, N.Y.
TIMES, June 12, 2001, at Al ("Mr. Bush remained firm in rejecting the 1997 Kyoto accord, noting
that it set no standards for major emitters of greenhouse gases, like China and India, while creating
mandates for the United States that could prove economically crippling.").
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sustainable development for which they should also be able to rely on
bilateral and multilateral assistance.
88
V. THE STATES (IN LITIGATION) IDENTIFY RESPONSIBLE PARTIES
The title of this article alludes to the interrelationship between juris-
dictions in responding to climate change. You may wonder, so far, what
this analysis has to do with the relationship among jurisdictions. The
answer, of course, is that while federal legislative solutions and interna-
tional processes have shied away from designating responsible parties for
climate change, litigation pursued by states has endeavored to designate
responsible parties and, to date, has failed.
In July 2004, the States of Connecticut, New York, California,
Iowa, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin, and the City
of New York, filed suit against American Electric Power Company,
American Electric Power Service Corporation, the Southern Company,
the Tennessee Valley Authority, XCEL Energy and CINERGY alleging
claims of public nuisance under both federal and state law.89 The com-
plaint did not hesitate to designate responsible parties and set forth the
bases of their responsibility. The complaint alleged damages already
suffered and to be suffered in the foreseeable future:
Global warming already has begun to alter the climate of the United
States. The threatened injuries to the plaintiffs and their citizens and
residents from continued global warming include increased heat
deaths due to intensified and prolonged heat waves; increased
ground-level smog with concomitant increases in respiratory prob-
lems like asthma; beach erosion, inundation of coastal land, and
salinization of water supplies from accelerated sea level rise; reduc-
tion of the mountain snow pack in California that provides a critical
source of water for the State; lowered Great Lakes water levels,
which impairs commercial shipping, recreational harbors and mari-
nas, and hydropower generation; more droughts and floods, resulting
in property damage and hazard to human safety; and widespread loss
of species and biodiversity, including the disappearance of hardwood
forests from the northern United States.
90
The complaint then alleged who was responsible:
88. UNITED NATIONS, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE:
THE FIRST TEN YEARS 43 (2004), available at
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/publications/first-ten yearsen.pdf.
89. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 267-68 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); see
also Andrew C. Revkin, New York City and 8 States Plan to Sue Power Plants, N.Y. TIMES, June 12,
2004, at AS. A copy of the original complaint filed in the district court, Complaint, Connecticut v.
Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 267-68 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), is available at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2004/jul/jul2Ia 04 attach.pdf.
90. Complaint, Am. Elec., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1-2.
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Defendants, by their annual emissions of approximately 650 million
tons of carbon dioxide, are substantial contributors to elevated levels
of carbon dioxide and global warming. Defendants are the five larg-
est emitters of carbon dioxide in the United States and are among the
largest in the world. Defendants' emissions constitute approximately
one quarter of the U.S. electric power sector's carbon dioxide emis-
sions and approximately ten percent of all carbon dioxide emissions
from human activities in the United States.
91
Finally, the complaint alleged how the responsible parties could
mitigate or eliminate the problem through their actions:
Defendants have available to them practical, feasible and economi-
cally viable options for reducing carbon dioxide emissions without
significantly increasing the cost of electricity to their customers.
These options include changing fuels, improving efficiency, increas-
ing generation from zero- or low-carbon energy sources such as
wind, solar, and gasified coal with emissions capture, co-firing wood
or other biomass in coal plants, employing demandside management
techniques, altering the dispatch order of their plants, and other
measures.
9 2
The complaint deftly sketches out the basis for legal responsibility:
the gravity of the threat, the injuries that can reasonably be expected to
result from it, the significance of the defendants' contribution to the
threat, and the defendants' capacity to mitigate if not eliminate the threat.
Lawyers were at work.
At the end of more than 50 pages of allegations, plaintiffs requested
an order to hold the defendants "jointly and severally liable for creating,
contributing to, and/or maintaining a public nuisance; [p]ermanently
enjoining each defendant to abate its contribution to the nuisance by re-
quiring it to cap its carbon dioxide emissions and then reduce them by a
specified percentage each year for at least a decade" and, of course,
"such other relief as this Court deems just and proper."93 In essence, the
states requested that: (1) defendants be held liable for their past and fu-
ture conduct, roughly the equivalent of "Payment for the Past"
CERCLA-type liability for past emissions and "Payment for the Future"
development fees for future emissions; and (2) that defendants be or-
dered to refrain from some future conduct reasonably anticipated to make
the problem worse, roughly the equivalent of the "Action for the Past"
Endangered Species Act take prohibition. In other words, they de-
manded that the court hold the defendants responsible.
91. Id. at 1.
92. Id. at 2.
93. Id. at 49.
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On September 20, 2006, the State of California filed suit against
General Motors, Toyota Motors North America, Ford Motor Company,
Honda North America, Chrysler Motors, and Nissan North America in
another public nuisance case. 94 Again, the plaintiff clearly alleged the
basis for liability. While setting forth in detail the actual and potential
damage to California's snowpack and coastline, the complaint alleged:
"Defendants, by their annual emissions in the United States of approxi-
mately 289 million metric tons of carbon dioxide are substantial con-
tributors-among the world's largest contributors-to global warming
and to the adverse impacts on California.,
95
The complaint also alleged that "[d]amages caused by global warm-
ing are cognizable, ongoing and increasing. Defendants are aware of the
impacts and have chosen to continue to produce products that generate
enormous quantities of carbon dioxide, to the detriment of California."
96
Again, the elements of the argument for legal responsibility are
clear: the gravity of the threat, the injuries that can reasonably be ex-
pected to result from it, the significance of the defendants' contribution
to the threat, and the defendants' capacity to mitigate, if not eliminate,
the threat.
In a significant departure from the Connecticut model, California
requested only that the court "[h]old each defendant jointly and severally
liable for creating, contributing to and maintaining a public nuisance"
and for "monetary damages according to proof., 97 California's allega-
tions limit responsibility to an obligation to pay, both for past and future
injury.
The strong statements of alleged responsibility embodied in these
two complaints were filed in federal district courts-in the Southern Dis-
trict of New York and Northern District of California. Had the litigation
been allowed to proceed, the courts would have developed a factual re-
cord to support (or contradict) the state's allegations. Both complaints,
however, were dismissed.
In September 2005, the United States District Court for the South-
ern District of New York dismissed the Connecticut complaint on "po-
litical question" grounds in deference to the very modest legislative ac-
tion taken by the federal government to combat climate change at that
time.98 The court emphasized the need to leave the question to the "ac-
94. California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871 (N.D. Cal. Sept.
17, 2007) (order granting defendants' motion to dismiss).




98. See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
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countable" political branches of government. 99 "Because resolution of
the issues presented here requires identification and balancing of eco-
nomic, environmental, foreign policy, and national security interests,"
the court found that "a policy determination" was required. 10 The court
largely ignored the fact that plaintiffs represented the "political
branches" in eight states and the nation's largest city and that-in the
absence of federal action-those political entities had few other mecha-
nisms to discharge their political obligations to their constituents. More
significantly for our purposes, the court dismissed state claims offering a
theory of responsibility in favor of a barely identifiable federal policy
offering none.
The district court ruling in Connecticut v. American Electric Power
is currently on appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit. 0 1 In September 2007, the United States District Court for
the Northern District of California dismissed California's complaint on
similar grounds. The court dismissed on political question grounds,
again deferring to the limited legislation already enacted by Congress.
!0 2
The court went further, indicating that the United States Supreme Court's
grant of standing to state plaintiffs in Massachusetts v. EPA0 3 somehow
required dismissal of state plaintiffs' claims in California v. General
Motors Corp.
104
Quoting the majority opinion in Massachusetts, the court argued
that the fact that "Massachusetts cannot invade Rhode Island to force
reductions in greenhouse gas emissions" somehow deprives Massachu-
setts or California of the right to sue General Motors in federal court.1
0 5
The court argued that the Clean Air Act precluded California's suit:
"Underpinning the Supreme Court's standing analysis is the concept that
the authority to regulate carbon dioxide lies with the federal government,
and more specifically with the EPA as set forth in the [Clean Air
Act].' 0 6  The court avoided traditional preemption analysis to deprive
the State of its common law rights for the simple reason that the Clean
Air Act contains two broad "savings clauses" preserving state common
law jurisdiction 10 7 for all parties including, arguably, the United States,1
08
99. Id. at 267.
100. Id. at 274.
101. See Brief of Amici Curiae, U.S. Senator James M. Inhofe and the Washington Legal
Foundation in Support of Defendants-Appellees and Supporting Affirmance of the District Court,
Connecticut v. American Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (No. 05-5104),
available at http://www.wlf.org/upload/Connecticut%20%20v.%20American%20Electric%20-
Power'/o20Compa ny,%201nc.pdf.
102. General Motors Corp., 2007 WL 2726871, at *8-10, * 16.
103. 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).
104. General Motors Corp., 2007 WL 2726871, at *10-13.
105. ld. at *11.
106. Id.
107. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7416, 7604(e) (West 2008).
108. United States v. Atlantic-Richfield Co., 478 F. Supp. 1215, 1220 (D. Mont. 1979).
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but almost certainly the states. In a remarkably creative justification for
dismissing a common law nuisance claim, the court declared:
Because the States have "surrendered" to the federal government
their right to engage in certain forms of regulations and therefore
may have standing in certain circumstances to challenge those regu-
lations, and because new automobile carbon dioxide emissions are
such a regulation expressly left to the federal government, a resolu-
tion of this case would thrust this Court beyond the bounds of justi-
ciability. 1
09
The district court ruling in California v. General Motors Corp. is
also on appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit. ' 10
Both the Connecticut and California courts rely on the third prong
in the traditional six-part Baker v. Carr"1 political question justiciability
test articulated by the United States Supreme Court in 1962: "the impos-
sibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for nonjudicial discretion.""1 2  As the California court put it:
"This factor largely controls the analysis in the current case due to the
complexity of the initial global warming policy determinations that must
be made by the elected branches prior to the proper adjudication of Plain-
tiff's federal common law nuisance claim." ' 13 As the Connecticut court
put it: "In this case, balancing those interests, together with the other
interests involved, is impossible without an 'initial policy determination'
first having been made by the elected branches to which our system
commits such policy decisions, viz., Congress and the President."
' 14
It is not entirely clear what "balancing of economic, environmental,
foreign policy, and national security interests" the courts would demand
from federal elected officials before they would be comfortable consider-
ing the existence and scope of defendants' responsibility for the damages
associated with climate change. What is clear is that they do not want to
be the first to determine who should be held responsible for the climate
crisis.
CONCLUSION
We could characterize the contrast between the federal legislative
proposals, based on emission trading and avoiding the designation of
responsible parties, and the state complaints in litigation, designating
109. General Motors Corp., 2007 WL 2726871, at *12.
110. See Appellant's Opening Brief, California v. General Motors Corp., 2007 WL 27226871
(9th Cir. 2008) (No. 07-16908), available at http://ag.ca.gov/globalwarming/pdf/ninth-circuit-
brief.pdf.
111. 369 U.S. 186(1962).
112. Id. at 217.
113. General Motors Corp., 2007 WL 2726871, at *6.
114. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
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responsible parties, as either a conflict or a frustrated symbiotic relation-
ship. My natural optimism favors the second possibility. We need not
follow the example of the district court opinions in Connecticut v.
American Electric Power and California v. General Motors Corp. and
emphasize the potential conflicts between the litigation process initiated
in the state public nuisance cases and the legislative process going on in
Congress. Instead, we can emphasize how these two very different legal
processes might support each other. If the states, or other plaintiffs, are
ever able to sustain cases like the Connecticut and California public nui-
sance cases in court, they will develop factual records regarding the re-
sponsibility of the named defendants for the climate crisis. By doing so,
they could help us do the one thing both national legislative and interna-
tional quasi-legislative processes seem incapable of doing: they could
help us identify responsible parties.
If we are fortunate, the next stage in this gestational process toward
a regulatory scheme to deal with the climate crisis will involve both fo-
cusing on classes of responsible parties and identifying workable mecha-
nisms for dividing the costs of response to climate change among them.
For now, we can only hope.
2008]
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INTRODUCTION
There is little doubt that climate change is an urgent problem, re-
quiring urgent attention at all levels of government. Climate change
policies are likely to require pervasive technological, economic, and be-
havioral changes at every level of society, with potentially profound im-
plications. Policymakers will have to determine not only how much to
reduce, but how the reductions are to be achieved and with what conse-
quences for whom. Who will make these critical decisions?
Policymakers and scholars alike are struggling with the federalism
question: whether climate change regulation should flow from a global,
national, state, or local level. In this article, I provide theoretical and
practical justifications for a cooperative federalist approach that strives to
avoid the weaknesses and build on the strengths of each level of govern-
ment. I then provide specific proposals for federal legislation that are
designed to garner the advantages of federal regulation while respecting
the states' autonomy to set more stringent standards and tailor critical
implementation decisions to state-specific conditions.
Part I establishes the fundamental importance of federal legislation.
Collective action and leakage concerns will undoubtedly necessitate
overarching global and national approaches. Moreover, given mis-
matches in the costs and benefits of climate change regulation experi-
enced by individual states, under-regulation by the states is likely. Fed-
eral legislation would also offer greater economies of scale and consis-
tency than state-level approaches.
Notwithstanding the importance of federal legislation, Part II ad-
dresses the states' critical role within a federal structure in light of the
pervasive local impacts of climate change, the significant political, eco-
nomic, and environmental implications of alternative regulatory ap-
proaches, and the local nature of many potential climate change strate-
gies. Moreover, a federal monopoly on regulatory authority could create
institutional inertia and would fail to provide a check on interest group
capture.
After reviewing the theoretical justifications for allowing a state
role, Part II turns to a case study on the environmental justice provisions
in California's climate change legislation that illuminates several key
state interests. California's innovative climate legislation not only estab-
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lishes ambitious greenhouse gas reduction goals, it also requires that
those goals be achieved in ways that protect and enhance air quality in
polluted communities. If national legislation creates federal goals and
implementation structures that explicitly preempt such state initiatives, or
if the courts interpret future federal statutes to implicitly preempt state
laws, then the states will have lost the power to control the impacts of
climate change regulation. More broadly, the nation will have lost the
"laboratories" of innovation that the states could otherwise have pro-
vided.
Part III evaluates existing cooperative federalism models. It notes
that the most significant federal legislation proposed to date, the Warner-
Lieberman bill, provides only a limited role for the states. Other climate
change and domestic environmental law programs provide greater in-
sights on model cooperative federalist structures. In the climate change
context, I consider the relatively decentralized approaches taken by the
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative and the European Union's Emissions
Trading System. On the domestic front, I consider the Clean Air Act,
which gives the federal government the authority to establish minimum
goals but gives states the discretion to adopt stricter environmental goals
and shape implementation to respond to state-specific political and eco-
nomic needs. While these models have not operated with full success,
they suggest options worthy of further consideration.
Part IV provides a preliminary sketch of a cooperative federalist
structure for federal climate change legislation and analyzes the specific
benefits of shared federal and state responsibilities. It argues that the
federal government should set minimum goals and standards, but that, in
most cases, it should not preempt state efforts to set more stringent goals
or standards. It then turns to program implementation, and argues that,
in light of the key environmental, political, and economic implications of
cap-and-trade programs, states should be allowed (but not required) to
administer such programs subject to minimum federal standards. State
autonomy over critical decisions is worth some potential loss in consis-
tency and efficiency.
In addition, I suggest that state implementation planning, similar to
that employed under the Clean Air Act, would facilitate the achievement
of both federal and state goals. Federal emission reductions goals could
be allocated to the states, and state implementation plans could then be
required to show how each state will integrate federal minimum require-
ments and adopt its own initiatives to achieve its required reductions.
Federal goals will not be achievable without state-directed actions, like
land use and transportation controls. Moreover, the states' unique cir-
cumstances and preferences are likely to prompt differing strategies for
reaching climate change goals. State implementation plans could pro-
vide a critical mechanism for demonstrating how federal and state meas-
ures will be combined to achieve the nation's overall objectives.
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I. THE IMPORTANCE OF FEDERAL LEGISLATION
In the absence of U.S. participation in the Kyoto Protocol and the
absence of a comprehensive federal regulatory approach,' the states have
taken the lead in adopting significant climate change initiatives.2 Cali-
fornia's Global Warming Solutions Ace and the northeastern states' Re-
gional Greenhouse Gas Initiative,4 as well as several other less specific
or developed state and regional programs, have been critical.5 However,
initiatives to date are unlikely to reduce emissions sufficiently to address
the threat of climate change.6 Furthermore, given the global nature of
climate change, future state initiatives are unlikely to provide a sufficient
response.
In determining the appropriate jurisdictional level for regulation,
scholars frequently refer to the "matching principle": that the jurisdic-
tional level should match the scale of the environmental problem in ques-
tion.7 Local environmental problems should be resolved at a local level,
problems that cross state lines should be resolved nationally, and, pre-
sumably, problems that cross national boundaries, like climate change,
should be resolved internationally. Matching the jurisdiction to the
problem means that the jurisdiction can fully account for the net costs
and benefits of regulation. Otherwise, perverse results would ensue.
1. See Alice Kaswan, The Domestic Response to Global Climate Change. What Role for
Federal, State, and Litigation Initiatives?, 42 U.S.F.L. REV. 39, 42-45 (2007) (describing weak
federal initiatives).
2. See Randall S. Abate, Kyoto or Not: Here We Come: The Promise and Perils of the
Piecemeal Approach to Climate Change Regulation in the United States, 15 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 369, 372 (2006) (describing a wide range of state programs); JR. DeShazo & Jody Freeman,
Timing and Form of Federal Regulation: The Case of Climate Change, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1499,
1521-30 (2007) (same); Kirsten Engel, State and Local Climate Change Initiatives: What is Moti-
vating State and Local Governments to Address a Global Problem and What Does This Say About
Federalism and Environmental Law?, 38 URB. LAW. 1015, 1016-29 (2006) (same); Robert B.
McKinstry, Jr. & Thomas D. Peterson, The Implications of the New "Old" Federalism in Climate-
Change Legislation: How to Function in a Global Marketplace when States Take the Lead, 20 PAC.
MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 61, 76-84 (2007) (listing state programs).
3. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 38500-99 (West 2007).
4. See REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING (Dec.
20, 2005), available at http://www.rggi.org/docs/mou-final 12_20_05.pdf [hereinafter MEMORAN-
DUM].
5. See Abate, supra note 2, at 372; DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 2, at 1521-30; Engel
supra note 2, at 1016-29 (listing sources that describe state programs). The Pew Center for Global
Climate Change provides up-to-date information on state programs. See Pew Center on Global
Climate Change, What's Being Done . . . in the States, http://www.pewclimate.org/what s
beingdone/in the states/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2008).
6. See Kirsten H. Engel & Scott R. Saleska, Subglobal Regulation of the Global Commons:
The Case of Climate Change, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 183, 220-23 (2005); Jonathon B. Wiener, Think
Globally, Act Globally: The Limits of Local Climate Policies, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1961, 1966-67
(2007).
7. See Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and the Matching Principle:
The Case for Reallocating Federal Authority, 14 YALE. L. & POL'Y REV. 23, 25 (1996); see, e.g.,
Engel & Saleska, supra note 6, at 191-92 (describing "matching principle").
8. See Wiener, supra note 6, at 1964.
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For example, in the context of global climate change, states may be
unwilling to regulate sufficiently because the costs of regulation-all
internal-could exceed the benefits-benefits necessarily shared with the
rest of the globe. 9 Leaving action solely to the states also creates the risk
of free riders, who hope to benefit from other states' regulation but are
unwilling to assume the costs themselves.' 0 States acting alone consis-
tently fear "leakage": that state regulation to control greenhouse gas
emissions will drive economic activity to unregulated states, merely relo-
cating rather than reducing emissions." If the emissions simply shift
location, then the regulating state would not have achieved its reduction
goal and could, in the meantime, have suffered adverse economic conse-
quences from its regulation. Leakage concerns are thus likely to chill
state action. A related concern is the race to the bottom, in which states
forego or weaken desired environmental regulation because they fear it
could drive away business.12
In addition, in the climate change context, different states perceive
different internal cost/benefit alignments. Some states might perceive
significant benefits from controlling greenhouse gases and not experi-
ence significant costs from its regulation.' 3  California, for example, is
9. See DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 2, at 1518; Barry G. Rabe, Mikael Roman & Arthur
N. Dobelis, State Competition as a Source Driving Climate Change Mitigation, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL.
L.J. 1, 7 (2005); Wiener, supra note 6, at 1965. Similarly, Professor Engel notes that, where pollu-
tion crosses state boundaries, states will pollute too much because they can externalize the environ-
mental costs while retaining economic benefits. See Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of
Dynamic Federalism in Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159, 164 (2006).
10. See Kaswan, supra note 1, at 72; Wiener, supra note 6, at 1965.
11. See DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 2, at 1532 (describing leakage risk in the context of
state renewable energy requirements); Wiener, supra note 6, at 1967-73. Professor Wiener notes
that leakage could take several forms. Under the "price effect," regulation could lead to higher
prices, prices which would shift consumer demand to products made in states or countries lacking
controls. Id. at 1967-68. The "slack off' effect is a form of the free rider problem: If states see
other states taking aggressive measures, they might slack off their own efforts. Id. at 1968. The
"capital relocation" effect could occur if industries respond to regulation by relocating to unregu-
lated states or countries. Id. at 1968. Professor Wiener provides a thoughtful analysis of the factors
that could influence the potential net emissions consequences of these forms of leakage. Id. at
1969-73.
12. See DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 2, at 1518-19; Wiener, supra note 6, at 1965. Aca-
demics have debated the validity of the race-to-the-bottom theory. See Kaswan, supra note 1, at 62
n.122. Professor Revesz has argued that states engage in competition for both businesses and citi-
zens that allows them to choose the balance of environmental and economic amenities that best suits
their preferences. See Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the
"Race-to-the-Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1210,
1211 (1992). The dynamics of interstate competition in any given instance are complicated, but it is
conceivable that, at least in some instances, the fear of losing business would deter a state from
enacting desired environmental regulation. See Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-
Setting: Is There a "Race" and Is It "To the Bottom"?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271, 303-04 (1997)
(providing empirical data suggesting that states fear that their environmental regulations could deter
economic investment).
In California, regulators confront the risk of economic flight as they develop their climate
change regulations. Entities likely to be subject to the state's climate change regulation have stated
that they will move their operations outside the state if the state's regulations are too onerous. See
Matthew Yi, Dems, Governor Spar over Road to Clean Air, S.F. CHRON., July 17, 2007, at Al.
13. Kaswan, supra note 1, at 66-67.
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deeply concerned about the impact of climate change on its coastline, its
water supply system, and its air quality.14  In addition, given its strong
technology sector, California anticipates net economic benefits from
climate change regulation as the state develops the innovative technology
necessary to transition away from a carbon-intensive economy.' 5 More-
over, California's control costs could be less than those of other states
because it is not heavily dependent on coal, a significant source of
greenhouse gases.' 6 Other states might foresee fewer short-term benefits
from controlling greenhouse gas emissions, but expect significant costs.
1 7
For example, a state that relies heavily on coal mining or burning is re-
sponsible for significant emissions, but would experience high costs of
control and, at least in the short-term, might not find the benefits of regu-
lation worth the costs. 
18
These disconnects between the causes and consequences of enmis-
sions, and the disconnects between the distribution of the costs and bene-
fits of control, suggest that reliance on the states could lead to significant
under-regulation. 19 In light of the United States' unwillingness to take a
global approach by ratifying the Kyoto Protocol, 20 the next-best ap-
proach, under the matching principle, would be federal regulation. A
federal approach would require all states to address the out-of-state con-
14. See CALIFORNIA CLIMATE CHANGE CENTER, OUR CHANGING CLIMATE: ASSESSING THE
RISKS TO CALIFORNIA (2006), http://www.energy.ca.gov/2006publications/CEC-500-2006-
077/CEC-500-2006-077.PDF.
15. See Kaswan, supra note 1, at 66 (describing California's expectation of economic benefits
arising from its climate change legislation); Rabe, Roman & Dobelis, supra note 9, at 37-41 (de-
scribing states' interest in economic development opportunities associated with climate change
regulation).
16. See CALIFORNIA ENERGY COMMISSION, INTEGRATED ENERGY POLICY REPORT 2007
(ExECUTIvE SUMMARY) 11 (2007) (indicating, in Figure 6, that only 8 percent of California's en-
ergy comes from coal), available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/2007publications/CEC-100-2007-
008/CEC- 100-2007-008-CMF-ES.PDF.
17. See McKinstry & Peterson, supra note 2, at 92 (observing that some states are likely to
experience greater costs from climate change regulation than others).
18. See Rabe, Roman, & Dobelis, supra note 9, at 11 (observing that states with significant
economic investments in carbon-producing industries are reluctant to address climate change); cf
Zachary Coile, Energy Bill Draft Splits House Dems: It's Pelosi's Greens Against Industry Protec-
tionists, S.F. CHRON., June 8, 2007, at A7 (noting, in the context of support for federal legislation,
that lawmakers from coastal states have favored deep emissions cuts while those "from states pro-
ducing automobiles, coal and oil favor a go-slow approach."). States may also fail to act due to
agency capture. Powerful interests within a state could influence state policy in a manner ultimately
deemed inconsistent with that state's best interests. See Robert L. Glicksman, From Cooperative to
Inoperative Federalism: The Perverse Mutation of Environmental Law and Policy, 41 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 719, 734-35 (2006) (discussing potential for "capture" of state government).
19. This is not to say that the states do not have any motivation for taking action; the presence
of so many significant state initiatives demonstrates that states have found sufficient political, eco-
nomic, and environmental justifications for action. See Kirsten Engel, State and Local Climate
Change Initiatives: What Is Motivating State and Local Governments to Address a Global Problem
and What Does This Say About Federalism and Environmental Law, 38 URB. LAW. 1015, 1016-21
(2006); Kaswan, supra note 1, at 65-68. That said, however, the states' collective efforts are
unlikely to be sufficient.
20. See Engel & Saleska, supra note 6, at 186.
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sequences of their emissions and would reduce leakage among' the
states.2
Other arguments, in addition to the matching principle, support fed-
eral regulation. Rather than having each state explore the greenhouse-
gas-reduction potential of each sector, it would be more efficient for the
federal government to research technological and operational opportuni-
ties.22 The federal government also has more resources at its disposal2 3
In addition, although I argue for allowing state flexibility, the existence
of a federal approach is likely to reduce the multiplicity of approaches to
greenhouse gas regulation around the country. To the extent that many
states simply follow the federal approach, without adding state-specific
implementation measures, the number of diverse approaches would be
reduced in comparison with a purely state-based approach.24  Finally, to
the extent the federal government adopts a cap-and-trade program, a lar-
ger market could lower costs25 and increase the fluidity of the market by
creating more trading opportunities and smoothing out the consequences
of local events.26 The nation thus needs a federal approach to climate
change.
II. THE STATE ROLE IN A FEDERAL PROGRAM
Notwithstanding the need for federal legislation, the states have a
vital interest in establishing their own climate change goals and in assert-
ing at least limited control over key implementation decisions. In this
Part, I justify a cooperative federalist approach 27 that sets significant fed-
eral minimum standards and then provides states with considerable
autonomy to exceed federal minimums and implement greenhouse gas
21. A federal approach would not, however, address the risk of international leakage: the risk
that federal domestic legislation could shift emissions to countries that are not regulating greenhouse
gas emissions. See Wiener, supra note 6, at 1967-68 (describing leakage caused by single-country
regulation in the absence of a global agreement).
22. See generally Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV.
570, 614-15 (1996) (describing greater efficiency of federal regulation).
23. Id. at 585-86.
24. See McKinstry & Peterson, supra note 2, at 105 (suggesting that minimum federal stan-
dards would establish floors that would lead to more uniform standards than a purely state-based
approach).
25. Lower costs are beneficial if they allow regulatory authorities to set higher emissions caps
than they would if reductions were more expensive. See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, TOOLS OF THE
TRADE: A GUIDE TO DESIGNING AND OPERATING A CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM FOR POLLUTION
CONTROL (2003), http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/resource/docs/tools.pdf. Lower costs could also
alleviate the economic costs of addressing climate change. That said, however, lower costs are
beneficial only to a point. If costs are too low, then regulated entities and the technology sector will
not receive a sufficient price signal to invest in alternative emission-reducing technologies.
26. See Engel & Saleska, supra note 6, at 228.
27. Scholars have historically focused on dual federalism: the respective roles of the states
versus the federal government. See Engel, supra note 9, at 163-66, 175. Recent scholarly attention
has focused on the idea of cooperative federalism, which embodies shared powers and, at times,
overlapping federal and state roles. Id at 175-76 (noting scholarly literature on "dynamic federal-
ism," "empowerment federalism," "polyphonic federalism," "interactive federalism," and "vertical
regulatory competition").
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reduction strategies. The appropriate balance between federal and state
responsibility depends, of course, on the nature of the regulatory strat-
egy, a subject I address in the context of specific proposals in Part IV,
below.
After describing the theoretical justifications for creating a coopera-
tive federalism approach, I use the environmental justice provisions in
California's climate change legislation as a case study on the practical
importance of allowing state implementation autonomy.
A. Theoretical Justifications for a Strong State Role
1. Arguments in Favor of State Autonomy
The "matching principle" provides important insights into why a
regulatory jurisdiction should match the scale of the environmental prob-
lem, and why climate change requires a global and national solution.28
But that is not the end of the story. Additional "matches" suggest the
suitability of multiple levels of regulation.29
Environmental problems are not one-dimensional: Global problems
like climate change have local manifestations that could shape the nature
of a locality's desired response. Thus, as suggested above, a state like
California, that perceives significant risks from climate change, could be
willing to establish more stringent goals than the federal government.
Similarly, the consequences of climate change regulation are local.
Climate policies that require local industries to reduce greenhouse gases
will have local economic consequences, both positive and negative, that
will depend upon the nature of the industry, the ease of making reduc-
tions, and the chosen regulatory mechanism for requiring reductions.
30
Local reductions will also have local environmental consequences: Re-
ductions in greenhouse gases generally (although not necessarily) lead to
reductions in harmful co-pollutants. 31 The rate and distribution of green-
house gas reduction requirements could thus impact the local distribution
of harmful co-pollutants. Due to the economic and environmental impli-
cations of regulatory strategies, states thus have an interest in the strin-
gency of direct regulation as well as in the relative role of a cap-and-
28. See William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the
Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1604-06 (2007).
29. See id. at 1604-05, 1617 (critiquing the matching principle for its heavy focus on the
location of pollution, and arguing that other factors, including the benefits and harms of regulation,
should influence jurisdictional choice).
30. See McKinstry & Peterson, supra note 2, at 87-88 (observing that states can better devise
climate change programs to address their particular regional characteristics and industries).
31. See MARKET ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD,
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DESIGNING A GREENHOUSE GAS CAP AND TRADE SYSTEM FOR
CALIFORNIA 13 (2007) (observing that production changes that reduce greenhouse gases tend to
reduce co-pollutant emissions as well) [hereinafter MKT. ADVISORY COMM. TO THE CAL. AIR RES.
BD.].
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trade program and its operational features. While the global scale of
climate change requires an international and national response, the local
implications of climate change policies provide a justification for allow-
ing some state flexibility in determining how to implement national
goals.
A state role within a federal system is further justified by familiar
principles of democratic theory.3 2 As Professor Kirsten Engel has stated,
federal preemption "cuts short the lawmaking process and products of an
entire level of democratic government. 3 3 If states wish to achieve more
demanding goals, or to control the economic and environmental conse-
quences of climate change policies, then allowing states the latitude to do
so allows them to fulfill their citizens' preferences.34
Federal minimums which prevent states from setting lower goals or
standards may appear, at first blush, to prevent some states from realiz-
ing their preference for lower standards.35  But the federal minimum
would allow other states to meet their democratic preferences, since race
to the bottom and leakage concerns might have prevented some states
from adopting their ideal standards. 36 One state's democratic loss is an-
other's democratic gain. Moreover, the democratic argument has limits:
A state's choice not to control its emissions is less compelling where that
choice has adverse consequences for other states or, in this instance, for
the globe. 37 Democratic theory thus supports having federal minimums,
but allowing states to exceed them.
State initiatives may also be more amenable to "bottom-up" partici-
pation by affected constituencies.38 Including stakeholders in policy
development can provide policymakers with critical information that
could lead to more tailored and effective programs and could, potentially,
increase "stakeholder buy-in." 39 (However, since the states are as vul-
32. See Esty, supra note 22, at 609-10 (describing democratic theory in favor of decentralized
decision making).
33. Engel, supra note 9, at 184.
34. See Esty, supra note 22, at 610 (stating democratic justification for state-level jurisdic-
tion); Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Im-
plementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1210 (1976-77) (same); see also
DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 2, at 1519-20 (observing that state climate change initiatives have
been a response to their citizens' fears about climate change); Engel, supra note 2, at 1025; Glicks-
man, supra note 18, at 779 (noting that recent state environmental initiatives have been a response to
state citizen desires for environmental protection).
35. See Buzbee, supra note 28, at 1581, 1586.
36. Id. at 1580 (noting that federal minimums help states meet their preferences by dampening
the race to the bottom).
37. See Butler & Macey, supra note 7, at 33 (observing that, in the case of interstate pollution
spillovers, pure state regulation would lead to political failure since the victim state would have no
capacity to control the polluting state's pollution); Stewart, supra note 35, at 1227 (stating that "a
state should not be entitled to invoke the principle of local self-determination against federal controls
where that state generates significant spillovers which impair the corresponding ability of sister
states to determine the environmental quality they shall enjoy.").
38. See McKinstry & Peterson, supra note 2, at 73, 87.
39. Id.
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nerable to political capture as the federal government, federal minimum
standards remain essential.4 0)
Another familiar argument in favor of retaining state flexibility is
that allowing the states to adopt alternative approaches fosters techno-
logical and regulatory innovation. 41 The states can act as "laboratories
for invention" by exceeding minimum federal product, production, or
renewable portfolio standards, thereby promoting technological innova-
tion that could provide models for other industries or jurisdictions.42
Differing regulatory approaches, like direct regulation, variants on cap-
and-trade programs, or new approaches to land use regulation, could
likewise test and provide models for other jurisdictions. Allowing state
experimentation is particularly appropriate where the problem to be ad-
dressed is new and where policymakers are uncertain about the best
mechanisms for addressing it.43 In the climate change context, Professor
William Buzbee has stated that "[i]n settings of volatility and diversity of
conditions, especially where knowledge is incomplete and evolving rap-
idly, room for pragmatic adjustment and experimentation is critical." 44 A
cooperative federalist approach that establishes basic federal parameters
but allows states to diverge could provide the best of all worlds; it takes
advantage of the economies of scale of a federal approach, while allow-
ing state experimentation.
Allowing a diversity of requirements and approaches also helps
counteract potential defects in legislative and regulatory processes.45
Federal preemption of divergent state approaches lodges complete power
in a single federal decision-maker. 46 Once federal decision-makers act,
they could fail to review and assess the standards or approaches they
have adopted.47  They could develop a significant institutional invest-
48ment in the status quo. Allowing states to develop more demanding or
divergent standards and approaches would create a diversity of players
simultaneously working to solve similar problems, stimulating continual
interaction, challenge, debate, reexamination, and inquiry.49 While that
40. See Glicksman, supra note 18, at 734-35 (discussing risk of agency capture at the state
level).
41. See Engel, supra note 9, at 182-83.
42. Under the Clean Air Act, for example, California is allowed to adopt vehicle emission
standards that differ from federal requirements, so long as EPA waives the normally-applicable
federal preemption provision. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7543(b) (West 2008). The differing requirements
have prompted technological innovation. See Ann E. Carlson, Federalism, Preemption, and Green-
house Gas Emissions, 37 DAVIS L. REV. 281, 313-18 (2003).
43. See Buzbee, supra note 28, at 1619; Engel, supra note 9, at 182.
44. Buzbee, supra note 28, at 1619.
45. See id. at 1597; Engel, supra note 9, at 178-81.
46. See Buzbee, supra note 28, at 1597.
47. Id. at 1594-95.
48. Id. at 1595, 1608-09.
49. id. at 1588-89, 1597; Butler & Macey, supra note 7, at 53 (observing that centralized
decision making impedes the detection of policymaking errors); Engel, supra note 9, at 170-73
(describing the dynamic innovation encouraged by the interplay of state and federal standard-
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conflict may not always be comfortable, having a multiplicity of players
is more likely to lead to continuing assessment and improvement in tech-
nological requirements and regulatory programs than a preemptive fed-
eral approach.
Having a multiplicity of players could also ameliorate the risk of
agency capture, at both the federal and state levels.50 If Congress or im-
plementing agencies are heavily influenced by particular interest groups
to the detriment of the public interest, 51 and the federal law preempts
divergent state approaches, then there is no antidote for the political fail-
ure.52 Without attempting to resolve the fine line between "capture" and
the appropriate operation of the political process in balancing diverse
needs, one could imagine that interests heavily invested in the short-term
future of coal or the existing state of the automobile industry could influ-
ence legislative or regulatory processes in ways that (arguably) under-
regulate in light of the long-term risks posed by climate change and the
general public interest. Given the risk of federal agency capture, the
states could retain the authority to impose more demanding require-
ments.5 3
A state role may also be necessary to address issues that are better
suited to state and local resolution than federal resolution. Without es-
sentializing the nature of "federal" versus "state" activities, certain gov-
ernmental decisions, like land use and building codes, have traditionally
been under state control. This is not to say that the federal government
should be precluded from addressing these areas. Even so, the federal
government could be more successful at meeting national goals if it
enlisted the states' assistance and cooperation in areas traditionally
within their control.5 4
2. Concerns Raised by State Autonomy
In the context of regulatory standards and the operation of a cap-
and-trade program, inconsistency is a significant consequence of allow-
ing states to diverge from federal standards and giving them implementa-
setting); see also infra notes 239 to 248 and accompanying text (describing the dynamic tension
between state and federal appliance efficiency and vehicle emission standards).
50. See Buzbee, supra note 28, at 1594-95; Engel, supra note 9, at 161, 178-81.
51. See Buzbee, supra note 28, at 1590-91, 1609.
52. See Butler & Macey, supra note 7, at 53; Engel, supra note 9, at 163.
53. In theory, there is also the risk of agency capture by environmentalists, leading to overly
restrictive regulation at the federal or state level. For example, if environmentalists captured the
federal legislative process, then arguably states should be allowed to set standards below the federal
level to provide an antidote to environmentalists' control at the federal level. In light of the relative
power of the interest groups, and the diffuse nature of the public's concern about climate change in
comparison to the intense interest of the regulated community, this risk appears less compelling than
the risk of industry capture.
54. See John P. Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. REV.
1183, 1218 (1995)
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tion discretion.55 Nationwide industries could encounter differing stan-
dards in different states, leading to inefficient production and manage-
ment.56 If states could impose their own requirements on a cap-and-trade
program, the program's transactions costs would increase. From a par-
ticipatory standpoint, industries and public interest groups would have to
monitor and participate in proceedings around the country, rather than
focusing their resources on federal legislative and regulatory process.57
Consistency is an important, but not necessarily determinative, fac-
tor. The virtues of consistency must be weighed against the benefits of a
diversity of approaches. The significance of consistency is also depend-
ent upon the type of regulation at issue.58 For example, inconsistent
product standards could adversely impact industrial efficiency.5 9 In con-
trast, overarching environmental goals have relatively little impact on
industrial efficiency, and do not present a compelling case for preemp-
tion.60 Process and performance standards, permitting structures, and
other regulatory options fall somewhere in between.61  I discuss these
issues in the climate change context more specifically below, in Part IV.
A cooperative federalist approach would also pose less risk of in-
consistency than a pure reliance on state initiatives. A federal approach
that gave states the option, but did not mandate, state divergence or im-
plementation would likely limit the degree of diversity. Under existing
cooperative federalist approaches, many states do not choose to deviate
from the federal minimums.62
In addition to inconsistency, another potential risk of state action is
that states could develop requirements that favor their own interests and
jeopardize out-of-state interests. Climate change policy could thus be-
come a protectionist vehicle.63 State product standards pose this risk if
55. See Buzbee, supra note 28, at 1600.
56. See Carlson, supra note 42, at 313-14; DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 2, at 1530-31.
57. See Engel, supra note 9, at 181 (noting that most interest groups would prefer federal
policies so that they could avoid having to lobby in all 50 states); cf Stewart, supra note 35, at 1213-
15 (noting that, relative to industry, environmental groups are likely to have more power at the
federal level, given their relative lack of resources).
58. See Buzbee, supra note 28, at 1603-04 (arguing that the nature of the regulatory target is a
key factor in determining whether preemption-and its accompanying consistency-is appropriate).
59. See id. at 1603; Kaswan, supra note 1, at 82-83. Federal statutes addressing product
standards are more likely to preempt state approaches than other federal regulatory statutes. See
Buzbee, supra note 28, at 1561-64; Engel & Saleska, supra note 6, at 224-26.
60. Kaswan, supra note 1, at 82.
61. See Buzbee, supra note 28, at 1603-04; Kaswan supra note 1, at 81-83 (discussing the
benefits and drawbacks to preemption for a number of types of regulatory efforts).
62. Some states have gone so far as to pass legislation preventing their states from exceeding
federal standards. See Jerome M. Organ, Limitations on State Agency Authority to Adopt Environ-
mental Standards More Stringent than Federal Standards: Policy Considerations and Interpretive
Problems, 54 MD. L. REv. 1373, 1375-95 (1995).
63. In other words, states could engage in a form of "cost externalization" by imposing con-
straints on out-of-state interests for the benefit of in-state interests. See Butler & Macey, supra note
7, at 45-47 (describing cost externalization risk of state-level regulatory action). More broadly, this
theory suggests that states imposing external costs might fail to comprehensively analyze the costs
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they are designed to favor in-state industries and are not otherwise envi-
ronmentally justified.64 On the other hand, states may be unable to pre-
vent leakage and meet their goals without establishing policies that have
some impact on out-of-state interests. For example, California has en-
acted an environmental performance standard for electricity that essen-
tially prevents the state from using electricity generated by traditional
coal-fired power plants, 65 a standard that will have little impact within
the state, due to its lack of coal-fired power, but that is likely to reduce
certain electricity imports.66 Without the ability to impose the standard
on electricity imports, California's greenhouse reduction goals could be
undermined by utilities' switching from California energy sources that
must meet the standard to out-of-state sources that are not subject to it.
So long as they are environmentally justified, states should be allowed to
develop product or production criteria to meet their objectives, even if
such measures have an incidental impact on out-of-state industries.
Moreover, such restrictions often impose higher costs on in-state resi-
dents, thus providing a check on the risk of protectionist and self-serving
legislation.67 In such interstate conflicts, there is no obvious reason why
the regulating state's interests should cede to the impacted state's inter-
ests.
Climate change is unquestionably a global problem, and strong fed-
eral minimums are necessary. But the states have a vital interest in the
consequences of climate change and a major stake in the economic and
environmental consequences of climate change regulation itself. The
states could foster innovation and avoid the risk of federal complacency
and inertia. Allowing states to exceed federal minimums could also pro-
vide a structural antidote to potential agency capture at the federal level.
As Professor Kirsten Engel has stated, "[p]reemption ... is the real boo-
geyman of public interest lawmaking because it prevents the political
process from policing itself.,
68
and benefits of regulation. Using the example of a non-coal state imposing restrictions on the use of
coal, the theory posits that states might impose restrictions that provide them with environmental
benefits but whose costs they do not have to endure. See id. at 45, n.45 (quoting E. Donald Elliott et
al., Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of Environmental Law, I J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 313, 329 (1985)). As Butler and Macey go on to note, however, the restricting state's
consumers generally experience higher costs from the regulation, even if its industries are not di-
rectly affected. See Butler & Macey, supra note 7, at 47. In many situations, costs are not, in fact,
"externalized" in a manner that would lead to political failure. Id.
64. Butler & Macey, supra note 7, at 45-48.
65. See Patricia Weisselberg, Shaping the Energy Future in the American West: Can Califor-
nia Curb Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Out-of-State, Coal-Fired Power Plants Without Violating
the Dormant Commerce Clause?, 42 U.S.F. L. REv. 185 (2007).
66. See id. at 213 (describing utility argument that the burden of the California standard will
fall heavily on out-of-state coal-fired power plants).
67. See Butler & Macey, supra note 7, at 47.
68. Engel, supra note 9, at 163.
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B. A Case Study on the Value of State Autonomy: California's
Environmental Justice Provisions
1. Introduction
The environmental justice provisions in California's climate change
legislation help illuminate the value of retaining state autonomy within a
federal system. While the case study does not raise all of the relevant
issues, it reveals: (1) the local political, environmental, and economic
implications of climate change regulation; (2) the expression of uniquely
state-level political preferences that are unlikely to be manifested in fed-
eral legislation; and (3) critical state interests that could arise in the op-
eration of a cap-and-trade program, the type of program that many as-
sume operates best at a national if not an international scale. The envi-
ronmental justice case study highlights the states' strong interest in shap-
ing regulatory processes to meet state-specific goals and needs.
In 2006, California enacted one of the nation's first comprehensive
climate change statutes, 69 the Global Warming Solutions Act, commonly
referred to as AB 32.70 The statute requires the state to reduce its green-
house gas emissions to 1990 levels by 2020.71 Although it provides rela-
tively little detail about how to achieve the required reductions, the law
explicitly includes parameters to achieve environmental justice, regard-
less of the specific regulatory programs the state chooses to adopt.72
The environmental justice implications of potential implementation
strategies were a key issue in legislative deliberations. The Governor
strongly supported a cap-and-trade program while many legislators, con-
cerned about the environmental justice implications of market-based
systems, were opposed.73 As a consequence, the law permits but does
not require the creation of a market mechanism. 74 In addition, the law
requires the state's regulations to serve environmental justice through
provisions designed to enhance participation in the development of im-
plementing regulations, substantive environmental protections for pol-
luted areas, and provisions designed to direct economic opportunities to
disadvantaged communities.
69. Several northeastern states preceded California. See Abate, supra note 2, at 377-81. But
California's size and influence gave California's legislation greater national and international sig-
nificance.
70. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 38500-99 (West 2007).
71. Id. § 38550.
72. See infra notes 75 to I I and accompanying text.
73. See Mark Martin, Nunez Slams Governor on Emission Law, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 17, 2006,
at BI (describing legislature's rejection of the Governor's proposal to mandate a cap-and-trade
program).
74. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38570(a).
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2. Participatory Environmental Justice Provisions
Citizens' participation in decisions affecting their communities is a
central value in the environmental justice movement.75  Participation is
necessary (though not sufficient) to empower disadvantaged communi-
ties in decision making processes that have historically failed to serve
their interests. Participation also helps government agencies obtain first-
hand information about conditions in the communities their decisions
will affect.76
AB 32 explicitly encourages broad participation in the development
of its implementing regulations and participation by disadvantaged
communities in particular. 77  The law requires the California Air Re-
sources Board (CARB), the agency with primary implementation author-
ity, to consult a wide range of stakeholders in developing its regulations,
including "the environmental justice community, industry sectors, busi-
ness groups, academic institutions, [and] environmental organizations. ' 8
It requires the creation of an Environmental Justice Advisory Committee
(EJAC) whose members are to be drawn from the state's most polluted
areas, "including, but not limited to, communities with minority popula-
tions or low-income populations., 79 In addition, as it develops its regula-
tory scoping plan, the law requires CARB to hold public workshops in
regions of the state suffering from poor air quality, once again including,
but not limited to, minority and low-income communities.8 °
3. Substantive Environmental Justice Provisions
Substantively, distributive justice is a key goal of the environmental
justice movement.8 1 The movement seeks to redress the current inequity
in the distribution of pollution and its effects.82 Numerous studies have
documented substantial disparities in the distribution of polluting facili-
ties, which are more likely to be concentrated in of-color and low-income
communities. 81 In California, many areas of the state have failed to at-
75. See Alice Kaswan, Distributive Justice and the Environment, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1031, 1045-
47 (2003) (describing claims in terms of "political justice").
76. See Stephen M. Johnson, Economics v. Equity: Do Market-Based Environmental Reforms
Exacerbate Environmental Injustice?, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 111, 159 (1999).
77. By "disadvantaged," I am referring to disadvantages such as disproportionate exposure to
undesirable land uses, to poverty, and to a lack of political power, conditions that are often corre-
lated with race and income.
78. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38501(f) (West 2007).
79. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38591(a) (West 2007). The Environmental Justice
Advisory Committee has been constituted and includes representatives from a range of environ-
mental justice organizations around the state. See Cal. Evtl. Prot. Agency Air Res. Bd., Global
Warming Environmental Justice Committee, http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/ejac/ejac.htm (last visited
Mar. 27, 2008) (committee website, listing members).
80. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38561(g) (West 2007).
81. See Kaswan, supra note 75, at 1043-44.
82. Jd. at 1037-39 (summarizing theories of distributive justice).
83. Id. at 1069-77.
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tain the nation's ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) and attainment
remains a far-off goal.84
Although carbon dioxide does not cause local environmental conse-
quences,85 climate change regulation nonetheless implicates local pollu-
tion because the chief source of greenhouse gas emissions, combustion,
generates not only carbon dioxide, but a host of problematic co-
pollutants.86 These co-pollutants can include nitrogen oxides, sulphur
oxides, particulates, mercury, volatile organic compounds, and, in some
cases, an array of other hazardous air pollutants. While not directly cor-
related, policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions are likely to have
the co-benefit of reducing co-pollutants.87 Similarly, policies that allow
greenhouse gas emissions to remain the same will not generate co-
pollutant reduction benefits, and policies that allow greenhouse gas emis-
sions to increase in local areas (presumably offset by decreases else-
where) could cause at least some degree of local increases in co-
pollutants.
In the ensuing subsections, I first consider provisions addressing co-
pollutant emissions, including provisions that are designed to prevent
increases in pollution and provisions that are designed to ensure that the
state reaps environmental and economic co-benefits from climate change
regulation. Next, I briefly consider how such provisions could affect the
development of climate change regulations. Finally, I consider the pro-
vision designed to channel potential economic opportunities arising from
climate change regulation to disadvantaged communities and its policy
implications.
(a) Provisions Implicating Co-Pollutant Emissions
i. Provisions that Prevent Increases in Co-Pollutants
AB 32 states generally that CARB must "[e]nsure that the activities
undertaken to comply with [its] regulations do not disproportionately
impact low-income communities." 88 The statement is broad, and could
include both economic and environmental impacts. From an environ-
mental standpoint, it suggests that measures that could create "hot spots"
by increasing air pollutants in already-burdened areas would violate this
provision. For example, if the state's emerging low-carbon fuel standard
84. Maps indicating the California regions that are in and out of attainment for particular
criteria pollutants are available on the following website: ENvTL. PROT. AGENCY, REGION 9, AIR
QUALITY MAPS, (Mar. 7, 2008), http://www.epa.gov/region09/air/maps/maps-top.htnl.
85. See A. DENNY ELLERMAN ET AL., EMISSIONS TRADING IN THE U.S.: EXPERIENCE,
LESSONS, AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR GREENHOUSE GASES 40-41 (2003), available at
http://www.pewclimate.org/global-warming-in-depth/allreports/emissionstrading/.
86. See Alice Kaswan, Environmental Justice and Domestic Climate Change Policy, ENVTL.
L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10287, 10298 (forthcoming May 2008).
87. See MKT. ADVISORY COMM. TO THE CAL. AIR RES. BD., supra note 31 and accompanying
text.
88. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38562(b)(2) (West 2007).
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led to a net increase in problematic co-pollutants from mobile sources
that would most impact residents in low-income areas, 89 the law could
require the state to impose additional vehicle emission controls. 90
The greatest controversy has concerned the potential adoption of a
cap-and-trade program for greenhouse gas emissions.91 A cap-and-trade
program could have significant distributional consequences, since some
facilities might reduce on behalf of others, who might not reduce at all or
could, subject to existing limits discussed below, increase their green-
house gas emissions through purchasing allowances. If allowances are
auctioned, some facilities would purchase less than existing emissions,
some would maintain emissions, and some could potentially purchase
enough allowances to increase emissions (subject to existing limits).
AB 32 addresses the risk of hot spots. The law specifically states
that CARB must consider potential "direct, indirect, and cumulative
emission impacts ... including localized impacts in communities that are
already adversely impacted by air pollution" before adopting a market
mechanism. 92  CARB must not only evaluate such impacts; it must de-
sign market mechanisms "to prevent any increase in the emissions of
toxic air contaminants or criteria pollutants."
93
That raises the key question: Would a greenhouse gas trading pro-
gram lead to localized increases in co-pollutant emissions, notwithstand-
ing aggregate reductions? The answer is complicated. For the most part,
a greenhouse gas trading program would not be the legal cause of co-
pollutant increases. Co-pollutants are subject to existing regulatory pro-
grams and a carbon trading program would not, presumably, displace
existing regulations. However, existing regulatory programs generally
allow emissions to increase up to a certain point.94 Most facilities are not
bound by absolute caps on their emissions; instead, they are subject to
89. The public health consequences of renewable fuels, and ethanol in particular, are con-
tested. A recent study suggests that, notwithstanding some environmental benefits, high ethanol use
could lead to a net increase in respiratory illnesses and deaths in certain regions due to synergistic
effects between ethanol-related emissions and existing pollutants. See Mark Z. Jacobson, Effects of
Ethanol (E85) Versus Gasoline Vehicles on Cancer and Mortality in the United States, 41 ENVIRON.
So. & TECH'Y 4150 (2007). Switching from gasoline to diesel, due to diesel's lower carbon content,
could also create environmental concerns due to the health risks associated with diesel's high par-
ticulate emissions. See CAL. AIR RES. BD., FACT SHEET: HEALTH EFFECTS OF DIESEL EXHAUST
PARTICULATE MATTER 4-5 (2006), http://www.arb.ca.gov/research/diesel/dpmdraft 3-01-06.pdf.
90. If additional vehicle emission controls are needed to address pollutants created by ethanol,
California would once again have to assert its unique authority under the Clean Air Act to adopt
mobile source standards that diverge from federal standards, and would once again have to request
an EPA waiver of the Clean Air Act's customary preemption provision. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7543(b)
(West 2008).
91. Under a cap-and-trade program, a cap on total emissions for the regulated sector would be
set and pollution allowances would be distributed, for free or by auction, to regulated facilities. In a
traditional cap-and-trade program, facilities that reduced emissions could trade excess allowances to
facilities that did not receive enough allowances to cover their emissions.
92. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38570(b)(1) (West 2007).
93. Id. § 38570(b)(2).
94. See Kaswan, supra note 86, at 10299-301.
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emission rate limitations.95 As long as the permissible rate of emissions
does not exceed their permit limits, they can increase the absolute quan-
tity of their co-pollutant emissions. 96  Actual amounts of co-pollutants
could increase up until the increase is deemed a "significant increase"
that triggers the Clean Air Act's rigorous pollution control requirements
for modified sources ("new source review" or NSR).97 Increases could
be locally problematic even if they did not trigger NSR.98 In addition, if
absolute increases in emissions are caused by an increase in hours of
operation or production, and not by a physical change to a facility, then
NSR would not be triggered notwithstanding a facility's significant in-
crease in emissions.99 Thus, a cap-and-trade program would not preclude
emissions increases that are already permissible under the existing regu-
latory system.
In a narrow set of circumstances, a cap-and-trade system could be a
more direct cause of emissions increases. 00 It is conceivable that a large
company with multiple facilities would make production decisions
based, in part, on the costs of greenhouse gas controls. It might choose
to lower production at facilities with lower costs of control. It might then
use the freed-up allowances to increase production, up to the constraints
imposed by existing co-pollutant permits, at facilities facing higher costs
of control. In this situation, the carbon trading system would have di-
rectly motivated, not simply facilitated, increased co-pollutant emis-
95. Under the Clean Air Act, the new source-related standards, like the New Source Perform-
ance Standards, Lowest Achievable Emission Rate standard for new sources in nonattainment areas,
and Best Available Control Technology Standards for new sources in attainment areas, are all pre-
sumptively emission rate standards. Id. at 10300 n. 131. Hazardous air pollutants standards are also
presumptively emission rate standards. Id. The standards are often framed in terms of emissions per
unit of production, pollutant concentrations per unit of emissions, or a rate of pollution over time.
Id. at 10300 n.132. Where smaller facilities seek to avoid being designated as "major" sources
subject to stringent pollution control regulation, however, they sometimes accept an absolute cap on
emissions so that their emissions will not exceed the "major" threshold. Id. at 10300 n. 129.
96. See id. at 10299-300.
97. See, e.g., DAVID WOOLEY & ELIZABETH MORSS, CLEAN AIR HANDBOOK § 1:111 (2007)
(providing general description of NSR program for modified facilities).
98. The threshold for triggering NSR requirements differs by pollutant and by an air district's
degree of nonattainment. See id. § 1: 113 (indicating threshold for criteria pollutants). Thresholds
from 15 to 40 tons per year are common. See id. Increases of this magnitude could, depending upon
local circumstances and the number of facilities engaging in increases, create local concerns. More-
over, the increases can be more dramatic than the rule suggests. In determining the baseline from
which to measure an emissions increase, facilities can choose the average emissions during any two
year period within the preceding ten years, even if recent emissions were considerably lower. See 40
C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(48)(ii)(c) (2008). As a practical matter, facilities could therefore increase their
emissions considerably more than the threshold amount if their recent emissions have been lower
than they were during the preceding ten years.
99. NSR applies only to "modifications" to existing facilities that result in a significant in-
crease. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 7501(4) (West 2008) (defining modification for facilities in nonat-
tainment areas by reference to the standard used for the New Source Performance Standards, which
defines modifications by reference to physical changes that significantly increase emissions). If the
emissions increase does not result from a physical change in the facility, it is not subject to NSR.
See 40 C.F.R. § 51.166(b)(2)(iii)(f) (2008) (stating that an increase in hours of operation or in the
production rate does not equal a physical change in operation).
100. See MKT. ADVISORY COMM. TO THE CAL. AIR RES. BD., supra note 31, at 13.
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sions. 1' 0 In addition, while greenhouse gas reduction measures are gen-
erally assumed to reduce co-pollutant emissions, some reduction meas-
ures could result in higher harmful emissions. For example, if a market
mechanism created an incentive to switch from gasoline to diesel due to
diesel's greater efficiency, the associated co-pollutants could increase,
subject only to the partial controls imposed by the existing regulatory
structure. 102
Thus, a cap-and-trade program would allow facilities to buy green-
house gas allowances that could incidentally lead to increases in existing
co-pollutant emissions up to the level allowed by existing co-pollutant
controls, and would therefore allow, and sometimes cause, increases in
criteria and toxic pollutants. A cap-and-trade program's flexibility
would allow co-pollutant emissions increases that a traditional approach
to greenhouse gas regulation would not. 10 3 Presumably, a more tradi-
tional approach would require all facilities to reduce greenhouse gases, a
reduction that would likely (although not certainly) reduce co-pollutant
emissions at all facilities and thereby avoid the potential increases that a
trading system could allow. These observations do not preclude the state
from adopting a cap-and-trade program, but they suggests that the state
must design the program to avoid co-pollutant emissions increases.
There is already some evidence that the law's environmental justice
provisions are shaping implementation principles. 14 To jumpstart a mar-
ket-based approach, Governor Schwarzenegger established a "Market
Advisory Committee" (the Committee) shortly after AB 32 was
passed.10 5 The first guiding design principle articulated by the Commit-
tee was that a California cap-and-trade program should "[a]void local-
ized and disproportionate impacts on low-income and disadvantaged
communities or communities already adversely impacted by air pollu-
tion."
10 6
101. See id. ("It is conceivable that.., the flexibility afforded by trading could cause a firm to
shift production from one facility to another in order to reduce GHG emissions at a lower overall
cost and that, because of differences in the industrial processes involved, this could lead to an in-
crease in emissions of a local pollutant at one facility.").
102. In addition, new power plant technologies are reportedly being developed that would
reduce greenhouse gas emissions but increase harmful particulate emissions.
103. See Kaswan, supra note 86, at 10301.
104. MKT. ADVISORY COMM. TO THE CAL. AIR RES. BD., supra note 31, at 10 (stating that the
Committee intended to recommend a system that was responsive to environmental justice concerns).
105. The Market Advisory Committee was created by Executive Order shortly after AB 32 was
adopted. See Exec. Order No. S-20-06 3 (Oct. 18, 2006), available at http://gov.ca.gov/
index.php?/executive-order/4484.
106. MKT. ADVISORY COMM. TO THE CAL. AIR RES. BD., supra note 31, at 11; see also id. at
16 (noting that, since some greenhouse gas mitigation strategies could implicate co-pollutant emis-
sions, CARB should "anticipate and address concerns about emissions hotspots.").
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ii. Provisions Requiring Environmental Co-Benefits
Preventing increases in co-pollutants is not the only environmental
justice issue presented by climate change regulation. Since climate
change regulation will produce a net decrease in greenhouse gas emis-
sions and, presumably, their associated co-pollutants, another key issue is
the distribution of the co-pollutant reduction benefits. 10 7 AB 32 contains
relevant provisions.
The above-noted requirement to consider impacts on low-income
areas 1 8 would include the requirement to consider whether greenhouse
gas regulations decreased co-pollutant emissions in such areas. More
specifically, AB 32 repeatedly requires the state to maximize the co-
benefits of climate change regulation, including its environmental co-
benefits. For example, the statute establishes the legislature's intent to
"maximize[] additional environmental... co-benefits for California, and
complement[] the state's efforts to improve air quality."' 0 9 The special
provisions guiding the design of a market-based system, if adopted, also
state that CARB should "[m]aximize additional environmental and eco-
nomic benefits for California, as appropriate."'"10 Arguably, decreasing
co-pollutant emissions is of greatest importance, and provides the great-
est benefit, in the state's most polluted areas. In addition, AB 32 states
that climate change regulations should complement "efforts to achieve
and maintain federal and state ambient air quality standards and to re-
duce toxic air contaminant emissions."'' AB 32 could thus require the
state to implement its climate change programs to maximize co-pollutant
reductions in the state's most polluted areas, where reductions would
help the state achieve its air quality goals and provide the greatest envi-
ronmental co-benefit.
AB 32's co-benefit requirements have influenced the principles ar-
ticulated by the Market Advisory Committee in its recommendations for
implementing a cap-and-trade program in California. The Committee's
second guiding design principle states that a cap-and-trade program
should "[a]void interference with the achievement of state and federal
ambient air quality standards,"'" 2 suggesting that it should lead to reduc-
tions, not increases, in co-pollutant emissions in nonattainment areas.
The Committee's third guiding design principle states, more generally,
that a cap-and-trade program should maximize co-benefits, "including
107. See Kaswan, supra note 86, at 10302.
108. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
109. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38501(h) (West 2007); see also CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 38562(b)(6) (West 2007) (requiring CARB to consider the implementing regulations' "over-
all societal benefits, including reductions in other air pollutants... and other benefits to the econ-
omy, environment, and public health.").
110. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38570(b)(3) (West 2007).
111. Id. § 38562(b)(4).
112. MKT. ADVISORY COMM. TO THE CAL. AIR RES. BD., supra note 31, at 11.
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reducing other air pollutant emissions .... 13 More specifically, the
report states that California should distribute pollution allowances "in a
manner that . . .advances the state's broader environmental goals by
ensuring that environmental benefits accrue to overburdened communi-
ties ....
iii. Mechanisms for Incorporating Environmental Justice
The most complex environmental justice issues are raised by cap-
and-trade programs, since they focus on aggregate pollution reductions
that could lead to an uneven distribution of co-pollutant emissions.1 5 In
this section, I briefly outline the ways in which the state's environmental
justice provisions could shape the ultimate implementation of a cap-and-
trade program. 16 While it is too soon to see how California will imple-
ment its program, this summary suggests the significance that state-
specific environmental justice policies could have on the implementation
of climate change mitigation strategies.
One option for dampening the risk of co-pollutant increases and en-
suring an equitable distribution of co-pollutant reduction co-benefits
would be to impose traditional control requirements in addition to adopt-
ing a market-based system. 17 The regulatory agency could assess feasi-
ble control strategies and simply require that they be undertaken. 1 8 That
approach could reduce greenhouse gas and associated co-pollutant emis-
sions at all facilities at the outset, thereby avoiding emissions increases
and widely distributing the co-pollutant reduction benefits of the regula-
tory system. 19  Thereafter, a cap-and-trade program could allow some
variation in emissions among facilities, but all of the facilities would be
starting from a lower baseline of co-pollutant emissions than would have
been the case if a market-based system were the exclusive control
mechanism. 120
113. Id.
114. Id. at 55.
115. See Kaswan, supra note 86, at 10294.
116. I have elaborated more fully on these potential mechanisms in other scholarship. See id.
at 10304-08.
117. See id. at 10304-05 (discussing approach). Others have addressed this combination of
trading and traditional approaches in the context of trading programs for non-greenhouse gas pollut-
ants. See Richard Toshiyuki Drury et al., Pollution Trading and Environmental Injustice: Los
Angeles' Failed Experiment in Air Quality Policy, 9 DuKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 231, 284-85
(1999); Johnson, supra note 76, at 162, 165; ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 25, at 3-22, 3-25.
118. Kaswan, supra note 86, at 10304.
119. Id.
120. This approach could serve goals in addition to distributional justice. Trading programs to
date have experienced difficulty in generating emission reduction incentives, since they have fre-
quently set caps too high or distributed too many allowances. See id at 10295-96. A traditional
approach would ensure that all feasible reductions are undertaken, without waiting for the market to
incentivize such steps. A market-based system could, thereafter, be used to create incentives for
facilities to reduce emissions in new and innovative ways. Id. at 10304-05.
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In addition, California's environmental justice provisions could be
met by imposing conditions on trades to prevent increases and encourage
decreases in co-pollutant emissions in areas suffering from serious air
quality problems.121 In a cap-and-trade system, the state could identify
the areas suffering from adverse air quality and prohibit or limit trades of
allowances into those areas.' 22  Trades could be limited by increasing
allowance prices for emissions in polluted areas, or by requiring a greater
than one-to-one ratio of allowances to cover emissions, similar to the
offset program for nonattainment areas. 
123
An additional mechanism by which the state could address the im-
pact of a trading system on co-pollutant emissions would be to establish
a fund to finance co-pollutant reductions in communities where emis-
sions have remained the same or increased as a consequence of trading.
Such a mitigation fund could be financed by auction proceeds.124 The
fund could be used to finance facility reductions, finance less-polluting
public transit, or finance other mechanisms to reduce co-pollutants. 125
California's environmental justice provisions could also implicate
additional program parameters. Since allowances purchased from out-
side California do not result in in-state co-pollutant emission reductions,
the state could consider some limitations on out-of-state allowance pur-
chases. 126 (Such a restriction would be particularly controversial in the
context of a national trading program.) In addition, the state could con-
sider limiting the use of offsets from carbon sequestration activities, such
as tree planting, since biological carbon sequestration activities do not
lead to co-pollutant emission reductions. 2 7 Finally, the state could con-
sider limitations on emissions banking, since emissions banking could
121. See id. at 10305-06. In considering mechanisms for limiting the adverse distributional
impacts of a cap-and-trade program, others have noted the possibility of geographic limitations. See
Drury et al., supra note 117, at 284; Johnson, supra note 75, at 162; ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra
note 25, at 3-22.
122. Regulatory agencies could also address adverse distributional impacts by reviewing and
conditioning individual trades. See Kaswan, supra note 86 at 10305 (describing option). However,
the additional administrative resources required for that approach would likely cause a significant
interference with the market system's efficiency. Limiting trades based upon predetermined geo-
graphic boundaries would provide a more efficient mechanism for increasing distributional fairness.
Id.
123. Id. at 10306. The Clean Air Act requires new or modified sources in nonattainment areas
to obtain offsets for their emissions. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7503(c) (West 2008). The offsets generally
exceed the proposed emissions, and, for ozone nonattainment areas, the ratio depends upon the
severity of the nonattainment area. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 751 la(a)(4) (West 2008) (setting offset
ratio for a marginal ozone nonattainment area). In that way, new facilities lead to a net benefit in air
quality.
124. See Kaswan, supra note 86, at 10306; MKT. ADVISORY COMM. TO THE CAL. AIR RES.
BD., supra note 31, at 57.
125. See Kaswan, supra note 86, at 10306.
126. See id. at 10307.
127. See id.
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allow facilities to save allowances for later use, resulting in higher co-
pollutant emissions in the future.
128
It is too soon to determine whether California's environmental jus-
tice provisions will actually lead to the integration of any of these pro-
posals. 129 AB 32's environmental justice provisions may, however, have
influenced the state's decision to adopt multiple early action measures
that represent the state's commitment to a traditional regulatory ap-
proach.130 In addition, the state's Market Advisory Committee proposed
the mitigation fund option for reducing co-pollutants in its recommenda-
tions for a California cap-and-trade program.'
3'
(b) Achieving Economic Justice for Disadvantaged
Communities
AB 32 addresses not only the environmental implications of climate
change policy for disadvantaged communities, but its economic implica-
tions as well. Climate change policies are expected to generate a variety
of economic opportunities, including new technology development 32 and
new employment opportunities associated with increasing the energy
efficiency of our existing infrastructure. 33 To the extent possible, AB 32
requires the state to "direct public and private investment toward the
most disadvantaged communities in California.' ' 134  Achieving green-
house gas reductions could require labor-intensive efforts to increase the
energy efficiency of existing buildings, install solar or wind power, and
take any number of additional steps. 135  Currently, there is a shortage of
trained workers. 36 The state could "direct investment toward disadvan-
taged communities" by facilitating green-collar job training programs for
128. See id. at 10308.
129. The state is just beginning to develop its scoping plan for implementing AB 32, and held
its first public workshop on potential policy mechanisms, such as direct regulation and market
mechanisms, on January 16, 2008. The agency must adopt the scoping plan by January 1, 2009.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38561 (a) (West 2007).
130. See CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, AIR RES. BD., CLIMATE CHANGE EARLY ACTION ITEMS,
http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/ccea/ccea.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2008) (describing initial regulatory
measures to achieve AB 32's goals). In its workshops on developing a scoping plan for AB 32
implementation, agency officials have emphasized direct regulation as an important component of
the scenarios it is likely to consider. See Overview of Compliance Mechanisms for Emissions Re-
ductions, http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/scopingplan/meetings/1 _16slides/session3mechanismsoverview.
pdf (last visited Mar. 27, 2008) (stating that "[d]irect regulations are a major part of AB 32 imple-
mentation.").
131. See MKT. ADVISORY COMM. TO THE CAL. AIR RES. BD., supra note 31, at 57.
132. See Press Release, Office of the Governor, Gov. Schwarzenegger Signs Landmark Legis-
lation to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions (Sept. 27, 2006), http://gov.ca.gov/index.php?/print-
version/press-release/4111/.
133. See generally Maxine Burkett, Just Solutions to Climate Change: A Climate Justice
Proposal for a Domestic Clean Development Mechanism, 56 BUFF. L. REv. (forthcoming 2008)
(describing need for green jobs in disadvantaged communities).
134. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38565 (West 2007).
135. See generally Burkett, supra note 133, at 33-39 (proposing mechanisms for creating green
jobs in disadvantaged communities).
136. David R. Baker, State Has Serious Green-Collar Labor Shortage, Summit Attendees Say,
S.F. CHRON., Jan. 15, 2008, at Cl.
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unemployed workers in poor communities. In addition, meeting the
technological demands for a new green society will require new indus-
tries. Green enterprise zones could be established in poor communi-
ties. 37
4. Conclusion
This is not the place to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the
proposed mechanisms for achieving environmental and economic justice.
Policymakers will have to consider multiple factors in meeting AB 32's
environmental justice provisions as part of an overarching efficient and
effective greenhouse gas reduction strategy. What the list of proposals
makes clear, however, is that a state's additional political and environ-
mental goals could have a significant impact on the implementation of a
cap-and-trade program specifically and greenhouse gas reduction poli-
cies more generally.
III. COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM MODELS
Having addressed the importance of federal legislation and the si-
multaneous importance of a vital state implementation role, the next is-
sue is how to design federal legislation to address federalism concerns.
Two key issues are presented by federal legislation: (1) who sets goals
and standards (and whether federal legislation preempts state efforts);
and (2) delegation of program authority.
Federal preemption of state goals, standards, or program parameters
is a significant issue in federal climate change policy debates.1 38 Facing
the prospect of diverse state approaches, some industries have supported
federal legislation as a mechanism for increasing consistency, and hence
support preemptive provisions.139 In contrast, states that have developed
their own approaches are generally wary of state preemption. 140 If Con-
gress decides not to explicitly preempt state efforts, the absence of an
explicit preemption provision may not be sufficient to eliminate the risk
of preemption. The courts have shown some tendency to find that Con-
gress has implicitly preempted state efforts.' 41 To avoid the risk of im-
plied preemption, federal legislation must therefore include explicit sav-
ings provisions that preserve the states' ability to adopt more stringent
standards.
137. See Burkett, supra note 133, at 37-38.
138. See DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 2, at 1536 n.135 (discussing debate over preemption
clause in cap-and-trade bill).
139. See Buzbee, supra note 28, at 1569-70; DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 2, at 1533-36.
140. See DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 2, at 1536 n. 135 (observing that a preemption provi-
sion in draft federal climate change legislation was dropped due to lobbying from California officials
trying to preserve their legislation).
141. See Glicksman, supra note 18, at 787-92 (describing courts' tendency to find implicit
preemption).
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A second critical federalism issue is the degree to which more gen-
eral implementation authority is devolved to the states. Federal legisla-
tion would need to clarify both the limits to and the breadth of the state's
implementation flexibility. Otherwise, questions could arise regarding
the extent to which state-level initiatives conflict with the overarching
federal program.
This Part analyzes the cooperative federalist features of proposed
federal legislation, two existing climate change programs, and the federal
Clean Air Act.
A. Proposed Federal Legislation
Of the many climate change bills introduced in the 110th Con-
gress, 42 Senators Warner and Lieberman introduced the bipartisan bill
receiving the most attention: America's Climate Security Act of 2007.1
41
The bill establishes a federal emissions reduction goal for the covered
sectors, 44 but explicitly preserves the rights of states to adopt and en-
force their own greenhouse gas standards and requirements, so long as
they are no less stringent than the bill's provisions. 45 By allowing states
to set more demanding goals and standards, the bill gives the states the
autonomy to realize state citizen preferences and fosters innovation, al-
beit at the cost of national consistency.
In terms of implementation, however, the bill is highly centralized.
The heart of the bill is a national cap-and-trade program. 46 Under the
bill, the federal government controls allowance allocation and is respon-
sible for ensuring that facilities have sufficient allowances to cover their
emissions. 47 The bill also establishes detailed parameters for the use of
142. At least six significant bills have been introduced in the Senate, and two in the House of
Representatives. See LARRY PARKER & BRENT D. YACOBUCCI, GREENHOUSE GAS REDUCTION:
CAP-AND-TRADE BILLS IN THE IlOTH CONGRESS 2 (Cong. Research Serv. 2007), available at
http://ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/07Nov/RL33846.pdf. The Pew Center for Global Climate
Change's website provides up-to-date information on proposed federal legislation. See Pew Center
on Global Climate Change, Climate Action in Congress, http://www.pewclimate.org/what s_
beingdone/in the congress/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2008).
143. S. 2191, 110th Cong. (2007).
144. Id. § 1201(d).
145. Id. § 9004(a) (any state can "adopt or enforce--(1) any standard, cap, limitation, or prohi-
bition relating to emissions of greenhouse gas; or (2) any requirement relating to control, abatement,
or avoidance of emissions of greenhouse gas") and § 9004(b) (stating, as an exception, that the states
cannot adopt any such standards or requirements if they are less stringent than those imposed by the
bill). The law also encourages states to adopt more demanding emissions limitations by allocating
extra allowances to such states and permitting them to use the auction revenue for certain designated
purposes. Two percent of the total allowances are to be distributed among states whose reduction
targets exceed the federal targets and that have imposed more stringent limitations on their facilities.
Id. § 3402. The states are entitled to use the proceeds from the sale of these allowances for a variety
of designated purposes. Id. § 3403(c)(1).
146. See id §§ 1101-3504 (outlining the federal cap-and-trade program).
147. Id. § 1201 (establishing allowances to be allocated each year, effectively establishing each
year's cap); id § 1202 (requiring facilities to demonstrate compliance to EPA).
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
offsets, 148 international trading, 149 emissions banking, 5 ° and emissions
borrowing.
151
While the bill's savings clause allows states to impose more de-
manding regulatory standards,' 52 it does not appear to provide states with
the authority to establish conditions on trades to control their potentially
adverse distributional impacts and could prevent states from controlling
other key political and economic variables. For example, the bill deter-
mines the ratio of free versus auctioned allowances, 153 a highly contested
issue with significant ramifications. The federal government also con-
trols most of the auction revenue.1
54
By including an explicit savings clause for state goals, the Warner-
Lieberman bill takes a step toward cooperative federalism. The bill does
not, however, provide a significant role for state implementation, or pro-
vide much guidance on how the federal government and the states can
together achieve climate change goals. 155 Federal climate change legisla-
tion would benefit from more sustained consideration of how to enlist the
strengths of each jurisdictional level.
B. Selected Cooperative Federalism Models
1. Climate Change Programs
The northeastern states' Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
(RGGI) and the European Union's Emissions Trading System offer ex-
amples of climate change programs that are more decentralized than pro-
posed federal legislation. 156 While a full examination of the role of fed-
eralism in the success or failure of these programs is beyond the scope of
this article, the programs provide models worthy of further consideration.
(a) The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
Under the RGGI program, a number of northeastern states have
agreed to develop a regional cap-and-trade program for electric utili-
148. Id. §§ 2401-11 (Title II, Subtitle D, on offsets).
149. Id. §§ 2501-02 (Title 11, Subtitle E, on international credits).
150. Id. §§ 2201-02 (Title 1I, Subtitle B, on banking).
151. Id. §§ 2301-03 (Title II, Subtitle C, on borrowing).
152. See id. § 9004 (outlining states' authority to set more stringent standards).
153. Id. § 3201 (listing the percentage of allowances to be auctioned each year from 2012
through 2050, referred to as "Allocation for Annual Auctions").
154. See, e.g., id. § 4302 (specifying the distribution of proceeds from the federal government's
annual auction). Although the bill does allocate some allowances to states and provide them with a
wide range of choices over how to spend the revenue from the sale of those allowances, id. §§ 3401-
03, the vast majority of the allowances are controlled by the federal government.
155. Nor have any of the other bills proposed in the 110th Congress addressed the state role.
See Robert B. McKinstry, Jr., John C. Dembach & Thomas D. Peterson, Federal Climate Change
Legislation as if the States Matter, 22 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 3, 3-4 (2008).
156. See MEMORANDUM, supra note 4; see also EUROPA, EMISSION TRADING SCHEME (EU
ETS), http://ec.europa.eu/environment/clinat/emission.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2008).
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ties, 1 57 slated to begin operation in 2009. 158 The Memorandum of Under-
standing (MOU) embodying the agreement includes a mix of centralized
and decentralized features. It establishes a regional emissions cap 59 and
then translates the regional goal into state-specific caps. 60  The MOU
does not explicitly preempt the states from setting more rigorous state-
specific reduction goals if they so choose, but the states are unlikely to
set more stringent goals since their interests were presumably already
embodied in the state caps they negotiated under the MOU.1
6'
The MOU, as well as the Model Rule the states negotiated to pro-
vide a template for each states' implementing regulations, 62 allows the
states some implementation discretion. The MOU gives the states con-
siderable discretion in the politically sensitive determination of how to
allocate allowances. While it requires the states to auction a minimum of
25 percent of the allowances and to allocate the proceeds to a "consumer
benefit or strategic energy purpose,"'' 63 the MOU does not otherwise ap-
pear to place constraints on the states' allocation rules and implicitly
gives them the discretion to determine whether to auction or distribute
the remaining 75 percent of their allowances. The states also retain per-
mitting authority.164
In contrast, the MOU takes a highly centralized approach on other
design features. For example, it requires all states to allow emissions
banking "without limitation,"' 65 and also requires the states to set a three-
year compliance period.
166
Other operational parameters appear to establish minimum require-
ments, without explicitly precluding states from taking a more stringent
approach. For example, the RGGI program imposes limitations on the
use of offsets, but does not explicitly prevent the states from imposing
additional limitations. 167  Nor does the MOU or Model Rule address
157. See MEMORANDUM, supra note 4.
158. Id. § 3(C).
159. See id. § 2(B).
160. Id. § 2(C).
161. See Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Overview of RGGJ C0 2 Budget Trading Pro-
gram 3 (Oct. 2007), available at http://www.rggi.org/docs/programsummary 10_07.pdf (observing
that the state caps embodied in the MOU were negotiated among the states).
162. See Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative Model Rule (Jan. 5, 2007), available at
http://www.rggi.org/docs/model-rule corrected 1 5 07.pdf
163. MEMORANDUM, supra note 4, § 2(G)(I).
164. Overview of RGGI C0 2 Budget Program, supra note 161, at 3.
165. MEMORANDUM, supra note 4, § 2(I).
166. Id. § 2(E)(1). In other words, every three years, sources must prove that they had enough
allowances during the preceding three-year period to cover their emissions.
167. The MOU establishes "minimum," not final, offset eligibility requirements. Id. §
2(F)(l)(a). It indicates the type of offset projects that "may," not "must" be approved by a state, and
indicates the terms under which offset allowances "may" be obtained from elsewhere within the
United States, not that they "must" be accepted. Id. §§ 2(F)(1)(b), (2). The MOU also appears to
give the states the authority to allow greater use of offsets as a "safety valve"-that is, to allow states
to use more offsets if allowance prices increase past a certain point, rather than requiring them to
allow the greater use of offsets. Id. § 2(F)(3)-(4).
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whether states could impose limits on trading to help achieve co-
pollutant reductions in heavily polluted areas.
Although the MOU and Model Rule do not explicitly preempt most
state implementation variations, the states are nonetheless seeking con-
sistency. One of the program's "guiding principles for program design"
states that "[t]he program will emphasize uniformity to facilitate inter-
state trading in GHG allowances .... ,,168 According to a New York
State official, notwithstanding the MOU's potential flexibility, the states'
are currently striving for as much uniformity as possible.
169
The MOU indicates that if a comparable federal program is adopted,
"the Signatory States will transition into the federal program."'170 How-
ever, one participating official indicated that the RGGI states do not want
federal legislation to prevent them from meeting their unique goals or to
undercut their implementation decisions. 171
The RGGI program could provide important insights for future fed-
eral legislation. While the participating states have perceived the desir-
ability of uniformity in a cap-and-trade program, the program nonethe-
less suggests that state-specific caps and allowing states to control allow-
ance allocation are potential design options.
(b) The European Union's Climate Change Program
Under the Kyoto Protocol, the European nations agreed to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions to eight percent below 1990 levels by 2012.172
To meet their collective Kyoto Protocol goal, the European Union ini-
tially developed a "burden-sharing agreement" that establishes emissions
goals for each state.1 73 To address carbon dioxide emissions from certain
energy-intensive sectors comprising about 45 percent of European emis-
sions, the European Union established an Emissions Trading System
(ETS). 174 The program commenced trading in 2005.17
168. Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Goals and Guiding Principles, available at
http://www.rggi.org/goals.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2008).
169. Personal communication with Peter lwanowicz, Director, Climate Change Office, New
York State Department of Environmental Conservation (March 28, 2008).
170. MEMORANDUM, supra note 4, § 6(C).
171. Personal communication, Peter lwanowicz, supra note 169.
172. LARRY PARKER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CLIMATE CHANGE: THE EU EMISSIONS
TRADING SCHEME (ETS) GETS READY FOR KYOTO 2 (2007).
173. See PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, THE EUROPEAN UNION EMISSIONS
TRADING SCHEME (EU-ETS) INSIGHTS AND OPPORTUNITIES 4-5 (2005),
http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/EU-ETS%20White%20Paper.pdf. The percentage reduc-
tions for each country differ considerably, reflecting underlying economic and political circum-
stances in each state.
174. PARKER, supra note 172, at 1.
175. Id.
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The current ETS approach embodies a relatively decentralized co-
operative federalist approach.176  The European Commission provides
centralized principles and oversight but leaves key decisions to the mem-
ber states. 177 Under the first two phases of the ETS, each state had the
authority to establish its own emissions cap and to distribute allowances
to covered sources,1 78 subject to certain criteria established by the Euro-
pean Commission (EC). 179 In addition, the states can develop various
conditions determining sources' eligibility for allowances, like requiring
them to adopt existing greenhouse gas reduction technologies as a pre-
requisite to receiving allowances,' 80 as well as other policies. 81  The
states emissions goals, allocation decisions, and trading policies must be
embodied in a National Allocation Plan, which must comply with a
number of EC criteria and be approved by the EC.
18 2
In addition to establishing certain general criteria and oversight over
National Allocation Plans, the European Commission has largely dic-
tated the choice between auctions and the free distribution of allowances,
allowing states to auction only five percent in Phase 1 of the program
(2005-08), increasing to ten percent in Phase 2.183 Otherwise, however,
the programs are generally quite decentralized in their central attributes.
As one commentator has noted, giving countries the authority to de-
velop their own allocation plans has allowed them "to maintain substan-
tial control over energy policy and related economic investment .... ,,84
Decentralized state control has been controversial. 85 While it has al-
lowed states to control decisions of critical political and economic impor-
tance, the member states have not been successful at reducing actual
emissions. 86 Some states had inaccurate data on actual emissions and
included overly optimistic growth projections, resulting in caps that were
too high, flooding the market with allowances and failing to drive real
176. See JOSEPH KRUGER, WALLACE E. OATES, AND WILLIAM A. PIZER, DECENTRALIZATION
IN THE EU EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME AND LESSONS FOR GLOBAL POLICY 5 (Feb. 2007) (Re-
sources for the Future Discussion Paper, RFF DP 07-02).
177. See id.
178. See PARKER, supra note 172, at 3.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 18. The practice of imposing threshold technology-based requirements has been
termed "benchmarking." Given the difficulties of determining appropriate technologies, however,
states have not generally pursued this option. Id. at 18. There is also some evidence that states have
manipulated the technology requirements to favor in-state resources. For example, Germany im-
posed technology requirements that favor domestic coal and provide no incentive to switch to less-
polluting fuels. Id. at 18-19.
181. The states can also set their own policies regarding how to allocate allowances to new
sources, id at 15, and on the marketability of emissions from facilities that have shut down. Id. at
17-18.
182. Id. at 3.
183. See id at 13-14. States have varied in their use of auctions, with only a few choosing to
auction any allowances in Phase 1 or Phase 2. Id.
184. Id. at 19.
185. See id. at 19-20; KRUGER, OATES, & PIZER, supra note 176.
186. See PARKER, supra note 172, at 6.
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reductions.1 87 In addition, states distributed allowances in a manner that
favored in-state businesses and created competitive distortions.
88
In designing Phase 3 of the European Union's program, slated to
begin in 2013, the European Commission has recently proposed substan-
tially revising the cooperative federalist approach to its trading pro-
gram, 89 although it has retained a strong state role for other aspects of its
climate change program. 90 According to a proposed plan issued in
January 2008, the program will become more centralized. Rather than
relying on the states to set their own caps, the European Commission will
set a European Union-wide cap and eliminate the NAP process. 19' The
states would remain responsible for distributing and auctioning allow-
ances, but would do so under EU-wide rules and based upon EU-wide
equity considerations.' 
92
While the European Commission proposal for Phase 3 centralizes a
formerly decentralized trading system, other aspects of the proposal con-
tinue to rely on member state actions. Since the trading program covers
only about one-half of the European Union's emissions, with the remain-
der coming from sectors like buildings, agriculture, waste, and small
facilities, the EC has set a European Union-wide emissions goal for the
non-trading sector, but then intends to set more specific non-ETS reduc-
tion targets for each state.' 93 The states would, however, be responsible
for determining how to meet the target. 194 The European Union has also
set a national renewable energy goal, but has then used numerous equita-
ble and practical factors to determine state-specific goals. 95 The states
themselves are to develop national action plans for meeting the EU's
state-specific renewable energy goals.
196
The EU's recent renunciation of a decentralized trading system sug-
gests that determining the appropriate mix of federal requirements and
state flexibility in a trading program requires care to ensure that state
187. Id. at 5-6. Thus, the cause of the ETS' initial failure could be partially attributable to
inaccurate data, not the system's decentralized nature.
188. See Press Release, Europa, Questions and Answers on the Commission's Proposal to
Revise the EU Emissions Trading System 2 (noting competitive distortions from state allocations)




190. See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, COMMUNICATION FROM THE
COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL COMMITTEE, AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS 7 (Jan. 23, 2008), http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri-COM:2008:0030:F1N:EN:PDF.
191. See Europa, supra note 188, at 3.
192. See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, supra note 190, at 6.
193. See id. at 7.
194. See id.
195. Id.
196. Id. The European Council has articulated the importance of letting member states decide
their own energy policy.
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flexibility does not undermine federal objectives. Rather than eliminat-
ing the state role entirely, the ETS's difficulties could perhaps have been
avoided by having the federal government, not the states, set each state's
trading sector cap, 197 and by having stronger federal minimum require-
ments. The EU's proposed approach to the non-trading sector, in which
it will establish state-specific goals but rely on the states to determine
how to achieve them, could provide a useful model for the United States'
domestic climate change policy.
2. The Clean Air Act
Cooperative federalism is nothing new in U.S. pollution policy:
The nation's primary pollution control statutes, the Clean Air Act (CAA)
and the Clean Water Act (CWA), rely on a cooperative federalist ap-
proach.' 98 In this section, I focus primarily on the Clean Air Act because
it provides a highly relevant model for future climate change legisla-
tion.' 99
The CAA establishes minimum federal air quality goals, 200 criteria
pollutant controls for new sources everywhere and for existing sources in
nonattainment areas,2° 1 and hazardous pollutant controls for both new
and existing sources.20 2 On the preemption front, it preserves state
autonomy by explicitly allowing states to adopt more rigorous air quality
goals and source controls.20 3
More broadly, the CAA devolves significant implementation au-
thority to the states, giving the states the ultimate responsibility for
achieving national air quality goals. The states must develop state im-
plementation plans (SIPs) that demonstrate how the states will achieve
federal goals through applying federal minimum requirements, applying
197. Cf KRUGER, ET AL., supra note 176, at 7 (indicating the complexity of determining the
relative economic efficiency of having the Member States or the European Union establish each
state's trading-sector cap).
198. See Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and Contemporary
Models, 54 MD. L. REV. 1141, 1174 (1995).
199. The Clean Air Act is, of course, not just a model for future climate change legislation, but
a potential vehicle for current greenhouse gas controls. See McKinstry et al., supra note 155, at 3
(arguing that, with a few modifications, the existing Clean Air Act could be used to address climate
change); McKinstry & Peterson, supra note 2, at 98-104 (same). Since it is an imperfect vehicle for
a global, as compared with a local, pollutant, Congress is likely to choose a new approach to address
climate change. I therefore treat the Clean Air Act as a model for future legislation.
200. The CAA requires EPA to establish National Ambient Air Quality Standards to protect
the public health and the environment from the most pervasive and ubiquitous pollutants. 42
U.S.C.A. § 7409(b)(1) (West 2008).
201. EPA establishes New Source Performance Standards, minimum technology-based stan-
dards for certain categories of new sources. 42 U.S.C.A. § 741 l(b)(l)(B) (West 2008). The Clean
Air Act establishes additional criteria for permits for new sources, including requiring the Lowest
Achievable Emissions Rate in nonattainment areas, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7503(a)(2) (West 2008), and
installation of the Best Available Control Technology in attainment areas. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7475(a)(4)
(West 2008).
202. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412(d)(3) (West 2008).
203. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7416 (West 2008) (savings clause).
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more stringent source controls as necessary, and taking other measures
that may not be directly required under federal law.204  This structure
gives states the autonomy to respond to state-specific environmental
conditions and preferences.2 °5 To provide a "check" on the state's im-
plementation process, the federal government must approve the SIPs.
20 6
The Clean Air Act experience also offers two models for cap-and-
trade programs. The Acid Rain Program to address the long-distance
transport of sulphur and nitrogen oxides is a highly centralized national
program in which the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) controls
the nature and distribution of allowances.20 7 In contrast, aspects of the
cap-and-trade program under the Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR), a
rule EPA developed to address the interstate transport of nitrogen oxides,
sulfur oxides, and particulates, 2 8 are more decentralized. EPA estab-
lishes state-specific caps for each of the three trading programs created
by CAIR and then gives states the option of achieving the reductions
internally or participating in a regional cap-and-trade program.20 9 States
that choose to meet the nitrogen oxide cap by participating in a regional
trading program must comply with model cap-and-trade rules, but retain
considerable flexibility under those rules.2 10 States can choose how to
allocate allowances (by free distribution or by auction), how often to
distribute allowances, the basis for allocating allowances, and can set
aside allowances if they choose. 21 1 The CAIR program's decentralized
structure suggests the potential viability of a more decentralized cap-and-
trade program model than that currently contemplated by federal climate
change legislation.
The Clean Air Act's cooperative federalism experience has not been
an unqualified success: Despite general improvements in air quality, the
states have often been resistant to federal mandates 212 and have often
failed to develop state implementation plans that achieve federal air qual-
ity goals.213 Conceivably, stronger federal minimums could have set the
bar higher: The Clean Air Act has not been as rigorous for existing
sources as it is for new or modified sources. In addition, notwithstanding
204. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7410(a)(1) (West 2008).
205. See Dwyer, supra note 54, at 1198.
206. § 7410(k)(1)(C).
207. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7651 (West 2008).
208. See Mack McGuffey & Gary R. Sheehan, Jr., Taking Care of CAIR, 20 NAT. RESOURCES
& ENV'T 67 (2005).
209. Id.
210. Id. The trading program for sulfur oxides is integrated with the nationally run Acid Rain
Program. Id.
211. Id.
212. See Dwyer, supra note 54, at 1199-1216 (describing state resistance to EPA's requiring
states to address land use, transportation, and automobile inspection and maintenance programs in
their SIPs); Percival, supra note 198, at 1161.
213. The extent to which many areas of the country continue to fail to attain air quality goals
testifies to the states' failure to meet air quality goals. See supra note 84 (providing website showing
the nation's nonattainment areas).
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the importance of state flexibility in developing SIPs and the history of
state resistance to federally-imposed SIP requirements,2 14 the federal
government may need to be even more detailed in its requirements and
more aggressive in its enforcement. A full analysis of the role of federal-
ism in contributing to the success or failure of the Clean Air Act is be-
yond the scope of this article, but would be a fruitful area for further in-
quiry.
Policymakers therefore have numerous cooperative federalist mod-
els to consider in designing future federal climate change legislation.
The experience to date suggests that strong federal minimums are essen-
tial to effective policies. At the same time, it also suggests that it is pos-
sible, if not necessary, to provide states with some autonomy to address
their state-specific goals and develop strategies for sectors that have his-
torically been within their control.
IV. A PRELIMINARY SKETCH OF A COOPERATIVE FEDERALIST
STRUCTURE
In this Part, I indicate how a national policy could establish a strong
minimum federal response while retaining state autonomy. I first con-
sider the goals and standards question, and argue that the federal gov-
ernment should set strong minimum goals, such as emission reduction
goals and renewable portfolio standards (RPS), 2 15 but allow the states to
exceed those goals. In addition, I argue that the federal government
should set strong emission control standards but, again, generally allow
states to exceed them (with some qualifications where consistency is a
particular concern).
Setting goals and emissions standards alone are not likely to solve
the problem of climate change, however. A cap-and-trade program could
operate instead of or in addition to direct source controls. In this section,
I analyze the particular federalism issues raised by a cap-and-trade pro-
gram. But, since standards and/or a cap-and-trade program will only go
so far in meeting the nation's emissions reduction goals, I consider the
other mechanisms necessary to reduce emissions. The states could be
key players in addressing the mix of state-specific strategies, including
but not limited to standards and emissions trading. I thus discuss the
potential role of state implementation planning as a key attribute of a
cooperative federalist model.2 16 These preliminary ideas are intended to
generate an ongoing discussion about how to design a cooperative feder-
alist structure that maximizes the benefits of our federal structure.
214. See Dwyer, supra note 54, at 1199-1216.
215. A renewable portfolio standard is a legislative mandate which requires utilities to provide
a minimum percentage of electricity from renewable energy sources. See DeShazo & Freeman,
supra note 2, at 1523.
216. Many other implementation issues must, of course, be resolved, including permitting
enforcement, and the like. I have focused on two of the most controversial issues in this article.
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A. Climate Change Goals and Standards
1. Climate Change Goals
National action to set federal reduction goals is essential. Ideally,
the national goal should reflect the level necessary to reduce net emis-
sions to a sustainable level. However, federal legislation might focus
only on reduction goals in particular sectors, not on setting an overall
national goal.21 7 Moreover, even if a bill were to set a national goal,
opinions differ as to the necessary level. 218 Therefore, federal legislation
should allow states to set their own reduction goals, as long as they are at
least as stringent as the federal goal. As noted above, the Warner-
Lieberman bill not only allows, but encourages, such an approach.
21 9
Other goal-oriented federal programs, like renewable portfolio stan-
dards, could be designed similarly. The federal government could estab-
lish minimum national goals, but individual states could choose higher
goals in light of their citizen preferences and state-specific renewable
energy opportunities. Many states have already developed RPSs, and
federal law could capitalize on that momentum.22°
Federalism principles support strong federal minimum goals. As
discussed above, states could fail to take sufficient action based on state-
specific cost-benefit analysis, an analysis that could fail to take their im-
pact on other states into consideration. 22' A strong national minimum
would also overcome the other impediments to state action: the free
217. For example, the Warner-Lieberman bill, discussed above, establishes the goal of reduc-
ing emissions sufficiently to "avert the catastrophic impact of global climate change," S. 2191, 110th
Cong. § 3(1) (2007), but it does not set a national reduction goal; it simply sets a cap on allowances
for the following facilities covered under the cap-and-trade program: large facilities in the electric
power sector, industrial sector, transportation fuel sector, and nonfuel chemical sector. See id. §§
4(7) (defining "covered facility"), 1201(d) (establishing progressively declining cap for the covered
facilities). A bill proposed by Senator Feinstein is even more limited, focusing solely on a cap-and-
trade program for the electricity sector. The Electric Utility Cap and Trade Act of 2007, S. 317,
110th Cong. (2007).
218. For example, the bills introduced by Senators Kerry and Snowe, on the one hand, and by
Senators Boxer and Sanders, on the other, both seek to stabilize atmospheric concentrations of
carbon dioxide at 450 parts per million. See Global Warming Reduction Act of 2007, S. 485, 110th
Cong. § 702(a)(1)(A) (2007) (Kerry-Snowe bill); Global Warming Pollution Reduction Act of 2007,
S. 309, 11 0th Cong. § 702(l)(B) (2007) (Sanders-Boxer bill). However, the Sanders-Boxer bill
assumes that emissions must be reduced to eighty percent below 1990 levels to achieve that goal, S.
309, § 704(c)(3), while the Kerry-Snowe bill assumes that goal can be achieved by reducing emis-
sions only sixty-two percent below 1990 levels. S. 485, § 702(a)(1)(B) (establishing a goal of reduc-
ing to sixty-five percent below 2000 levels). The Pew Center on Global Climate Change has con-
cluded that a sixty-five percent reduction below 2000 levels in equivalent to a sixty-five percent
reduction below 1990 levels. See PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, ECONOMY-WIDE CAP-
AND-TRADE PROPOSAL IN THE 110TH CONGRESS, http://www.pewclimate.org/doc
Uploads/1 10th%20Congress%20Economy-wide%2OCap&Trade%20Proposals%2001-30-2008%20-
%20Chart.pdf (last visited Mar. 27, 2008).
219. S. 2191, § 3402 (providing that states that set more stringent reduction goals could receive
additional allowances).
220. See DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 2, at 1523.
221. See supra notes 17 to 18 and accompanying text (discussing likelihood that some states
might find that the short-term costs of addressing climate change exceed its benefits).
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rider problem, the race to the bottom, and the states' concerns about leak-
age.222
The importance of federal minimums does not, however, erase the
significance of allowing states to set pollution reduction goals above a
federal minimum. That would enable states to meet their citizens' pref-
erences for strong action,223 and provide a structural antidote to potential
political failure at the federal level.224 Since the goals themselves do not
directly implicate national industrial operations, they do not raise the
consistency concerns that might arise in connection with other types of
regulatory measures. Leakage concerns may well deter the states from
enacting more stringent goals, but that does not mean that the law should
deprive them of that opportunity.
2. Efficiency and Emission Standards
(a) Product Standards
In the climate change context, a sampling of the types of product
standards at issue includes appliance efficiency standards, vehicle emis-
sion standards, and, arguably, biofuels standards. 225  Federal legislation
already addresses all of these areas and, in some cases, addresses pre-
emption. Federal legislation in the 1970s gave the federal government
the authority to set appliance efficiency standards, and that federal au-
thority has been amended several times since.226 The states can develop
standards for products not covered by a federal standard.227  Although
federal law presumptively preempts state standards for appliances cov-
ered by federal standards, the states can develop more stringent effi-
ciency standards if they obtain a preemption waiver from the Department
of Energy.228 Somewhat similarly, the Clean Air Act preempts state ve
222. See supra notes 11 to 12 and accompanying text.
223. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 45 to 53 and accompanying text.
225. Vehicle emission standards are already addressed under the federal Clean Air Act, which
preempts all states except California from adopting their own state standards, Clean Air Act, 42
U.S.C.A. § 7543(a) (West 2008), although it gives other states the choice of adopting the national or
the California standard. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7507 (West 2008). California must, however, obtain a
waiver of preemption from EPA before it can implement its own standards, § 7543(b), a waiver
request that was rejected when California attempted to establish carbon dioxide emissions limits for
mobile sources. See Zachary Coile et al., EPA Blocks California Bid to Limit Greenhouse Gases
from Cars, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 20, 2007, at Al.
226. See John C. Dembach, U.S. Policy, in GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND U.S. LAW 61, 69-
71 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 2007); APPLIANCE STANDARDS AWARENESS PROJECT, APPLIANCE
EFFICIENCY STANDARDS IN THE 2007 ENERGY BILL: KEY FACTS (Dec. 2007),
http://www.standardsasap.org/documents/2007EnergyBill_Standardsfactsheet.pdf.
227. APPLIANCE STANDARDS AWARENESS PROJECT, LEADING THE WAY: CONTINUED
OPPORTUNITIES FOR NEW STATE APPLIANCE AND EQUIPMENT EFFICIENCY STANDARDS iv (2006)
(observing that states can develop standards for products not governed by federal efficiency stan-
dards), available at http://www.standardsasap.org/documents/a062execsum.pdf.
228. See Dernbach, supra note 226, at 70; David Hodas, State Initiatives, in GLOBAL CLIMATE
CHANGE AND U.S. LAW 343, 363 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 2007). The state must demonstrate that
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hile emission standards,2 29 but allows California to adopt divergent
standards if it obtains a preemption waiver from EPA.230 Federal energy
legislation has set biofuels standards for the nation's fuel supply, but
does not preempt the states' ability to set their own biofuels standards.
Since future climate change legislation may revisit these standards and
the preemption question, the discussion remains relevant.
As with federal emission reduction goals, federal minimum stan-
dards are appropriate due to the myriad potential political obstacles to
sufficient state action.231 In addition, the federal government may have
more resources to engage in research,232 and having all 50 states conduct
the same research would be inefficient.233
Moreover, as discussed above, product standards, particularly for
products in national commerce, do raise consistency concerns, since they
could require individual plants to develop separate production lines to
234market their products in different states. In addition, some states
might develop product standards that are intended to protect state indus-
tries rather than the environment.235
Nonetheless, preemption has its costs: If the federal government is
captured by special interests, it could fail to develop standards that some
states believe possible and necessary.236 Federal standards, once devel-
oped, might languish, rather than continually evolve.237 In addition,
companies operating in a global marketplace have survived the inconsis-
tencies presented by differing countries' standards.238 Thus, the best
balance could be some form of limited, rather than complete, preemp-
tion. Federal control, through a waiver requirement, could control the
multiplicity of standards. It could also provide a check against purely
protectionist state standards.
The history of appliance efficiency and motor vehicle standards
suggests that allowing limited state autonomy might be desirable, not-
its more stringent regulation is needed to meet "unusual and compelling State or local energy" needs.
See id. at 363-64.
229. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7543(a).
230. Id. § 7543(b).
231. See supra notes 9 to 19 and accompanying text.
232. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
233. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
234. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
235. See Rabe, Roman & Dobelis, supra note 9, at 32-33 (discussing potential for state fuel
standards to serve protectionist purposes). Mixed motives are, of course, possible. A state that
promotes efficiency is likely to generate industries that achieve it. The issue would be whether the
standard is a pretext that fails to achieve efficiency, not whether the standard would incidentally
favor state industry.
236. See supra notes 47 to 49 and accompanying text.
237. For example, U.S. automakers face a variety of vehicle emissions standards in the global
marketplace.
238. See McKinstry & Peterson, supra note 2, at 90.
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withstanding consistency concerns. 2 9 After appliance efficiency stan-
dards were federalized in the 1970s, the federal government was slow to
adopt standards.2 40  Progress continued, however, because states-like
California-continued to adopt stringent appliance efficiency stan-
dards. 24' Thus, innovation continued notwithstanding the federal paraly-
sis. 142 Over time, increasing state activity created political pressure for
uniform national efficiency standards, prompting federal efficiency stan-
dards for some products.24 3 The cycle of diverse state standards prompt-
ing federal action was repeated recently, as states developed new stan-
dards in the early 2000s, leading Congress to require additional federal
standards in the Energy Policy Act of 2005.244  The states have thus
served as laboratories of invention that have ultimately inspired national
action.
Limited state autonomy has been productive in the automobile
emissions context as well.245  California has frequently taken advantage
of its unique authority to set stricter vehicle emission standards.246 As a
consequence, the state has spurred innovation in the automobile industry
that would not have occurred with a single federal standard.24 7 Although
EPA denied California's recent request for a waiver for its carbon diox-
ide vehicle emissions standards, commentators believe that EPA acted
contrary to statutory provisions requiring that the waiver be granted and
that the courts are likely to reverse the decision (if it is not reversed by
administrative or legislative action before the courts act). 248 These con-
siderations are likely to be relevant to the future preemption fate of state-
set biofuels requirements, like California's low-carbon fuel standard,24 9
239. See Engel, supra note 9, at 170-72.
240. See U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, Energy Efficiency: Long-Standing Problems with
DOE's Program for Setting Efficiency Standards Continue to Result in Forgone Energy Savings,
GAO Rep. No. 07-42, at 9 (2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0742.pdf; see also
Engel & Saleska, supra note 6, at 225 (observing that the federal government did not set any effi-
ciency standards because it did not believe they were economically justified); APPLIANCE EFFI-
CIENCY STANDARDS IN THE 2007 ENERGY BILL, supra note 226 (noting that the first federal appli-
ance efficiency standards were not set until 1987).
241. APPLIANCE STANDARDS AWARENESS PROJECT, supra note 227, at iii.
242. See Engel, supra note 9, at 170-72.
243. See APPLIANCE STANDARDS AWARENESS PROJECT, supra note 227, at iii; Engel & Sale-
ska, supra note 6, at 225-26.
244. APPLIANCE STANDARDS AWARENESS PROJECT, supra note 227, at iv.
245. See Carlson, supra note 42, at 311-18 (discussing the value of California's autonomy to
develop its own vehicle emission standards); Engel, supra note 9, at 187.
246. See CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, AIR RESOURCES BOARD, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUES-
TIONS: EMISSION REDUCTION STANDARDS FOR VEHICLES, http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/factsheetsl
ccfaq.pdf (last visited Mar. 27, 2008). California has set more stringent standards many times, and
has almost always received a waiver from EPA to do so. Id.
247. Engel, supra note 9, at 187.
248. See Zachary Coile, Behind EPA's Rejection of State Emission Rules, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 24,
2008, at A-1. The recent motor vehicle saga suggests that waiver provisions should clearly set forth
the circumstances in which waivers must be granted, rather than leaving the decision to pure federal
administrative discretion. Otherwise, the states have no recourse against federal capture or inertia.
249. See Exec. Order No. S-01-07 (Jan. 18, 2007), available at http://gov.ca.gov/index.php?/
print-version/executive-order/5172.
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as the federal government increasingly sets national renewable fuels
standards. °
The appliance efficiency and automobile standards cases indicate
that allowing states to adopt their own standards, subject to federal over-
sight through a waiver provision, could prompt technological innovation
and provide an antidote to the federal government's failure to act. Al-
lowing limited state autonomy would also generate a more dynamic in-
quiry into what is technologically possible, countering potential bureau-
cratic inertia once standards are set.
(b) Pollution Control Standards
In light of the Supreme Court's 2006 ruling, in Massachusetts v.
EPA, that greenhouse gases are "pollutants" under the Clean Air Act,
251
EPA likely already has the authority to control greenhouse gases by set-
ting pollution control standards, like New Source Performance Standards
and the standards associated with New Source Review. 252  As noted
above, the Clean Air Act explicitly allows the states to set more stringent
source controls. 253 Nonetheless, it is possible that a newly-proposed cap-
and-trade program could preempt efforts to establish direct source con-
trols for facilities covered by the cap-and-trade program.254 It is also
possible that the federal government will consider comprehensive cli-
mate change legislation that could explicitly or implicitly preempt state
greenhouse gas controls, notwithstanding the savings clause in the Clean
Air Act. The federalism issues presented by state pollution control stan-
dards therefore require consideration.
Ideally, federal legislation would establish federal minimums for
existing and new facilities to ensure that all facilities adopt available
mechanisms to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.255 Such federal stan-
250. Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, 121 Stat. 1492. At
present, the federal renewable fuels requirements and California's low-carbon fuel standard are quite
different, since California's standard is intended to reduce lifecycle carbon emissions and the renew-
able fuels standards do not directly address carbon emissions. In fact, given the carbon intensity
associated with generating corn ethanol, the federal standard might not be a low-carbon standard.
See BRIAN T. TURNER ET AL., CREATING MARKETS FOR BIOFUELS 38 (2007), available at
http://repositories.cdlib.org/its/tsrcUCB-ITS-TSRC-RR-2007-1/ (concluding that ethanol from coal-
fired facilities generates the same or more greenhouse gases as gasoline).
251. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1460 (2007).
252. See McKinstry & Peterson, supra note 2, at 101 (regarding new source performance
standards).
253. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7416(b) (West 2008).
254. For example, an early version of a bill to create a cap-and-trade program for the electricity
sector would have explicitly exempted state regulation of that industry. DeShazo & Freeman, supra
note 2, at 1536 n. 135. Although deleted, the issue is likely to arise again. Id.
255. Unlike the federal Clean Air Act, federal legislation should direct EPA to set standards for
all existing facilities, avoiding the federal loophole for existing facilities in attainment areas. See
supra note 201 and accompanying text. In that respect, climate legislation could thus be modeled
more on the Clean Water Act, which sets federal minimum standards for all existing sources. Clean
Water Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1311 (West 2008).
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dards would help avoid leakage concerns that the states might otherwise
encounter were they to consider state-level regulation.256
Even if the federal government chooses to reduce emissions through
a cap-and-trade program rather than direct regulation, federal legislation
should grant states the power to establish direct greenhouse gas emission
controls on stationary sources. States would thereby retain the ability to
couple the trading system with direct regulations, based on both pruden-
tial257 and equity concerns.258 Allowing divergent state standards would
allow states to meet more stringent goals (if they have them), allow them
to operate as laboratories of invention, avoid bureaucratic inertia on the
issue of what limitations are feasible, and provide an antidote to the risk
of federal capture in setting federal standards.
The case for preempting more stringent production process stan-
dards is less compelling than that for product standards. In the product
context, one industrial plant could face the specter of having to produce
differing products to serve differing state requirements. 259 With produc-
tion process requirements, in contrast, a facility located in one state
would simply have to meet the requirements in that state, not a multiplic-
ity of requirements.260
As with product standards, leakage concerns may make states reluc-
tant to exercise their power to exceed federal pollution control standards.
Nonetheless, I argue that they should retain the option to do so if they
choose.
(c) Building Efficiency Standards
Building efficiency standards present one last example of a standard
that could play a key role in greenhouse gas reductions. While the fed-
eral government would, ideally, set minimum standards, local variations
in weather conditions and materials suggest that state and local entities
should retain their long-standing authority to set more stringent stan-
dards. The building industry has long tolerated divergent local building
standards, and federal consistency is less important for inherently decen-
tralized building activities. Moreover, state and local governments are in
a better position to enforce such broadly-applicable and dispersed stan-
dards.
256. See McKinstry & Peterson, supra note 2, at 101.
257. The primary prudential concern is that the market would be ineffective at prompting
facilities to take already-feasible steps to reduce emissions. See Kaswan, supra note 86, at 10295-
96.
258. The equity concerns raised by a cap-and-trade program are those discussed supra notes 88
to 114 and accompanying text.
259. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
260. See DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 2, at 1508.
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B. Delegating Program Implementation
Federalism issues arise not only in connection with goals and stan-
dards, but in connection with program implementation. Many program
parameters are implicated: If federal legislation seeks to meet emission
reduction goals through a cap-and-trade program in addition to or instead
of through direct source regulation, then the legislation must address the
respective federal and state roles in operating the program. Since federal
emission reduction goals are unlikely to be achievable solely through
direct source regulation and/or a cap-and-trade program, and are likely to
require state and local action, then some mechanism, like state imple-
mentation plans, will be necessary to stimulate the necessary state and
local action and to determine how regulatory actions at multiple levels
will ultimately achieve federal goals. In this article, I focus on these two
parameters, but note that federal legislation will have to address other
critical implementation issues as well, including permitting and enforce-
ment systems.
1. Cap-and-Trade Programs
Federal legislation has generally envisioned a nationally-operated
cap-and-trade program.26' While there are undoubtedly benefits to hav-
ing a national-scale trading program, those benefits do not erase the
states' critical interest in the design and operation of cap-and-trade pro-
grams. A national cap-and-trade program could implicate the states'
abilities to achieve state-specific emission reduction goals, their deci-
sions about the most effective way to accomplish emission reductions,
their decisions about how to reconcile environmental justice and eco-
nomic efficiency goals, and their judgment about how to distribute the
economic benefits and costs that could result from a trading program.
First, unlike RGGI or the European Union's initial ETS, I propose a
presumptively national trading program. It is unlikely that all states
would have the resources and will to set up their own programs.262
Nonetheless, I suggest that states be given the option of establishing their
own programs, subject to certain limitations. I propose that the federal
government determine the state's maximum cap, rather than leaving full
discretion to each state. Having a maximum cap set by the federal gov-
ernment rather than allowing states to freely set their caps would help
avoid the inflated state-set caps experienced in the initial phases of the
ETS. 263
261. See PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 224.
262. Cf Rabe, Roman, & Dobelis, supra note 9, at 11 (discussing some states' unwillingness to
address climate change generally).
263. See supra note 187 and accompanying text (discussing excess allowances issued by Euro-
pean states).
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Certain other features would likely need to be federally-controlled.
Whether administered at the national or state level, a national registry of
emissions, with a standard protocol for registering emissions, is likely to
be necessary. 16 Ideally, monitoring protocols should be standardized,
and the public should have easy access to information about all national
trades.165 With those federal parameters in place, a state could then be
given discretion to decide how many of the allocated allowances it
chooses to distribute and how.
State control over allowance distribution, and the ability to retire
certain allowances, is critical to the state's autonomy to set its own goals
and standards. Without such control, all of the flexibility to set varying
standards discussed in the preceding section could be undermined.
Unless a state can retire unnecessary allowances, a state that set a lower
cap and required its sources to reduce by more than the national goal
2 66
would simply free up allowances that other states' sources could use,
undermining the restrictive state's more demanding goals. In addition, if
a state chose to regulate some sources directly instead of relying solely
on a cap-and-trade program, it would similarly free up allowances that
sources in other states would then use, undermining the reductions the
state hoped to achieve through direct regulation.267 A state could also be
concerned that the national cap would be too high, and allowances too
numerous, to create a strong enough price signal to prompt reductions
and technological innovation. A state could therefore choose to retire
some allowances in order to create higher allowance prices and further
stimulate innovation. 268 Due to monitoring and enforcement concerns, a
state might also choose a narrower sectoral scope for its trading program
than that used in a federal program. If so, the state would want the dis-
264. The states have recognized this reality. More than half the states have agreed to partici-
pate in an emissions registry. Janet Wilson, 31 States to Track Warming: They Form a Climate
Registry that Will Measure and Compile Greenhouse Gas Emissions by Industry, L.A. TIMES, May
9, 2007, at A23.
265. In the event that federal legislation establishes weak monitoring protocols or does not
require transparent information on trading, however, I would argue that states should have the au-
thority to establish more rigorous requirements.
266. States could, alternatively, achieve more stringent state goals by requiring their facilities
to obtain or purchase a higher ratio of allowances for each ton of emissions. That would effectively
"retire" the excess allowances. It is also theoretically possible that reductions to be achieved as a
consequence of more stringent state goals, or reductions achieved through state standards rather than
trading, could be subtracted from the national cap rather than retired by individual states. See
McKinstry et al., supra note 155, at 4 (observing that reductions achieved outside of a cap-and-trade
program must be subtracted from the cap). Such an effort would, however, raise a number of com-
plex practical and policy questions that would render it difficult to administer.
267. California, for one, is already engaging in regulatory efforts. See supra notes 93-99
(describing role of regulation in California's implementation of AB 32). While it may ultimately
adopt a cap-and-trade program, the reductions to be achieved through the cap-and-trade program are
likely to be less than would have been necessary had the state not combined the program with a
regulatory effort.
268. Unless a state has a strong technology sector that hopes to benefit from such an approach,
interstate competitiveness concerns are likely to render this approach unlikely. Ideally, the national
cap would be low enough to set an appropriate nationwide price signal.
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cretion to retire the allowances associated with the sectors that were not
included in the state's program. Thus, a state's ability to retire allow-
ances is necessary to give states real authority to adopt more demanding
goals or standards.
State control over allowance distribution would also allow the state
to control key political and economic variables-variables that could
differ by state. States that chose to administer their own programs could
retain some discretion about the degree to which allowances should be
distributed for free or auctioned. Many factors are likely to influence a
state's decision about how much and to whom to auction. The impacts
of auctioning could vary considerably by industry, with differences in
industries' ability to pass costs along to consumers. Different industries
could also face differing competitiveness constraints, and pose varying
risks of "flight" in reaction to auctioning.269 States may also differ in
their commitment to the "polluter pays" principle underlying an auction
approach. Some states may also be concerned that distributing allow-
ances for free could provide undeserved corporate profits.27 °
In order to allow states the freedom to auction, however, the federal
government may need to establish strong minimum auction levels so that
states do not fear that the decision to auction will undermine their com-
petitiveness or generate leakage.271 Under the RGGI program, for exam-
ple, all states are required to auction a minimum of 25 percent of allow-
ances.2 72 Politically, however, the slowly increasing auction levels speci-
fied in proposed federal legislation may be all that can be expected.273
States should thus retain the ability to auction more than the federal mini-
mum.274
Auction revenues could also provide states with a key mechanism
for addressing climate change and its regulatory impacts, including, for
example, energy efficiency assistance to low-income consumers, worker
training and retraining programs, research and development for new
technologies, and adaptation financing.275 Given the critical needs that
could be filled with auction revenues, some federal guidance in the
269. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (discussing risk of leakage).
270. See Kaswan, supra note 86, at 10295. Complaints about "windfall profits" have tainted
the European Union's trading system. See PARKER, supra note 172, at 14.
271. In the European Union's trading program, for example, few states have auctioned even the
minimum five percent allowable in Phase 1, and few plan to auction up to the minimum ten percent
in Phase 2. See PARKER, supra note 172, at 13-14. One of the innovations in Phase 3's more cen-
tralized program is to establish progressively increasing auction levels for the EU trading program.
See Europa, supra note 188, at 3.
272. See MEMORANDUM, supra note 4, § 2(G)(1).
273. See America's Climate Security Act, S. 2191, 110th Cong. § 3201 (2007).
274. Many of the RGGI states are planning to auction well over the required 25 percent. See
Overview ofRGGI C0 2 Budget Program, supra note 161, at 4.
275. See, e.g., Kaswan, supra note 86, at 10312 (describing certain environmental justice goals
that could be met with auction revenues).
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state's use of auction revenues would be useful.276 Nonetheless, federal
legislation could provide states that administer their own programs and
choose to auction with some discretionary authority over how to use a
portion of the auction revenues.
State control over a cap-and-trade program would also allow states
to address the environmental justice implications of such programs in the
event that federal legislation does not include sufficient protections. As
discussed above, environmental justice provisions could, potentially,
277have a significant impact on the contours of a trading program. States
should therefore retain the ability to include trading limitations that
achieve environmental co-benefits in disadvantaged neighborhoods. The
limitations could include limits on trading into disadvantaged areas, lim-
its on the use of offsets, and limits on international allowances that do
not achieve domestic reductions.278
Unless federal legislation explicitly allows these types of restric-
tions, the courts could find that they conflict with the terms and goals of
the national trading program and are therefore preempted.2 7 9 For exam-
ple, when New York attempted to regulate trades under the national Acid
Rain Program due to air quality concerns, the Second Circuit held that
the state's efforts were preempted by the national acid rain trading sys-
tem, which did not impose geographic trading limitations.28 °
State implementation of a trading system could also help detect and
prevent violations of traditional air permits. The states have the primary
authority for administering air pollution permits under the Clean Air
Act.281 Separating the management of greenhouse gases from the control
of harmful co-pollutants could increase the likelihood of undetected and
unlawful increases in co-pollutant emissions. If the same agency were
responsible for both greenhouse gases and their co-pollutants, it would
be easier to confirm that changes in greenhouse gas emissions accom-
plished through a trading program did not violate co-pollutant permit
requirements. Given the critical environmental consequences at stake,
states should have the autonomy to control the operation of cap-and-trade
276. See, e.g., America's Climate Security Act, S. 2191, 110th Cong. § 3403.
277. See discussion supra Part lI.B. States might couple trading with direct regulation, limit
trading into heavily-polluted areas, or take other measures to maximize the co-pollutant reduction
benefits of climate change regulation. Id.
278. In order to encourage actual reductions within the regulated sector, the RGGI program
places limits on the use of offsets. See Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, supra note 168.
279. Since the restrictions would likely reduce the cost-savings from trading, they could be
found to conflict with a national goal of facilitating the lowest-cost reductions.
280. Clean Air Mkts. Group v. Pataki, 338 F.3d 82, 89 (2d Cir. 2003). State restrictions on
national trades could also be found invalid under the dormant commerce clause. The district court in
Clean Air Markets addressed this issue. Clean Air Mkts. Group v. Pataki, 194 F. Supp. 2d 147, 160
(N.D.N.Y. 2002). This constitutional question deserves attention but is beyond the scope of this
article.
281. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7401 (West 2008); 40 C.F.R. § 70.1 (2006).
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programs and to harmonize them with the states' other environmental
objectives.
From a federalism standpoint, a decentralized cap-and-trade pro-
gram is more controversial than decentralized goals, pollution control
standards, or developing state implementation plans for climate action.
An unencumbered national allowance market would likely be easier to
administer than one that is national with respect to trading in some states
and subject to state-based limitations in others. In addition, having dif-
ferent rules in different states would complicate the market's operation
and have some impact on the market's economic efficiency goals. State-
imposed constraints could impede some industries' ability to take advan-
tage of nationally available low-cost emission reduction opportunities.
The difficulties experienced in the European Union's decentralized trad-
ing system suggest the need for caution in allowing state variation within
a national market.282
At the same time, a national cap-and-trade program that precluded
state limitations would sacrifice critical state prerogatives. States would,
in effect, lose control over their individual reduction goals or standards,
which could be thwarted if they simply lead to the increased availability
of allowances elsewhere. They would be unable to control the price sig-
nals that could prompt in-state technological innovation and develop-
ment. And they would not be able to control the co-pollutant conse-
quences of trading and the general distribution of environmental co-
benefits. Not having control over whether to auction or freely distribute
allowances would curtail their ability to address the economic impacts of
trading, and, if they chose, their ability to adopt the "polluter pays" prin-
ciple. Nor could they control the auction revenue stream.
These incursions on state autonomy are a high price to pay for na-
tional efficiency. Moreover, the proposal above would not lead to as
much inefficiency as a purely state-centered approach; it would give
states the option, not require them, to run their cap-and-trade programs.
It is not clear how many states would accept the opportunity.283 If rela-
tively few did, then allowing some state autonomy would not have as
large an impact on efficiency as 50 individual programs.
282. See supra notes 185 to 188 and accompanying text.
283. Of course, if state-centered trading created control over auction revenues, it might provide
states with a strong incentive to adopt their own programs. Those programs could use minimum
federal guidelines, however, so state control over auctioning would not necessarily result in a multi-
plicity of inconsistent state rules. See supra note 192 and accompanying text (describing European
Union's Phase 3 centralized rules coupled with decentralized auctions). This is not to advocate for
centralizing rules to the extent proposed in the EU. But if minimum federal rules are adopted, then
most states are likely to follow the federal rules, reducing the multiplicity of approaches that full
decentralization could engender.
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2. State Implementation Plans
Even a highly centralized federal program is likely to require a role
for the states in achieving federal goals. Once federal legislation estab-
lishes a national emissions reduction goal, a key issue remains: How
will it be achieved? First, many critical sectors are within state, not fed-
eral control, and a state implementation plan could demonstrate how the
states will contribute their part to meeting national goals.284 Second, in
light of the delegation of standard-setting and program operations I pro-
pose, state implementation plans could provide a vehicle for collecting
information on the state programs and providing federal oversight.
Although some policymakers appear to presume that a cap-and-
trade program will provide a sufficient solution, a more multi-faceted
approach is necessary. 285 The federal government cannot simply set the
cap at the targeted reduction level and expect the market's invisible hand
286to efficiently guide the nation toward the required reductions. Not all
sectors are amenable to cap-and-trade: To operate efficiently and effec-
tively, cap-and-trade programs are likely to be limited to major sectors in
which emissions contributions can be effectively monitored. A cap-and-
trade program is therefore unlikely to address small sources or sources
where monitoring is difficult.
A cap-and-trade program is also unlikely to be a tool that could
guide major components of a greenhouse gas reduction policy. To ac-
complish certain goals, like reducing consumer electricity demand, direct
standards like building or appliance efficiency standards are likely to be
more effective than relying on the market to trigger the necessary emis-
sion reduction incentives.28 7 Since buildings consume 70 percent of the
nation's electricity, increasing building standards could be a key mecha-
nism for reducing greenhouse gases, and relying exclusively on the mar-
ket to trigger private incentives for building green would be less predict-
able and effective than developing standards.2 88 Increasing appliance
efficiency is likewise unlikely to emerge effectively through a cap-and-
trade program, except through the clumsy mechanism of increasing en-
ergy costs.
284. See McKinstry et al., supra note 155, at 4-6.
285. See id.; McKinstry & Peterson, supra note 2, at 100-0 1.
286. See McKinstry et al., supra note 155, at 6 (describing market imperfections that are likely
to prevent a cap-and-trade program from sending sufficient market signals to induce changes in
consumer demand).
287. See id. (discussing why a cap-and-trade program is unlikely to be sufficient to reduce
consumer demand).
288. Arguably, a cap-and-trade program that drives up energy costs could provide a private
incentive for green buildings, without requiring a regulatory approach. However, operational costs
are often less significant than capital costs in design decisions, dampening the impact of rising
energy prices on building design.
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Other key sources of greenhouse gases, like agriculture, land use
patterns, and landfill practices, may similarly be less amenable to a cap-
and-trade program, in part due to monitoring and verification difficul-
ties.289 Land use is the key driver of the nation's transportation-related
emissions. 290 Transportation constitutes almost 28 percent of the nation's
greenhouse gas emissions. 291 Even as cars have grown more efficient,
the number of vehicle miles traveled has continued to increase, largely as
a consequence of continued sprawl.292 Reducing vehicle miles traveled
through smart growth requirements and improved public transit is likely
to be an essential component of an effective climate change policy,
2 93
and one that cannot be accomplished through a cap-and-trade program.
If setting a cap in a cap-and-trade program will not assure achieve-
ment of a national net reduction goal, then additional mechanisms will be
necessary. However, many of the sectors that are not amenable to cap-
and-trade are sectors that have historically been within state and local
control, such as building standards, land use, and agricultural policy.
294
While minimum federal standards are appropriate where possible, the
states should arguably be given a significant role in implementing poli-
cies over which they have had traditional control. For example, on both
a political and a practical front, it is difficult to imagine how the federal
government could establish and administer land use policy.
The federal government thus needs state planning to achieve federal
goals.29' The Clean Air Act's State Implementation Plans could provide
289. See McKinstry et al., supra note 155, at 7. The agriculture and landfill sectors could
conceivably be addressed by allowing facilities in a cap-and-trade program to purchase offsets from
these sectors to meet their emission reduction targets. However, such programs are likely to be beset
by significant permanence and verification issues that could preclude the use of offsets from the
agricultural sector.
290. See Oliver A. Pollard, III, Smart Growth and Sustainable Transportation: Can We Get
Therefrom Here? 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1529, 1531-32 (2002) (observing the role of post-World-
War-II suburban sprawl in increasing motor vehicle use).
291. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE AND ENVTL. FORECASTING,
PERCENTAGE OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMiSSIONS, 2005, http://www.climate.dot.gov.
292. See ROBERT PATERSON ET AL., TECHNIQUES FOR MITIGATING URBAN SPRAWL 10 (2003)
http://www.utexas.edu/research/ctr/pdf reports/0 4420 2.pdf (stating that VMT increased by almost
100 percent between 1969-1989, while population increased by only 22.5 percent); U.S. DEP'T OF
TRANSP., RESEARCH AND INNOVATIVE TECHNOLOGY ADMINISTRATION, BUREAU OF TRANSP.
STATISTICS, http://www.transtats.bts.gov/DLSelectFields.asp?TablelD=507&DBShortName=
VMT (last visited Mar. 27, 2008) (observing that national VMT increased almost 30 percent from
1990 to 2001).
293. Cf Pollard, supra note 290, at 1549-50 (proposing denser development to reduce driving
and its associated environmental impact).
294. See, e.g., Dwyer, supra note 54, at 1217 (observing the need for a state role in areas like
land use and natural resources law that have long been under state and local controls).
295. A federal law imposing a state planning requirement would have to avoid the constitu-
tional limits on the federal government's ability to require the states to act. See New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 175 (1992) (invalidating a state law that "commandeers" states to carry out
federal statutes). The legislation could condition state funding on the completion of state plans, or as
in the Clean Air Act, it could provide the states with the alternative of having the federal government
prepare their plans for them. See Dwyer, supra note 54, at 1198-99 (observing that a state that failed
to follow state requirements retains the "exit option" of having EPA assume responsibility).
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a model.29 6  Instead of focusing on achieving local air quality standards,
the federal government could determine how much each state must re-
duce its emissions for the nation as a whole to meet its goals. 297  The
process would presumably begin with a flat percentage reduction from a
baseline. The states will undoubtedly expect other relevant factors to be
taken into consideration, including some sort of credit for states that have
already taken emission reduction steps, 298 as well as some recognition of
the extent to which emissions are generated for the use of other states (a
likely concern for power-generating states). The process is likely to be
contested, but this article is not the place to resolve how each state's al-
location should be set. It is also possible that setting state-specific allo-
cations would be so contested that it would not be politically feasible.
Whether state-specific reduction targets are established or not, state
planning to meet federal goals would nonetheless serve many useful
functions, and would build upon the climate change planning efforts
many states have already undertaken.29 9 In a state implementation plan,
the states could indicate how they have adopted any minimum federal
standards or programs that have been established. Since federal mini-
mum standards and programs are unlikely to be sufficient to reach fed-
eral emission reduction goals,30 0 the states would have to indicate how
they plan to address sectors within their control. Given that the sources
of each state's greenhouse gas emissions differ markedly, states are
likely to develop very different programs and to respond to state-specific
conditions and priorities.3°' States that generate electricity are likely to
296. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7410 (West 2008). Kenneth A. Manaster & Daniel P. Selmi, Federal
Standards and State Implementation-State Implementation Plans, 1 STATE ENVTL. L. § 6.5 (2007)
(providing a basic description of state implementation plans).
297. McKinstry et al., supra note 155, at 7-8 (describing numerous potential variables for
determining state reduction obligations). The process could be similar to the development of the
"burden-sharing agreement" developed within the European Union, in which the European nations
determined emissions goals for each state in light of the collective European goal established under
the Kyoto Protocol. See PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, THE EUROPEAN UNION
EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME (EU-ETS): INSIGHTS AND OPPORTUNITIES 4-5 (describing burden-
sharing agreement) (2005), available at http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/
EU%2DETS%2OWhite%20Paper%2Epdf.
298. See McKinstry et al., supra note 155, at 7 (suggesting that, in allocating emission reduc-
tion responsibilities to the states, states should receive early action credit); ef Nicholas DiMascio,
Credit Where Credit Is Due: The Legal Treatment of Early Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reductions,
56 DuKE L.J. 1587, 1593-98 (2007) (in the context of industry early action, discussing the general
benefits and attributes of credit for early action of emissions reductions).
299. Many states are already creating climate action plans. See, e.g., PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL
CLIMATE CHANGE, STATES WITH CLIMATE ACTION PLANS, http://www.pewclimate.org/what s_
beingdone/in the states/action_plan map.cfm (last visited Mar. 27, 2008) (map indicating states
with climate action plans).
300. See McKinstry et al., supra note 155, at 6 (emphasizing the importance of state implemen-
tation plans because "as is often the case, uniform national standards are not sufficient to achieve the
needed reductions and additional reduction measures need to be undertaken.").
301. See, e.g., Dwyer, supra note 54, at 1198 (stating that decisions about how to reduce air
pollutants implicate significant political and economic issues); Brent Yarnal & Rob Neff, Primary
Sources of Greenhouse Gases: A Cross-Scale Comparison, 12 PENN. ST. ENvTL. L. REv. 173, 178
(2004) (using the state of Pennsylvania as an example of how states can vary in their sources of
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focus on that sector, and will have to determine whether a national cap-
and-trade program will achieve sufficient reductions. States for which
transportation is a significant component are more likely to focus on land
use changes and public transportation, and to be more likely to adopt
measures like California's vehicle emission standards if possible. °2
Cold states are more likely to focus on weatherization and energy effi-
cient building codes than warm states. States could address the sectors
uniquely within their control, and could play a key role in developing
strategies to meet national goals.
In order to address the risk that states will fail to take the planning
process seriously and fail to adequately generate reductions from the
sectors under their control, the federal government will need to establish
minimum SIP expectations. The states should be required to demon-
strate regulatory actions in the sectors where change is inevitably neces-
sary, like land use and transportation, notwithstanding the political con-
troversy such controls are likely to generate.30 3 Ultimately, the federal
government should review and approve the states' implementation plans
to ensure that they will lead to promised reductions. Since states may
differ in their commitment to real and difficult climate change measures,
federal oversight and enforcement is necessary to ensure that the states'
plans are sufficient.
A state planning process accords with federalism principles.30 5
Minimum federal requirements and oversight could help overcome state
inertia or internal political obstacles to state action. But providing the
states with a role in determining how to implement reductions would
allow those with the relevant information and expertise to devise strate-
gies.30 6 It would also give states leeway to broker the thorny political
emissions and concluding that a national "mitigation strategy must take into account regional and
local differences in emissions.").
302. In California, for example, transportation accounts for 39 percent of emissions and in-state
electricity-generation for only 14 percent. CAL. ENERGY COMM'N, CALIFORNIA'S GROSS GHG
EMISSIONS IN 2004, http://www.energy.ca.gov/global climate change/inventory/
index.htmi (last visited Mar. 27, 2008). In contrast, the national averages are 27.7 percent for trans-
portation and 33.5 percent for electricity-generation. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., CTR. FOR CLIMATE
CHANGE AND ENVTL. FORECASTING, PERCENTAGE OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS, 2005,
http://climate.dot.gov/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2008). Also, the future of California's greenhouse gas
emissions standards for vehicles is in limbo, since California did not receive the necessary waiver of
preemption from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. See Coile, supra note 240. However,
the state has challenged EPA's waiver denial. See Bob Egelko, State Sues EPA to Force Waiver
over Greenhouse Gas Emissions, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 3, 2008, at A-I.
303. See Dwyer, supra note 54, at 1206-08 (describing state resistance to including land use
and transportation in their SIPs).
304. Ideally, federal legislation would create a less cumbersome bureaucratic process than the
Clean Air Act's SIP review process. See Manaster & Selmi, supra note 296, § 6.5 (describing SIP
process).
305. See, e.g., Kaswan, supra note 1, at 79-85 (discussing the merits of a cooperative federalist
approach).
306. See McKinstry & Peterson, supra note 2, at 87-88.
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and economic challenges that addressing climate change involves.
30 7
Allowing state autonomy could also foster laboratories of invention as
states struggle to change long-established patterns, such as unsustainable
land use.
CONCLUSION
Federal legislation is clearly necessary to address climate change.
The global nature of climate change presents too many obstacles to state
action to expect the current momentum driving state programs to con-
tinue or to be sufficient.
Federal policymakers may be tempted to design a purely national
program by its relative simplicity and in light of strong political pres-
sures for federal consistency.30 8 But the federal government cannot meet
emission reduction goals by itself. The states are better able to address
many of the relevant sources and sectors. Moreover, giving the federal
government a monopoly over climate change policy would deprive the
states of control over key political, economic, and environmental vari-
ables, deprive the nation of the technological and regulatory innovation
benefits of multiple actors, and fail to provide a check on potential politi-
cal capture.
A cooperative federalist system, despite its inherent complexity,
provides a sounder model for federal climate change legislation. Almost
all the nation's environmental laws recognize the importance of distribut-
ing power to both the federal government and the states. The fact that
climate change is a more global environmental problem does not give the
states any less interest in having at least some control over implementa-
tion decisions that will inevitably have far-reaching societal impacts.
307. See Dwyer, supra note 54, at 1198 (indicating the political significance of air pollution
control implementation decisions and their impact on land use and economic development); id. at
1218 (stating that local political support and involvement is essential to the success of national
environmental goals).
308. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.

GLOBAL RESPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE-
FROM STOCKHOLM TO COPENHAGEN
ANITA M. HALVORSSENt
INTRODUCTION
The anthropogenic effect on the climate system demands that strong
action be taken now to avoid the worst impacts.' The tipping point be-
fore the onset of catastrophe is no longer decades away.2 This is a global
problem that calls for international cooperation on a scale comparable to
the Marshall Plan after World War II to "reshape the world's future
economy and redirect investment flows into a sustainable future" as Yvo
de Boer, the Executive Director of the United Nations Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) has stated the case.3 The inter-
national community has produced the legal tools for dealing with the
problem in the form of the UNFCCC 4 and the Kyoto Protocol to the
UNFCCC (Kyoto Protocol),5 yet these need to be amended to take into
t Adjunct Professor, University of Denver, College of Law; Lecturer, University of Colo-
rado, Political Science Department; Director, Global Legal Solutions, LLC (e-mail: am-
halvorss@aol.com). This article is based on a presentation given at the Denver University Law
Review Symposium, Climate Change: Integrating Environmental Justice into Policy, Regulation,
and Litigation, February 15, 2008.
1. NICHOLAS STERN, Summary of Conclusions, in STERN REVIEW: THE ECONOMICS OF
CLIMATE CHANGE vi (2007), available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/3/2/
SummaryofConclusions.pdf [hereinafter STERN REVIEW: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS].
2. See Jeremy Lovell, Interview-The World Has Under Decade to Act on Climate Crisis,
REUTERS NEWS SERVICE, Nov. 22, 2006, available at http://www.planetark.com/
dailynewsstory.cfm/newsid/39096/story.htm; see also Juliet Eilperin, Debate on Climate Shifts to
Issue of Irreparable Change, WASH. POST, Jan. 29, 2006, at Al, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/contentarticle/2006/01/28/AR2006012801021 .html; Ian
Sample, Warming Hits Tipping Point, THE GUARDIAN, Aug. 11, 2005, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/climate change/story/0,12374,1546824,00.html.
3. Press Release, UNFCCC Secretariat, Latin American and Caribbean Countries to Play
Key Role in Global Fight Against Climate Change (Feb. 1, 2008), available at
http://unfccc.int/files/press/releases/application/pdf/20080201 santo domingo release eng.pdf; see
also UN News Service, Joint Attack on Climate Change and Poverty Needed, Al Gore Tells Audi-
ence at UN (Sept. 24, 2007), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewslD=
23942&Cr=climate&Crl =change#.
4. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 849
(1994) [hereinafter UNFCCC]. The UNFCCC has near universal participation with 192 Parties as of
August 22, 2007. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: Status of Ratifi-
cation, http://unfccc.int/essential-background/convention/status-of ratification/items/2631.php (last
visited Mar. 28, 2008).
5. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec.
10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (2007) [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]. As of January 15, 2008, there were 178
Parties to the Kyoto Protocol; see also Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change: Status of Ratification, http://unfccc.int/
files/kyotoprotocol/background/status of ratification/application/pdf/kpratification.pdf (last
visited Mar. 28, 2008) [hereinafter Status of Kyoto Protocol].
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account the current status of the climate science and the international
political situation.6
At the thirteenth Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP-
13) in Bali in 2007, the international community recognized the serious-
ness of the climate change situation as stipulated in the Intergovermmen-
tal Panel on Climate Change's (IPCC) latest report by referring directly
to the IPCC's Fourth Assessment Report in the Bali Action Plan, which
stated that "warming of the climate system is unequivocal, and that delay
in reducing emissions significantly constrains opportunities to achieve
lower stabilization levels and increases the risk of more severe climate
change impacts."7 Now there is no longer any excuse for not taking ur-
8gent action. The international community must be able to "deliver as
one" if we are to have any chance in humanity's "war" against global
climate change. However, as is usual in international law, multilateral
cooperation takes time. All that was agreed to in Bali was an agenda, not
a substantive agreement on the amounts of greenhouse gas (GHG) emis-
sions that need to be reduced nor which particular states are to take these
actions. 9 Reaching "an agreed outcome" and adopting a decision nearly
two years from now, in Copenhagen in 2009, does not exemplify a leap
to action considering the seriousness of the climate change problem.
Yet, this was considered a success, mainly due to all the disagreements
that have plagued the last few meetings.' 0
Among the many problems that need to be resolved, two deal with
important equity issues that have plagued the climate change negotia-
tions for a number of years. One problem is that the United States is not
willing to commit to mandatory cuts in GHGs, and hence has not ratified
the Kyoto Protocol. The other problem, closely related to the first, is that
the emerging economies, the fast-growing developing countries such as
India and China, do not have any mandatory cuts in the Kyoto Protocol,
6. This article is, in part, based on an earlier article amending only the Kyoto Protocol. See
Anita M. Halvorssen, Common, but Differentiated Commitments in the Future Climate Change
Regime-Amending the Kyoto Protocol to Include Annex C and the Annex C Mitigation Fund, 18
COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 247 (2007).
7. The text in Decision -/CP.13 is "[r]esponding to the findings of the Fourth Assessment
Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change ...." See United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change, Bali Action Plan, Decision -/CP.13, at I (Dec. 15, 2007), available
at http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_13/application/pdf/cp bali-action.pdf (last visited Mar. 28,
2008) [hereinafter Bali Action Plan]; see also Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate
Change 2007: Synthesis Report, Summary for Policymakers (2007), available at
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr-spm.pdf [hereinafter IPCC's AR4].
8. See Bali Action Plan, supra note 7, at 1 ("Recognizing... and emphasizing the urgency
to address climate change as indicated in the Fourth Assessment Report .... ).
9. See generally Robert N. Stavins & Joseph Aldy, Harvard Project on International Climate
Agreements, Bali Climate Change Conference: Key Takeaways (Dec. 18, 2007), available at
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/17781/bali-climate-changeconference.html (giving
an overview of the Bali Climate Change Conference).
10. See Thomas Fuller & Andrew C. Revkin, Climate Plan Looks Beyond Bush's Tenure,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2007, at 1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/16/world/16climate.html.
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even if they are Parties to the Protocol. These major economies will
soon overtake the industrialized countries in amounts of GHG emissions.
In order to solve these two problems, this article posits amending
the UNFCCC to include a new category of Parties-Annex III Parties-
defined as emerging economies (the fast-growing developing countries).
These countries will be able to commit to mitigation measures/emission
cuts under a new Annex C of the Kyoto Protocol in return for financial
and technological assistance provided by a new Annex C Mitigation
Fund. Then, perhaps, the United States will feel compelled to ratify the
Kyoto Protocol and comply with its stipulated reduction targets under
Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol, allowing for a unified approach against
global climate change. In order to make the Annex C Mitigation Fund
more effective, this article also suggests that the Fund include a set of
capacity-building teams, the Climate Change Corps (3Cs), as a special
corps of volunteer engineers and climate scientists among others that
would be set up by individual Annex I nations coordinated by the United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in order to make sure these
capacity-building teams are sent to the fast-growing developing countries
that need them most urgently.
Part I of this article will give an overview of the status of the cli-
mate science and its impacts based on the IPCC's Fourth Assessment
Report, since this has a bearing on the equity issues. The relationship
between climate change and sustainable development, examined in Part
II, will specifically address the equity principle of common, but differen-
tiated responsibilities. Part III will analyze the roadmap and outcome of
the international climate change negotiations at the Bali Conference. In
Part IV, this article will examine the extent to which the amendments
suggested to the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol address the main bar-
riers to having an all inclusive agreement to address the scourge of cli-
mate change.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE STATUS OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND ITS IMPACTS
The IPCC Fourth Assessment Report is a collaborative effort by
hundreds of scientists from around the world assessing the current scien-
tific knowledge about climate change." In this Part, I will briefly pre-
sent the IPCC and the findings of its reports, with the main focus being
on the impacts, showing how they will affect developing countries dis-
proportionately.
The IPCC was established in 1988 as an intergovernmental body by
the World Meteorological Organization and the United Nations Envi-
ronment Programme.12 Its primary function is to provide decision-
11. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, About IPCC,
http://www.ipcc.ch/about/index.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2008).
12. Id.
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makers with an objective source of information about climate change by
assessing "on a comprehensive, objective, open and transparent basis the
latest scientific, technical and socio-economic literature produced
worldwide relevant to the understanding of the risk of human-induced
climate change, its observed and projected impacts and options for adap-
tation and mitigation."' 3
The IPCC has three main groups which each produce a report:
Working Group I, which produces the report on the Physical Science
Basis of Climate Change; Working Group II, which focuses on Impacts,
Adaptation and Vulnerability; and Working Group III, which focuses on
Mitigation.14 In addition, the IPCC produces the Synthesis Report and
other Special Reports. a5 Final reports are accepted at a Plenary Session
of the IPCC and the Summaries for Policymakers are approved line by
line. 16 The last steps in the procedure include a consensus by the interna-
tional community.'
7
Working Group I of the IPCC's Fourth Assessment Report, which
addresses the scientific basis of climate change, emphasized that "warm-
ing of the climate system is unequivocal, as is now evident from observa-
tions of increases in global average air and ocean temperatures, wide-
spread melting of snow and ice, and rising global average sea level."' 8
The report states that "global increases in carbon dioxide concentration
are due primarily to fossil fuel use and land use change, while those of
methane and nitrous oxide are primarily due to agriculture."' 9 The report
also states that the "atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide in 2005
exceeds by far the natural range over the last 650,000 years., 20  With
greater scientific understanding since the Third Assessment Report, there
is now "very high confidence that the global average net effect of human
13. Id.
14. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, About the IPCC, How the IPCC Is Organ-
ized, http://www.ipcc.ch/about/how-the-ipcc-is-organized.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2008); see also
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, About the IPCC, The IPCC Working Group I,
http://www.ipcc.ch /about/working-groupl.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2008); Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change, About the IPCC, The IPCC Working Group II,
http://www.ipcc.ch/about/working-group2.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2008); Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change, About the IPCC, The IPCC Working Group III,
http://www.ipcc.ch/about/working-group3.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2008).
15. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC Reports,
http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/index.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2008).
16. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Sixteen Years of Scientific Assessment in
Support of the UNFCCC 4, available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/l0th-anniversary/anniversary-
brochure.pdf.
17. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Principles Governing IPCC Work 2, avail-
able at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/ipcc-principles/ipcc-principles.pdf"
18. WORKING GROUP I, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, IPCC FOURTH
ASSESSMENT REPORT, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 5, available at http://
www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wgl/ar4-wgl-spm.pdf [hereinafter WORKING GROUP I
REPORT].
19. Id. at 2.
20. Id.
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activities since 1750 has been one of warming ....,,2 1 The report notes
that "numerous long-term changes in climate," such as "changes in arctic
temperatures and ice, widespread changes in precipitation amounts,
ocean salinity, wind patterns and aspects of extreme weather including
droughts" have been observed.22 The IPCC also states that the observed
increases in average global temperatures since the 1950s are "very
likely" due to the observed increase in human-induced GHG concentra-
tions.23
Working Group II's report on impacts, adaptation, and vulnerability
states that "[o]bservational evidence from all continents and most oceans
shows that many natural systems are being affected by regional climate
changes, particularly temperature increases., 24  Examples include in-
creased numbers of glacial lakes, ground instability in permafrost, and
changes in some Artic and Antarctic ecosystems.25  The extent of
drought-affected areas is likely to increase.26 At lower latitudes, crop
productivity is projected to decrease, leading to risk of hunger.27 In Af-
rica, 75-250 million people are expected to be exposed to an increase of
water stress due to climate change by 2020.28 The report also states that
new studies confirm that Africa is one of the most vulnerable continents
to climate variability and change, due to its many stresses and low ability
to adapt.29 The report further details that climate change will hamper
sustainable development for most developing countries in Asia as it in-
creases the pressures on natural resources and the environment in con-
junction with rapid urbanization, industrialization, and economic devel-
opment.30
Working Group II of the IPCC also addresses adaptation and vul-
nerability to climate change. In that context, the report explains that the
future vulnerability to climate impacts is not only due to projected cli-
mate change, but also projected social and economic changes. 31 Other
stresses exacerbate the vulnerability to climate change, such as poverty,
unequal access to resources, food insecurity and incidence of disease
(HIV/AIDS). 32  The projected number of people affected by climate
change is greater in areas with low per capita income and large popula-
21. Id. at 3. "Very high confidence" means "at least a 9 out of 10 chance of being correct."
See id. n.7.
22. Id at 7.
23. See id. at 8. "Very likely" means more than 90 percent likely. See id. at 3, n.6.
24. WORKING GROUP 11, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 1PCC FOURTH
ASSESSMENT REPORT, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 8, http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-
report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-spm.pdf [hereinafter WORKING GROUP 11 REPORT].
25. Id.
26. Id. at 11.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 13.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 19.
32. Id.
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tion growth, indicating that these areas are more vulnerable.33 By in-
creasing resilience and adaptive capacity, sustainable development can
reduce vulnerability to climate change. 34 On the other hand, Working
Group II states that climate change can delay the pace of progress toward
sustainable development, either directly, through an increase in exposure
to adverse impacts, or indirectly, due to erosion of the capacity to
adapt.35
II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CLIMATE CHANGE AND SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT
A. Sustainable Development
Sustainable development is most commonly defined according to
the Brundtland Commission's Report as "development that meets the
needs of the present without compromising the needs of future genera-
tions. 36 The need for balancing environmental and economic policies
was first addressed in an international setting at the U.N. Conference on
the Human Environment, held in Stockholm in 1972. 37 Since then the
international community has met at the U.N. Conference on Environment
and Development, held in Rio de Janiero in 1992, the Millenium Summit
in New York City in 2000, and the World Summit on Sustainable Devel-
opment, held in Johannesburg in 2002, to further highlight the impor-
tance of these issues and to take action.38 Sustainable development is
said to encompass three pillars: environmental, economic, and social
aspects of development. 39  Climate change is a matter affecting these
very same issues. In order to tackle climate change, the goal of sustain-
able development must be attained at a much faster pace, since economic
growth produces the funding to mitigate and adapt to climate change. If
this is not done, the impacts of climate change will destroy most of the
progress made toward sustainable development. In the same way, eco-
nomic growth that is not de-coupled from fossil fuel as an energy source
will only lead to more GHG emissions. Just as was done in the case of
the depletion of the stratospheric ozone layer, where developing coun-
tries were not ratifying the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete
the Ozone Layer until they were offered a delayed compliance schedule
33. Id. at 20.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON FUTURE
8 (1987) [hereinafter OUR COMMON FUTURE].
37. Philippe Roch & Franz Xaver Perrez, International Environmental Governance: The
Strive Towards a Comprehensive, Coherent, Effective and Efficient International Environmental
Regime, 16 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1, 7 (2005).
38. Id. at 9; Paolo Galizzi, From Stockholm to New York, Via Rio and Johannesburg: Has the
Environment Lost Its Way on the Global Agenda?, 29 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 952, 980, 988 (2006).
39. World Summit on Sustainable Development, Johannesburg, S. Aft., Aug. 26-Sept. 4,
2002, Report of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, 1, U.N. Doc A/CONF. 199/20,
available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/aconfl99d20&c _en.pdf
[Vol. 85:4
GLOBAL RESPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE
and a specific funding mechanism, 40 we need to find solutions to the is-
sue of climate change by crafting equitable bargains regarding economic
and environmental issues between developed and developing countries.
In the case of the Kyoto Protocol the fast-growing developing countries
are Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, but they do not have any binding re-
duction commitments.
B. Equity--Common, but Differentiated Responsibilities
Addressing global environmental problems, in general, using trea-
ties that require universal participation requires developed and develop-
ing countries to take on obligations. Under international law, countries
have accepted the principle of sovereignty to include sovereign equality
as reflected in the U.N. Charter, thereby giving all countries equal rights
and obligations on the international plane.41 Yet, to encourage universal
participation and reflect the principle of equity in international law, these
environmental treaties must provide differentiated responsibilities for
developing countries. This is because developing countries historically
have not had the same economic growth and social benefits as developed
countries, and they have contributed to a lesser degree to the environ-
mental problems. 42 This historical context, along with the developing
countries' lack of capacity to address the environmental problems, has
led to the idea of asymmetrical or differential rights and obligations for
developing countries in international environmental law.43
The problem of the depletion of the stratospheric ozone layer was
the first environmental problem regarding the atmosphere that was tack-
led on a global scale using differential treatment for developing coun-
tries. 44 In many ways, it was an easier problem to solve than climate
change, since there were just a few manufacturers of ozone-depleting
substances, as opposed to all consumers of fossil fuels, from utilities to
school buses, being emitters of CO2. Once they manufactured a substi-
tute for chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), an ozone depleting substance, the
manufacturers were willing to produce it. Most of the countries that
were big producers and consumers of CFCs ratified the Vienna Conven-
tion for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, followed by the Montreal
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer.45 In the Montreal
Protocol, the negotiating countries adopted an approach whereby all
40. See Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, S.
Treaty Doc. No. 100-10, 1522 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Montreal Protocol].
41. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. I ("The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign
equality of all of its Members.").
42. ANITA MARGRETHE HALVORSSEN, EQUALITY AMONG UNEQUALS IN INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 28-31 (1999).
43. ld. at 31.
44. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, avail-
able at http://www.oas.org/DIL/ViennaConvention-on-theLaw-ofTreaties.pdf [hereinafter
Vienna Convention]; Montreal Protocol, supra note 40.
45. See Vienna Convention, supra note 44; Montreal Protocol, supra note 40.
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countries were to take action, but developing countries were to have a
delayed compliance schedule.46 Shortly thereafter, the Montreal Protocol
was amended to include a multilateral fund to facilitate the replacement
of technology using CFCs in developing countries, thereby persuading
India and China to become Parties to the Protocol.47
Historically, developing countries have had different developmen-
tal, social, and environmental needs and priorities and have not had the
same economic benefits as the developed countries that have degraded
the global environment in their process of industrialization. However,
the picture in China and India is changing rapidly, since those countries
are growing exponentially and experiencing immense environmental
problems that need to be dealt with.48 Yet, they are much more aware of
environmental degradation than were the developed countries when they
began industrializing, and to a certain extent, they are addressing their
environmental problems using new, "cleaner" technology.49 However,
this is at a much too slow pace, mostly due to a lack of funding.
Even in this context, it is not equitable to demand that these devel-
oping countries have an equal share of the burdens of controlling GHG
emissions when, until recently, they have not done most of the pollut-
ing.50 This is because economic growth is still the primary strategy for
eradicating poverty and should not be prohibitively restricted through the
use of environmental controls. 5' Due to this principle of equity, asym-
metrical or differentiated obligations for developed and developing coun-
tries have become the norm in international environmental treaties.52
This equity principle is now often called "common, but differentiated
responsibility" (CBDR) and is expressed in Rio Declaration Principle 7:
46. See Montreal Protocol, supra note 40, at art. 5.
47. U.N. Env't Programme, Second Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on Sub-
stances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Report of the Second Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, U.N. Doc. UNEP/OzL.Pro.2/3 (June 29,
1990), available at http://www.unep.ch/ozone/2mlonfin.shtml.
48. See China Admits to Climate Failings, BBC NEWS, Jan. 27, 2007, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6306881 .stm.
49. See NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND REFORM COMMISSION, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA, CHINA'S NATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE PROGRAMME 31-32 (2007), available at
http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/ChinaNationalClimateChangeProgramme%20June%2007.p
df.
50. Once CO 2 is emitted to the atmosphere, it remains there for at least a century. Hence, we
are now seeing the effects of GHGs emitted since the industrial revolution. This constitutes, for the
most part, pollution from developed countries, not developing countries. University Corporation for
Atmospheric Research, Understanding Climate Change, Global Warming, Frequently Asked Ques-
tions, The Greenhouse Effect, http://www.ucar.edu/news/features/climatechange/faqs.jsp (last vis-
ited Mar. 28, 2008).
51. See OUR COMMON FUTUJRE, supra note 36, at 50-51; see also U.N. Conference on Envi-
ronment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, Braz., June 3-14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment
and Development, princ. 11, U.N. Doe. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. 1) (Aug. 12, 1992) [hereinafter Rio
Declaration].
52. See Yoshiru Matsui, Aspects of the Principle of "Common but Differentiated Responsibili-
ties," in 2 INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS: POLITICS, LAW AND ECONOMICS 151,
166 (2002).
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States shall cooperate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve,
protect and restore the health and integrity of the Earth's ecosystem.
In view of the different contributions to global environmental degra-
dation, States have common but differentiated responsibilities. The
developed countries acknowledge the responsibility that they bear in
the international pursuit of sustainable development in view of the
pressures their societies place on the global environment and of the
technologies and financial resources they command.
53
Despite the fact that the CBDR principle is not considered binding
international law, it has become a cornerstone of burden-sharing struc-
tures adopted in international environmental treaties. 4 In the context of
climate change, developed countries have historically contributed the
most to the climate change problem and have the greater technological
and economic capacity to address the problem, 55 whereas developing
countries have not significantly contributed to climate change and are
more vulnerable to its impacts because they lack the resources to address
the problem. As a result, developed countries should take more respon-
sibility for controlling GHG emissions.
The CBDR principle can also be seen as requiring obligations of
solidarity assistance in the form of technology transfer and financial as-
sistance.56 To do this, developing countries would make the implementa-
tion of their commitments in environmental treaties conditional on the
receipt of assistance from developed countries.57 The UNFCCC already
reflects this theory: "the extent to which developing country Parties will
effectively implement their commitments under the Convention will de-
pend on the effective implementation by developed country Parties of
their commitments under the Convention related to financial resources
and transfer of technology. ' 8
The CBDR principle does have its limits, however. First, it is only
meant to last for a limited time period to allow the developing countries
to achieve the same level of economic growth as industrialized countries,
while simultaneously addressing environmental issues.59 It is not sup-
posed to institute a permanent arrangement. Once the differences be-
tween the countries cease to exist, differential treatment should no longer
be used.60 Second, the CBDR principle should not be incompatible with
53. Rio Declaration, supra note 51, at princ. 7.
54. Christopher D. Stone, Common but Differentiated Responsibilities in International Law,
98 AM. J. INT'L L. 276, 299-300 (2004); see also LAVANYA RAJAMANI, DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT
IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONENTAL LAW 127, 158 (2006).
55. PATRICIA W. BIRNIE & ALAN E. BOYLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE ENVIRONMENT 101
(2d ed. 2002).
56. Id. at 102.
57. Id.
58. UNFCCC, supra note 4, art. 4(7). This commitment is reaffirmed in Articles 10 and 11 of
the Kyoto Protocol. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 5, arts. 10(b)-(e), 11.
59. HALVORSSEN, supra note 42, at 4, 29.
60. RAJAMANI, supra note 54, at 162.
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the object and purpose of the treaty in question.6' If implementation of
the CBDR principle defeats the object and purpose of the treaty, it has
gone beyond the limits of the treaty. 62 For example, the object and pur-
pose of the UNFCCC is "stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations
in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic
interference with the climate system., 63  This objective would be de-
feated if the developing countries' emissions of GHGs continue to grow
to meet their development needs, leading to dangerous anthropogenic
interference with the climate system. Thus, sustainable development
requires that economic growth in all countries is balanced with the cli-
mate change objectives.
C. Equity and Climate Change-The United States and the Fast-
Growing Developing Countries
In regards to climate change, the first equity problem is that the
United States has not agreed to mandatory emission cuts and hence has
not ratified the Kyoto Protocol. The stage was already set with a unani-
mous vote in the U.S. Senate in 1997, in which the Senate stated that it
would not give its "advice and consent" to the Kyoto Protocol unless it
included commitments to limit GHGs for developing countries and that
the Protocol did not result in serious harm to the U.S. economy. 64 The
Senate was concerned that the U.S. would be less competitive than major
economies such as India and China if it ratified the Kyoto Protocol be-
cause these countries do not have any binding reduction commitments
under the Protocol.65
In November 2008, the United States is electing a new President.
No matter who she or he is, the future President will likely take climate
change more seriously than President Bush. The three top contenders for
the presidential race all call for mandatory cuts in carbon dioxide emis-
sions, support a market-based approach that would set caps on carbon
and other greenhouse gas emissions, and provide industries with tradable
credits.66 It would be convenient if the problem regarding the U.S. could
be solved as easily as was the case of Australia, where a new government
came into power in December 2007 and as his first official act, Prime
61. HALVORSSEN, supra note 42, at 29.
62. RAJAMANI, supra note 54, at 162.
63. UNFCCC, supra note 4, art. 2.
64. See Expressing the Sense of the Senate Regarding the Conditions for the United States
Becoming a Signatory to Any International Agreement on Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997) (Byrd-
Hagel Resolution).
65. See id.
66. American Association for the Advancement of Science, Science and Technology in the
2008 Presidential Election: Candidate Science & Technology Positions,
http://election2008.aaas.org/comparisons/ (last visited Mar. 28, 2008) (click on each candidate's
name; scroll down to the "Energy and Environment" section on web page).
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Minister Rudd took the steps needed to ratify the Kyoto Protocol.67
However, the new President will still need the "advice and consent of the
Senate" before the instrument of ratification for the Kyoto Protocol can
be signed.
The United States is the only Annex I Party (industrialized country)
not to have ratified the Kyoto Protocol, though it has ratified the
UNFCCC.6 8  There are only 17 other states that are not Parties to the
Kyoto Protocol, which currently has 177 Parties.69 On April 23, 2008,
only 16 Parties will not have ratified the Kyoto Protocol, as Iraq ratified
it in January.70 It seems rather unfortunate that the international commu-
nity is supposed to draft a new agreement because the one remaining
Annex I Party does not want to cooperate with most all of the interna-
tional community which has agreed to, and worked diligently to opera-
tionalize, the Kyoto Protocol. That is not to say the Kyoto Protocol is
perfect; it needs major improvements. Yet to set it aside is perhaps a bad
idea at this urgent stage of climate change. Amending it seems a more
viable option, taking into account all the structures, procedures and enti-
ties already set up in accordance with the Protocol. Amending the
UNFCCC to add Annex III, thus arranging for fast-growing developing
countries to have binding commitments under a new Annex C of the
Kyoto Protocol, would save an enormous amount of time. The Kyoto
Protocol is already structured in such a way that the industrialized coun-
tries, Annex I Parties, are to be subjected to more stringent commitments
under Annex B of the Protocol for the subsequent commitment periods
using its own amendment procedure.7' Clearly a five percent average
decrease in GHGs emissions stipulated for the first commitment period
of the Protocol would not be enough to tackle climate change.72
The second problem, a related equity issue, concerns the fact that
the fast-growing developing countries, such as China, India, and Brazil,
do not have mandatory reduction commitments under the Kyoto Proto-
col. They are Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, but the Protocol only stipu-
lates emission targets for Annex I Parties (industrialized states). How
can one require developing countries that historically have not contrib-
67. Getting Serious in Bali: Talks on Tackling Climate Change Begin, ECONOMIST, Dec. 3,
2007, available at http://www.economist.com/world/international/displaystory.cfin?storyid =
10237931.
68. See Status of Kyoto Protocol, supra note 5, at 7. The Principality of Andorra and San
Marino are considered to be developed States, but they are not listed as Annex I Parties in the
UNFCCC. See UNFCCC, supra note 4, annex 1 (listing all developed countries but not including
Andorra or San Marino).
69. UNFCC, Fact Sheet: The Kyoto Protocol, http://unfccc.int/files/press/back
grounders/application/pdf/fact sheetthe kyoto_protocol.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2008).
70. See Iraq Ratifies Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change, MIDDLE EAST TIMES, Jan. 26, 2008,
available at http://www.metimes.com/Politics/2008/0 l/26/iraq_ratifieskyoto protocol-on-climate_
change/afp/.
71. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 5, art. 3(9).
72. See id. art. 3(1).
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uted to global warming and are the most vulnerable to climate change, in
addition to having the least capability or financial resources to deal with
it, to also cut emissions on par with developed countries? This question
becomes even more poignant when taking into account that the U.S. does
not have any mandatory cuts because it did not ratify the Protocol.
D. Post 2012
The critical issue now is deciding which countries should take the
main responsibility for reducing greenhouse gas emissions in the next
phase, after 2012, when the first commitment period of the Kyoto Proto-
col comes to an end.73 Is it sufficient to carry on with the existing Kyoto
Protocol arrangement in which the current Annex I Parties 74 are to have
more stringent commitments under Article 3 to be spelled out in Annex
B75 of the Kyoto Protocol? Or should the fast-growing, developing
countries such as India and China -which emit more GHGs than several
developed countries-also take on binding commitments for the second
commitment period or soon thereafter? With the steadily growing emis-
sion of GHGs in India and China, it is clear that the international com-
munity cannot accept business as usual from any state.76 All states have
to pull their weight in the climate change context. But what does this
mean for India and China?
73. Id.
74. Annex I Parties constitute the developed countries, namely, most of the member countries
of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the countries with
economies in transition (EIT). The Annex I Parties are listed at the end of the UNFCCC and include
the following countries: Australia; Austria; Belarus; Belgium; Bulgaria; Canada; Croatia; Czech
Republic; Denmark; European Economic Community; Estonia; Finland; France; Germany; Greece;
Hungary; Iceland; Ireland; Italy; Japan; Latvia; Liechtenstein; Lithuania; Luxembourg; Monaco;
Netherlands; New Zealand; Norway; Poland; Portugal; Romania; Russian Federation; Slovakia;
Slovenia; Spain; Sweden; Switzerland; Turkey; Ukraine; United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland; and the United States of America. UNFCCC, supra note 4, annex I; see also
Conference of the Parties on its Third Session, Kyoto, Japan, Dec. 1-11, 1997, Amendments to the
List in Annex I to the Convention Under Article 4.2() of the Convention, Dec. 4/C.P.3, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add. 1 (Mar. 18, 1998), available at
http://www.gcrio.org/OnLnDoc/pdfgkyoto_protocol.pdf (deleting Czechoslovakia from list and
adding Croatia, Czech Republic, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Slovakia, and Slovenia).
75. Annex B Parties are Annex I Parties that have binding limitation or reduction commit-
ments in the Kyoto Protocol. This list appears at the end of the Kyoto Protocol (the numeral is the
qualified emission limitation or reduction commitment, a percentage of the base year or period for
the first commitment period): Australia 108; Austria 92; Belgium 92; Bulgaria 92; Canada 94;
Croatia 95; Czech Republic 92; Denmark 92; Estonia 92; European Community 92; Finland 92;
France 92; Germany 92; Greece 92; Hungary 94; Iceland 110; Ireland 92; Italy 92; Japan 94; Latvia
92; Liechtenstein 92; Lithuania 92; Luxembourg 92; Monaco 92; Netherlands 92; New Zealand 100;
Norway 101; Poland 94; Portugal 92; Romania 92; Russian Federation 100; Slovakia 92; Slovenia
92; Spain 92; Sweden 92; Switzerland 92; Ukraine 100; United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland 92; and the United States of America 93. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 5, annex B.
The Annex I and Annex B lists of countries are essentially the same. Compare UNFCCC, supra
note 4, annex I, with Kyoto Protocol, supra note 5, annex B.
76. Neil Sands, China, India Speed Climate Change. Australian Report, YAHOO! NEWS, Feb.
21, 2008, http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/2008022 1/sc afp/australiaclimatewarmingreport.
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The UNFCCC dictates in Article 3 that the CBDR principle is to be
used for guidance.77 By applying the CBDR principle, the Convention
specifically stipulates in Article 4 that the developed countries are to
"take the lead."78 However, the UNFCCC does not give Annex I Parties
(developed countries) any binding commitments; it only "urges" them to
reduce their GHGs.79 Non-Annex I Parties (developing countries), how-
ever, were not given such an "aim" to reduce GHGs, but the Convention
does specify that non-Annex I Parties can take on voluntary commit-
ments to do so. 80 However, all Parties were required to fulfill binding
commitments to report on their national inventory of anthropogenic
emissions and measures taken to implement the UNFCCC. The timeta-
bles for the reporting requirements were differentiated among the Parties:
Developed countries were given a six-month deadline, developing coun-
tries were given three years, and the least-developed countries could re-
port at their discretion.8'
At the first Conference of the Parties to the Climate Convention,
COP-1, in 1995, the Parties agreed in the Berlin Mandate that the com-
mitments to reduce GHGs under the UNFCCC needed to be strength-
ened, but stipulated, again, that the Annex I Parties were to "take the
lead.",82 As a result, the developing countries were not given any binding
commitments to reduce GHG emissions in what became known as the
Kyoto Protocol.
The core commitment of the Kyoto Protocol, stated in Article 3,
also clearly captures the CBDR principle. That commitment requires
Annex I Parties to reduce their overall emissions of GHGs by at least
five percent below the 1990 levels in accordance with the reduction
commitments specified in Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol. 3 Only Annex
I Parties were given binding reduction commitments while non-Annex I
Parties were not given any targets. This has been a point of contention
for the U.S. ever since the Kyoto Protocol was adopted.
III. OUTCOME OF THE CLIMATE CHANGE CONFERENCE IN BALI IN 2007
A. Bali Action Plan
In response to the lack of binding commitments for developing
countries, the international community finally, in 2005, at COP-11,
agreed to start a series of "dialogues" to consider long-term cooperation
under the UNFCCC "without prejudice to any future negotiations, com-
77. UNFCCC, supra note 4, art. 3(1).
78. Id. art. 4(2)(a).
79. Id. art. 4(2)(a)-(b).
80. Id. art. 4(2)(g).
81. Id. art. 12(5).
82. UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its First Session, § l(1)(a), U.N.
Doc. FCCC/CP/1995/7/Add. I (Apr. 7, 1995) [hereinafter Berlin Mandate].
83. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 5, art. 3(1), annex B.
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mitments, process, framework or mandate under the Convention. '8 4 At
Bali in 2008, at COP-13, the Parties to the UNFCCC established the Ad
Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action (AWGLCA) as a
subsidiary body under the UNFCCC. 85 This decision was made as part
of the Bali Action Plan, which was adopted by the Conference of the
Parties to the UNFCCC. 6 This plan constitutes one track of the Bali
Roadmap. 7 The other track deals with the negotiations under the Kyoto
Protocol, which will be covered in the next subsection. The Bali Action
Plan was adopted by consensus after negotiating twenty-four hours over-
time.88 Tensions were high when the delegate from Papua New Guinea
asked the U.S. delegation to "get out of the way" if it was not going to
lead the way. 9 In the eleventh hour the U.S. delegation decided to be
more flexible and joined the consensus which allowed for the adoption of
the Bali Action Plan.
90
The Bali Action Plan sets out a roadmap that includes four building
blocks: mitigation, adaptation, technology transfer, and financial re-
sources. 91 AWGLCA is to carry out a comprehensive process to enable
the implementation of the UNFCCC through long-term action, starting
now and going beyond 2012.92 It is to produce an agreement that can be
adopted at the 15th meeting of the Conference of the Parties (COP-15) in
2009 in Copenhagen.93
AWGLCA has a mandate to come up with a long-term global goal
for emission reductions. 94 This has been lacking since the adoption of
the UNFCCC. There were no specific numbers defining what consti-
tuted "dangerous ... interference with the climate system."95 Now the
IPCC has stipulated that global emissions need to peak in 10-15 years
and that emissions need to decline by 50 percent by 2050 in the most
84. UNFCCC, Dialogue on Long-term Cooperative Action to Address Climate Change by
Enhancing Implementation of the Convention, 1 1, Decision -/CP. 11 (Dec. 10, 2005) available at
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_ I /application/pdf/cop 1 _00_dialogueonlong-
term coop_action.pdf.
85. Bali Action Plan, supra note 7, 2.
86. Id.
87. Bali Roadmap, Address to Closing Plenary by His Excellency Mr. Rachmat Witoelar,
President, UN Climate Change Conference Closing of Joint High-Level Segment Bali (Dec. 15,
2007) available at http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop 13/application/pdf/closestatcopl 3_
president.pdf.
88. Summary of the Thirteenth Conference of Parties to the UN Framework Convention on
Climate Change and Third Meeting of Parties to the Kyoto Protocol: 3-15 December 2007, EARTH
NEGOTIATIONS BULL. (International Institute for Sustainable Development, New York, N.Y), Dec.
18, 2007, at 15, available at http://www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/enb12354e.pdf [hereinafter ENB].
89. Id. at 16.
90. Id. at 20.
91. Id. at 19; see also Bali Action Plan, supra note 7, art. l(b)-(e).
92. Bali Action Plan, supra note 7, art. 1.
93. Id.
94. Id. art. 1(a).
95. UNFCCC, supra note 4, art. 2.
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stringent stabilization category (below 490 ppmv C0 2-equivalent).96
Furthermore, Annex I Parties would need to reduce their emissions sig-
nificantly by 2020 (10-40 percent).97 These numbers were not, however,
spelled out in the Bali Action Plan due to opposition from the U.S., Can-
ada, Russia, and Japan, which did not want to prejudge the outcome of
the process. 98 The Plan makes a reference to the Fourth Assessment Re-
port of the IPCC, but only mentions "deep cuts" in global emissions will
be needed to achieve the ultimate objective of the Convention.99
In regards to mitigation, AWGLCA is to consider mitigation com-
mitments or actions, including quantified emission limitations and reduc-
tion objectives by all developed country Parties. 00 Developing countries
are to have nationally appropriate mitigation actions in the context of
sustainable development, supported and enabled by technology, financ-
ing, and capacity-building, in a measurable, reportable, and verifiable
manner.'01 Policy approaches related to reducing emissions from defor-
estation and forest degradation are also supposed to be considered.10 2 In
regards to mitigation, AWGLCA is also to consider cooperative sectoral
approaches and the use of markets.'
03
The Bali Action Plan calls for international cooperation to support
urgent implementation of adaptation action using vulnerability assess-
ments, financial-needs assessments, and capacity-building and response
strategies, among others. 0 4 Risk management is promoted as well as
insurance to transfer risks. 0 5 Furthermore, economic diversification is
emphasized to build resilience. 10 6  In regards to technology transfer,
AWGLCA is to consider means for removal of obstacles and provisions
of incentives to scale-up the development and transfer of technology to
developing countries, thus promoting access to affordable, environmen-
tally-sound technology. 0 7 Enhanced action on the provision of financial
resources will be based on consideration of improved access to adequate,
predictable and sustainable financial resources for developing countries,
96. BRIAN FISHER & NEBOJSA NAKICENOVIC, ISSUES RELATED TO MITIGATION IN THE LONG-
TERM CONTEXT 172, available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg3/ar4-wg3-
chapter3.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2008).
97. TERRY BARKER ET AL., CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP III TO THE FOURTH
ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, TECHNICAL
SUMMARY 90 (2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg3/ar4-wg3-
ts.pdf.
98. ENB, supra note 88, at 15.










DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
including new and additional resources and mobilization of private sector
funding and investment.'
0 8
B. Negotiations Under the Kyoto Protocol
In the context of the Kyoto Protocol, the first Conference of the Par-
ties serving as the Meeting of the Parties (COP/MOP-1) met in Montreal
in 2005 and began negotiations on longer-term international cooperation
on climate change. 109 They established a new subsidiary body, the Ad
Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under
the Kyoto Protocol (AWG).I"0 According to Article 3, paragraph 9 of the
Kyoto Protocol, commitments for subsequent periods-in other words
after 2012 (after the first commitment period)-shall be established for
Annex I Parties in amendments to Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol.'
The negotiators at Bali considered the work of AWG to be the second
track of the Bali Roadmap. At Bali, AWG agreed to spell out the target
ranges stipulated by the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC, men-
tioned above," l 2 which AWGLCA was not able to agree on."l 3 This was
to show that AWG's work would be guided by a "shared vision" of the
UNFCCC's ultimate objective."14 One of the main tasks of AWG was to
develop a work program and timetable to guide the completion of its
work in order to avoid a gap between the first and second commitment
period of the Kyoto Protocol." 5 AWG was able to reach this goal, set-
ting the deadline for 2009 when it will forward relevant decisions on
Annex I future commitments for adoption by COP/MOP-5 in Copenha-
gen. 
6
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE AMENDMENTS TO THE UNFCCC AND THE KYOTO
PROTOCOL
The Bali Roadmap does not specify what form of an agreement is
supposed to be adopted in Copenhagen in 2009. Will there be a new
framework convention with new goals on global emission reductions-
long-term and short-term? There have been discussions that have con-
sidered setting commitments based on per capita emissions rather than
108. Id. art.l(e)(i), (v).
109. Press Release, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Dec. 10,
2005) available at http://unfccc.int/files/press/news-room/press-releases-and advisories/
application/pdf/press051210_cop 11 .pdf.
110. Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties Under the Kyoto
Protocol, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocoVitems/3878.php (last visited Mar. 28, 2008).
Ill. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 5, art. 3(9).
112. See lPCC's AR4, supra note 7.
113. REPORT OF THE AD HOC WORKING GROUP ON THE FURTHER COMMITMENTS FOR ANNEX
I PARTIES UNDER THE KYOTO PROTOCOL ON ITS RESUMED FOURTH SESSION 5 (2008), available at
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2007/awg4/eng/05.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2008) [hereinafter AWG
REPORT].
114. Id.; see also ENB, supra note 88, at 17-18.
115. AWG REPORT, supra note 113, at 5.
116. 1d. at 8.
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total emissions, and emission ranges have also been suggested." 7 Fur-
thermore, emissions by sectors such as transportation and utilities have
been considered.
18
The goal of the international community must be to move much
more quickly to act on climate change, especially now that we know that
we do not have decades to figure out what to do. 19 This article proposes
amending the UNFCCC to include "Annex III" to include the fast-
growing developing countries that emit large amounts of GHGs. 120 The
Annex III Parties would then have commitments under the Kyoto Proto-
col under a new "Annex C." Furthermore, a separate provision, Article
11-Bis, would be added to the Kyoto Protocol, entitled the "Annex C
Mitigation Fund." This fund would specifically assist the fast-growing
developing countries in achieving compliance with their new Kyoto Pro-
tocol commitments to be specified in Annex C.
Amending the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol by adding Annex
III, Annex C, and the Annex C Mitigation Fund would create the needed
equitable bargain between developed and developing countries. This
bargain would balance the primary interests of developing countries,
such as economic development to eradicate poverty and address debt
issues, with the primary interest of the developed countries to protect the
climate system. Furthermore, it would operationalize the concept of sus-
tainable development, which the international community agreed to im-
plement through the Rio Declaration, 12 and Agenda 21, adopted at the
Rio Conference in 1992.122 Amending the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Pro-
tocol by adding Annex III, Annex C, and the Annex C Mitigation Fund
would reflect the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities
enunciated in the Rio Declaration. Ultimately, this proposal would pro-
mote sustainable development while upholding the stated objective of the
U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change: "stabilizing GHG
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate system.
', 2 3
117. See generally Kevin A. Baumert, Timothy Herzog & Jonathan Pershing, Navigating the
Numbers: Greenhouse Gas Data and International Climate Policy (2005),
http://pdfwri.org/navigatingnumbersfront.pdf.
118. Id.
119. See Press Release, United Nations Foundation, Science Panel Outlines Roadmap for
Reducing Risks from Climate Change, (Feb. 27, 2007), available at
http://www.unfoundation.org/media center/press/2007/pr22707.asp.
120. RAJAMANI, supra note 54, at 248.
121. Rio Declaration, supra note 51, art. 1.
122. Agenda 21, available at http://habitat.igc.org/agenda21/index.html [hereinafter Agenda
21]. Sustainable development is commonly defined as development "meeting the needs of the
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs." OUR
COMMON FUTURE, supra note 36, at 8.
123. UNFCCC, supra note 4, art. 2. Article 2 states that the objective is
to achieve, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention, stabilization of
the greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dan-
gerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be
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The UNFCCC and the Berlin Mandate both state that Annex I Par-
ties should "take the lead., 124 This can be interpreted as implying that
developed countries are to take a leadership role based on the CBDR
principle. However, the ordinary meaning of "to take the lead" also im-
plies that once the Annex I Parties (developed countries) have taken the
first step, namely to fulfill their commitments in the first commitment
period, then non-Annex I Parties (developing countries) are to "follow"
with their own binding commitments, be they reduction commitments or
limitations or other types of action. 25 This interpretation is drawn from
the context of the UNFCCC's object and purpose of "stabilizing GHG
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate system.' ' a6 Not taking dras-
tic action now to stabilize the GHGs will lead to dangerous interference
with the climate system.
Assuming Annex B Parties actually take the lead by fulfilling their
obligations during the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol,
developing countries (at least those emitting large amounts of GHGs)
then need to follow with commitments of their own during either the
second or third commitment period. It is becoming quite clear that, in
terms of development, some developing countries, such as China and
India, are growing much more rapidly than they were at the time the
Kyoto Protocol was adopted in 1997. Consequently, they are emitting
much greater amounts of GHGs than many developed countries. This
new situation must be reflected in the Kyoto Protocol's commitments.
27
Given the scientific indications that climate change needs to be addressed
urgently, all Parties that are major emitters of GHGs (both Annex I Par-
ties and countries like China and India) must have binding commitments.
Otherwise the object and purpose of the Climate Convention would be
defeated: The international community would not be able to stabilize
GHGs at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interfer-
ence with the climate system.
If the major GHG-emitting developing countries are not given bind-
ing reduction commitments, the CBDR principle will have been taken
beyond the limits of the object and purpose of the Climate Convention.
However, it is important to stress that the assumption of binding com-
mitments by major GHG-emitting developing countries is still contingent
achieved within a time frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate
change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic devel-
opment to proceed in a sustainable manner.
Id.
124. See UNFCCC, supra note 4, art. 4(2)(a); see also Berlin Mandate, supra note 82, §
I(1)(a).
125. Vienna Convention, supra note 44, art. 31.
126. See UNFCCC, supra note 4, art. 2.
127. At the COP-12 in November 2006, there was also mention that there be "wider and deep-
ening participation" in regards to GHG reduction commitments. See ENB, supra note 88, at 11.
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on the actions of the developed countries. The developed countries still
need to "take the lead" by reducing their emissions during the first com-
mitment period as dictated in Annex B and by committing to more strin-
gent reduction targets for the second commitment period. On the issue
of emission reduction ranges, Yvo de Boer stated in Bali that "[w]hat's
becoming clear to me is the more robust industrialized countries are will-
ing to be in terms of the effort they are working towards, the stronger the
reaction you're likely to get from developing countries."' 2 8  "If these
commitments were watered down," he said, "G77 countries would be
justified in asking why they should be more ambitious."'
' 29
A. Annex C
Using the Montreal Protocol as a model, the Parties to the Kyoto
Protocol should amend the UNFCCC to create Annex III, a new category
of Parties which would then have binding commitments under the Kyoto
Protocol stipulated in Annex C. Annex III would include non-Annex I
Parties with high levels of GHG emissions, such as China, India, and
Brazil. Annex III Parties would have binding limitation, reduction, or
mitigation action commitments under Annex C in the Kyoto Protocol
starting in the second (2013-2017) or third commitment period (2018-
2022), with a five-year delayed compliance schedule.
130
Technically, Annex III Parties would have many of the same rights
as Annex I Parties in the context of the Kyoto Protocol, yet in the context
of the UNFCCC they would remain non-Annex I Parties.' 31 Further-
more, Article 3 of the Kyoto Protocol, containing the core commitment,
would be amended to include Annex III as follows: "The Parties in-
cluded in Annex I and Annex III shall ... ensure that their ... emissions
... do not exceed their assigned amounts, calculated pursuant to their
quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments or mitigation
action commitments inscribed in Annex B [and Annex C].' 32 As they
grow and emit greater amounts of GHGs, additional developing countries
would graduate into the Annex III category.' 33 China and India would
qualify right away to be included in Annex III, with commitments under
128. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Previous Coverage from
COP 13, http://unfccc.int/meetings/cop_ 13/items/4231 .php (last visited Mar. 28, 2008).
129. Id.
130. This is assuming the commitment periods of the Kyoto Protocol are not extended beyond
five years, but continue the pattern of the first commitment period.
131. Kevin A. Baumert, Participation of Developing Countries in the International Climate
Change Regime: Lessons for the Future, 38 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 365, 390-91 (2006). Bau-
mert explains this type of status in the context of parties taking on voluntary commitments through
the use of the alternative process available in Climate Convention Article 4.2(g) for becoming an
Annex I Party. Id. Yet, that status would be analogous to the status described here for Annex III
Parties.
132. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 5, art. 3(1).
133. See Tadashi Otsuka, Professor, Waseda Univ., Tokyo, Japan, Presentation at the Interna-
tional Symposium: Legal Principles and Post-2012 Climate Regime (Dec. 17, 2006) (slides from
presentation on file with author).
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Annex C in the Kyoto Protocol. For some developing countries included
in Annex III, there would only be obligations to take actions or measures
to mitigate climate change, others would have a limitation on emission of
GHGs and not a reduction requirement. Within Annex C, the amount of
reductions or limitations would be differentiated, just as they are in An-
nex B among the developed countries.
An important question for further analysis is when the CBDR prin-
ciple ceases to apply because the former developing country has reached
a certain level of economic growth and is no longer different from devel-
oped countries. In regards to emissions, would the state then graduate
from Annex C into the Annex B category, joining the other developed
Parties? One would have to take into account the capacity of fast-
growing countries to take on the same binding commitments as long-time
developed countries. Furthermore, one would need to determine at what
level of development China and India should leave the developing coun-
try classification and enter the ranks of developed countries.
B. Annex C Mitigation Fund
To complement Annex C, a new Annex C Mitigation Fund needs to
be incorporated into the Kyoto Protocol as "Article 1 1-Bis," placed im-
mediately after Article 11, the financial provision. This amendment
would be adopted simultaneously with the amendments to include Annex
III in the UNFCCC and Annex C in the Protocol in order to promote the
early participation of Annex III Parties in fulfilling their new Annex C
commitments. This new arrangement would depend on the political will
of the developed countries, since to a large extent they would be funding
the Annex C Mitigation Fund. This fund would have to be substantial to
help the Annex III Parties receive technology transfers and other assis-
tance much faster than provided by the current financial mechanism un-
der the Climate Convention and the Kyoto Protocol that is operated by
the Global Environment Facility. 13 4 The financing for the Annex C Miti-
gation Fund would come from a specific small fee charged in emission
trading transactions. As a result, the funding would come from devel-
oped countries because Annex B Parties are currently the only Parties
using the emissions trading mechanism. As Annex III Parties start to use
the emissions trading mechanism, they would also participate in the
funding of the Annex C Mitigation Fund.
Following the trend in the U.N. to partner with the private sector,
the Annex C Mitigation Fund would not necessarily be run by the Global
Environment Facility, but could be managed by an international private
bank accountable to and guided by the COP/MOP. The goal would be to
use the more efficient private banking system to track, manage, and dis-
perse the funds earmarked for the financing of the incremental costs of
134. See UNFCCC, supra note 4, art. 11, 21(3); Kyoto Protocol, supra note 5, art. 11.
[Vol. 85:4
GLOBAL RESPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE
"clean" technology transfer and other assistance to Annex C countries.
The chosen bank would already have adopted the Equator Principles.1
35
One could argue that fast-growing developing countries emitting
large amounts of GHGs would be more likely to take on voluntary com-
mitments than agree to binding commitments under Annex C. However,
setting up a system in which developing countries with major economies
are in a separate category seems more advantageous than subjecting them
to the binding commitments under Annex B. 136 Furthermore, the Annex
Ill/Annex C system includes the five-year delayed compliance schedule
and the Annex C Mitigation Fund set up specifically for developing
countries. The purpose of an Annex C Mitigation Fund is to facilitate the
assumption of binding commitments by developing countries emitting
large amounts of GHGs without having to slow down their economic
growth in any drastic way, thereby promoting sustainable development.
C. Climate Change Corps
In order to make the Annex C Mitigation Fund more effective, a
new set of capacity-building teams, an equivalent of the "Peace
Corps"-the Climate Change Corps (3Cs)-should also be introduced.
This special corps of volunteer engineers and climate scientists, among
others, would be set up by individual Annex I nations. The 3Cs would
be funded by the Annex C Mitigation Fund and coordinated by UNDP in
order to make sure these capacity-building teams were sent to the fast-
growing developing countries that needed them most urgently. The 3Cs
would help facilitate the developing countries' move toward low-carbon
sustainable development, by assisting with mitigating climate change at
all levels, such as training in the area of fundamental research on climate
change, assisting with GHG emissions monitoring systems, improving
the ability to adapt to and assimilate transferred technologies, and facili-
tating in the invention and production of endogenous "clean" technology.
D. Kyoto Mechanisms
Regarding the Kyoto Mechanisms, Annex C Parties would be able
to take advantage of all the flexible mechanisms. Currently, developing
countries can only participate in the Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM). Participating in all three mechanisms is important because be-
ing eligible to participate in emissions trading can help Annex III Parties
economically, while at the same time fulfilling their reduction commit-
135. The Equator Principles are guidelines for banks working in the project finance sector to
ensure that projects are socially responsible and reflect sound environmental management practices.
The Equator Principles (July 2006), available at http://www.equator-
principles.com/documents/EquatorPrinciples.pdf.
136. Voluntary commitments could be adopted by first expressing to be bound by the Climate
Convention, Article 4(2)(g), and then taking on commitments under Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol.
UNFCCC, supra note 4, art. 4(2)(g); Kyoto Protocol, supra note 5, annex B.
2008]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
ments. For instance, when they use energy efficiency to cut back on
GHG emissions, they can sell the surplus credits and then use the reve-
nue to fund new cleaner energy technology, making more credits avail-
able for them. However, Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol would have to
be amended to read as follows: "The Parties included in Annex B [and
Annex C] may participate in emissions trading for the purposes of fulfill-
ing their commitments under Article 3. " l37 In the same manner, joint
implementation would give the large GHG emitting developing countries
the possibility of funding projects in the territory of other Annex I or
Annex III Parties and receiving credits toward their own commitments.
In terms of the CDM, Annex III Parties, such as India with 33.33
percent of the program's projects, 138 would likely want to carry on as
host countries to projects carried out under the CDM. Article 12 of the
Kyoto Protocol specifically states that the mechanism shall assist Parties
not included in Annex 1.139 In other words, Annex III Parties would con-
tinue to receive assistance in "achieving sustainable development and in
contributing to the ultimate objective of the Convention" as specified in
Article 12.140 To achieve this, the text of Article 12 should be amended
to read:
The purpose of the clean development mechanism shall be to assist
Parties not included in Annex I in achieving sustainable development
and in contributing to the ultimate objective of the Convention, and
to assist Parties included in Annex I [and Annex HI] in achieving
compliance with their quantified emission reduction limitation and
reduction commitments under Article 3.
Annex III Parties could continue to host CDM projects, helping them
achieve sustainable development. At the same time, these Annex III
Parties could also carry out CDM projects in other developing countries
and use the credits they receive to comply with their Annex C limitation
or reduction commitments. For CDM projects carried out by Annex B
Parties in the territory of Annex C Parties, the credits would go to the
Annex B Parties.
E. Amending the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol
In order to incorporate Annex III into the UNFCCC and Annex C
and the Annex C Mitigation Fund into the Kyoto Protocol, the Protocol
would have to be amended by the Parties. To amend the Kyoto Protocol
137. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 5, art. 17.
138. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, CDM Statistics, Registration,
http://cdm.unfccc.int/Statistics/Registration/NumOfRegisteredProjByHostPartiesPieChart.htm (last
visited Mar. 28, 2008). There are 948 registered project activities as of March 3, 2008. Id.
139. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 5, art. 12(2).
140. Id. This would allow developing countries to mature economically while taking social
and environmental issues, including climate change, into account. See OUR COMMON FUTURE,
supra note 36, at 8; Rio Declaration, supra note 51, princs. 3-5.
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in order to incorporate the Annex C Mitigation Fund as Article 11 -Bis
requires that a proposed amendment be sent to the Parties at least six
months before the COP/MOP where it would be proposed for adop-
tion. 141 If the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol could not reach agreement by
consensus, the amendment would be adopted by a three-fourths majority
vote of the Parties. 142 The amendment would enter into force for the
Parties that accepted it ninety days after at least three-fourths of the Par-
ties deposited their instrument of ratification. 143 Adopting a new Annex
III to the UNFCCC and Annex C to the Kyoto Protocol would follow the
same procedure as for an amendment to the treaty and Protocol.'
44
CONCLUSION
The best result that can be hoped for to result from the COP- 15 in
Copenhagen in 2009 is to amend the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol to
get near universal participation in a more forceful way to address the
enormous challenges of climate change, so every nation feels its con-
cerns are addressed. The UNFCCC should be amended to include a new
category of Parties-Annex III Parties--defined as emerging economies
(the fast-growing developing countries). These Parties will be able to
commit to mitigation measures/emission cuts under a new Annex C of
the Kyoto Protocol in return for financial and technological assistance
provided by a new Annex C Mitigation Fund. Then, perhaps, the United
States will feel compelled to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and comply with
its stipulated reduction targets under Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol,
allowing for a unified approach against global climate change. This
would go a long way in addressing the dilemmas of climate regulation
and equity. It would also allow the fast-growing developing countries to
move toward sustainable development, while at the same time address
the scourge of climate change based on the efforts made by the devel-
oped countries to assist them financially and using effective mechanisms
to provide them with affordable, environmentally-sound technologies.
141. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 5, art. 20(3).
142. Id. art. 20(4).
143. Id. art. 20(5).
144. Id. art. 21(3)-(4); see also UNFCCC, supra note 4, art. 15-16.
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Developing a sense of ourselves that would properly balance his-
tory and nature and space and time is a more difficult task than we
would suspect and involves a radical reevaluation of the way we look at
the world around us. Do we continue to exploit the earth or do we pre-
serve it and preserve life? Whether we are prepared to embark on a
painful intellectual journey to discover the parameters of reconciling
history and nature is the question of this generation.'
INTRODUCTION
American Indian tribes and people have contributed very little to the
causes of global warming, yet for geographic, cultural, and demographic
reasons, they stand to suffer disproportionately from global warming's
negative effects. A recent study, Native Communities and Climate
Change, prepared by the Natural Resources Law Center at the University
of Colorado Law School, documents that these effects include, among
others, threats to traditional hunting and gathering, destruction of tribal
villages in Alaska, increased pressure on tribal reserved rights to water in
the arid Southwest, and inundation of reservation lands in Florida.2 The
disproportion between tribal contributions to global warming and the
negative impacts on tribes qualifies this as an environmental justice is-
sue. 3 As the Native Communities and Climate Change Report suggests, a
complex of legal rights, in conjunction with Congress's moral obligation
t Associate Professor, University of Colorado Law School. I am grateful to Mark Squil-
lace, Ahmed White, Brad Bernthal, Phil Weiser, Mark Fenster, and Robin Barnes for helpful feed-
back at a works-in-progress session at the University of Colorado Law School. Many thanks also to
Jonathan Hanna, Natural Resources Law Center Fellow, University of Colorado Law School, 2006-
07, the principal author and editor of Native Communities and Climate Change: Protecting Tribal
Resources as Part of National Climate Policy.
1. VINE DELORIA, JR., GOD Is RED: A NATIVE VIEW OF RELIGION 61 (2d ed. 1992).
2. JONATHAN HANNA, NATIVE COMMUNITIES AND CLIMATE CHANGE: PROTECTING TRIBAL
RESOURCES AS PART OF NATIONAL CLIMATE POLICY 11-12, 19,26 (Natural Res. Law Ctr., Univ. of
Colo. Law Sch., 2007), http://www.colorado.edu/law/centers/nrlc/publications/ClimateChange
Report-FINAL%20_9.16.07_.pdf.
3. See David H. Getches & David N. Pellow, Beyond "Traditional" Environmental Justice,
in JUSTICE AND NATURAL RESOURCES: CONCEPTS, STRATEGIES, AND APPLICATIONS 25-26 (Kath-
ryn M. Mutz et al. eds., 2002) (providing a definition of environmental justice in the natural re-
sources context); see also Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 11, 1994) (calling on
federal agencies to achieve environmental justice as part of their mission and defining the problem
as the "disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental effects" of programs or
policies).
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to tribes, provides the foundation and incentive for the federal govern-
ment to take action to address these impacts.4
Yet as important as it is to highlight its environmental justice as-
pects, global warming's spatial and temporal dispersions render it a
global and intergenerational collective action problem that is not suscep-
tible to typical environmental justice solutions. Global warming is
caused by human emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) and other gases
(methane, nitrous oxide, various hydrofluorocarbons, various perfluoro-
carbons, and sulfur hexafluoride) that trap heat that would otherwise be
reflected back into the atmosphere. 5 The atmosphere is a global com-
mons; no matter where in the world you are, your emissions contribute to
its increasing insulating properties. Further, the atmosphere cannot be
compartmentalized. For example, the fact that the United States has the
highest historical greenhouse gas emissions6 does not mean that our at-
mosphere is "thicker" and that we will suffer from global warming pro-
portionately more than other countries. The spatial dispersion also
means that reductions in one part of the globe can be rendered meaning-
less by increases in another part of the globe. If the total parts per mil-
lion of CO 2 continue to rise overall, it does not matter where the parts
come from. This spatial dispersion feature of global warming means that
disparate effects from climate change cannot be redressed by targeting
the emitters closest to the affected area. Furthermore, disparate effects
cannot even be redressed by targeting only the biggest emitters. The
commons aspects of climate change require all emitters to be part of a
collective solution. These spatial collective action features are what
prompt politicians to adopt the line: "Why should we reduce our emis-
sions if China will soon render our efforts meaningless? '7 While there
are many appropriate rejoinders to this, including the imperative of moral
leadership and the necessity of the United States leading the way in terms
of technological solutions, the do-nothing position has, to date, prevailed
as a matter of national policy.
Climate change's temporal dispersion adds an even more challeng-
ing aspect to the commons problem. Global warming is a severely tem-
porally lagged phenomenon. CO 2, the most prevalent of the greenhouse
gases, stays in the atmosphere for hundreds of years,8 so most of the
molecules added since the dawn of industrialization are still hanging
around. As a practical matter, every molecule we add is one that is in-
4. HANNA, supra note 2, at 28-29.
5. Timeforchange.org, Cause and Effect for Global Warming, http://timeforchange.org/
cause-and-effect-for-global-warming (last visited Mar. 27, 2008).
6. See Robert Collier, A Warming World: China About to Pass U.S. as World's Top Genera-
tor of Greenhouse Gases, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 5, 2007, at Al.
7. See LEE LANE & SAMUEL THERNSTROM, A NEW DIRECTION FOR U.S. CLIMATE POLICY:
CREDIBLE ALTERNATIVES TO KYOTO 2 (2007), available at http://www.aei.org/docLib/20070201_
EPOPosted g.pdf (discussing the challenge of unifying politicians around effective climate policies).
8. Timeforchange.org, supra note 5.
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creasing the thickness of our atmospheric blanket, because none are go-
ing away within a time frame that matters. This results in a lag between
emissions increases and the effects on warming. The effects from to-
day's blanket will be felt throughout the rest of the century (meaning
increased warming and so on), even if we were to stop all carbon emis-
sions today. Likewise, we are now feeling the effects not only of our
own emissions, but of our parents' and grandparents.' Climate change is
therefore an intergenerational collective action problem of potentially
tragic proportions.9 Each generation has incentive not to act, since the
effects will be felt later. Yet only the current generation has the ability to
take steps to avoid compounding the misery inflicted on future genera-
tions.10
Global warming's spatial and temporal dispersions render it a pro-
found global and intergenerational collective action problem. Address-
ing the disparate effects warming will have on tribes and other disadvan-
taged communities leads us into these potentially tragic features of cli-
mate change, and requires us to articulate an ethical framework that
would support global efforts to mitigate (i.e., reduce and eventually
eliminate) human contributions to global warming, as well as to assist
tribal communities in the already inevitable need to adapt to a warming
world. Ultimately, solutions, if they are to take seriously environmental
justice claims as well as the impacts at large, lie in the realm of sustain-
ability. While that term has been overused, what I mean by it is the
adoption of policies and practices that allow us to live within our eco-
logical means and to distribute the benefits of development equally
across human communities." To provide redress as well as hope to the
most disadvantaged communities, we should adopt policies and practices
of sustainability worldwide. This brings us to the significant problem
that, despite decades of discussion about sustainability and what it
means, we have done relatively little to implement or achieve it. There
are at least several explanations for this, each rooted in various under-
standings of human nature and the actual extent of resource scarcity.'2
Why, then, should anyone bother to try? The answer lies, I think, in the
9. See generally Stephen Gardiner, A Perfect Moral Storm: Climate Change, Intergenera-
tional Ethics and the Problem of Moral Corruption, 15 ENVTL. VALUES 397 (2006).
10. See id.
11. See WORLD COMM'N ON ENV'T AND DEV., OUR COMMON FUTURE 4,8-9 (1987) [herein-
after OUR COMMON FUTURE]. The report, edited by Gro Harlem Brundtland and therefore known as
the Brundtland Report, provides a definition of sustainable development and outlines the principles
and practices that would operationalize it on a global scale.
12. Some argue that most humans are not inclined to give up present benefits for the good of
future generations. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, On the Divergent American Reactions to Terrorism
and Climate Change, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 503, 503 (2007) (arguing that this accounts for why most
Americans have not pressed for climate change policies). Others contend that the costs of taking
action are too high and that we should invest in technological fixes to engineer our way out of envi-
ronmental problems, including climate change. See, e.g., Thomas Schelling, Climate Change: The
Uncertainties, the Certainties, and What They Imply About Action, 4 ECONOMISTS' VOICE 3, 2-4
(2007), available at http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1276&context-ev.
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kinds of lives we want to lead, the norms we want to aspire to, and the
virtues we want to cultivate, irrespective of whether we will ever have
any certainty that either the specific injustices suffered by American In-
dians or the broader effects that everyone will endure as a result of cli-
mate change will be redressed or avoided. Not coincidentally, a philoso-
phical worldview that we might turn to for instruction as we navigate this
new terrain is that embraced by many American Indian tribes.
This article will proceed by describing in Part I the place-based
worldview held by most American Indian tribes. An understanding of
this worldview, and the cultural and ethical practices that flow from it, is
necessary to comprehend the disparate negative effects tribes will suffer
from global warming. Yet, fittingly, the American Indian worldview
may also provide the blueprint for life in a zero-emissions world. In Part
II, I will summarize the particular effects on tribes in the four regions
examined in the Native Communities and Climate Change Report, and
also discuss the rights tribes possess that give rise to legal as well as
moral claims for specific redress. In Part III, I will discuss the inevitabil-
ity of a global approach to this particular form of environmental injus-
tice, highlighting the possibilities for deepening our conception of sus-
tainability and giving it ethical content that may be crucial to navigate
the warming world we all face.
I. AMERICAN INDIAN CULTURE AND RELIGION: SPACE AND PLACE AND
ALL THAT COMES FROM IT
Most modem American Indian nations do not have pristine land-
scapes. On a trip through Indian country, the following sights are not
uncommon: trash swirling in parking lots; garbage piling up in washes;
road-killed dogs lying bloating in the sun for days. Like all poverty-
stricken places in the modem world, most Indian nations have trouble
keeping the refuse of consumer life at bay. It is important to start on this
note, because in describing the deep, vital, and complex environmental
ethic that many tribes hold, I do not want to invoke the mythic, romantic
Indian, perpetually at one with nature and free of taint and pollution.
First, like all human communities, American Indians do not always act in
perfect sync with their deeply held norms and beliefs. Second, the hard-
ships of economic and cultural devastation visited on tribes throughout
history have left them with a lot of garbage to clean up, figuratively and
literally. Yet, remarkably, this history has not snuffed out traditional
American Indian culture and religion, which carries on to this day. Part
of Native tradition is to embrace their landscapes, whether battered or
pristine. In short, American Indian people are not hard-wired to be any
closer to nature or more environmentally sensitive than non-Indian peo-
ple. But their traditional religious and cultural systems of meaning re-
volve around the earth and its values, and these long-held beliefs have
influenced how American Indians view and interact with the land and the
natural world.
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In his book, God Is Red. A Native View of Religion, Vine Deloria,
Jr., describes the philosophical and thematic differences between Ameri-
can Indian religions and western, Judeo-Christian religions. 13 One cru-
cial difference is that of organizing principles: American Indian relig-
ions emphasize space while the Judeo-Christian religions emphasize
time.' 4 As Deloria explains, Judeo-Christian religions place great em-
phasis on the chronology of their story of revelation. 15 It is important,
for example, that the savior appeared when he did, and that the spiritual
message, good for the rest of time, was then revealed. 16 While particular
places can take on sacred significance, such as the town of Bethlehem or
the site of the crucifixion, they do so typically because of the historical
events that took place there. 17 For American Indians, the place itself is
sacred, and therefore the starting point for the system of beliefs and eth-
ics that generate from it: "American Indians hold their lands-places-
as having the highest possible meaning, and all their statements are made
with this reference point in mind."'
18
This spatial aspect to American Indian religion gives different con-
tent to revelation. The place reveals its meaning, through communion
and ceremony, to religious practitioners on an ongoing basis. The con-
tent of that revelation may vary, as different behaviors may be necessary
to behave rightly toward a place depending on the season, year, or era.
As Deloria writes:
The structure of [American Indian] religious traditions is taken di-
rectly from the world around them, from their relationships with
other forms of life. Context is therefore all-important for both prac-
tice and the understanding of reality. The places where revelations
were experienced were remembered and set aside as locations where,
through rituals and ceremonials, the people could once again com-
municate with the spirits. Thousands of years of occupancy on their
lands taught tribal peoples the sacred landscapes for which they were
responsible and gradually the structure of ceremonial value became
clear. It was not what people believed to be true that was important
but what they experienced as true. Hence revelation was seen as a
continuous process of adjustment to the natural surroundings and not
as a specific message valid for all times and places. 19
Christian revelation, by contrast, issues at a specific time to a specific
listener, and is literally "the gospel" until a chronologically subsequent
13. See generally DELORIA, supra note 1.
14. Id. at 122.
15. Id. at98.
16. See id. at 104.
17. See id. at 67.
18. Id. at 62.
19. Id. at 66-67 (emphasis added).
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amendment.2 ° (Some branches of western religions do not adhere to the
possibility of modem amendment by revelation, while others do.21)
Because most American Indian religions have this place-centric as-
pect, there is a corresponding totality to the role that religion has in In-
dian life. A place generates not just a list of rules to follow, but a whole
life's worth of attitudes and behaviors: "Tribal religions are actually
complexes of attitudes, beliefs, and practices, fine-tuned to harmonize
with the lands on which the people live. 2  As Deloria implies, there is
even something misleading about calling traditional American Indian
beliefs and practices "religion," because it implies segregation from the
rest of life.23
The place-based nature of American Indian religion and culture has
come to legal and public consciousness as a result of conflicts over sa-
cred sites on public lands. For example, in Lyng v. Northwest Cemetery
Protective Association, the Yurok, Karok, and Tolowa Indians fought the
construction of a Forest Service road that had been proposed to run
through an area of the Six Rivers National Forest in Northern Califor-
24nia. The area, known as Chimney Rock,
"is significant as an integral and indispensible part of Indian religious
conceptualization and practice." Specific sites are used for certain
rituals, and "successful use of the [area] is dependent upon and facili-
tated by certain qualities of the physical environment, the most im-
portant of which are privacy, silence, and an undisturbed natural set-
ting."25
In dissent, Justice Brennan described the tribes' relationship to the
Chimney Rock area as follows:
For respondent Indians, the most sacred of lands is the high country
where, they believe, prehuman spirits moved with the coming of hu-
mans to the Earth. Because these spirits are seen as the source of re-
ligious power, or "medicine," many of the tribes' rituals and practices
require frequent journeys to the area. Thus, for example, religious
leaders preparing for the complex of ceremonies that underlie the
Tribes' World Renewal efforts must travel to specific sites in the
high country in order to attain the medicine necessary for successful
renewal. Similarly, individual tribe members may seek curative
powers for the healing of the sick, or personal medicine for particular
20. See id. at 66.
21. See, e.g., All Things Considered: Explaining the Underpinnings of Mormonism (NPR
radio broadcast July 5, 2007) (transcript available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?
storyld=1 1761615).
22. DELORIA, supra note 1, at 70.
23. See id.
24. Lyng v. Nw. Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 442 (1988). The Court is quoting
from a study commissioned by the Forest Service completed in 1979. Id. at 442.
25. Id. (second alteration in original) (citations omitted).
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purposes such as good luck in singing, hunting, or love. A period of
preparation generally precedes such visits, and individuals must se-
lect trails in the sacred area according to the medicine they seek and
their abilities, gradually moving to increasingly more powerful sites,
which are typically located at higher altitudes. Among the most
powerful of sites are Chimney Rock, Doctor Rock, and Peak 8, all of
which are elevated rock outcroppings.
26
Other sacred areas that are well known due to conflicts over public
lands include: Devil's Tower in Wyoming, a stark volcanic feature that
is central to the religious and cultural lives of several plains tribes and
also a popular rock climbing destination;27 Cave Rock, a once-popular
climbing spot that is now off-limits due in part to the religious concerns
of the Washoe Tribe;28 and Rainbow Bridge, an enormous sandstone arch
that can be visited by boaters coming from Lake Powell, but which is
also considered central to the ceremonies of Navajo people in the re-
gion. 29 This list is just a partial one, omitting not only many other sacred
sites that have become publicly identified through land use conflicts, but
also the vast number that tribes and their members keep to themselves.
Another feature of most American Indian religions is that humans
are part of an animate universe and have moral relationships with all
other creatures, beings, and even elements. 30 For example, the Hopi hold
several springs to be sacred.31 The springs play an integral role in the
Hopi creation story and are part of ongoing ceremonies and practices.
32
Likewise, animals are sacred to many tribes and are required for the
proper performance of religious ceremonies. 33 For the Northern Arap-
aho, Hopi, Navajo, and other plains and southwest tribes, the eagle plays
a key role. 34 For each of these tribes, an entire set of practices surround-
ing capture, treatment, and use of the bird comprise the religious experi-
ence.35 As this small handful of examples indicates, religious and cul-
26. Id. at 461 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
27. See Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbit, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1448 (D. Wyo. 1998), aftd,
175 F.3d 814 (10th Cir. 1999).
28. See Access Fund v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 499 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2007).
29. See Natural Arch & Bridge Soc'y v. Alston, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1207 (D. Utah 2002); Badoni
v. Higginson, 455 F. Supp. 641 (D. Utah 1977).
30. See Rebecca Tsosie, Tribal Environmental Policy in an Era of Self-Determination: The
Role of Ethics, Economics, and Traditional Ecological Knowledge, 21 VT. L. REv. 225, 273, 276
(1996).
31. See Peter Whiteley & Vernon Masayesva, The Use and Abuse ofAquifers: Can the Hopi
Indians Survive Multinational Mining?, in WATER, CULTURE & POWER 13-18 (John M. Donahue &
Barbara Rose Johnson eds., 1998).
32. See Katosha Belvin Nakai, Water. It Always Has Been; It Is; It Will Be-A Cultural
Perspective on the Valuation of Water, 38 TEx. TECH L. REv. 1027, 1032-33 (2006).
33. DELORIA, supra note 1, at 89.
34. See Victoria Sutton, Wind and Wisdom, 1 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL'Y J. 345, 360
(2007).
35. See United States v. Friday, No. 05-CR-260-D, 2006 WL 3592952, at *1 (D. Wyo. Oct.
13, 2006) (describing the religious significance of the eagle to the Northern Arapaho); United States
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tural life for American Indians is inextricably bound up with a way of
living in a particular place with and among its creatures and elements.
Thus, despite the variety within and among American Indian tribes, Vine
Deloria identified the following common features of the American Indian
religious outlook:
The Indian is confronted with a bountiful earth in which all things
and experiences have a role to play. The task of the tribal religion, if
such a religion can be said to have a task, is to determine the proper
relationship that the people of the tribe must have with other living
things and to develop the self-discipline within the tribal community
so that man acts harmoniously with other creatures. The world that
he experiences is dominated by the presence of power, the manifesta-
tion of life energies, the whole life-flow of a creation. Recognition
that the human beings holds [sic] an important place in such a crea-
tion is tempered by the thought that they are dependent on everything
in creation for their existence.
36
This attachment to place, rooted in religious and cultural norms and
traditions, is integral to the disparate effects tribes are experiencing due
to global warming. It is not simply that places to which strong religious
feelings are attached are at risk. Ways of life that have evolved specifi-
cally around these places are also at risk. The option of relocating is
certainly as available to tribal communities as to others, but relocation
has a different meaning if the cultural definition of a people is bound to a
location and its unique ecological offerings. Certainly, this resonates
with issues faced by other affected communities. The people who came
home to New Orleans, and the people who never left, describe their at-
tachment to a way of life, not just a spot on the map.37 The point is not
to say that the norms and practices of Native communities are like no
others. But, there is a key distinction to keep in mind. For Native com-
munities, it is not just the place that matters, but the animate world of
which it is a part: the animals, plants, seasons, and rhythms that flow
from centuries of knowledge about a place and all of its emanations.38
Global warming is already affecting all of these aspects of place, and will
continue to do so for some time to come.
II. EFFECTS ON NATIVE COMMUNITIES FROM GLOBAL WARMING
Scientific knowledge about the phenomenon of climate change has
been accumulating for at least two decades, and reports by international
bodies and others have become increasingly certain about the causes as
v. Tawahongva, 456 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1124 n.8 (D. Ariz. 2006) (describing the religious signifi-
cance of the eagle to the Hopi).
36. DELOR1A, supra note 1, at 88.
37. See, e.g., Mike Miller, Morning Edition: My Home Is New Orleans (NPR radio broadcast
Aug. 28, 2006) (transcript available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?
storyld=5705026).
38. See Tsosie, supra note 30, at 276-80.
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well as the need for immediate policy responses. The Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) issued its fourth set of assessment re-
ports in 2007, and its conclusions were stark.39 The reports, which re-
flect the consensus of hundreds of participating scientists who have re-
viewed thousands of studies on climate, concluded that "warming of the
climate system is unequivocal," and further expressed "very high confi-
dence" that human emissions of CO2 and other heat-trapping gases since
1750 have caused the earth's surface temperature to rise.40 During that
time, C0 2-the most important of the anthropogenic greenhouse gases-
increased from a pre-industrial level of roughly 280 parts per million
(ppm) to 379 ppm in 2005.41
Unfortunately, the moment has long passed when we could think
exclusively about mitigation strategies, as they are called in climate
change parlance. Mitigation strategies are those aimed at reducing and
eventually zeroing out global greenhouse gas emissions in order to slow,
stop, and perhaps ultimately even reverse the warming trend. Scientists
estimate that beyond 455 ppm of C0 2, the effects from warming will be
extreme, unpredictable, and even catastrophic.42 The pressing need to
engage in serious, globally coordinated action to mitigate emissions still
exists, and will continue to exist indefinitely, because even if we surpass
455 ppm, we will need to stabilize and eliminate emissions, or the cli-
mate system will be an ever-moving, increasingly volatile target, render-
ing adaptation measures temporary at best, futile at worst. But, as the
IPCC reports indicate, the effects of warming are already being experi-
enced and, even under the most optimistic mitigation scenarios, will con-
tinue for the foreseeable future.43 Governments around the world are
therefore already engaging in adaptation planning, which means fashion-
ing reactions to the extant and inevitable effects of warming. These ef-
39. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE
PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS (Susan Solomon et al. eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2007) [hereinafter
IPCC: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS]; INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY (Martin Parry et al. eds.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 2007) [hereinafter IPCC: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY].
40. IPCC: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, supra note 39, at 3, 5.
41. ld. at2.
42. See Dan Shapley, Global Warming "Beyond the Worst-Case Scenario," THE DAILY
GREEN.COM, Oct. 9, 2007, http://www.thedailygreen.com/environmental-news/latest/7642; see also
Jim Hansen, The Threat to the Planet, 53 THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS 12 (2006), available at
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/19131. Hansen states that the business-as-usual scenario, with an
annual global increase in emissions of two percent such as has occurred in the last 10 years, will
make it impractical to achieve the reductions necessary to stabilize temperature increases at less than
two degrees Fahrenheit. Id. At temperature increases above this, feedback effects, including the
release of methane from permafrost, could result in much more accelerated warming. Id. In addi-
tion, the business as usual scenario would cause the disintegration of the land-based ice sheets,
ultimately resulting in an 80-foot rise in sea levels. Id. Others put the critical stabilization point at
500 ppm for CO 2. See, e.g., Martin Hoffert, Physics Dept., N.Y. Univ., Presentation at the Natural
Resources Law Ctr., Univ. of Colorado: An Energy Revolution for the 21 st Century (June 8, 2006),
available at http://www.colorado.edu/law/centers/nrlc/summerconference/2006/Hoffert.zip (copy
also on file with author).
43. IPCC: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, supra note 39, at 12.
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fects include rising sea levels (with predictions ranging from a few to
twenty or more feet), acidification of oceans with harm to coral reefs and
other species, increasing intensity and frequency of extreme weather
events (such as tropical storms and heat waves), larger drought affected
areas and more frequent droughts and floods, and changing patterns for
pests and diseases of various sorts. 4 This is a list of likely global effects,
and each region will experience different consequences. The Native
Communities and Climate Change Report drew from various regional
studies of current and future effects in order to draw some conclusions
about impacts on American Indian tribes in those areas.45
A. Pacific Northwest: Effects on Salmon
For American Indian Tribes of the Pacific Northwest, the potential
demise of wild salmon is the signature effect of climate change. Salmon
are central to the religious, cultural, and economic lives of most tribes in
the region, and as a result tribes negotiated treaty rights, enforceable to
this day, to continue to harvest the fish.46 While threats to wild salmon
are multiple, the changing climate could be the factor that pushes the
species beyond the brink. For these reasons, salmon are an appropriate
lens through which to view the impacts to Northwest tribes from climate
change.
1. Changing Climate in the Pacific Northwest
The Pacific Northwest has experienced a region-wide warming
trend over the last 100 years.4 7 Average temperatures have risen by 1.5
degrees Fahrenheit, with the 1990s being the warmest decade.a Average
temperatures in the Puget Sound region rose at a higher rate, with a 2.3
degree Fahrenheit increase in the twentieth century, and much of that
warming occurring within the last 50 years.49 Projections for the future
indicate that the warming trend will accelerate. 50 Climate models predict
that average temperatures for the region will rise at the rate of 0.5 de-
grees Fahrenheit per decade at least through the middle of the twenty-
first century, with greater increases between June and August but higher
average temperatures occurring year round as well.5'
Precipitation changes have also occurred in the region. The Pacific
Northwest experienced an 11 percent average increase in annual precipi-
52tation in the twentieth century. Yearly levels fluctuated significantly,
44. IPCC: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY, supra note 39, at 11-12, 14, 18.









ETHICS FOR A WARMING WORLD
however, and the past trend is not as easy to discern as it is for the tem-
perature record.53 Future predictions about precipitation amounts are
also less definitive, though most climate models show only little or slight
change in the annual mean precipitation through the first half of the
twenty-first century.54 The more significant effect is on the hydrologic
cycle. While roughly the same amount of precipitation appears likely to
fall in the region, more of it will fall as rain rather than snow, and the
spring runoff will occur earlier.55 With warmer temperatures occurring
all year and particularly in the summer, stream flows will be higher in the
winter and lower in the spring and summer. 56 These changes in turn are
likely to cause more flooding in the winter and more drought risk in the
summer, when water is in greater demand.57
Climate change has also already resulted in changes to the marine
and fresh water environment in the region. Rising sea levels are causing
shore erosion, landslides, damage to coastal estuarine and salt marsh
habitats, and destruction of near-shore marine plants including eelgrass
and bull kelp.58 In addition, climactic factors will change the circulation
and upwelling patterns in the Puget Sound area, where freshwater inland
streams mix with saltwater from the Pacific Ocean to create a unique
marine environment on which aquatic species depend.5 9 Changes in
freshwater flow and timing, described above, will affect the circulation
and stratification of these coastal waters. 60 In addition, warmer air tem-
peratures will result in warmer freshwater and ocean temperatures.
6 1
Temperature increase, along with the increased volume of freshwater
into the marine environment, will further affect ocean salinity.62 Both
the changing temperatures and salinity will in turn affect oxygenation
levels and phytoplankton growth.63 High levels of winter precipitation
are also the likely cause of higher levels of fecal coliform in Puget
Sound.64 Finally, glacial melt will affect volume and temperatures of
stream flows, and may also increase stream contamination when pollut-
ants stored in the ice are released by melting.
65
53. Id.
54. Id. at 5-6.
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2. Effects on Salmon and Tribes
Salmon will be affected by each of the above described effects of
climate change in the Pacific Northwest. As anadromous fish, salmon
hatch in freshwater, migrate to the ocean to mature, and then make their
way back to the freshwaters of their birthplace to spawn.66 Because they
move through various aquatic environments in the course of their lifecy-
cle, the effects climate change will have on each of these environments
will in turn affect the salmon. First, increases in freshwater temperatures
pose risk to the salmon. Higher stream temperatures will affect the suc-
cess and timing of egg incubation.67 For those salmon fry that do hatch,
a further risk is that stream temperatures may eventually become too
high to support the young fish.6 8 Rising stream and marine temperatures
could also diminish the salmon food supply.69 If ocean temperatures rise
dramatically, entire salmon populations might be forced to abandon his-
toric migration patterns and habitat ranges, seeking colder waters to the
north. 70 This phenomenon may have already begun. Coho salmon, for
example, have been found one thousand miles further north than their
traditional habitat. 71 Similarly, other species may move into salmon
habitat in search of cooler waters, creating greater risk of predation and
competition for food.72
Changes in the hydrologic cycle will also affect the salmon. More
winter precipitation and higher winter stream flows will increase the fre-
quency and severity of flooding, scouring streambeds and potentially
destroying the gravel habitat necessary for salmon spawning.73 Flooding
will increase the number of landslides, causing siltification of stream
beds which could smother salmon eggs.74 Higher and earlier winter
stream flows may also push the young salmon along their ocean-ward
journey earlier than usual, forcing them into the saltwater environment
before food supplies are available.75 Finally, the lower summer flows
will make it more difficult for salmon to migrate and increase already
tight competition both for habitat and food sources.76
Certainly, climate change does not pose the first or only threat to
salmon survival. Many salmon species are already on the brink of ex-
tinction due to logging, dams, over-fishing, and the range of other effects
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the last 200 years.7 7 Yet climate change could be the over-riding factor
that renders all of the other restoration efforts futile. Fish ladders,
stream-bed restoration, and restrictions on over-fishing could all be for
naught if the changes described above cause the species to abandon the
region entirely. For the American Indian tribes of the Pacific Northwest,
this would be a cultural and economic disaster. For thousands of years,
salmon have provided the basis of a way of life for these tribes. 78 His-
torically, salmon poured out of the Northwest streams in numbers that
today defy imagination. In the Columbia River basin alone, it is esti-
mated that 16 million salmon and steelhead were produced annually.79
The salmon's regular migratory patterns allowed the tribes to rely on
them as a year-round food source, and tribal fishing and storage tech-
niques created the basis for extensive trade networks.80 The salmon's
centrality to tribal life is reflected in tribal custom, artwork, legend, and
ceremonial life.8 '
The salmon's significance to American Indian tribes of the region is
also reflected in the treaties that the tribes entered into, ceding vast tracts
of their aboriginal homelands but carefully retaining the right to fish. 2
From 1854 to 1855, Isaac Stevens, governor of the Washington Terri-
tory, negotiated treaties with tribes throughout what are now Washing-
ton, Oregon, and Idaho. 3 In recognition of the centrality of salmon to
these otherwise diverse Indian nations, Governor Stevens included virtu-
ally identical language reserving the tribes' right to fish into each
treaty.84 The following language from the Treaty with the Tribes of
Middle Oregon is representative:
[T]he exclusive right of taking fish in the streams running through
and bordering said reservation is hereby secured to said Indians; and
at all other usual and accustomed stations, in common with citizens
of the United States, and of erecting suitable houses for curing the
same; also the privilege of hunting, gathering roots and berries, and
pasturing their stock on unclaimed lands, in common with citizens, is
secured to them.
85
77. See CHARLES F. WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN 199-203 (Island Press
1992).




82. See WILKINSON, supra note 77, at 187.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Treaty with the Tribes of Middle Oregon art. 1, June 25, 1855, 12 Stat. 963. The other
Stevens Treaties are: Treaty of Medicine Creek, Dec. 26, 1854, 10 Stat. 1132 (treaty between the
United States and the following tribes: Nisqually, Puyallup, and Squaxin Island); Treaty of Point
Elliott, Jan. 22, 1855, 12 Stat. 927 (treaty between the United States and the Dwamish, Suquamish,
and Other Allied and Subordinate Tribes of Indians in Washington Territory); Treaty of Olympia,
Jan. 25, 1856, 12 Stat. 971 (treaty between the United States and the Qui-nai-elt and Quil-leh-ute
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Litigation beginning in the late 1960s established that these treaty
rights had survived the passage of time. Tribes and American Indian
individuals throughout the Northwest sued to require the states to regu-
late the fisheries to ensure that a "fair and equitable" share of anadro-
mous fish were available to the tribes. In United States v. Washington,
86
the Federal District Court for the District of Washington defined the "fair
and equitable" tribal share to be one-half of all salmon and steelhead not
needed for spawning.8 7 The Supreme Court affirmed this holding, but
elaborated that "one half' of the runs was a maximum, not a minimum,
and that tribes would only be entitled to the amount required to provide
them with a moderate livelihood.88 In the second phase of the Washing-
ton litigation, the district court addressed the states' obligations with
regard to environmental quality and salmon survival. 89 The court found
that the tribes had an implied right to protection of the salmon habitat,
but that this was not absolute, and the state did not have affirmative du-
ties to adopt new measures to protect the salmon, but only to exercise
existing regulatory powers so as not to harm the habitat.90 In addition to
these landmark treaty cases, tribes throughout the region have litigated
and sometimes settled individual cases involving water and other re-
served rights affecting salmon runs. 91 In the wake of the litigation, an
elaborate and effective regulatory structure has emerged. The Northwest
Indian Fisheries Commission and the Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish
Commission monitor the ecological health of the streams in their respec-
tive regions and work cooperatively with state and federal agencies to
effectuate tribal treaty rights.
92
Climate change thus threatens to extinguish what tribes have fought
for centuries to preserve. The backdrop of legal rights, including an im-
plied though not absolute right to preserve the salmon's habitat,93 create
the likelihood of further litigation as the situation becomes more dire.
Indians); Treaty of Neah Bay, Jan. 31, 1855, 12 Stat. 939 (treaty between the United States of Amer-
ica and the Makah Tribe of Indians); Treaty of Point no Point, Jan. 26, 1855, 12 Stat. 933 (treaty
Between the United States of America and the S'Klallams Indians); Treaty between the United States
of America and the Nez Perce Indians, June 11, 1855, 12 Stat. 957; Treaty between the United States
and the Walla-Walla, Cayuses, and Umatilla Tribes and Bands of Indians in Washington and Oregon
Territories, June 9, 1855, 12 Stat. 945; Treaty between the United States and the Yakama Nation of
Indians, June 9, 1855, 12 Stat. 951.
86. 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974).
87. Id. at 343.
88. Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658,
686-87 (1979).
89. United States v. Washington, 506 F. Supp. 187, 190-91 (W.D. Wash. 1980).
90. See id. at 206-08.
91. See, e.g., IDAHO DEP'T. OF WATER RES., THE NEZ PERCE WATER RIGHTS SETTLEMENT
(May 15, 2004), available at http://www.idwr.idaho.gov/nezperce/index.htm.
92. See Northwest Indian Fisheries Commission, Overview of the NWIFC,
http://www.nwifc.org/aboutus/index.asp (last visited Mar. 27, 2008) (providing an overview of the
NWIFC); Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission, What Is CRITFC (2008),
http://www.critfc.org/text/work.html (providing an overview of the CRITFC) (last visited Mar. 27,
2008).
93. See United States v. Washington, 506 F. Supp. at 190-191.
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And while tribes have been able to adapt to changing circumstances by
diversifying their economies, salmon remain indispensable to tribal cul-
ture and identity. Billy Frank, a Nisqually tribal member and leader who
has led the battles over the Northwest fisheries, has said that "fishing
defines the tribes as a people., 94 Tribal leaders throughout the region
express the same sentiment. Chairman Antone Minthorn of the Umatilla
Nation provided the following poignant testimony in congressional hear-
ings about the collapse of the salmon runs: "It is almost impossible to
describe in words the pain and suffering this has caused my people. We
have been fisherman for thousands of years. It is our life." 95 And it is
that life that, after all of the other legal, administrative, and political ef-
forts, climate change threatens to extinguish.
B. Alaska: A Melting Landscape
The warming effects from greenhouse gas emissions are most evi-
dent at the poles of the earth, and in particular the North Pole. 96 As a
result, Alaska has already experienced significant changes due to global
warming, and scientists predict that the region will continue to become
warmer and wetter throughout this century.97 There are eleven distinct
groups of Alaska Natives who are divided into five groups based on geo-
graphic proximity or cultural affinity: (1) the Athabascan in the East and
interior; (2) the Yup'ik and Cup'ik in the West; (3) the Inupiaq and St.
Lawrence Island Yupik of the North and Northwest; (4) the Aleut and
Alutiiq of South Central Alaska and the Aleutian islands; (5) the Eyal,
Tlingit, Haida and Tsimshian of the Southeastern archipelago.98 Climate
change is already affecting all inhabitants of Alaska, but could have par-
ticularly damaging effects on Alaska natives whose economic, social,
cultural, and spiritual lives are bound up with the area's unique ecology.
1. Changing Climate in Alaska
Winter temperatures in the Alaska region have risen by six to eight
degrees Fahrenheit over the last 50 years. 99 Under even a moderate
greenhouse gas emissions scenario, average annual inland temperatures
are predicted to rise by another six to 10 degrees Fahrenheit, and tem-
94. Catherine A. O'Neill, Risk Avoidance, Cultural Discrimination, and Environmental Jus-
tice for Indigenous Peoples, 30 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 36 (2003).
95. Mary Christina Wood, EPA's Protection of Tribal Harvests: Braiding the Agency's
Mission, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 175, 188 (2007) (quoting Water Spreading: Hearing on Water Use
Practices on Bureau of Reclamation Projects Before the H Comm. on Natural Res., Subcomm. on
Oversight & Investigations, 103d Cong. (1994) (statement of Antone Minthorn, Chairman, Confed-
erated Tribes of Umatilla Indian Reservation)).
96. See Gordon MeBean et al., Arctic Climate: Past and Present, in ARCTIC CLIMATE
IMPACT ASSESSMENT 21, 22-23 (Carolyn Symon et al. eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2005), available
at http://www.acia.uafedu/pages/scientific.html (quoting the 2001 reports of the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change).
97. See id. at 54.
98. HANNA, supra note 2, at 10.
99. See id.
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peratures over the ocean will rise by another 14 degrees Fahrenheit. 00
Due to the acute warming, over the last 30 years, the average annual sea
ice has decreased by roughly 8 percent, with even sharper than expected
decreases occurring within the last year.' 0' Other effects flowing from
the rising temperatures include changes in vegetation, increases in forest
fires and insect infestation, and severe coastal erosion. 10 2 The erosion is
a result of the combined effects of rising sea levels, decreasing sea ice,
and melting permafrost. 0 3 The first two effects combine to allow higher
waves to reach the shoreline, and the third results in unstable soil that is
more susceptible to being washed away.'
4
The changing climate in Alaska has already affected wildlife in the
region. The plight of the polar bears, caused by the dramatic decline in
sea ice as well as the higher temperatures, is well known." 5 But other
species, including seals and sea lions, will have equal difficulty as the ice
continues to recede. Inland, the changing vegetation will affect many
bird species dependent on the flora of the tundra for nesting and breeding
grounds. Some bird species, including several endangered sea birds,
could lose as much as 50 percent of their breeding grounds within the
century. 10 6 Caribou and reindeer might also decline as the tundra ecol-
ogy changes and the vegetation these species rely on either disappears or
moves northward.
The melting permafrost has also already caused disruption to hu-
mans. Ice highways over the tundra are thawing, resulting in transporta-
tion difficulties that will require significant reengineering to address.
10 7
Oil exploration has been cut in half due to the instability of the soil and
consequent risk of environmental harm. 0 8 Future health effects could
include the spread of West Nile virus and other infectious diseases.'0 9
The one potential benefit to humans that has been identified is that an
absence of sea ice could prolong the shipping seasons as well as open
new routes across the top of the world.10
2. Alaska Natives in a Melting World
The dramatic effects of warming have touched almost every aspect
of life for Native Alaskans. A petition filed by Sheila Watt-Cloutier, a
member of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, before the Inter-American
100. Id.
101. See id. at 3, 10.
102. Id. at 10.
103. Id.
104. See id.
105. See id; see also John M. Broder & Andrew C. Revkin, Warming May Wipe Out Most
Polar Bears, Study Says, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2007, at A 1.
106. HANNA, supra note 2, at 10.
107. See id
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Commission on Human Rights alleges that the United States has violated
various rights and norms of international law by contributing to global
warming.11 The Inuit Circumpolar Conference is comprised of all Inuit
of the polar region, including those in Alaska.' 1 2 While the territory is
broader than that within the jurisdiction of the United States, the allega-
tions in the petition aptly summarize the pervasive nature of global
warming's impacts on Alaska's indigenous peoples:
Inuit culture has developed over thousands of years in relationship
with, and in response to, the physical environment of the Arctic. The
Inuit have developed an intimate relationship with their surroundings,
using their understanding of the arctic environment to develop a cul-
ture, including tools, techniques and knowledge, that has enabled
them to subsist and thrive on the scarce resources available.
113
That intimate knowledge is at risk, threatening the ability of Alaska
Natives to build vibrant human communities. For example, elders have
traditionally passed on centuries' worth of accumulated wisdom about
how to read ice, snow, and other environmental conditions. 14 That wis-
dom is proving empty in a world of changing weather. Not only does the
inability to read the weather make travel and hunting more dangerous, it
also undermines the ability of the elder generations to teach the younger
generations." 5 Climate change thus disrupts both the material practices
that enable survival in harsh conditions and the cultural continuity that
perpetuates those practices.
Due to climate change, Alaska Native communities are facing a cul-
tural loss as profound as that suffered by the plains tribes when they were
confined to reservations and forced to abandon the practices that gave
their lives meaning. 1 6 As Professor Jonathan Lear describes in his elo-
quent book on the Crow leader Chief Plenty Coup, when the Crow Tribe
was confined to a fraction of its former territory, and therefore unable to
engage in the rituals and practices that gave meaning to being Crow, they
suffered a form of cultural death more profound than what could have
been achieved through criminalization of their spiritual practices:
To make the point, allow me to speak in the first person as an imagi-
nary Crow subject: Not only can I no longer plant a coup-stick, but
nothing could count as my intending to do so. As it turns out, only in
I11. See PETITION TO THE INTER AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS SEEKING RELIEF
FROM VIOLATION RESULTING FROM GLOBAL WARMING CAUSED BY ACTS AND OMISSIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES 1 (2005), available at http://www.earthjustice.org/library/legaldocs/petition-to-the-
inter-american-commission-on-human-rights-on-behalf-of-the-inuit-circumpolar-conference.pdf
[hereinafter INUIT PETITION].
112. See id. at 1, 9.
113. Id. at 35.
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the context of vibrant tribal life can I have any of the mental states
that are salient and important to me. The situation is even worse:
these are the mental states that help to constitute me as a Crow sub-
ject. Insofar as I am a Crow subject there is nothing left for me to do;
and there is nothing left for me to deliberate about, intend, or plan
for. Insofar as I am a Crow subject, I have ceased to be."1
7
So too, many Native Alaskan communities are looking at a future where
they, in this profound cultural sense, may cease to be.
Some of the effects of warming in the region are even more con-
crete. Rising sea levels, melting sea ice, and thawing permafrost are
causing coastal erosion that is destroying some Native villages." 8 The
General Accounting Office found that more than 86 percent of the 216
Alaska Native villages are already subject to flooding and erosion, and
that this perennial problem is likely to become worse due to warming
temperatures.1 9 The villages of Kivalina, Koyukuk, Newtok and Shish-
maref are severely affected and will have to relocate, which is not only
painful to community members, but also very expensive. 120 Relocating
Kivalina, for example, has been estimated to cost $1 million per vil-
lager.
121
The legal status and rights of Alaska Natives differ from those of
American Indian tribes in the lower 48 states. Yet, similar to the tribes
of the Pacific Northwest, the Southwest, and Florida, Alaska natives do
have unique legal claims that are implicated by the effects from climate
change. The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA), 22 enacted
in 1971, extinguished all claims to aboriginal title and associated hunting
and fishing rights in exchange for Alaska Natives' selection of ownership
of approximately 45 million acres of land, $462.5 million in congres-
sional appropriations, and $500 million in expected state revenues from
oil royalties. 123 ANCSA also provided for the land and money to be dis-
tributed to Native local and regional corporations, rather than directly to
existing tribal governments. 24 Despite ANCSA's obvious assimilation-
ist bent, Congress intended for Native Alaskans' traditional subsistence
activities to be protected by the Department of the Interior. 25 When it
became clear that subsistence rights were being insufficiently protected
117. See JONATHAN LEAR, RADICAL HOPE: ETHICS IN THE FACE OF CULTURAL DEVASTATION
49-50 (Harvard Univ. Press 2006) (emphasis in original).
118. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUBL'N NO. 04-142, ALASKA NATIVE VILLAGES: MOST
ARE AFFECTED BY FLOODING AND EROSION, BUT FEW QUALIFY FOR FEDERAL ASSISTANCE 7-8
(2003).
119. Seeid at 2-3.
120. See id. at 4.
121. See id.
122. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1601 (West 2008).
123. See 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1603, 1605-06, 1608 (West 2008).
124. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1628 (West 2008).
125. See HANNA, supra note 2, at 14.
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after ANCSA, Congress passed the Alaska National Interest Lands Con-
servation Act (ANILCA) 126 which establishes priorities for subsistence
activities based on rural residency rather than Native status. 27 Nonethe-
less, the statute provides a legal basis for Alaska Natives, as well as their
non-Native neighbors engaging in subsistence lifestyles, to continue to
use federal lands to engage in subsistence activities. 128 ANILCA's regu-
latory structure allows for participation by Native Alaskans in the formu-
lation of subsistence policies. 29 Several other federal statutes reinforce
Alaska Native subsistence rights by preempting state regulation of cer-
tain activities such as game hunting, reindeer herding, and whaling.
30
While these rights arguably have less bite than treaty rights, they none-
theless contribute to the justice claims that Alaska Natives may assert in
response to climate change, and at a minimum should put lawmakers on
notice that serious legal issues will be on the horizon even if we act
swiftly to mitigate global warming. Alaska is already melting, and
Alaska Natives are on the forefront of climate activism as a result.
13
C. Southwest: Water Scarcity
There are more than 70 federally recognized Indian tribes in the
Southwest, all of which rely on the region's scarce water resources to
survive. 132 The Southwest is the heart of the arid region, receiving less
than 10 inches of rainfall on average each year. 33 Tribes, like the Hopi,
that have lived in the Southwest for millennia have cultural and religious
ceremonies that revolve around maintaining the health and wellbeing of
their sacred springs.
134
1. Climate Change in the Southwest
Not surprisingly, the signature effect of climate change in this re-
gion will be water scarcity.' 35 Model projections range, but all predict
declining precipitation as temperatures increase. 136 One study projected
126. 16 U.S.C.A. § 3101 (West 2008).
127. 16 U.S.C.A. § 3111 (West 2008).
128. See 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 3111, 3115 (West 2008).
129. In furtherance of ANILCA's mandate, the Secretaries of Agriculture and the Interior
established the Federal Subsistence Board to oversee management of subsistence activities on fed-
eral lands and waters of Alaska. Id. §§ 3112, 3115. In 1993, the Board established 10 regional
advisory councils, and Alaska Natives are well represented in these councils. See generally FRANK
NORRIS, U.S. DEP'T INTERIOR, ALASKA SUBSISTENCE: A NATIONAL PARK SERVICE MANAGEMENT
HISTORY ch.7 (2002).
130. See Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1531 (West 2008); Reindeer Industry Act of
1937, 25 U.S.C.A. § 500 (West 2008); Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1361 (West
2008).
131. See, e.g., INUIT PETITION, supra note 11, at 10-Il.
132. See HANNA, supra note 2, at 18.
133. U.S.G.S., EFFECTS OF CLIMATIC VARIABILITY AND LAND USE ON AMERICAN DRY LANDS
1 (2004), available at http://esp.cr.usgs.gov/info/sw/maps.html.
134. See Whiteley & Masayesva, supra note 31, at 10.
135. HANNA, supra note 2, at 19.
136. See IPCC: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, supra note 39, at 16 fig. SPM7.
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that a 2 degrees Celsius temperature rise could result in a 20 percent re-
duction in stream flows to the Colorado River basin. 137 Another pre-
dicted a decrease ranging between seven to 20 percent. 38 All studies
predict increasing precipitation falling as rain rather than snow, and ear-
lier and shorter spring run-offs. 139 Even without certainty as to decreas-
ing amounts of precipitation, these changes are enough to result in less
water for the entire region.
2. Effects on Southwest Tribal Water Rights
Just as the Pacific Northwest tribes have powerful legal rights to
fish, Southwest tribes have powerful rights to water, at least on paper.
By virtue of the Winters doctrine, most tribes have a priority water right
that dates back to the creation of their reservations. 140 In the West, water
rights are typically determined by the doctrine of prior appropriation,
which grants superior rights to the user who is first in time to divert the
water.'14  Winters reserved rights are superior to most prior appropriation
claims because of the pre-settlement dates of many treaties. 14  Thus,
legally, tribes have rights to water that threaten to up-end existing pat-
terns of diversion and use. In the real world, however, tribes' paper
rights have often not stood up to existing diversions.
143
Some tribes have entered into settlements regarding their water
rights, but many others have not. As of 2004, Congress had approved of
18 such settlements with Indian tribes.144 Whether tribal water rights are
settled, adjudicated, or as yet unquantified, global warming's effects on
water will only heighten the tension that exists with regard to access to
the West's most precious and scarce resource. For all Southwest tribes-
and the Hopi can perhaps stand in here as shorthand-the consequences
are more than just economic. They are religious and cultural. 145 They
are about a way of life and attachment to land and its creatures that has
existed for millennia, adapting in many ways to changing circumstances,
but not ready or willing to adapt to life without their sacred waters. If
historical practices are any guide, tribal legal rights and the moral claims
that back them up will be vulnerable to the greater political power that
137. HANNA, supra note 2, at 19.
138. Id.
139. See id. at 6.
140. See Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 564 (1908) (holding that the Fort Belknap
Tribe's treaty impliedly reserved water rights for the reservation notwithstanding the absence of
express language to that effect).
141. HANNA, supra note 2, at 22.
142. See id. at 23.
143. See WILKINSON, supra note 77, at 219-31 (describing effects of pre-existing diversions
and massive reclamation projects on Jicarilla Apache and Navajo claims to water).
144. THE HARVARD PROJECT ON AMERICAN INDIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, THE STATE OF
NATIVE NATIONS: CONDITIONS UNDER U.S. POLICIES OF SELF DETERMINATION 170 (2008) [herein-
after THE STATE OF NATIVE NATIONS].
145. See Whiteley & Masayesva, supra note 134, at 15 (describing Hopi ceremonies and be-
liefs surrounding water and their sacred springs).
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rests with competing water users in the region, including large and grow-
ing cities, metropolitan districts, and agricultural interests. 1
46
D. Florida: Rising Sea Levels
Florida's two tribes, the Seminole and the Miccosukee, are de-
scended from tribes throughout the region whose members migrated
south to escape conflict with other tribes as well as European and Ameri-
can persecution. 147 Members from the Creek, Hitchiti, Apalachee, Miki-
suki, Yamassee, Yuchi, Tequesta, Apalachicola, Choctaw, and Oconee
joined together, along with some escaped slaves, to form the two groups
that now are Florida's federally recognized Indian nations.44 Florida
will be seriously affected by climate change, predominately due to rising
sea levels and rising temperatures, as well as increased frequency and
severity of extreme weather events.1
49
1. Climate Change in Florida
The most dramatic impact of climate change for Florida tribes stems
from the predicted rise in sea levels in that region. 50 Over the next cen-
tury, a rise of anywhere from eight to 30 inches is possible, which could
result in an advance of up to several hundred feet on Florida's gradually
sloped shoreline.' 51 Florida has approximately 4,500 square miles of
land within five feet of sea level.'52 Much of this low elevation consists
of the Everglades in the southern tip of Florida. 53 Rising temperatures
will also have profound effects in the region. The heat index is predicted
to rise by as much as eight to 15 degrees Fahrenheit over the next 100
years, affecting public health, agriculture, and ecosystems throughout the
state. 1 54
2. Effects on Florida Tribes: Inundation of Reservation Lands
The Seminole and Miccosukee have reservation lands in and around
the Everglades, and they use its mangrove forests, cypress domes, and
saw grass prairies for hunting, gathering, and other traditional subsis-
tence activities. 55 The rising sea levels, changing weather patterns, ele-
vated temperatures, and saltwater intrusion all could have devastating
146. See WILKINSON, supra note 77, at 219-26; see also MARC REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT
255-305 (Penguin Books 1986) (recounting the machinations to get water to Arizona and California
and noting the tribes' powerful paper rights).
147. HANNA, supra note 2, at 24.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 26.
151. Id. at 25.
152. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PUBL'N No. 430-F-02-007, SAVING FLORIDA'S VANISHING
SHORES 5 (2002) available at http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/effects/coastal/savingFL.pdf
153. Id.
154. See HANNA, supra note 2, at 25.
155. Id. at 26.
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effects on this region and the plants and animals on which the tribes rely
to support their traditional practices. Flooding could result in the direct
loss of tribal lands, significant portions of which are in the most vulner-
able areas. For example, the Seminole Tribe's Hollywood reservation is
located in the coastal area around Ft. Lauderdale and their Big Cypress
reservation is in a low-lying wetland southeast of Ft. Myers. 56 Simi-
larly, the Miccosukee Tribe's lands are near Miami and the Ever-
glades. 57 Tribal land loss threatens not just tribal homes, but also the
ability to engage in cultural and religious practices. Both the Seminole
and the Miccosukee have a long history of subsistence activities, includ-
ing hunting, fishing, and growing crops in the Everglades.158 Traditional
ceremonies, such as the annual Green Corn Dance that brings tribal clans
together to celebrate the harvest, socialize, and settle grievances, are at
risk if climate change disrupts or eviscerates the possibility of a har-
vest. "'
Climate change will also affect tribal economies in ways similar to
the impacts on the rest of Florida. The Seminole have profitable citrus
and sugar cane operations, and rising temperatures, increasing storms,
and changing water tables will make these more volatile and less profit-
able.1 60 Tourism, likewise, is a source of income and economic devel-
opment for both tribes, and is linked to the tribes' gaming revenues.'
6'
Both of these non-agricultural sources of income are also vulnerable due
to Florida's poor climate outlook.
62
Like the tribes of the Pacific Northwest and the Southwest, the
Seminole and Miccosukee have legal rights both to their land and to en-
gage in their traditional hunting and other practices. The Seminole Tribe
settled a land claims dispute with Florida and the South Florida Water
Management District in 1987, securing rights to continue traditional
ceremonial and subsistence practices. 63  The Seminole also retained
rights in Everglades National Park and Big Cypress that were previously
recognized.164 The Miccosukee Reserved Area Act reserved a section of
the Everglades for the Miccosukee, and recognized rights to use lands
and waters in the park for fishing, boating, and cultural and religious
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rights to land in the Big Cypress area.166 All of these rights, like those of
the other tribes discussed, may become meaningless in a warming world.
E. Proposals to Meet Our Unique Obligations to American Indian Tribes
The Native Communities and Climate Change Report (Report)
makes several recommendations to Congress regarding measures to ad-
dress the effects of climate change on American Indian tribes. 167 The
first is an important procedural one regarding the necessity of tribal input
and participation. The Report suggests that Congress should hold con-
gressional hearings to gather information from tribes themselves before
enacting any provisions into legislation. 168 Further, as Congress expands
the administrative capacity for responding to climate change, it should
establish ongoing channels of communication with tribes and their repre-
sentatives so that tribal nations can be involved in the process of formu-
lating climate policy. 169  These consultation measures are essential to
creating climate change solutions that will be effective for tribes. The
history of federal relations with tribes indicates that policies with the
harshest effects on American Indians were those crafted without their
consultation and consent.
170
Second, the Report suggests that Congress should include an ade-
quate revenue raising mechanism in climate change legislation to re-
spond to tribes' costly adaptation needs, as well as to fund tribal mitiga-
tion programs. 17  To date, Congress has not passed any serious carbon
emissions reduction legislation. But several bills have been introduced,
most of which propose a cap-and-trade scheme to limit emissions.
172
Only one bill has proposed a carbon tax, which is the preferred approach
of most economists1 73 and may also be the best alternative for meeting
our obligations to American Indian tribes. Carbon taxes, if calibrated
accurately, are the most efficient route to achieve emissions reduc-
tions. 74 They also have the benefit of a revenue stream that would exist
as long as the tax takes to achieve the eventual desired result of zero-
166. Id.
167. Id. at 30-31.
168. Id at 30.
169. Id.
170. See THE STATE OF NATIVE NATIONS, supra note 144, at 3-5 (recounting briefly the history
of United States-American Indian relations). This history reveals that the most damaging policies,
such as allotment and termination, were crafted and implemented without meaningful tribal consul-
tation and that even well-intentioned efforts faltered due to excessive control by the federal govern-
ment. See id. at 4 (describing the Indian Reorganization Act policies, which gave inordinate control
to the Secretary of the Interior).
171. HANNA, supra note 2, at 30-31.
172. See Victor B. Flatt, Taking the Legislative Temperature: Which Federal Climate Change
Legislative Proposal Is Best?, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 123, 135 (2007) (analyzing climate
change bills introduced in the 110th Congress), available at http://www.law.northwestem.edu/
lawreview/colloquy/2007/32/.
173. Id. at 135, 138.
174. See id. at 138-39; see also CARBON TAX CENTER, INTRODUCTION (2007),
http://www.carbontax.org/introduction/#cap-and-trade (last visited Mar. 27, 2008).
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emissions. While cap-and-trade systems can also generate revenue if the
initial allowances are auctioned to emitters, as proposed by some of the
congressional bills, there are greater risks of cheating, rent-seeking and
other non-compliant behaviors under cap-and-trade regimes. 75 The Re-
port does not take a position on a cap-and-trade regime versus a carbon
tax,176 but it would behoove legislators to take seriously the benefits of a
carbon tax given the inevitable need for government funding to address
our legal and moral obligations to tribes.
Third, the Report recommends that Congress invest in alternative
energy development on tribal lands. 177 Tribes have significant capacity
for wind, solar, and other forms of renewable energy. 178 Some have al-
ready begun to develop their renewable energy resources with assistance
from existing federal programs. 179 As this sector of the economy be-
comes more important and profitable, the federal government should
make sure that tribes are not left out of any emerging incentive structure.
As the Report and its suggestions make plain, to address legal and
moral obligations to tribes, Congress will have to provide for sufficient
funding for the unique adaptation challenges tribes face. Congress
should also, however, adopt a national mitigation strategy that is effec-
tive, that provides incentives to develop alternative energy and technol-
ogy, and that includes a revenue stream to address adaptation inequities.
The reason for stressing the need for effective mitigation is that if the
United States (and therefore the world) fails to reverse global warming,
much of what matters to tribes spiritually and culturally will be lost, as
discussed above in Parts I and II. Without mitigation, not only will adap-
tation be a never-ending endeavor, it may eventually be an unintentional
exercise in tribal termination, if what it means to be a tribe is to retain a
distinctive worldview and culture. This leads us, however, to the diffi-
cult subject of whether we have the ethical framework necessary to adopt
effective mitigation strategies.
III. SAVING THE WORLD TO SAVE NATIVE COMMUNITIES, OR VICE
VERSA?
The disproportion between American Indian contributions to global
warming and the negative effects on tribal communities is part of a larger
global story of climate injustice. The developed countries, including
most significantly the United States, are responsible for two-thirds or
175. See Tom Redburn, The Real Climate Debate: To Cap or to Tax?, N.Y. TIMES ONLINE,
Nov. 2, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/02/Us/politics/04web-redbum.html.
176. See HANNA, supra note 2, at 30-31.
177. Id. at 31.
178. See THE STATE OF NATIVE NATIONS, supra note 144, at 161-62.
179. See, e.g., NATIvEENERGY, OUR PROJECTS, http://www.nativeenergy.com/pages/
ourprojects/14.php (last visited Mar. 27, 2008) (providing a list of tribal wind and other renewable
energy projects).
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more of historical greenhouse gas emissions.'8 ° Yet underdeveloped and
developing nations will experience more serious impacts.18' There are
interrelated reasons for this. Many developing nations are located at
latitudes that are more vulnerable to changes in surface temperature and
its consequent effects on soil, water availability, and local weather.'8 2 In
addition, developing nations, by definition, are poorer than developed
nations, and have fewer economic resources to devote to adaptation
measures. Further, many economies within developing nations are cen-
tered on local natural resources, the alteration or destruction of which
will therefore have dramatic economic and cultural effects.'83 For Af-
rica, for example, the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report expressed high
confidence that, among other effects:
by 2020, between 75 and 250 million people will be exposed to an
increase of water stress due to climate change;
local food supplies will be negatively affected by decreasing fisheries
in large lakes due to rising temperatures;
agricultural production, including access to food, will be severely
compromised by climate variability and change.
184
As the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report dryly concludes, "Africa is one
of the most vulnerable continents to climate variability and change be-
cause of multiple stresses and low adaptive capacity."'' 85 While the de-
tails vary greatly, the IPCC and other sources report a similarly disparate
vulnerability for virtually all underdeveloped and developing regions.
86
The developed nations, by contrast, have not only benefited eco-
nomically from their historical greenhouse gas emissions, they have also
begun to spend some of that wealth on adaptation programs. For exam-
ple, desalination projects are in the planning stages for arid regions in the
United States and Australia. 87 The Netherlands has begun to modify its
infrastructure to prepare for rising sea levels, including constructing am-
phibious housing and planning for entire floating cities.1 88 California and
other western American states are well into planning processes for how
180. See Stephen M. Gardiner, Ethics and Global Climate Change, 114 ETHICS 555, 579 n.75
(2004). Exact figures vary somewhat depending on the method of analysis.
181. See, e.g., IPCC: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY, supra note 39, at 412.
182. See, e.g., id. at 394.
183. See, e.g., id. at 413-15.
184. Id. at 13.
185. Id. at 8.
186. See id. at 12-15.
187. See Applause, at Last, for Desalination Plant, TAMPA TRiB., Feb. 22, 2007, at A16; Syd-
ney Desalination Plant to Double in Size, AUSTL. BROAD. CORP. NEWS, June 25, 2007,
http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2007/06/25/1961044.htm.
188. Matt Bradley, Dutch Design Lets Homes Float on the Floodwaters, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Oct. 26, 2005, at A13.
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to adapt their water storage facilities. I8 9 So while global warming ulti-
mately will be democratic, in that no one anywhere will be beyond its
effects, wealthy nations will be less vulnerable initially, and will be bet-
ter able to manage the consequences.
Complicating the equitable issues even further, poor people, regard-
less of where they live, will suffer more from the effects of global warm-
ing. As Dale Jamieson has put it, "this pattern of the poor suffering most
from extreme climactic events has been documented as far back as the
'little ice age' that occurred in Europe from 1300 to 1850." '90 Close to
home, Hurricane Katrina highlighted the disproportionate effects of ex-
treme weather on poor and minority populations, and the lessons from
Katrina are relevant regardless of whether that particular storm was in-
tensified or caused by climate change, given the IPCC's predictions re-
garding increases in extreme weather, including heat waves, droughts,
heavy precipitation, and tropical storms.1 91
Global warming thus presents questions about obligations that the
global community owes to vulnerable populations, other species, and
future generations. There are also issues concerning whether developed
nations, which have benefited from unregulated emissions, should have a
higher obligation to reduce global emissions today and in the future.
And for some countries, in particular the United States, there is a ques-
tion of whether that obligation should be further heightened by obdurate
behavior since the late 1980s, which may well have cost the entire world
several precious decades during which un-recoupable progress might
have been made.
Despite these various compelling reasons to see global warming in
moral and ethical terms, many do not perceive it as a moral issue. Ac-
cording to Dale Jamieson, "[a] paradigm moral problem is one in which
an individual acting intentionally harms another individual; both the in-
dividuals and the harm are identifiable; and the individuals and the harm
are closely related in time and space." 192 The spatial and temporal dis-
persion that defines global warming makes these identifications and con-
nections particularly difficult to make. 1
93
The difficulties are exacerbated by the fact that the behavior consti-
tuting the harm was (and for many still is) simply living a normal life in
a wealthy, developed country. Consider my very own maternal grand-
189. See, e.g., STATE OF CALIFORNIA OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, GOVERNOR CALLS FOR
AGREEMENT ON COMPREHENSIVE WATER INFRASTRUCTURE PLAN (Nov. 13, 2007),
http://gov.ca.gov/issue/water-supply.
190. Dale Jamieson, Adaptation, Mitigation, and Justice, 5 ADVANCES IN ECON. OF ENVTL.
RESOURCES 217, 227 (2005).
191. See IPCC: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY, supra note 39, at 15.
192. Dale Jamieson, The Moral and Political Challenges of Climate Change I (Mar. 14, 2008)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
193. See id. at 1-3.
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parents. They drove two big Buicks for many years, lived in an apart-
ment heated and cooled by fossil fuels, and, in their later years, flew all
over the globe to travel. While I am not certain about this, it seems
likely that my grandmother never once took public transportation to get
anywhere in her hometown of Columbus, Ohio. By living this (from
their perspective, hard-earned, up from the shtetl, American dream of a)
life, they, along with similarly situated U.S. residents, have contributed
to more than one third of the global emissions that have put us in this
climactic bind. Yet when they drove to the kosher butcher or boarded
the plane to fly to Santiago, Chile, they had no sense that they were con-
tributing to a global crisis that would affect many future individuals and
non-human species. In addition the "harm" that they did cannot be dis-
aggregated from the harms done by all other carbon emitters. Further,
the victims of the harms are equally dispersed in time and space. They
are island dwellers who may lose their homes in the twenty-first century,
Inuit seal hunters today, and perhaps residents of Manhattan several gen-
erations from now.
Recently, increasingly emphatic statements by the IPCC (and the
climate science community generally) about the causes and effects of
global warming have begun to overcome these obstacles to perceiving
global warming as a moral issue. While the link between facts and val-
ues may be forever fraught and contested, the more we know about the
connections between our actions and their effects, the less difficulty we
have in accepting ethical constraints on our behavior. As put slightly
differently by E.O. Wilson, "[w]hen very little is known about an impor-
tant subject, the questions people raise are almost invariably ethical.
Then as knowledge grows, they become more concerned with informa-
tion and.., more narrowly intellectual. Finally, as understanding be-
comes sufficiently complete, the questions turn ethical again."' 194 Thus,
despite the challenges of spatial and temporal dispersion, it is apparent
that a moral vocabulary is emerging. People all over the world, includ-
ing several prominent American politicians, are expressing values of
caring for future generations, other species, and particular vulnerable
populations. 195 These articulations correlate with the mounting scientific
evidence of what we have wrought. Despite the ethical distance many
may have to travel to get from the paradigm moral problem of, "I know-
ingly hurt you," to "I, along with billions of others, am living my life in
such a way as to deprive distant and/or future human beings and non-
194. EDWARD 0. WILSON, BIOPHELIA 119 (Harvard Univ. Press 1984).
195. See, e.g., Juliet Eilperin, Lawmakers on Hill Seek Consensus on Warming, WASH. POST,
Jan. 31, 2007 at A6 (quoting lawmakers as urging action on global warming in order to protect
future generations); Press Release, Office of the Governor, Gov. Schwarzenegger Signs Landmark
Legislation to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions (Sept. 27, 2006), http://gov.ca.gov/
index.php?/press-release/41 11/ (discussing Governor Schwarzenegger's speech urging action on
global warming to protect future generations).
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human species of a range of opportunities for an acceptable and/or flour-
ishing life," we are beginning to make the trip.
A. Sustainability: Remarrying Humans and Nature
Despite the local and global emergence of various versions of an
ethic that might equip us to take action on climate change, the United
States has not internalized one as a matter of policy. There are and have
been some important nods in that direction. But the prevailing norm
since the turn of the millennium has been an antediluvian (or ante-Earth
Day, anyway) version of utilitarianism, which reduces all manner of val-
ues, obligations, and concerns to a unitary economic measure. 196 This
approach, derived from welfare economics,197 currently dominates a
great deal of environmental and natural resource decision-making. The
executive agencies of the federal government are required, for example,
to apply cost-benefit analysis to a wide range of proposed agency ac-
tion. 98 In such a system, attachment to nature, whether spiritual or oth-
erwise, has no greater a priori ethical weight than the preference for a
bigger ski area, or a faster snowmobile ride.
What global warming may do is catapult us beyond this way of
thinking. Addressing global warming will mean rethinking what growth
and development should consist of. The world within which growth can
take place has always been defined by our ethics. We do not, for exam-
ple, include the possible economic benefits of free labor from slaves or
children when we consider whether or not to issue permits for construc-
tion of a factory. What the problem of worldwide greenhouse emissions
will do, however, is render apparent that the ethical constraints on our
behavior come from many directions. Global warming makes visible the
heretofore hidden kinds of exploitation that, if we were forced to think
about them on a daily basis, should give us pause. For example, we
might ask ourselves: Is it really worth displacing other people from their
families and homes just so I can drive a big car; does my ski trip to Can-
ada really measure up against the last drop of water in the Hopi's sacred
aquifer? We might begin to see our daily behavior in light of its tempo-
rally and spatially dispersed, yet very real, effects.
Fortunately, we are not starting from scratch. Sustainability, an ap-
proach both centuries old and recently articulated, marries the ethical
insights from the environmental movement with those from the human
rights framework. It embodies the idea of viewing human and natural
systems as interconnected, and of meeting all human needs in a manner
that supports the health of the environment. "Sustainable development"
196. See generally FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE
PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (The New Press 2004).
197. See id. at 81-84.
198. Exec. Order No. 13,422, 72 Fed. Reg. 2763 (Jan. 18, 2007) (requiring "market failure"
assessment of all planned agency action, and annual cost benefit analysis of all agency rules).
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became a term of art after the publication of the Brundtland Report,
which was the final report by the World Commission on Environment
and Development.'99 The publication explores environmental and devel-
opment issues in tandem, and concludes that governments world-wide
must take simultaneous efforts to address poverty and environmental
degradation so that meeting the basic needs of humanity is not perpetu-
ally in tension with the long-term health of the environment. As the pub-
lication explains:
There has been a growing realization in national governments and
multilateral institutions that it is impossible to separate economic de-
velopment issues from environment issues; many forms of develop-
ment erode the environmental resources upon which they must be
based, and environmental degradation can undermine economic de-
velopment. Poverty is a major cause and effect of global environ-
mental problems. It is therefore futile to attempt to deal with envi-
ronmental problems without a broader perspective that encompasses
the factors underlying world poverty and international inequality. 20 0
The report called on all nations of the world to adopt eight princi-
ples in order to integrate sustainable development into their policies. The
principles are: (1) to revive growth in order to alleviate poverty, both for
equitable and environmental reasons (noting that poverty is a major
cause of environmental degradation); (2) to change the quality of growth:
"[r]evived growth must be of a new kind in which sustainability, equity,
social justice, and security are firmly embedded as major social goals";
(3) to conserve and enhance the resource base: "[s]ustainability requires
the conservation of environmental resources such as clean air, water,
forests, and soils; maintaining genetic diversity; and using energy, water,
and raw materials efficiently"; (4) to ensure a sustainable level of popu-
lation: "[p]opulation policies should be formulated and integrated with
other economic and social development programmes--education, health
care, and the expansion of the livelihood base of the poor"; (5) to reorient
technology and manage risks; (6) to integrate environment and econom-
ics in decision-making; (7) to reform international economic relations;




A deep version of sustainability prescribes a way of living on the
earth for all of us that allows each of us, in the company of nature, to
thrive, but that proscribes any of us from living beyond our ecological
means. Our "ecological means" now include our greenhouse gas emis-
sions, which provide a material link between the many activities that
render a consumption-oriented culture and economy unsustainable. The
blueprint for such a worldview is available to us; it is the worldview em-
199. OUR COMMON FUTURE, supra note 11, at 8-9.
200. Id. at 3.
201. Id. at 363-65.
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braced by American Indian tribes, described in Part II, supra. In his dis-
sent in Lyng v. Northwest Cemetery Protective Ass 'n, Justice William
Brennan observed that Native American religions
regard creation as an on-going process in which they are morally and
religiously obligated to participate .... Native Americans fulfill this
duty through ceremonies and rituals designed to preserve and stabi-
lize the earth and to protect humankind from disease and other catas-
trophes. Failure to conduct these ceremonies in the manner and place
specified .. .will result in great harm to the earth and the people
whose welfare depends upon it.
20 2
This is not a static, romanticized vision of people living in perpetual
harmony with nature; rather it describes an ethical attitude that takes the
form of daily habits and physical engagement, and is one that is strik-
ingly well suited to the kinds of behavioral changes that will have to oc-
cur in a zero-emissions world.
Recently, many non-Indian communities committed to action on cli-
mate change have expressed these kinds of values, both in their positive
laws and in their statements about why they are committed to addressing
global warming. States, regions, cities, and even informal community
groups have adopted emissions reductions goals and behaviors.203  To
provide just one example, recently in England, small groups have formed
whose members pledge to one another to live low-carbon lives. Carbon
Rationing Action Groups, or CRAGS, as they are called, are communi-
ties that keep one another true to their principles by formulating a yearly
limit of emissions for members and then meeting regularly to monitor
one another. According to a recent New York Times article, there are
currently 160 people active in some twenty CRAGS across Britain. 2
4
The CRAG described in the Times has a yearly limit of 9,000 pounds of
CO2 per member. To put this in perspective, a single round-trip plane
flight between London and Hong Kong generates 4,800 pounds of car-
bon. To meet their goals, members are changing their daily habits, using
less light and different sources of fuel. According to the New York
Times, CRAG member
Jacqueline Sheedy has turned the former coal barge where she lives
into a shrine to energy efficiency: she reads by candlelight in mid-
winter, converts the waste from her toilet into fertilizer, and hauls
fresh water home on a trailer attached to her bicycle. Now Ms.
202. Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 460 (1988) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
203. See Sarah Krakoff, Fragmentation, Morality, and the Law of Global Warming 31-39
(University of Colorado Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 07-
10, 2007), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-976049.
204. James Kanter, Members of New Group in Britain Aim to Offset Their Own Carbon Out-
put, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2007, at A12.
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Sheedy has set herself a new goal: to stop burning coal for heat and
instead use wood from renewable sources.
205
Notwithstanding the relative intransigence of national and interna-
tional governing institutions, many people at local levels have begun to
live as if they could indeed participate in the creation of a sustainable
world.
B. The Futility of Ethical Convergence?
Global warming provides the over-arching material connections that
might render the ethical paradigm of sustainability concrete, meaningful,
and urgent. CRAGs in England, cities and states throughout the United
States, and individuals, communities, and countries world-wide appear to
be internalizing just such an ethic despite the daunting spatial and inter-
generational collective action features of global warming. In addition,
we may finally be on the verge of achieving the external legal framework
and accompanying government enforcement and coordination that would
give full expression to the sustainability norm. And yet there remains the
distinct possibility that we, as a global community, will fail to rein in our
emissions in time to avert serious consequences. If we cannot act in time
to preserve Native Alaskan subsistence traditions from devastation; if the
Hopi's sacred waters dry up; if the Everglades are already a goner; if
wild salmon and the cultures they sustain go extinct, is a restricted car-
bon diet just a hair-shirt exercise in futility?
There are two answers to this. The first is practical, and the second
is metaphysical. Practically, in perpetuity there will be reason to reduce
our greenhouse gas emissions even if we keep missing our mark. Absent
miracle technological solutions (which at the moment are remote and
will, in all likelihood, always be difficult to assess in terms of unintended
consequences), the more emissions we add to the atmosphere, the
warmer we will get. So even if we blow past the 2-4 degree increase that
some scientists suggest could result in catastrophic effects, we will then
want to focus on not getting to 8-10, or 10-12, or 12-14 degrees of aver-
age temperature increase, will we not? To those who might suggest that
the potential futility of ever achieving a zero-emissions world points to-
wards "adaptation only" policies, the rejoinder is that even adaptation
will be an ever-changing proposition if we never stabilize global tem-
perature increases.
Metaphysically, the likelihood of futility in the climate change con-
text might be seen as a heightened version of the futility that haunts the
entire human experience. The impulse to be good rarely comes with an
accompanying guarantee of success. Yet there are other rewards in terms
of how we feel about ourselves and our lives; our sense of meaning irre-
205. Id.
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spective of positive results in our lifetimes. And to mingle the meta-
physical with the practical, fostering the daily habits and rituals that re-
flect the ethic of climate sustainability might also prepare us and our
progeny for a world of protean resource scarcity. Learning to live more
locally and engaging in regular activities of caring for where we live
might be the perfect ethical, cultural and social skill for life in a perpetu-
ally warming world.
CONCLUSION
In the fall of 2008, I taught an Advanced Indian Law seminar on
American Indian Religion and Culture. Two of our classes covered sa-
cred sites on public lands. We read Lyng and several lower court cases
addressing these issues. We also took a field trip to the sacred site in our
own back yard. Valmont Butte is east of downtown Boulder and is
known to most local residents, if indeed it is known at all, as the rocky
outcropping near the waste disposal facility. Perhaps in part because of
this association, the City of Boulder bought the land several years ago
intending to use it for firefighter training and a bio-composting site.2°6
As soon as the City's plans became apparent, American Indian commu-
nity members came forward to protest.20 7 To them, Valmont Butte is a
sacred site-a place of great spiritual significance to the tribes that used
to inhabit this region and an ongoing location for ceremonies and care-
taking by many tribes. 2 8 The American Indian constituents joined with a
group of non-Indians whose ancestors had established a pioneer burial
ground on the Butte to form the Valmont Butte Heritage Alliance
(VBHA). Eventually, the City backed off of its plans and a settlement
involving the possible transfer of the site to a land trust is moving for-
ward.
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The afternoon was cold and grey, and a soft drizzle began to fall as
my students and I got out of our cars in the muddy pull-out near Valmont
Butte. Lori Windle, a VBHA board member, met us there, and then we
hiked up the hill and were introduced to Nick Halsey, an Ojibwe tribal
member who had lived at the Butte for two years. Nick was wearing a
blue hooded sweatshirt and a baseball cap, blue jeans and work boots. If
my students were expecting regalia and eagle feathers, they might have
been disappointed. Nick was quiet for a time, and then said a prayer. He
led us up past a couple of decrepit shacks, through a barbed wire fence,
and up the trail to where he had set up a sweat lodge and a prayer circle.
As he walked, he explained to us how contaminated the area was. Met-
als, including uranium, and a lot of ordinary trash polluted the Butte. He
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also told us more than I thought he would about the meaning of the Butte
to local tribes, the kinds of ceremonies he conducts to keep things in bal-
ance, and the relationship he has to the local hawks that nest there. We
stood there in the rain at the top of the Butte for some time, taking in the
view in every direction, the way the Arapaho and Ute people must have.
A high point on the edge of the plains is no small thing. I wonder if at
least some of my students felt that there was something to this "sacred
site" business, even if the sacred is marred by years of degradation.
What Valmont Butte has to do with climate change is this: In the
American Indian worldview, the point of life is to take care of where you
live. You are a part of nature and it is a part of you. Nature changes,
becomes polluted and even contaminated. But it remains your obligation
to care for it. Every measure towards this end matters on a daily basis.
These are the attitudes that might keep us on target to mitigate climate
change by reducing and eventually eliminating our greenhouse gas emis-
sions. Understanding the depth and beauty in these attitudes might also
nudge us towards enacting the full range of remedies necessary to ad-
dress the disparate effects climate change is having on American Indian
communities. Finally, these are the same attitudes that our children and
grandchildren will need if our generation continues to fail to address
climate change, and they are living in a world requiring skills, flexibility,
and engagement of a kind that we can only barely imagine.
2008]





Many people now agree that the global climate is changing and that
human activities are a contributing factor, but disagree about who is
responsible and what should be done. Some citizens are turning to the
courts to resolve climate-related disputes. Climate litigation cases help
to illuminate many of the legal, ethical, scientific, economic, social, and
other complexities of climate change. These cases will decide rights and
responsibilities, how uncertainties should be managed, and who should
make societal decisions about climate change. The cases tell stories
about climate causes and impacts, and identify potential winners and
losers of both climate change and various policy alternatives. Climate
litigation allows examination of ethical and social issues within the fac-
tual context of a legal case. These cases also illuminate the role of
American courts in educating the public, stimulating debate, and setting
or clarifying climate policy.
INTRODUCTION
Our global climate is changing. Most scientists now acknowledge
the simple reality of global climate change and agree that increasing lev-
els of greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the atmosphere are contributing to the
change, but consensus fades as the discussion turns to the multiple causes
of climate change, the degree to which human behavior drives it, and the
advisability of various societal responses.' While scientific research
continues to accumulate, many communities, particularly in the polar
regions,2 already feel the impacts of climate change, and local, national,
and international communities are beginning to plan how to adapt to a
changing climate.3 Stresses of anticipated climate change drive some
t Marilyn Averill is a lawyer who currently is a doctoral student in Environmental Studies
at the University of Colorado at Boulder. She is affiliated with the Center for Science and Technol-
ogy Policy Research, 1333 Grandview, Boulder, CO 80309 USA.
1. See WORKING GROUP I OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007-THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 665-66 (2007) [hereinafter IPCC].
2. See, e.g., ARCTIC CLIMATE IMPACT ASSESSMENT HIGHLIGHTS: IMPACTS OF A WARMING
ARCTIC 34 (2004), http://amap.no/workdocs/index.cfm?action=getfile&dirsub=%2FACIA%2
Foverview&filename=Finding2.pdf&CFID=6&CFTOKEN=CC50FD60-FC1B-EC67-2B9A10704
FEE5347&sort-default.
3. See UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE: ADAPTATION,
http://unfccc.int/adaptation/items/4159.php (last visited on Apr. 13, 2008); PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL
CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 101: ADAPTATION, http://www.pewclimate.org/
docUploads/Adaptation_0.pdf (last visited Apr. 13, 2008).
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citizens to advocate for societal responses to regulate human behavior or
to compensate those adversely affected. Others think action is premature
and are concerned about unnecessary and expensive overreaction to a
complex and uncertain problem. Some citizens are turning to the courts
to resolve climate-related disputes, filing a series of cases referred to as
''climate litigation."
Climate change presents some of the most complex and most trou-
bling issues of our time, and of our children's times for generations to
come. As lawyers, we have obligations to our clients to be aware of how
a changing climate may affect them, and of their rights and responsibili-
ties with respect to the causes and impacts of a changing climate, in order
to assist them in assessing possible liabilities and opportunities in plan-
ning for the future. As citizens, we have responsibilities to be aware of
our role in climate change, how we contribute to climate change and how
a changing climate may affect us, and to participate in public debates
over how best to deal with the challenges of a changing climate. As citi-
zens of the world, we should be aware of the international and inter-
generational implications of climate change, and consider the rights and
responsibilities, both legal and ethical, that we, our families, our commu-
nity, our profession, our country, and our global society may have with
respect to these issues.
Climate litigation helps to illuminate many of the legal, ethical, sci-
entific, economic, social, and other complexities of the climate change
debates. These cases will help to decide rights and responsibilities, how
uncertainties should be managed, and who should make societal deci-
sions about climate change. The cases tell stories about the causes and
likely effects of climate change, and identify potential winners and losers
of both climate change and various policy alternatives.
Lawyers presenting climate-related claims should think about im-
pacts beyond the result in the immediate case. Climate litigation edu-
cates the public about climate issues and can influence public opinion on
those issues, and provides support for various policy options. These
cases can affect the perceived salience, credibility, and legitimacy of
climate science and other expert testimony.4 Climate litigation can trig-
ger pressure for or against governmental action from local to interna-
tional levels.
Climate disputes often focus on science and its attendant uncertain-
ties, but this may mask fundamental underlying disputes over values and
ethical issues. Climate change implicates the duties countries have to
each other; the responsibility of those alive today for the well-being of
4. See David Cash et al., Salience, Credibility, Legitimacy, and Boundaries: Linking Re-
search, Assessment and Decision Making 4 (John F. Kennedy Sch. of Gov't, Harvard Univ., Work-
ing Paper No. RWP02-046, 2002).
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future generations; the responsibilities that humans have to protect natu-
ral systems; rights and responsibilities of citizens, corporations, and gov-
ernments with respect to climate change; mitigating circumstances that
may shift rights and responsibilities; and procedural rights for all stake-
holders.
The subtitle of this Symposium is "Integrating Environmental Jus-
tice into Policy, Regulation, and Litigation." This article will focus on
some of the ethical implications of climate-related lawsuits and other
claims filed in United States courts or against the United States in other
forums, and some of the broader societal impacts these cases are likely to
have. Climate cases allow examination of ethical and social issues
within the particular factual context of a legal case. They also illuminate
the role of American courts in educating the public and contributing to
policy relating to some of the most important issues of our time. This
article begins with an overview of climate litigation in the context of the
United States legal system, including a brief description of some of the
more prominent cases. It then moves to a discussion of some of the ethi-
cal implications of climate litigation, and ends with a description of pos-
sible social impacts beyond the cases themselves.
I. THE UNITED STATES LEGAL SYSTEM
A. Law and Ethics
Concepts of ethics and justice permeate the U.S. legal system, as
community standards have been incorporated into U.S. statutory and
common law over the centuries. American law is a dynamic system that
provides both the continuity of standards developed over the years, and
the ability to adapt to new problems and shifting social norms. Law and
ethics address similar issues, such as rights and responsibilities, but are
far from identical. Law reflects standards and power structures in place
in a community at a given point in time and serves both to regulate hu-
man behavior and to resolve disputes. Ethics are more aspirational, and
reflect what different thinkers or schools have to say about the right way
to live or about what ought to be done. Cases in litigation embed ethical
arguments in a specific factual context, allowing more meaningful dis-
cussions about what is fair and equitable than may be possible in an ab-
stract discussion.
Law incorporates and applies a selection of ethical standards but
may privilege certain interests, either inadvertently or by design. To the
extent that judges have discretion, their decisions may incorporate per-
sonal value systems and ways of thinking. 5  Furthermore, U.S. law re-
5. See RICHARD T. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 80-81 (2004); CASS
R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL
JUDICIARY 10 (2006).
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flects U.S. standards, which may not be identical with standards in the
international community. Nevertheless, U.S. cases can stimulate discus-
sion about what is fair both domestically and internationally.
The adversarial model of the U.S. legal system provides voice and
visibility to different points of view and helps to illuminate the complexi-
ties of issues. Champions-the lawyers on each side of a case-use
every argument in their arsenals to support their client's case and to per-
suade the judge or jury to rule in their favor. Lawyers often assert the
application of moral standards in legal cases. One side may argue about
what is right or fair in a given situation, while opponents contend that the
law does not and should not stretch to cover such moral arguments. Over
time, courts have extended existing legal theories to cover many novel
factual situations.
B. Climate Litigation
Climate-related cases in litigation play an important role in the de-
bate over the ethical and social dimensions of climate change. They
showcase ethical issues by telling stories about winners and losers situ-
ated in the particular factual context of the litigants and illustrate how
actions by one country or industry can cause harm to others, even across
national or generational boundaries. They establish whether and under
what circumstances one party may be held responsible for its contribu-
tions to climate change. These cases serve an important civic educa-
tional function, presenting complex material in a format accessible to the
average juror, and therefore the average citizen. They affect public per-
ceptions of everything from basic climate science to the relationships
among nations and the responsibilities that humans have to nature. Deci-
sions in visible cases stimulate debate over what governments should or
should not be doing in response to climate change, when parties should
be held responsible for injuries, and the rights and responsibilities of
individuals, industries, and governments from the local to the interna-
tional level. Climate litigation allows study of the role of U.S. courts in
the co-production of knowledge, in shaping ethical debates, and in the
relationship between law and ethics in general. These cases also provide
the public with a context within which to debate ethical issues of fair-
ness, justice, and responsibility with respect to climate change.
Courts provide a controlled environment within which litigants may
openly contest knowledge and values relating to climate change. Cli-
mate litigation combines science, ethics, economics, social, and other
issues at a scale rarely addressed by American courts or by society in
general. These cases pose new challenges and so provide an ideal con-
text within which to examine how the U.S. legal system addresses and
resolves novel problems, and how courts change or resist change in re-
sponse to increasingly complex global problems.
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Many of the ethical implications of climate litigation extend beyond
decisions in individual cases. Judicial decisions can frame issues and
trigger public debate over what is right or fair. Law, science, ethics,
economics, and politics come together in climate litigation to co-produce
knowledge, new concepts about what should be valued and considered in
climate debates, and highlight which voices should be heard.6 The cases
will reflect social values and debates, and may incorporate changing so-
cial norms about environmental responsibility into new legal precedent.
This article examines some of the most visible climate-related cases
filed in or against the United States in recent years. While cases have
also been filed in other countries, especially in Australia,7 the majority
seem to have been filed in the U.S. This partly is because industrialized
countries such as the United States account for most of the human con-
tributions to GHGs in the atmosphere, far out of proportion to their popu-
lations.8 At the same time, the U.S. has refused to enter into the Kyoto
Protocol, the international community's attempt to begin to mitigate fac-
tors contributing to climate change, and has taken limited steps to reduce
GHG emissions at the national level.9 Many public and private entities
have turned to the courts to try to force or block action on climate
change. The U.S. provides a well established system of environmental
laws that allows many challenges to governmental action, providing a
logical forum for such suits. More international cases are likely to be
filed in the future, but for now, the U.S. cases provide the best opportu-
nity to study how courts are responding to climate change, including its
ethical challenges.
This article does not attempt to suggest what the United States or
the international community should do to mitigate or adapt to climate
change. It simply considers how cases in litigation illuminate important
ethical and social issues by presenting and arguing them within the con-
text of the specific facts presented in individual climate lawsuits. This
article is part of a larger study of the role American courts play in provid-
ing a controlled forum within which climate law, science, social science,
6. See, e.g., Sheila Jasanoff, The Idiom of Co-Prodcuction, in STATES OF KNOWLEDGE: THE
CO-PRODUCTION OF SCIENCE AND SOCIAL ORDER 2-3 (Sheila Jasanoff ed., Routledge 2004);
SHEILA JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR: LAW, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY IN AMERICA 36-39
(Harvard Univ. Press 1995); Clark A. Miller, The Study of Public Reasoning: Background Prepared
for NSF Workshop on the Social Sciences and Science Policy 1-2 (July 13-14, 2006), available at
http://www.cspo.org/ourlibrary/papers/Miller.pdf.
7. For an Australian perspective on climate litigation, see JOSEPH SMITH & DAVID
SHEARMAN, CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION: ANALYSING THE LAW, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE &
IMPACTS ON THE ENVIRONMENT, HEALTH & PROPERTY 59-61 (2006).
8. See, e.g., Kevin Baumert & Jonathan Pershing, Climate Data: Insights and Observations
11 (2004), available at http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/Climate%20Data%2Onew.pdf;
ROBERT HENSON, THE ROUGH GUIDE TO CLIMATE CHANGE 17, 38 (Rough Guides 2006).
9. See John C. Dernbach, US. Policy, in GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND U.S. LAW 78
(Michael B. Gerrard ed., 2007).
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ethics, and other issues are contested to co-produce knowledge that leads
to direct and indirect influences on climate policy.
II. THE UNITED STATES CLIMATE CASES
The cases filed to date in the United States may be divided into
those intended to force or block government action with respect to cli-
mate change, and those seeking compensation or other remedies for al-
leged injuries. Within that division, cases may be categorized according
to their primary legal claims. A few of the early and more visible cases
are described below.' 0
A. Cases to Influence Government Action
1. Authority and Responsibility
In Massachusetts v. EPA," numerous states, cities, an American
Territory, and environmental nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
brought claims against the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
challenging the agency's decision not to regulate GHG emissions from
motor vehicles under the Clean Air Act (CAA).12 Plaintiffs claimed that
EPA had both the authority and responsibility to regulate. The U.S. Su-
preme Court decided in a 5-4 opinion that the CAA does give EPA the
authority to regulate, and returned the decision to EPA to decide whether
it should regulate GHG emissions from motor vehicles under the terms
of the CAA. 3
2. Procedural Requirements
In Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Watson,14 nongovernmental organi-
zations and cities brought suit against two federal agencies involved in
financing large projects in other countries. 5 Plaintiffs alleged that the
agencies failed to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) by neglecting to consider project impacts on climate when con-
ducting environmental reviews.' 6 The judge ruled that NEPA applies to
major federal actions that affect climate change. 17 Other cases have al-
10. For a more extensive overview of individual cases, see generally GLOBAL CLIMATE
CHANGE AND U.S. LAW, supra note 9. For updates, see American Bar Association, Updates for
Global Climate Change and U.S. Law, http://www.abanet.org/abapubs/
globalclimate/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2008).
11. 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).
12. Id. at 1446.
13. Id. at 1460, 1463.
14. No. C 02-4106 JSW, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42335 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2005) (order
denying defendant's motion for summary judgment).
15. Id. at * 1. NGOs Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace, along with cities of Oakland,
Acadia, and Santa Monica, California and Boulder, Colorado, brought suit against the Export-Import
Bank of the U.S. and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation. Other procedural suits seek
compliance with other environmental statutes.
16. Id.
17. See id at *8.
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leged procedural deficiencies under the Endangered Species Act and
other laws, as well as related state laws.
1 8
3. Federal Preemption
Thirteen car dealers and the American Alliance of Automobile
Manufacturers brought suit against the California Air Resources Board
(CARB) in Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Witherspoon,'9 alleging
that federal law preempted the state's regulation of GHG emissions from
motor vehicles. 20  Plaintiffs asked that California be enjoined from im-
plementing its GHG emission regulations. The judge found that the fed-
eral CAA preempted California's program to regulate greenhouse gas
emissions, and enjoined the state from enforcing its program until EPA
issues a preemption waiver or Congress permits California to carry out
its regulations.2' The EPA denied California's request for a CAA waiver
on December 19, 2007.22 On January 2, 2008, California filed a Petition
for Review of the EPA's decision to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit.
23
B. Cases Alleging Liability for Injuries
1. Public and Private Nuisance
In Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co.,24 eight states 25 and
New York City filed claims against five of the biggest power companies
in the United States, 26 alleging that emissions of carbon dioxide from the
companies' power plants constituted "ongoing contributions to a public
nuisance." The plaintiffs asked that the companies be ordered to reduce
their emissions by a specified percentage every year for at least a dec-
ade.27 The judge dismissed the case because "these actions present non-
18. See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council v. Kempthome, 506 F. Supp. 2d 322, 330 (E.D. Cal.
2007); Cent. for Biological Diversity v. Brennan, No. C 06-7062 SBA, 2007 WL 2408901, at *1-3
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2007)..
19. No. CV-F-04-6663 REC/LJO, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26536 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2005).
20. Id. at *34. Similar actions have been filed against other states seeking to adopt the
CARB standards. See Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d
295, 300 (D. Vt. 2007).
21. Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Goldstone, No. CV F 04-6663 AWl LJO, 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 91309, at *111-15 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2007). The case name was changed after James
Goldstone replaced Catherine Witherspoon as the primary named defendant. Id. at *6 n. 1.
22. Letter from Stephen L. Johnson, Administrator of EPA, to Arnold Schwarzenegger, Gov-
ernor of California (Dec. 19, 2007), available at http://epa.gov/otaq/climate/20071219-slj.pdf [here-
inafter Letter]; see also Dot Earth, http://dotearth.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/12/19/epa-to-states-co2-
is-not-your-problem/?scp= I -b&sq=E.P.A.+to+States%3A+CO2+Is+Not+Your+Problem&st=nyt
(Dec. 19, 2007, 20:34 EST).
23. California v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, No. 08-70001 (9th Cir. filed Jan. 2, 2008).
24. 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
25. Id. at 267. The eight states are California, Connecticut, Iowa, New Jersey, New York,
Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin.
26. Id. The power companies include American Electric Power Co., Inc., The Southern Co.,
Cinergy Corp., Tennessee Valley Authority, and Xcel Energy, Inc.
27. Id. at 270 ("Here, to curtail Defendants' contribution to global warming, Plaintiffs 'seek
an order (i) holding each of the Defendants jointly and severally liable for contributing to an ongoing
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justiciable political questions that are consigned to the political branches,
not the Judiciary. 28
2. Human Rights
Sheila Watt-Cloutier, then chairperson of the Inuit Circumpolar
Council (ICC), and with the support of the Council, brought a petition
before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR).29
The petition alleged that the United States violated the human rights of
the Inuit people by failing to control emissions of GHGs. 30 The IACHR
refused to hear the case but requested a presentation on the issues.3 '
III. ETHICAL DIMENSIONS
A. Common Concern of Mankind
Our global climate is a public resource or public good, available to
and relied upon by all living systems of the world. No one can be ex-
cluded from the benefits and other impacts of climate, and all are af-
fected by it. The opening lines of the Preamble to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) define climate
change as "a common concern of humankind., 32 Many believe that the
global climate is subject to the "tragedy of the commons," in which eve-
ryone uses the resource but no one has responsibility for protecting it.
33
Litigation is one strategy to establish responsibility for protecting, and
liability for injuring, our global climate commons.
Climate litigants have asserted a variety of legal theories in their at-
tempts to protect the global climate. Massachusetts v. EPA demonstrates
that EPA has responsibility for GHG emissions under the CAA.34
Friends of the Earth alleges that federal agencies have a responsibility to
consider impacts on climate when conducting environmental reviews.35
Cases apply many legal theories to show that humans are responsible for
the global commons.
public nuisance, global warming, and (ii) enjoining each of the Defendants to abate its contribution
to the nuisance by capping its emissions of carbon dioxide and then reducing those emissions by a
specified percentage each year for at least a decade."').
28. Id. at 274.
29. Sheila Watt-Cloutier, Petition to the Inter American Commission on Human Rights, Seek-
ing Relief from Violations Resulting from Global Warming Caused by Acts and Omissions by the
United States (Dec. 7, 2005), available at http://www.earthjustice.org/library/legal-docs/petition-to-
the-inter-american-commission-on-human-rights-on-behaf-of-the-inuit-ircumpolarconference.pdf.
30. Id. at 1-8.
31. Press Release, The Ctr. for Int'l Envtl. Law, Global Warming and Human Rights Gets
Hearing on World Stage, (Mar. 5, 2007), http://www.ciel.org/Climate/IACHRInuit5MarO7.html.
32. United Nations, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 31 I.L.M.
849, 851 (1992) [hereinafter UNFCCC].
33. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCl. 1243, 1244 (1968) (maga-
zine).
34. 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1459-60 (2007).
35. No. C 02-4106 JSW, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42335, at *4-5, *27 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23,
2005) (order denying defendant's motion for summary judgment).
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B. Procedural Justice
Procedural justice considers whether the process used to reach a de-
cision is fair.36 Scholars may disagree, however, as to what constitutes a
fair process. John Rawls would call for a "veil of ignorance" so that
those deciding would be unaware of the costs and benefits to them-
selves.37 Others would require a democratic process in which all affected
parties have a meaningful voice.38 Still others maintain that careful pro-
cedures specifying what must be proven and what qualifies as evidence
will achieve procedural justice.3 9
American courts have instituted many rules to provide procedures
that are fair, are perceived by the public to be fair, and are intended to
reach consistent results. Litigants must meet high burdens of proof on
specific elements of causes of action. Rules of evidence constrain the
litigation process to ensure that evidence presented meets high standards
of relevance, legitimacy, and credibility. These well-established rules
will help to ensure that climate litigation meets high standards of proce-
dural fairness.
C. Democratic Principles
The United States does not yet have a clear legal framework spell-
ing out rights and responsibilities of individuals, institutions, and, par-
ticularly, government agencies, for climate change.40  Litigants have
turned to the courts to demonstrate that existing laws can be stretched to
cover climate change. In Massachusetts v. EPA,41 a divided Supreme
Court ruled that the CAA can indeed be used to regulate GHG emissions
from the tailpipes of motor vehicles, and returned the case to EPA to
determine whether such emissions should be regulated under the terms of
the CAA.42 Friends of the Earth alleged that NEPA environmental re-
views should consider the impacts of federal action on climate, and that
other cases should clarify whether the Endangered Species Act, the Ma-
rine Mammals Protection Act, and other statutes include climate-related
concerns within their ambit.
43
36. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF LEGAL THOUGHT 81-82 (Oxford Univ. Press
1996).
37. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 12 (Harvard Univ. Press 1971).
38. See Gary Bryner, Assessing Claims of Environmental Justice, in JUSTICE AND NATURAL
RESOURCES: CONCEPTS, STRATEGIES, AND APPLICATIONS 31, 44-45 (Kathryn Mutz et al. eds.,
2002).
39. See id.
40. Michele M. Betsill & Roger A. Pielke, Jr., Blurring the Boundaries: Domestic and Inter-
national Ozone Politics and Lessons for Climate Change, INT'L ENVTL. AFFAIRS, Summer 1998, at
147, 161-62.
41. 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).
42. Id. at 1463.
43. See No. C 02-4106 JSW, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42335 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2005) (order
denying defendant's motion for summary judgment).
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As a democratic society, the United States expects its courts to op-
erate consistent with democratic principles, but litigants, judges, and
academics differ as to what democracy requires with respect to environ-
mental litigation in general and climate litigation in particular. The de-
bate comes down to who should be making decisions regarding climate
change. Should courts determine rights and responsibilities, should they
defer to the judgments of executive agencies, or should they leave all
such decisions to Congress? Should states be allowed to regulate GHG
emissions, or has Congress precluded states from taking action through
federal regulation? Is accountability best served by leaving policy deci-
sions to elected officials or by allowing citizens to challenge governmen-
tal action or inaction through the courts?
Scholars debate the influence that environmental litigation in gen-
eral and climate litigation in particular has on democratic processes.
Joseph Sax describes environmental litigation as "a means of access for
the ordinary citizen to the process of governmental decision-making.
' 4
Sheila Jasanoff emphasizes the importance of litigation in civic educa-
tion and in providing information "about the epistemological, social, and
moral dilemmas" associated with science and technology issues. 5 Oth-
ers argue that environmental litigation undermines democracy by shifting
decisions away from elected officials.46 Robert Kagan maintains that
adversarial legalism can block cooperation and frustrate justice.47
Climate litigation contributes to public participation in various
ways. 4 It allows citizens to challenge governmental actions they believe
are improper, such as EPA's decision not to regulate GHGs under its
CAA authority. Litigation provides a forum within which plaintiffs may
seek relief for perceived injuries, as demonstrated in both the public nui-
sance cases and the Inuit human rights claim. As discussed in more de-
tail below, these cases educate the public about major issues relating to
climate change. Litigation can stimulate public debate as to what should
happen and encourage additional political action.
Climate litigation can give voice to minority interests, but these
cases are expensive and not available to everyone. In some cases, groups
such as environmental NGOs and industry associations provide access to
courts that might not be available to individual litigants. For example,
Earthjustice and the Center for International Environmental Law have
44. Joseph L. Sax, Defending the Environment: A Strategy for Citizen Action, in LAW AND
THE ENVIRONMENT: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY READER 300-05 (R.V. Percival & D.C. Alevizatos eds.,
Temple Univ. Press 1998).
45. JASANOFF, 1995, supra note 6, at 21.
46. Marilyn Averill, Climate Litigation: Democratic Participation and Civic Education (Mar.
2006) (paper presented at the Western Political Science Association annual meeting in Albuquerque)
(on file with author).
47. ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 4 (Harvard
Univ. Press, 2003).
48. Averill, supra note 46, at 2.
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helped the Inuit to make their voices heard in a variety of international
forums.
49
Massachusetts v. EPA50 was as much a debate over the separation of
powers as it was about climate change. At the D.C. Circuit level, three
judges wrote three wildly different opinions about how the case should
be decided, but really focused on who should decide-a federal agency,
Congress, or the courts? 51 The Supreme Court majority and dissenting
opinions engaged in a similar debate. Connecticut v. American Electri-
cal Power Co.52 reflected similar concerns; the judge dismissed the case
as a "political question," one that should be addressed through a political
process rather than by the courts.53
Climate litigation also involves questions about the appropriate
level for making decisions about climate policy. Who has the authority
and responsibility to regulate GHGs? When does federal policy preempt
state action? Automobile manufacturers have filed suit to block Califor-
nia from implementing its standards for vehicle emissions, and to block
other states from adopting the California standard, claiming that such
decisions belong to the federal government.
54
Courts serve procedural justice by allowing citizens access to the
decision-making process, particularly by challenging government action
or inaction, but the expense of litigation limits access. Courts may reach
decisions contrary to those of the executive, but Congress can override
most decisions with which it disagrees. The debate over who should
decide is likely to continue until either Congress or the courts provide a
clearer legal framework for climate change.
D. Rights, Responsibilities, and Liability
Discussions about climate change at the domestic and international
levels often focus on responsibility and liability.55  Who should be held
responsible for our changing climate, and what should they be required
to do? What circumstances should excuse responsibility? Who will be
injured by climate change, and how can they be protected from or com-
49. Press Release, Earthjustice, Inuit Human Rights Petition File Over Climate Change (Dec.
7, 2005), http://www.earthjustice.org/news/press/005/inuit-human-rights-petition-filed-over-climate-
change.html.
50. 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).
51. Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
52. 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
53. Id. at 274.
54. See, e.g., Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Witherspoon, 456 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (E.D.
Cal. 2006). These cases were rendered moot, at least temporarily, on Dec. 19, 2007, when EPA
denied California's request for a waiver to the Clean Air Act. See Letter, supra note 22. California
has petitioned for review of the decision.
55. DONALD BROWN ET AL., WHITE PAPER ON THE ETHICAL DIMENSIONS OF CLIMATE
CHANGE 8, available at http://www.ndsciencehumanitiespolicy.org/resources/climate-change_
white._paper.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2008).
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pensated for injuries? Climate litigation addresses some of these issues
head on.
According to Dale Jamieson, "[a] paradigm moral problem is one in
which an individual acting intentionally harms another individual, both
the individuals and the harm are identifiable, and the individuals and
harm are closely related in time and space. 56 Jamieson uses six increas-
ingly complex stories about bicycle thefts to illustrate the difficulties in
treating climate change as a moral problem. Virtually everyone around
the globe contributes to and will be affected by climate change. Actions
taken in the past, or today, will have impacts that persist for decades or
centuries.57 Activities undertaken in all countries, from GHG emissions
to agricultural practices to deforestation, affect the global climate.
58
These activities were not intended to change the climate; in most cases,
they were intended to promote societal benefits such as economic devel-
opment. Energy users probably were aware of their emissions but not of
the possible impacts on climate, although such impacts have become
well known in the last decade. Linking specific climate injuries to spe-
cific causes will be extremely difficult, complicating arguments about
ethical implications.
Legal issues are similar to those in the moral paradigm. Law pro-
vides causes of action through which those injured may seek redress, but
law also protects those alleged to contribute to injuries in order to avoid
holding them responsible for frivolous claims. Both law and ethics are
concerned with defining rights and responsibilities and with deciding
who should be held responsible or legally liable for harm. Law is
grounded in ethical principles but turns them into legal rules that may be
applied with some consistency in the courts. For example, general ethi-
cal principles define general duties that one person holds to others. Law
turns duties into rules about how someone can be held responsible in a
given context.
Both the classic moral paradigm and law address the conditions un-
der which an individual or other entity may be held responsible for be-
havior. Jamieson lists intentionality and spatial and temporal proximity
as important factors in establishing responsibility. 59  Law joins these
norms with other community standards into a system that allows for the
determination of responsibility in a given context or a given case.
Causes of action specify the elements that must be proven. Burdens of
56. Dale Jamieson, The Moral and Political Challenges of Climate Change, in CREATING A
CLIMATE FOR CLIMATE CHANGE: COMMUNICATING CLIMATE CHANGE AND FACILITATING SOCIAL
CHANGE 475 (Suzanne C. Moser & Lisa Dilling eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2007).
57. IPCC, supra note 2, at 23-24.
58. See generally Working Group III of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,
Climate Change 2007-Mitigation of Climate Change (2007) (provides an overview of the many
human activities contributing to climate change).
59. Jamieson, supra note 56, at 475.
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proof indicate the degree of certainty that must be obtained, and who
must meet that burden. Rules of evidence ensure that expert testimony,
data, and other evidence meet high standards of relevance, credibility,
and legitimacy.
"[A]s a general rule, the imposition of liability depends upon a
showing by the plaintiff that his or her injuries were caused by an act of
the defendant or by an instrumentality under the defendant's control. 60
Climate change presents serious causation problems and questions about
how much proof of a causal link between a defendant's behavior and a
plaintiff's injury is required in order to make fair decisions about assign-
ing responsibility and requiring compensation or other relief.
The majority in Massachusetts v. EPA found sufficient evidence of
causation to support standing,6 1 but Chief Justice Roberts disagreed in his
dissent, saying "the connection is far too speculative to establish causa-
tion., 62 A case seeking to establish liability, as in the Inuit claim or the
public nuisance case, would face even higher burdens of proof.
In spite of the split decision, Massachusetts v. EPA may profoundly
shift the causation debate. Most of the climate science was uncontested
by the litigants, and the Court acted as if climate change and its impacts
are widely accepted as a reality. The Court accepted, at least for stand-
ing purposes, the likelihood that federal regulation could reduce the im-
pacts of climate change. This endorsement of a causal link between hu-
man activities and climate impacts undoubtedly will be cited in future
climate disputes.
Ethicists may conceive of multiple contributing factors, but phi-
losophers rarely have to make specific decisions about how to allocate
liability among those responsible. Courts must make allocation decisions
in any case involving more than one responsible party. Over time, U.S.
courts have demonstrated their ability to establish legal rules controlling
the increasingly complex cases presented by a modem industrial society.
For example, in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories,63 the court found a way
to allocate liability among many pharmaceutical manufacturers of a drug
that contributed to patient injuries. 64
Climate change presents an infinitely more complicated web of in-
terwoven causal factors, but courts, at least in theory, seem capable of
adjusting to increasingly complicated factual situations. Law shifts with
changes in society to incorporate new factual systems and new legal
60. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924, 928 (Cal. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912
(1980).
61. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1453 (2007).
62. Id. at 1469 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
63. 607 P.2d 924 (1980).
64. Id. at 928.
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theories. 65 The majority in Massachusetts v. EPA recognized this in say-
ing that Congress understands that "without regulatory flexibility, chang-
ing circumstances and scientific developments would soon render the
Clean Air Act obsolete. 66
What should excuse responsibility for contributions to climate
change? President Bush cites possible injury to the U.S. economy as the
reason not to sign the Kyoto protocol.67 Litigants cite the magnitude of
likely economic injury as a reason that the decision should be taken from
the courts. 68 Others claim that such arguments are unethical.69 The Su-
preme Court has not yet decided "whether policy concerns can inform
EPA's actions" 70 if it decides that carbon dioxide reaches the level of
endangerment, as specified in the CAA. Future courts undoubtedly will
have to deal with arguments regarding the high costs of dealing with
climate change, and how and where those costs should be imposed.
E. Scientific Uncertainty
Uncertainty runs rampant throughout climate change and clouds the
science, economics, social impacts, and even the ethical issues.71 Alea-
tory uncertainties are inherent in a model or system and are irreducible.
Epistemic uncertainties relate to what we know, and may be reduced as
knowledge increases. The role uncertainty plays in determining what to
do about climate change has triggered fierce debates. President Bush
maintains that action to limit GHG emissions would be premature with-
out better understanding of the causes and effects of climate change.72
Others call such inaction unethical.73
The parties to the UNFCCC explicitly considered the role that sci-
entific uncertainty should play in climate decisions. The UNFCCC ac-
knowledges some of the uncertainties and adopts a precautionary princi-
ple: "Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of
scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing" meas-
65. See PHIL HARRIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW 1 (7th ed. 2007); LAZARUS, supra note 5, at
1; MILLER, supra note 6, at 1.
66. 127 S. Ct. at 1462.
67. Press Release, The White House, President Announces Clear Skies & Global Climate
Change Initiatives (Feb. 1, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2002/02/20020214-5.html.
68. See BROWN ET AL., supra note 55, at 29-30.
69. Id. at 29-32 (arguing, inter alia, that no one has the right to protect economic health by
harming others).
70. 127 S. Ct. at 1463.
71. See generally INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE
2007: FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT (Cambridge Univ. Press 2007) (carefully portraying uncertain-
ties in the science and highlights key uncertainties).
72. Press Release, The White House, President Bush Discusses Global Climate Change (June
11, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/06/20010611-2.html; see
also Richard A. Kerr, Climate Change: Major Challenges for Bush's Climate Initiative, SCIENCE,
July 13, 2001, available at http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/293/5528/199.
73. BROWN ET AL., supra note 55, at 23-28.
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ures to prevent or mitigate the causes and adverse effects of climate
change.74 But the principle contains conditioning language that requires
cost-effective actions and consideration of impacts on all economic sec-
tors. The exact reach of the UNFCCC precautionary principle remains
unclear as to what kinds of actions might be required at different levels
of uncertainty about the degree of threat, the likelihood of harm, or the
degree of human influence. The language itself is uncertain enough to
reduce its potential as a legal standard.
Litigants use uncertainty to gain an advantage in arguing climate
cases, and case outcomes may depend on perceptions about the adequacy
of current knowledge about climate change. Court decisions can both
resolve questions about scientific uncertainty, at least in the legal con-
text, and influence the way the public views uncertainty. For example, in
Massachusetts v. EPA, the majority said: "A well-documented rise in
global temperatures has coincided with a significant increase in the con-
centration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. Respected scientists
believe the two trends are related. ' 7 5 This statement recognizes the real-
ity of climate change and lends credibility to the correlation between
carbon dioxide build up and rising temperatures. Nevertheless, the Court
also recognized that uncertainty remains problematic, and left the door
open for EPA to decide that "scientific certainty is so profound that it
precludes EPA from making a reasoned judgment as to whether green-
house gases contribute to global warming.
7 6
F. Intra-Generational Equity and the Responsibility to Protect
Climate change fundamentally involves questions of intra-
generational equity, both among nations and among economic groups
within nations. Human activities contributing to climate change, such as
GHG emissions and deforestation, occur locally but have global effects.
GHGs accumulate in the air and circulate around the globe, affecting
climate patterns throughout the world.77 Adverse impacts are likely to be
felt far from the sources of emissions. At the country level, those con-
tributing most to climate change may be among those least affected, rais-
ing major questions about equity, fairness, and under what conditions an
entity such as a nation, a corporation, or an industry should be held re-
sponsible for its contributions to a changing climate. Both within and
between nations, the poor are likely to suffer the most severe effects,
both because they tend to live in more environmentally sensitive areas
74. UNFCCC, supra note 32, at 854.
75. 127 S. Ct. at 1446.
76. Id. at 1463.
77. See generally IPCC, supra note 2.
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and because they lack adequate resources to adapt to a changing climate,
raising serious issues of environmental justice. 8
What responsibility do the people of one nation have to protect the
well being of people from other nations? International law has adopted
numerous principles, generally stating that a state is not permitted to take
actions that will cause injuries beyond its borders. 79  These principles
will be strained by climate change problems, in which virtually everyone
contributes to the problem and everyone will be affected. The climate
change regime explicitly allows some forms of differential treatment in
international law.80  For example, the UNFCCC itself provides for
"common but differentiated responsibilities" among nations.8' But these
differences were generally adopted to correct perceptions of past inequi-
ties and to accommodate varying capacities to deal with climate change.
They were not intended to allow one nation to undertake activities that
would harm others outside of its borders.
Similar questions may be asked about the responsibilities that coun-
tries have to protect the most disadvantaged among their citizens.
American courts have dealt with various environmental justice issues in
recent years, but not of the magnitude presented by climate change.
Most of the current U.S. climate cases do not directly involve inter-
national issues. Two exceptions are Friends of the Earth v. Watson,
82
which involves U.S. agencies that fund projects overseas, and the Inuit
human rights petition, 83 which involves injuries to people in the polar
regions of Canada and the U.S. More such cases can be expected in the
future as more people around the world sustain injuries they believe can
be attributed to climate change induced by emissions from industrialized
societies.
G. Inter-Generational Equity
What responsibilities do people alive today have for the well-being
of people of the future? The U.S. legal system has little to say about this
issue, although some specific laws, particularly environmental laws, have
provisions for the benefit of future generations. Attorneys typically ap-
ply principles of discounting, borrowed from economics, to consider and
78. NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: THE STERN REVIEW 106-07
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2006).
79. See, e.g., REBECCA M. BRATSPIES & RUSSELL A. MILLER EDS., TRANSBOUNDARY HARM
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LESSONS FROM THE TRAIL SMELTER ARBITRATION (Cambridge Univ.
Press 2006); BROWN ET AL., supra note 55, at 13-14.
80. LAVANYA RAJAMANI, DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW 11, 176 (Oxford Univ. Press 2006).
81. UNFCCC, supra note 32, at 854.
82. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Watson, No. C 02-4106 JSW, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42335
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2005) (order denying defendant's motion for summary judgment).
83. See, e.g., Watt-Cloutier, supra note 29.
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monetize the effects of actions taken today on the future. 84 The magni-
tude of the discount rate makes an enormous difference in how future
injuries are valued in economic analysis. 85 As a result, much of the de-
bate over inter-generational equity has focused on the appropriate choice
of a discount rate.86
Courts have a long history of accepting evidence about future inju-
ries and are accustomed to using discount rates. Pollution cases require
discounting to figure future losses to the public until resources can be
adequately remediated. 87  Tort cases require estimates of future earn-
* 88ings. 8 Certain conventions have emerged with respect to discount rates.
The federal government, for example, specifies rates that it should apply
in certain contexts.
89
The magnitude of likely adverse effects of climate change on future
generations has intensified the ethical and emotional debate over inter-
generational equity. Courts eventually will need to decide issues regard-
ing liability for injuries likely to occur in the future. For now, most of
the courtroom debate centers on the present.
H. Inter-Species Equity and Responsibility to Nature
The rights that natural objects have in U.S. courts largely remain
unsettled. Environmental cases typically involve challenges to stand-
ing-to whether the plaintiffs have a right to bring their claims before a
court. One question has been whether non-human objects such as trees
or ecosystems have a right to be represented in court. 90 Specific envi-
ronmental laws, such as the Endangered Species Act, protect certain
natural species or systems, but few non-statutory responsibilities have
been identified that require humans to protect other natural objects, ex-
cept when they are owned by humans. Philosophers have been more
specific about humans' obligations to nature. 91
Climate cases to date have addressed other species either through
their utility for human communities or within the context of a specific
U.S. law. These laws have great power, and may provide the earliest
successes on climate litigation. Procedural cases such as Friends of the




88. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 913A cmt. a (2007).
89. See OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, MEMORANDUM FOR HEADS OF EXECUTIVE DEP'TS
& ESTABLISHMENTS (1992), http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a94/aO94.html.
90. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, SHOULD TREES HAVE STANDING? AND OTHER
ESSAYS ON LAW, MORALS, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 6-7 (Oceana Publ'ns 1996).
91. See generally HOLMES ROLSTON II1, ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS: DUTIES TO AND VALUES
IN THE NATURAL WORLD (Temple Univ. Press 1988); PETER SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS (2d ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1993).
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Earth92 that seek to have the impacts of climate change included as part
of agency environmental reviews have a lower standard for causation to
establish standing and are more likely to succeed than cases seeking to
establish responsibility and liability. Success in these cases will make
climate more visible and ensure that agencies consider the effects their
actions may have on climate, and its resulting impacts on ecosystems,
humans, and other species. A California judge has already found a bio-
logical opinion on the Delta smelt to be inadequate under the Endangered
Species Act, in part because it failed to consider the stresses of climate
change.93 Other cases seek similar rulings under other statutes.94 In-
creased visibility will encourage debate over the role that federal agen-
cies have to protect nature from a changing climate.
IV. SOCIETAL IMPACTS
In a globalized world, actions taken in one place are likely to have
impacts that cross spatial, temporal, political, and scalar boundaries.
Arguments and decisions in climate cases may have repercussions far
beyond the narrow interests of the litigants themselves. Each case, of
course, may serve as precedent for future decisions, or as an incentive to
file additional complaints, either within the United States or elsewhere.
But decisions in climate litigation also have impacts that extend beyond
the legal system itself to the way society thinks about and responds to the
challenges of climate change.
A. Civic Education and Debate
Perhaps the most important connection between climate litigation
and both ethical issues and societal impacts lies in the civic education
function of litigation in the United States. 95  Climate cases tell stories
about the causes and impacts of climate change. These stories are in-
tended to persuade judges and juries, and consequently are written in
language accessible to non-scientists. They identify possible winners
and losers in climate change, and make climate injury claims come alive.
For example, the Inuit, who are among the first to feel the negative im-
pacts of climate change, have been very effective at telling their story
and in turning it into a human rights claim. While the initial claim itself
92. No. C 02-4106 JSW, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42335 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2005) (order
denying defendant's motion for summary judgment).
93. Natural Res. Def. Council v. Kempthome, 506 F. Supp. 2d 322, 330 (E.D. Cal. 2007).
94. See id.; Cent. for Biological Diversity v. Brennan, No. C 06-7062 SBA, 2007 WL
2408901, at *1-3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2007).
95. Marilyn Averill, Climate Litigation: Shaping Public Policy and Stimulating Debate, in
CREATING A CLIMATE FOR CHANGE: COMMUNICATING CLIMATE CHANGE AND FACILITATING
SOCIAL CHANGE 462-71 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2007); JASANOFF, 1995, supra note 6, at 215-18.
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was unsuccessful, the Inuit stories continue to receive international atten-
96tion.
As reported through the media, climate cases can teach the public
about aspects of climate science and bring the scientific debates to a level
that allows participation by the lay public. Courts play a significant role
in how the public understands many scientific issues.9 7 The ways that
litigants present climate science and its inherent uncertainties, and the
ways that courts respond, could affect public perceptions of the rele-
vance, credibility, and legitimacy of climate experts and climate science.
A better understanding of climate science, in turn, will help the public to
appreciate the ethical, economic, social, and other implications of a
changing climate. Climate litigation serves to enhance public under-
standing and stimulate debate on a wide variety of climate-related issues.
Chief Justice Roberts, writing in dissent in Massachusetts v. EPA,
argued that the role of the courts is "not to serve as a convenient forum
for policy debates. 98 While policy debate may not be the primary pur-
pose of cases in litigation, such debate is the inevitable outcome in visi-
ble cases treating controversial issues such as climate change.
B. Advocacy for Political Action
Stories told through climate litigation may capture the public's
imagination and trigger interest in change. Concerned citizens may press
for political action to correct inequities and avoid or compensate for inju-
ries, or for action to mitigate climate change or to support adaptation
planning. Legislatures may take action in response to a court decision.
Climate litigation could affect action at all levels, from local community
decisions to international negotiations. Stimulating political action may
be a prime motivator for some litigants.
In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court has already recognized
and legitimized claims that the global climate is changing, that human
activities, including domestic automobile emissions, contribute signifi-
cantly to the change, and that the "harms associated with climate change
are serious and well recognized." 99 The press referred to the decision as
a "rebuke to the Bush administration and its passive approach to the
warming threat,"' 00 and some translated it as a message to government to
96. Andrew C. Revkin, World Briefing Americas: Inuit Climate Change Petition Rejected,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2007, at Al.
97. Richard C. Leone, Foreword to SHEILA JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR: LAW, SCIENCE,
AND TECHNOLOGY IN AMERICA, at ix (Harvard Univ. Press 1995).
98. 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1470 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 1455.
100. Editorial, The Court Rules on Warming, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2007, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/03/opinion/03tues .html.
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do something.' 0' The media and NGOs across the political spectrum
predicted that Congress was more likely to take action following the Su-
preme Court opinion.
Losing a climate-related case also may trigger political action. If
states lose the right to regulate GHG emissions because of federal pre-
emption, they are likely to pressure Congress to either put a strong legal
framework in place at the federal level, or to allow states to legislate be-
yond federal standards. Corporations, if held legally responsible for their
emissions, are likely to seek protection from liability from the federal
government. Industry also may seek federal regulation in order to pro-
vide consistent national standards, and industry undoubtedly will try to
influence the nature of such regulation.
CONCLUSION
Climate litigation provides a microcosm within which to study how
society debates and reaches decisions about ethical, social, and other
issues related to climate change. Litigants are bringing creative claims to
the courts to force action on climate change, to block governmental ac-
tion, and to hold entities responsible for climate-related injuries. The
impact of climate litigation has just begun. Following plaintiffs' success
in Massachusetts v. EPA, other parties are likely to file suit over climate
issues, both in the U.S. and abroad. These cases show great promise for
illuminating and possibly redressing some of the many ethical and social
dimensions of climate change.
While litigants face daunting challenges to win their cases, the ef-
fects of climate litigation may be felt well beyond the courtroom, regard-
less of who wins in an individual case. Lawyers who are aware of these
cases can help their clients plan for a changing climate and related legal
challenges, but can also themselves participate more fully in the public
debate about how society should respond to the challenges of our chang-
ing global climate.
101. Linda Greenhouse, Justices Say E.P.A. Has Power to Act on Harmful Gases, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 3, 2007, at A5, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/03/washington/03scotus.html.
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Recently states and individuals have turned to federal common law
causes of action to provide equitable and legal relieffor climate change.
Thus far, every federal court to consider these claims has held that they
raise non-justiciable political questions consigned to the coordinate
branches. These courts reason that federal courts lack jurisdiction over
climate cases because climate change is textually committed elsewhere,
there are no judicial standards to apply, and the elected branches have
yet to render an initial policy determination about the subject. This arti-
cle concludes that these courts either misapply or misapprehend the doc-
trine. It concedes that federal common law is not the optimal or only
legal response to climate change. Yet it maintains that the political
question doctrine is a false basis for dismissing climate cases that invoke
these causes of action. The Constitution does not commit climate change
to Congress or the executive. Federal common law provides ample and
long-applied standards in cases involving disparate transboundary pol-
lution. The elected branches have made initial policy determinations
about climate change policies. Furthermore, there is good reason to
question both the doctrine's jurisprudential bases and whether its fram-
ers meant it to be applied to federal common law in general, and climate
cases in particular. Regardless, courts have rejected use of the doctrine
to dismiss analogous claims for redress based on federal common law.
The political question doctrine does not prevent courts from entering the
climate change thicket.
Whether Georgia by insisting upon this claim is doing more harm
than good to her own citizens is for her to determine. The possible
disaster to those outside the State must be accepted as a consequence
of her standing upon her extreme rights.I
t Professor of Law, Widener Law School. J.D., University of Kansas School of Law;
LL.M., Pace University School of Law (Feldshuh Fellow). The author thanks Professor Randy
Abate for comments to a draft of this article, and Patrick Clary, Widener Law '10, for proofreading
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1. Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907) (Holmes, J.).
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The scope and magnitude of the relief Plaintiffs seek reveals the tran-
scendently legislative nature of this litigation.
2
[The court] ought not inject itself into the global warming thicket.
3
INTRODUCTION
Climate change, as Chief Justice Roberts observes in his dissenting
opinion in Massachusetts v. EPA, "may be a crisis, even the most press-
ing environmental problem of our time."4 The challenge it presents may
be parts insurmountable and indifferent to political boundaries. It is not,
however, indivisible. Its causes and effects are not equally distributed.
It is caused much more by some than by others. While a global phe-
nomenon, its costs are distributed unevenly, borne more acutely by the
poor, the elderly, the infirm, and the politically disenfranchised.
The stakes are both tremendous and unknown, and transcendentally
personal. Some have nowhere to turn but in despair and desperation to
the federal courts, beckoning ossified causes of action. For example, on
February 27, 2008, the tiny City of Kivalena and the Alaska Native Vil-
lage of Kivalena-a federally recognized tribe-brought a federal law-
suit against a dozen petroleum refining, energy producing, and coal ex-
tracting companies.5 They claim that the greenhouse gases these indus-
tries emit contribute to global climate change, causing them real, palpa-
ble, harm. Invoking the federal common law of public nuisance and
other claims, they argue that these industries should pay the estimated
$400 million it will cost to relocate the community lock, stock and barrel
before it melts-schools, churches, streets, businesses, hospital, police
and fire stations, community center, people and permafrost-into the
Arctic Ocean.
What to do. Congress could force the energy, transportation and ex-
tractive sectors to change their ways or bare the economic externalities of
their climate-altering activities. It could have them shoulder their fair
share of the relocation, health care, property damage and other costs of
climate change. States could do this too, subject to federal preemption.
It does not seem, however, that such measures are likely soon to
come to pass. Congress has not enacted technology-forcing, damages-
paying legislation to address climate change. Some states have picked
up the slack with their own measures to reduce emissions of greenhouse
2. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
3. California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 3:06-CV-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871, at *29
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007).
4. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1463 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (internal
quotations omitted).
5. See Climate Change Threatens Existence, Eskimo Lawsuit Says, CNN, Feb. 27, 2008,
available at http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/americas/02/26/us.warming.ap/index.html.
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gases, promote conservation or alternative energy and transportation, and
create markets in hopes of reducing carbon output. Yet states are left
with little means either to mandate engineering responses or to be reim-
bursed for response costs.
The costs to states and individuals for responding to climate change,
including that for health care, community relocation, property damage,
shoreline loss, and technical assistance, to name a few, will likely be
unlike anything we have seen in kind or degree. Whatever uncertainties
about costs exist, however, one prediction seems an even bet: States and
individuals will be left both with the dinner bill and the dirty dishes for
the vestiges of a party-hard century of unsustainable carbon output.
Enter the common law. Public nuisance theory allows states and
individuals to seek injunctive relief and/or money damages to abate ac-
tivities that unreasonably interfere with a right common to the general
public. Yet state public nuisance causes of action are often curtailed by
limitations on liability and statutes of limitations, by requirements for
individuals to show special damages, and by other obstacles.
Enter the federal common law. Since the time Justice Holmes sat
on the Court, federal common law for public nuisance has served as a
meaningful cause of action for states and individuals to stop harmful
activities and recover the costs of transboundary pollution. So too it can
with climate change. Indeed, the legal challenges of climate change
seem a particularly cozy fit for federal common law. It is transboundary.
Legislative enactments allowing for injunctive relief or money damages
do not exist. A patchwork of state common law responses is untenable.
So one is left to wonder for what federal common law can exist if not for
climate change. And if current circumstances concerning climate change
do not warrant its use, then when possibly could it be so.
Thus, states representing almost one-half of the nation's citizenry
have brought federal common law public nuisance causes of action
against the world's largest auto manufacturing 6 and fossil fuel burning
energy companies. 7 Cities and tribes-as in Kivalena-have followed
suit. Private litigants have also brought federal common law nuisance
actions for damages caused or complicated by climate change. 8
Enter the political question doctrine. It aims to thwart the judicial
review of issues textually or prudentially consigned to Congress, the
6. Gen. Motors, 2007 WL 2726871, at *16. Randall S. Abate, Automobile Emissions and
Climate Change Impacts: Employing Public Nuisance Doctrine as Part of a "Global Warming
Solution " in California, 40 CONN. L. REV. 591, 598 (2008) [hereinafter Automobile Emissions].
7. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 274.
8. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-436-LG-RHW, 2006 WL 1066645, at *2
(S.D. Miss. Aug. 30, 2007) (dismissing under the political question doctrine private common law
cause of action brought by individuals to address effects of climate change), appeal docketed, No.
07-60756 (5th Cir. 2007).
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President, or both.9 The doctrine's political philosophy is "essentially a
function of the separation of powers"' 0 rooted in Jeffersonian notions of
constitutional theory that democracy is best served by having coordinate
elected branches resolve political questions rather than politically unac-
countable federal judges." To coin a phrase, the doctrine applies to dis-
able federal courts from reviewing matters on the theory that they "ought
not enter [the] political thicket."'
' 2
Enter the courts. Expressly declining to "enter the global warming
thicket," federal courts have thus far invoked the political question doc-
trine to dismiss federal common law causes brought by states and indi-
viduals for climate change. This means that the cause of action is dead
on arrival. There is no answer, no discovery, no standing, no proof, and
no opportunity to prove damages or "unreasonable" harm. Exit the case.
Enter a preemptive clarification and concession. First, this article
does not argue that federal courts in the United States are the premier
forum for addressing what is arguably the world's most pressing prob-
lem. It does not aim to diminish the role of international fora, Congress,
the President, agencies, the States, and citizens. The operative question
here is whether the political question doctrine prevents federal courts
from hearing climate cases rooted in federal common law. This article
concludes it does not.
Second, this article is not an aria apologia on behalf of federal
common law to address climate change. Federal common law is un-
wieldy and amorphous. To be sure, describing it is a little like describing
what Mozart's opera Magic Flute tastes like. Federal common law is
hardly the only or most efficient societal response to climate change.
But a vital response it is. Climate cases, if they are to fall, should
fail on other ground, say, because the plaintiffs fail to prove damages are
"unreasonable," or because they yield to other constitutional features.
Indeed, state and private responses to climate change raise a constellation
of other, arguably more substantial, constitutional questions. These in-
clude those under the Supremacy, 13 dormant Commerce 14 and Foreign
9. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210-27 (1962) (thoroughly discussing the political ques-
tion doctrine).
10. U.S. Dep't of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442, 456 (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 217).
11. See id
12. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
13. U.S. CONST. art. V1, cl. 2. For assessment of preemption and climate issues, see generally
Ann E. Carlson, Federalism, Preemption, and Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 37 U.C. DAvIS L. REV.
281 (2003); Sara A. Colangelo, Comment, The Politics of Preemption: An Application of Preemp-
tion Jurisprudence and Policy to California Assembly Bill 1493, 37 ENVTL. L. 175 (2007); Sarah
Olinger, Comment, Filling the Void in an Otherwise Occupied Field: Using Federal Common Law
to Regulate Carbon Dioxide in the Absence of a Preemptive Statute, 24 PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 237
(2007).
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. For an analysis of how the dormant Commerce Clause and
dormant Foreign Relations Clause apply to California's recent climate legislation, see generally
Erwin Chemerinsky et al., California, Climate Change, and the Constitution, 37 ENvTL. L. REP.
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Relations, 15 Compact16 and Treaty 17 clauses, and standing.18  Each pro-
vides more constitutionally legitimate application to climate cases than
does the political question doctrine.
This article summarizes and evaluates the growing body of juris-
prudence relating to how the political question doctrine applies to federal
common law causes of action that address the causes and effects of cli-
mate change. Part I provides an overview of the effects of and policies
toward climate change, and the role federal common law might play in
addressing them. Part II discusses the political question doctrine's ori-
gins and legal architecture. Part III describes juridical applications of the
"textual commitment" prong of the doctrine and explains why it does not
apply to climate cases. Part IV examines how courts have applied the
prudential component of the doctrine and explains why these too do not
apply in climate cases. Part V questions whether applying the political
question doctrine to climate cases is constitutionally legitimate and
whether it was designed to apply to federal common law in general, and
climate cases in particular.
This article concludes that federal courts have thus far incorrectly
invoked the political question doctrine in climate cases under federal
common law. This erroneously foreclososes consideration of any other
factual, causal, constitutional, statutory, common law, or remedial issues
out of undue deference to the elected branches of the federal government.
10653 (2007); Peter Carl Nordberg, Note, Excuse Me, Sir, But Your Climate's on Fire: California's
S.B. 1368 and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2067 (2007).
15. See generally Hannah Chang, Foreign Affairs Federalism: The Legality of California's
Link with the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme, 37 ENvTL. L. REP. 10771 (2007) (dis-
cussing the dormant foreign affairs power and California's efforts to combat climate change). Some
question the existence of foreign-affairs preemption. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Global Warming
as a Public Nuisance, 30 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 293, 327-28 (2005) ("If the mere appearance of an
issue on the international agenda would result in automatic preemption of state authority under the
dormant foreign affairs preemption, a good deal of the police powers of the States would become at
risk.").
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. For a discussion of the interplay between the Compact
Clause and multi-state agreements to address the effects of climate change, see generally Katie
Maxwell, Comment, Multi-State Environmental Agreements: Constitutional Violations or Legiti-
mate State Coordination? 15 PENN. ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 355 (2007); Michael S. Smith, Note, Murky
Precedent Meets Hazy Air: The Compact Clause and Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 34 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 387 (2007).
17. U.S. CONST. art I, § 10, cl. 1; id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. See generally Kirk Junker, Conven-
tional Wisdom, De-Emption and Uncooperative Federalism in International Environmental Agree-
ments, 2 LOY. U. CHI. INT'L L. REV. 93 (2005) (discussing the Treaty Clauses, states' rights, and
international environmental agreements). For broader commentary on international agreements and
federalism, see generally Robert J. Delahunty, Federalism Beyond the Water's Edge: State Pro-
curement Sanctions and Foreign Affairs, 37 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1 (2001); Edward T. Swaine, Does
Federalism Constrain the Treaty Power?, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 403 (2003); Edward T. Swaine,
Negotiating Federalism: State Bargaining and the Dormant Treaty Power, 49 DUKE L.J. 1127
(2000).
18. For an overview of standing principles raised in climate litigation, see generally Bradford
C. Mank, Standing and Global Warming: Is Injury to All Injury to None?, 35 ENVTL. L. 1 (2005);
Nigel Cooney, Note, Without a Leg to Stand On: The Merger ofArticle III Standing and the Merits
in Environmental Cases, 23 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 175 (2007).
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Thus, while conceding that federal common law causes of action do not
provide an optimal democratic, economic or societal means to address
the effects of climate change, this article concludes that the political
question doctrine is an unworkable constitutional means for dismissing
climate cases planted in federal common law. The doctrine does not
prevent federal courts from entering this thicket.
I. CLIMATE CHANGE, POLICY, AND THE ROLE OF FEDERAL
COMMON LAW
A lengthy discussion of the root causes and effects of climate
change and attendant policies is beyond the scope of this article. It is,
however, helpful to recapitulate them briefly before describing how fed-
eral common law might apply.
A. Effects of Climate Change
Climate Change is at least somewhat attributable to anthropogenic
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from the use and combustion of fossil
fuels.19 Extracted from underground sources derived from the decompo-
sition of plants and animals that lived and died millions of years ago,
fossil fuels (e.g., coal, petroleum, natural gas) have become an indispen-
sable component of life in the western world. We use fossil fuels to pro-
pel our cars, planes and trains; to heat our homes, hospitals, schools and
businesses; to make fabrics, plastics and pharmaceuticals; and to provide
the majority of the power we use to wash our clothes and dishes, keep
the lights on, charge our phones and other electronics, run our computers,
and live our modern lives.
The fossil fuels used to facilitate these activities produce copious
amounts of GHGs. Indeed, over the time it takes for you to read this
article (assuming you are an average reader with above-average pa-
tience), human activity will contribute about another three million tons of
GHGs into the atmosphere, further concentrating GHG levels.
20
19. A comprehensive discussion of the evidence surrounding anthropogenic-induced climate
change is beyond the scope of this article. For this, the reader is referred to Chapter 1 of the Stem
Review from the British government. See generally SIR NICHOLAS STERN, STERN REVIEW ON THE
ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE (2006), available at http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/independent-reviews/stem-review-economics-climate-change/stern-review-
report.cfin.
20. See Donald A. Brown, The US. Performance in Achieving Its 1992 Earth Summit Global
Warming Commitments, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 10, 741 (2002). Many scientists and policy makers
believe that a doubling of CO2 from preindustrial levels to 560 ppm may be unavoidable in the 21st
century. This is so because the world's political and economic system cannot respond rapidly
enough to make faster changes in some major polluting sources such as gasoline-powered automo-
biles or coal fired power plants. Some environmentalists, however, believe it is still possible to
stabilize GHG at 450 ppm, a level that would limit the temperature increase (in addition to that
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The increase in GHGs courts calamity by contributing to global cli-
mate change.2' Future generations will be saddled with the costs of "do-
ing nothing. 22 As the Supreme Court recently observed, "[t]he harms
associated with climate change are serious and well recognized, 23 poten-
tially including "a precipitate rise in sea levels by the end of the century,
.. 'irreversible changes to natural ecosystems,' a 'significant reduction
in water storage in winter snowpack in mountainous regions. . . ,' and an
increase in the spread of disease. 24
The effects of climate change are distributed disproportionately. It
is expected to increase precipitation in the Americas, but decrease it in
southern Africa, the Mediterranean and southern Asia.2 5 Relative ground
temperatures are expected to rise faster in the polar regions, particularly
in the Arctic Regions. 6
The manifestations of climate change are difficult to ignore. In-
deed, as former Vice President Al Gore explained when accepting the
Nobel Peace Prize for his extensive work on spreading the news about
the dangers of climate change:
In the last few months, it has been harder and harder to misinterpret
the signs that our world is spinning out of kilter. Major cities in
North and South America, Asia and Australia are nearly out of water
due to massive droughts and melting glaciers. Desperate farmers are
losing their livelihoods. Peoples in the frozen Arctic and on low-
lying Pacific islands are planning evacuations of places they have
long called home. Unprecedented wildfires have forced a half mil-
lion people from their homes in one country and caused a national
emergency that almost brought down the government in another.
Climate refugees have migrated into areas already inhabited by peo-
which has already been caused by human activities) to 1.5 to 2°F during the next 100 years. Virtu-
ally nobody believes that it is possible to stabilize atmospheric concentrations below 450 ppm and
concentrations could continue growing after that if third-world countries do not implement aggres-
sive reduction strategies, even if the most ambitious proposal currently under consideration were
adopted. Id.
21. For a discussion of some of the impacts of climate change, see generally Richard A. Kerr,
Latest Forecast: Stand By for a Warmer, but not Scorching, World, SCIENCE, Apr. 21, 2006, avail-
able at http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/312/5772/35 Ia; CAMILLE PARMESAN & HECTOR
GALBRAITH, PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIENT CHANGE, OBSERVED IMPACTS OF GLOBAL CLIMATE
CHANGE IN THE U.S. (2004), available at http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/final_
Obslmpact.pdf. For contemporaneous impacts, see generally Real Climate: Climate Science from
Climate Scientists, http://www.realclimate.org (last visited Mar. 26, 2008).
22. Robert L. Glicksman, Global Climate Change and the Risks to Coastal Areas from Hurri-
canes and Rising Sea Levels: The Costs of Doing Nothing, 52 Loy. L. REV. 1127, 1127, 1179
(2006).
23. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1455 (2007).
24. Id. at 1456 (quoting declaration of Michael MacCracken, former Executive Director, U.S.
Global Change Research Program).
25. This harm also translates into economic costs. See Gateway to the United Nation's Sys-
tems on Climate Change, Climate Change at a Glance,
http://www.un.org/climatechange/background/ataglance.shtml (last visited Mar. 26, 2008).
26. See Gateway to the United Nation's Systems on Climate Change, supra note 25.
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pie with different cultures, religions, and traditions, increasing the
potential for conflict. Stronger storms in the Pacific and Atlantic
have threatened whole cities. Millions have been displaced by mas-
sive flooding in South Asia, Mexico, and 18 countries in Africa. As
temperature extremes have increased, tens of thousands have lost
their lives. We are recklessly burning and clearing our forests and
driving more and more species into extinction. The very web of life
on which we depend is being ripped and frayed.
27
The status quo will increase GHG emissions about two percent per
annum, resulting in a global increase of at least two to three degrees Cel-
sius by 2100.28 It will also likely bring about abrupt climate change.
This includes ice sheet disintegration, and regional climate disruptions.
29
Furthermore, it is likely to result in significant species loss because iso-
therm displacement due to climate change moves more rapidly than
plants and animals can migrate. 30  The domestic effects of climate
change include extreme weather events and more significant droughts,
floods, and fires. 31 States in the United States have already reported ris-
ing sea levels, flooding, snowfall reductions, and coastal erosion.32 They
are also left with health care and other costs in the aftermath.33
B. Policy Responses
A conspicuous lack of cohesive federal action to regulate green-
house gas emissions has invited piecemeal approaches to climate change
in the U.S.3 4  In 1992, the United States joined the U.N. Framework
Convention on Global Climate Change (UNFCC). In 1997, it served as a
signatory to the Kyoto Protocol on Global Climate Change. Yet subse-
quently the political branches and federal agencies have said much and
done relatively little to address climate change.
27. Al Gore, Nobel Peace Prize Acceptance Speech (Dec. 10, 2007), available at
http://nobelprize.orglnobel prizes/peace/laureates/2007/gore-lectureen.html.
28. Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 295, 340 (D.
Vt. 2007); see also Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Witherspoon, 2007 WL 135688 (E.D. Cal.
2007), 456 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (companion case challenging California standards);
Lincoln Dodge, Inc. v. Sullivan, 1:06-cv-00070-T-LDA (filed Feb. 13, 2006) (same for Rhode
Island).
29. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 340.
30. Id. at 340-41.
31. See, e.g., id. at 341. Hansen Aff., Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v.
Crombie, Nos. 2:05-CV-302, 2:05-CV-304, 2006 WL 4761053, at 65 (D. Vt. Aug. 14, 2006).
32. See, e.g., GUIDO FRANCO, CALIFORNIA ENERGY COMMISSION, CLIMATE CHANGE
IMPACTS AND ADAPTATION IN CALIFORNIA 7 (2005), available at
http://www.energy.ca.gov/2005publications/CEC-500-2005- 103/CEC-500-2005-103-SD.PDF;
Washington State, Department of Ecology, http://www.ecy.wa.gov/climatechange/effects.htm (last
visited Mar. 26, 2008).
33. See, Lisa Heinzerling, Climate Change, Human Health, and the Post-Cautionary Princi-
ple, 96 GEO. L.J. 445, 445-60 (2008).
34. Randall S. Abate, Kyoto or Not, Here We Come: The Promise and Perils of the Piece-
meal Approach to Climate Change Regulation in the United States, 15 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL'Y
369, 372 (2006).
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First, Congress. While many federal representatives lend their
name to pending climate legislation, Congress has yet to enact any of it.
35
The U.S. Senate has yet to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. With Australia's
late 2007 ratification of the Protocol, 36 this leaves the U.S. with the dubi-
ous distinction of being the only major industrialized country in the
world that has not done so. 37 Moreover, Congress has not allocated or
appropriated funds to pay for the direct effects of climate change. These
include shoreline loss, property damage, crop diminution, and personal
health and welfare loss and injuries.
Next, the Executive. The President has done little to enter the cli-
mate change fray other than promote volunteerism. While the Bush Ad-
ministration observes that global climate change is a "complex and im-
portant issue," 38 it regularly resists federal measures to regulate GHG
emissions. When countries from around the globe met in Bali in the fall
of 2007 to discuss ways to reduce GHG emissions, primarily as a means
of protecting the poor and politically powerless around the globe,39 the
White House announced that it would not agree to reduce U.S. green-
house gas emissions.4 °
The Fourth Branch has fared no better. Federal agencies have
adopted a "wait and see" approach exalting voluntary community action.
While the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) allows that
"human-induced warming and associated sea level rises are expected to
continue through the 21st century," 41 it has avoided opportunities to
regulate GHG emissions under available legislative vehicles, such as the
Clean Air Act, despite prodding by the U.S. Supreme Court.42 It has also
failed to recommend legislative action.
Furthermore, EPA has thwarted innovative state measures to ad-
dress climate change. For example, on December 19, 2007, EPA Chief
Administrator Johnson denied the State of California's petition 43 to regu-
35. See, e.g., America's Climate Security Act of 2007, S. 2191, 110th Cong. (2007), available
at http://usclimatenetwork.org/federal/lieberman-warner-bill/ACSA.pdf; Low Carbon Economy Act
of 2007, S. 1766, 110th Cong. (2007); Global Warming Reduction Act of 2007, S. 485, 110th Cong.
(2007).
36. Australia Raties Kyoto Protocol, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2007, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/03/world/asia/03rudd-wire.htmJ.
37. Abate, supra note 34, at 370-72.
38. The White House, Council on Environmental Quality,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/ceq/global-change.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2008).
39. Peter Gelling, Focus of Climate Talks Shifts to Helping Poor Countries Cope, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 13, 2007, at A31.
40. See Chemerinsky et al., supra note 14, at 10662.
41. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, CHAPTER 6, IMPACTS AND ADAPTATION 1,
available at http://yosernite.epa.gov/oar/globalwarming.nsf/UniqueKeyLookup/SHSU5BNQ7Z/
$File/ch6.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2008).
42. See Robert S. Glicksman, Balancing Mandate and Discretion in the Institutional Design
of Federal Climate Change Policy, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 196, 201-02 (2008).
43. California Environmental Protection Agency Air Resources Board, Request for a Clean
Air Act Section 209(b) Waiver Preemption for California's Adopted and Amended New Motor
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late greenhouse gas emissions from new automobiles. 44 In a curious
call,45 EPA maintains that California has failed to demonstrate the "com-
pelling and extraordinary circumstances" needed to enact such regula-
tions. 46 California immediately objected4 7 and has filed suit,4 8 joined by
fifteen other states, 49 to reverse the EPA's ruling. 50  EPA then waited
another three months before formally rejecting the State of California's
request to regulate GHG emissions from new motor vehicles.
51
The vacuum left by the lack of coherent federal action has resulted
in an ad-hoc "dynamic federalism." 52 Think of it as the Wild West meets
political climate science, where sub global regulation runs amok.
53
Alas, the states. States frustrated with the lack of action by the
elected federal branches have turned to other mechanisms to address
climate change.54 Take your pick. State measures include gubernatorial
action,55 legislation, regulation,56 and multistate climate change com-
Vehicle Regulations and Incorporated Test Procedures to Control Greenhouse Gas Emissions:
Support Document, December 21, 2005.
44. Letter from Stephen L. Johnson, Administrator, EPA, to Arnold Schwarzenegger, Gover-
nor, California, denying Section 209(b) waiver preemption (Dec. 19, 2007), available at
http://www.epa.gov/otaq/climate/20071219-slj.pdf.
45. Glicksman, supra note 22, at 201-02.
46. Id.; see also Johnson, supra note 44.
47. Letter from Arnold Schwarzenegger, Governor, California, and 13 Other Governors to
Stephen L. Johnson, Adminstrator, EPA, regarding U.S. EPA's denial of California's tailpipe emis-
sions waiver request (Jan. 23, 2008), available at http://gov.ca.gov/press-release/8596/ ("The federal
government, with this unprecedented action, is ignoring the rights of states, as well as the will of
more than one hundred million people across the U.S.").
48. See California v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, No. 08-70011 (9th Cir. filed Jan. 2, 2008).
49. Fifteen states have joined the suit, on the basis of § 177. Keith Richburg, California Sues
EPA Over Emissions Rules, WASH. POST, Jan. 3, 2008, at A02, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/01/02/AR2008010202833.html.
50. Office of the Governor, Governor Schwarzenegger Announces EPA Suit Filed to Reverse
Waiver Denial, available at http://gov.ca.gov/press-release/8400/ (suit filed in Ninth Circuit on
January 2, 2008); California Sues EPA over Greenhouse Gas Rules, MSNBC, Jan. 2, 2008, available
at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/22474944/ (arguing EPA ignored legal requirements of CAA).
51. California State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards: Notice of Decision Denying
a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for California's 2009 and Subsequent Model Year Green-
house Gas Emission Standards for New Motor Vehicles, 73 Fed. Reg. 12,156 (Mar. 26, 2008).
52. Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental Law,
56 EMORY L.J. 159, 177 (2006).
53. See, e.g., Kirsten H. Engel & Scott R. Saleska, Subglobal Regulation of the Global Com-
mons: The Case of Climate Change, 32 EcOL. L.Q. 183, 194, 196-97 (2005).
54. For discussions of recent state efforts, see Daniel A. Farber, Climate Change, Federalism,
and the Constitution 2-3 (U.C. Berkeley Public Law Research, Paper No. 1081664, 2008), available
at http://ssm.com/abstract-1081664; Alice Kaswan, The Domestic Response to Global Climate
Change: What Role for Federal, State, and Litigation Initiatives?, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 39, 46 (2007).
55. Sarah Krakoff, Essay: Arnold Schwarzenegger and Our Common Future, 53 BUFF. L.
REV. 925, 925 (2005).
56. See Farber, supra note 54, at 3 1. Professor Farber states:
Courts should not be quick to invalidate state climate regulations, whether or not Con-
gress has legislated. It is much more likely that society will be too timid in responding to
climate change than that it will go too far; any fear of over-regulation by states would be
largely misplaced. The courts should consequently content themselves with policing
against the most obvious potential flaws in state legislation.
Id. at4.
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pacts.57 Last, states have looked to federal courts for help, summoning
the federal common law.
C. Role of Federal Common Law
Impatient with the general lack of federal action,58 and concerned
about the effects of climate change, states representing nearly one-half of
the nation's population and individuals have brought a significant
amount of litigation to address climate change.5 9 Aiming for compensa-
tion,60 or pushing technological responses, states, communities and indi-
viduals have turned to the federal common law of public nuisance.61
Public nuisance law involves an "unreasonable interference with a
right common to the general public. 62 Public nuisance cases are gener-
ally brought by public entities, such as states as parens patriae, to protect
state resources and the interests of a state's citizens.
The theory is relatively straightforward. The linchpin of a federal
public nuisance cause of action is establishing that the interference is
"unreasonable" to public health or welfare.63  Causation for public nui-
sance can be collective. Any defendant that plays a substantial role in
57. Kirsten H. Engel, Mitigating Global Climate Change in the United States: A Regional
Approach, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 54, 65 (2005); Memorandum of Understanding on the Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative from the Governors of the States of CT, DE, ME, NH, NJ, NY, and VT
(Dec. 20, 2005), available at http://www.rggi.org/docs/mou-final 12 20_05.pdf (capping GHGs
from, and agreeing to cooperate with carbon markets for, electric utilities).
58. Robert L. Glicksman, From Cooperative to Inoperative Federalism: The Perverse Muta-
tion of Environmental Law and Policy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 719, 778 (2006).
59. See ROBERT MELTZ, CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION: A GROWING PHENOMENON 5, 14,
18, 22 (2007), available at www.ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/05jan/RL32764.pdf; see also
JUSTIN R. PIDOT, GLOBAL WARMING IN THE COURTS: A LITIGATION UPDATE 1 (2006), available at
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/gelpi/current-research/documents/GWL Report.pdf.
60. See Daniel Farber, Basic Compensation for Victims of Climate Change, 155 U. PA. L.
REv. 1605, 1613-14 (2007). In advancing ideas about how to compensate for climate change, Pro-
fessor Farber writes:
My purpose is not to offer a fully matured blueprint for compensation. It is to put some
basic ideas on the table and to suggest that at least part of the compensation issue is rela-
tively manageable. In the end, the decision of whether to compensate will be driven
largely by political decision makers rather than by courts or, even less likely, by scholars.
Whether a large-scale compensation plan will ever be adopted, let alone when such a step
might be taken, remains unclear. Even at this early stage, however, it is useful to imagine
the outlines of a compensation scheme. Doing so may help focus the debate on whether
or not to compensate, and it will provide a useful head start on actual programmatic de-
sign if the decision is ultimately made to provide compensation.
Id. at 1608.
61. See Kaswan, supra note 54, at 52 ("I suggest that the courts remain a vital forum for
addressing climate change, particularly in the absence of comprehensive action by the other branches
of government."). For other potential remedies, see Denise E. Antolini & Clifford L. Rechtschaffen,
Common Law Remedies: A Refresher, 38 ENVTL. L. REP. 10114, 10127 (2008).
62. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1979).
63. See Thomas W. Merrill, Global Warming as a Public Nuisance, 30 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L.
293, 328-30 (2005) (explaining how courts balance equities in public nuisance cases); Matthew F.
Pawa & Benjamin A. Krass, Global Warming as a Public Nuisance: Connecticut v. American
Electric Power, 16 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 407, 448-49 (2005) (discussion of elements of public
nuisance cause of action).
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causing the nuisance can be liable. 64 A plaintiffs ability to demonstrate
causation will depend upon the significance of each defendant's contri-
butions. When the harm is indivisible, liability for public nuisance is
joint and several.65 In the climate context, it is plausible to find that a
defendant is a significant contributor to an unreasonable interference
with a right common to the general public and allocate responsibility for
equitable or legal relief.
66
Federal common law for public nuisance has a long and storied his-
tory of helping to fill the interstitial regulatory gaps left by diluted or
dilatory federal legislative and executive responses. There is thus a rich
history of cases applying federal common law to transboundary pollution
in the face of insufficient federal regulation.67 The more venerated, if not
necessarily household name cases, include Illinois v. City of Milwaukee
68
and Missouri v. Illinois69 (water pollution), New Jersey v. New York7"
(solid waste), and Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.71 (air pollution).
Federal common law holds potential for addressing the effects of
climate change, even if it is "second best" to other legislative and judicial
responses. As Professor Kaswan notes:
[T]he common law provides a legal remedy for a serious injury that
the political branches have failed to provide. Common law actions
could also create political pressure for needed congressional action.
Moreover, the climate change public nuisance cases brought to date
do not pose as great a risk of piecemeal and inconsistent standards as
common law cases sometimes pose. The courts' relative institutional
competence, from both a technical and a political perspective, is a
concern, and one that suggests that a legislative approach would ul-
timately be preferable. Nonetheless, in the absence of a legislative
response, the common law's "second best" is better than nothing.
72
Since the nation's founding the common law has afforded the
means for states and citizens to stop or curtail harmful and insufficiently-
regulated activities and to recover demonstrable personal and property
damages. Hence states and citizens have turned to the federal common
law to address unreasonable effects of cigarettes, weapons, insurance
64. Pawa & Krass, supra note 63, at 450-55 (discussing liability of defendants whose contri-
butions alone would not have created the nuisance).
65. David A. Grossman, Warming up to a Not-So-Radical Idea: Tort-Based Climate Change
Litigation, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 31 (2003).
66. See id. at 27.
67. Joel Franklin Brenner, Nuisance Law and the Industrial Revolution, 3 J. LEGAL STUD.
403,421 (1974).
68. 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
69. 200 U.S. 496 (1906).
70. 284 U.S. 585 (1931).
71. 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
72. Kaswan, supra note 54, at 106.
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fraud and price gouging, as well as for the transboundary effects of air
emissions, water pollution and contamination of land and drinking water.
Federal common law provides a means for addressing the impacts
of climate change in three ways. First, it offers the opportunity to estab-
lish compliance schedules to require the installation of technology that
might be used to reduce emissions of GHGs. Second, it provides a basis
for compensation for personal or property damage.73 Third, it provides a
means for paying the costs of monitoring, protecting, restoring, or pro-
74
viding substitutes for existing resources.
Federal common law is specially suited to remedy the personal and
property parade of climate change horribles. When Congress inevitably
enters the fray and enacts pervasive climate legislation, it is unlikely to
set aside a remedial fund to pay states, cities and citizens who will absorb
the externalized costs of GHG emissions of the auto, industrial and en-
ergy sectors. The tea leaves suggest that when Congress acts it is
unlikely to do so in a fashion that gives states and citizens much latitude
in controlling measures or damages. Rather, it is more likely to install a
"cap and trade" market in which regulated entities are allocated and can
acquire and trade emission credits and perhaps enjoy partial or full im-
munity from private law causes of action, if not liability limits for com-
pensatory or punitive damages. It is also likely that Congress will ex-
plicitly if not implicitly preempt federal common law causes of action for
injunctive relief, and maybe for damages too. It may also preempt state
common law causes of action in the same regard.
There is little doubt that federal common law is hardly the optimal
option for addressing climate change. Climate change is a global issue
with salient national impacts. The elected branches are well suited to
weigh the tough policy choices about energy, conservation, transporta-
tion, and a host of other factors. The states no doubt have a role in im-
plementing climate policy in a grand dance of cooperative federalism.
Yet equally doubtful is the elected branches' capability to provide
the legislative and tactical relief due states and individuals for the ad-
verse effects of climate change. The effects of climate change come with
a price tag, one that is regressive for states and citizens, including those
on the political and economic margins of society. 75 Adverse effects in-
clude ice-melt sea level rise that would inundate the East Coast of the
73. For a discussion of a possible framework for compensating the victims of climate change,
see generally Farber, supra note 54.
74. Id. at 1655.
75. See also Ruth Gordon, Climate Change and the Poorest Nations: Further Reflections on
Global Inequality, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 1559, 1624 (2007); Rebecca Tsosie, Indigenous People and
Environmental Justice: The Impact of Climate Change, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 1625, 1677 (2007).
See generally Alice Kaswan, supra note 54 (providing an overview of the positive and negative
environmental justice implications of a variety of the most significant emerging climate change
policies, including cap and trade).
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U.S., including most of Florida and most urban centers heavily populated
by racial and ethnic minorities.
76
The price tag for climate change is daunting. Massachusetts alone
concludes that climate change will cost its taxpayers $1.8 billion annu-
ally due to increased flooding, loss of shoreline, and water borne dis-
eases. 77 Climate change will also place some states at a competitive dis-
advantage.78 Hence states, their instruments, and individuals are left
wondering why they should be left to pay for climate change.79
Almost as last resort then they have enlisted the federal judiciary to
help fashion relief under the federal common law. These cases naturally
involve a complex intersection of foreign, federal and state law and pol-
icy. They also raise myriad constitutional questions, including whether
the "political question doctrine" prevents federal courts from exercising
jurisdiction over climate cases, as discussed in Part II. This article con-
cludes it does not.
II. THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE
While the Constitution does not admit of a field of "political ques-
tions" beyond the reach of the federal judiciary, the Supreme Court has
concluded that matters that are demonstrably committed to a coordinate
branch of government, or otherwise imprudent for judicial service, are
not justiciable.8°
Chief Justice Marshall's observations serve as the fountainhead of
the doctrine. In Marbury v. Madison,81 he wrote that there are "irksome"
and "delicate" questions that are inherently political and out of reach to
the federal judiciary: "Questions, in their nature political or which are,
by the Constitution and laws, submitted to the executive can never be
made to this court., 82 Thus, he anticipated two strands of cases that en-
gender judicial forbearance, and with them, the framework of the politi-
cal question doctrine: first, those that are constitutionally or statutorily
76. Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 295, 340 (D.
Vt. 2007).
77. See also Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).
78. See Barry G. Rabe, Mikael Romhn & Arthur N. Dobelis, State Competition as a Source
Driving Climate Change Mitigation, 14 N.Y.U. ENVT. L.J. 1, 45 (2005) (state litigation "is a flexible
tool for overcoming regulatory inertia at the federal level").
79. See Daniel A. Farber, Adapting to Climate Change: Who Should Pay?, 23 J. LAND USE &
ENVTL. L. 1, 2-3 (2007). Professor Farber says:
Most importantly, we should start thinking about cost allocation now because very soon
the world is going to start doing so. As the realization sinks in that climate change will
cause billions of dollars of harm even if we do everything feasible to cut back on emis-
sions, the people who are directly harmed are going to start wondering whether they
alone should bear the costs.
Id. at4.
80. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198-204 (1962).
81. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
82. Id. at 169-70.
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committed to the executive branch and second, those that as a matter of
prudence should be avoided because they are political "in their nature."
83
Modem political question jurisprudence inquires as to "whether the
duty asserted can be judicially identified and its breach judicially deter-
mined, and whether protection for the right asserted can be judicially
molded., 84 In deciding whether to apply the doctrine, courts must "ana-
lyze representative cases and . . . infer from them . . . analytical
threads. 85 Such threads expose six "formulations" of cases that are not
suitable for judicial identification, determination or molding:
(1) a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue
to a coordinate political department; or (2) a lack of judicially dis-
coverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or (3) the im-
possibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of the
kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or (4) the impossibility of a
court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack
of the respect due coordinate branches of the government; or (5) an
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision al-
ready made; or (6) the potentiality of embarrassment from multifari-
ous pronouncements by various departments on one question.
86
The formulations are "probably listed in descending order of both
importance and certainty. ' 87 Yet dismissal is warranted only if one ofthese formulations is "inextricable" from the case.88
Baker v. Carr's formulations reveal the two strands of the political
question doctrine. The first strand-which encompasses the first formu-
lation-is textual, and asks whether commitment of the issue to an
elected branch is "[p]rominent on the surface." 89 The second strand-
which includes formulations (2) through (6)-is prudential, and applies
in the absence of a textual commitment but when there are functional
reasons for judicial restraint.
90
The political question doctrine has proven one of "limited applica-
tion."91 Applying the doctrine involves "a delicate exercise in constitu-
tional interpretation" to be conducted on a "case-by-case inquiry. '92 It is
to be used sparingly in the context of demonstrable "political questions"
devoted to the elected branches, not simply to cases that involve political
83. Id. at 170.
84. Baker, 369 U.S. at 198.
85. Id. at 211.
86. Id. at 217.
87. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278 (2004).
88. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See Barasich v. Columbia Gulf Transmission Co., 467 F. Supp. 2d 676, 681 (E.D. La.
2006).
92. Baker, 369 U.S. at 211.
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issues. 93 To be sure, the Court has used the doctrine only a half a dozen
times in more than two centuries. Traditional questions into which
courts "ought not enter the political thicket ' 94 include political appor-
tionment and gerrymandering,9 impeachment, 96 constitutional amend-
ments,97 and treaty abrogation.98
Now to this list add climate change. Somewhat surprisingly, federal
courts have recently extended the doctrine in dismissing federal common
law causes of action by states and citizens to address the effects of cli-
mate change. They have done so under both the textual and prudential
prongs of the doctrine. As discussed in Parts III and IV, this is a wrong
turn for the doctrine.
III. WHY CLIMATE CASES ARE NOT CONSTITUTIONALLY COMMITTED
The first prong of modem political question doctrine inquires as to
whether the issue involves a "textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department."99 It is the
"clearest statement of the six,"' 00 and registers the "dominant considera-
tion in any political question inquiry." 101 This Part explains why climate
cases are not textually committed to a coordinate branch of government.
It begins with explaining the types of issues that are subject to this prong
of the doctrine, before moving on to how some courts have misapplied it
in climate cases.
A. General Application
The Court has held matters "constutitionally committed" when they
are expressly addressed by the Constitution. This includes federal con-
gressional districting, foreign relations, impeachment of federal officers
and constitutional amendments. Congressional districting provides per-
haps the most salient use of this prong of the doctrine. For example, in
Colegrove v. Green,10 2 the plaintiffs argued that Illinois' congressional
districting scheme violated the Republican Guarantee Clause because it
did not apportion voting districts equally, which had the effect of accen-
tuating the influence of rural voting districts and diluting that of urban
districts inhabited predominantly by racial minorities. The Court elected
to remain "aloof," finding apportionment constitutionally committed to
93. Id. at 217.
94. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
95. Id.; Baker, 369 U.S. at 186.
96. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993).
97. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
98. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
99. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
100. Barasich v. Columbia Gulf Transmission Co., 467 F. Supp. 2d 676, 681 (E.D. La. 2006).
101. Id. (quoting Saldano v. O'Connell, 322 F.3d 365, 369 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Nixon, 506
U.S. at 252-53 (Souter, J., concurring))).
102. 328 U.S. 549, 550 (1946).
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the House of Representatives:10 3 "[T]he Constitution has conferred upon
Congress exclusive authority to secure fair representation by the States in
the popular House [of Representatives]."' 1 4 Thus, the Court reasoned
that "[c]ourts ought not to enter this political thicket."'
0 5
Foreign relations, constitutionally committed to the elected
branches, are also subject to the political question doctrine. For example,
the Court has also found that presidential abrogation of existing treaties
falls under the political question doctrine. In Goldwater v. Carter, the
Court in a plurality opinion ruled that the issue of whether the President
could terminate a treaty unilaterally without Senate involvement is non-
justiciable because "it involves the authority of the President in the con-
duct of our country's foreign relations."'' 0 6 The Court reasoned it should
refrain when the dispute is "between coequal branches of our Govern-
ment, each of which has resources available to protect and assert its in-
terests, resources not available to private litigants outside the judicial
forum.'
107
The Court has also concluded that the impeachment process is con-
stitutionally committed to the elected branches. In Nixon v. United
States,10 8 a federal judge challenged his impeachment conviction by the
Senate, claiming that the Constitution afforded him a trial before the full
Senate instead of a committee of the Senate. Former federal judge Wal-
ter Nixon argued that while the Constitution provides an elaborate proc-
ess for impeachment and conviction of federal officers for "Treason,
Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors,"' 9 it is the Senate-
and not a committee of the Senate-that has the "sole Power to try all
Impeachments."
0
The Court declined to engage the issues under the political question
doctrine. It held that impeachment matters are constitutionally commit-
ted to the elected branches: "judicial review would be inconsistent with
the Framers' insistence that our system be one of checks and bal-
ances."' 1 It also found it would be imprudent to impose judicial stan-
dards on the impeachment process: "In addition to the textual commit-
ment argument, we are persuaded that the lack of finality and the diffi-
culty of fashioning relief counsel against justiciability."
' 12
103. Id. at 552-53 ("[T]he petitioners ask of this Court what is beyond its competence to
grant.... [T]his controversy concerns matters that bring courts into immediate and active relations
with party contests. From the determination of such issues this Court has traditionally held aloof.").
104. Id. at 554.
105. Id. at 556.
106. 444 U.S. 996, 1002 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
107. Id. at 1004.
108. 506 U.S. 224, 226 (1993).
109. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
110. Id. art. 1, § 3, cl. 6.
111. Nixon, 506 U.S. at 234-35.
112. ld at 236.
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Finally, the Court has held that questions surrounding the constitu-
tional amendment process are constitutionally committed. In Coleman v.
Miller,113 it ruled that challenges to the duration for holding open pro-
posed amendments to the Constitution raise a non-justicable political
question because the Constitution commits the amendment process to
Congress. 14 It reasoned that judicial involvement in the matter would
upend "[t]he respect due to coequal and independent departments."
'"15
B. Application in Climate Cases
The leading case finding there to be a "textually demonstrable con-
stitutional commitment" of climate change issues to a coordinate politi-
cal department is California v. General Motors Corp.116 In that case, the
State of California brought a federal and state common law causes of
action against General Motors, Toyota, Ford, Honda, DaimlerChrysler,
and Nissan, seeking damages for "past and ongoing contributions to
global warming, a public nuisance."'"1 7 California claimed that the de-
fendants produce more than 20 percent of CO 2 emissions in the United
States, and 30 percent of all CO2 emissions in California."
8  It com-
plained that it has incurred substantial cost as a result of climate changes
due to decreased snowfall and increased erosion, flooding and wild-
fires. 119 It asked that the court assess damages to defray the costs associ-
ated with these effects.
The court found the first prong of the Baker v. Carr test precluded
judicial review. It enlisted Congress' enumerated power over interstate
commerce, and the President and the Senate's complementary roles over
foreign policy as evidence of a constitutional commitment of climate
issues to the elected branches. 120 It observed that the Constitution gives
Congress authority "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."' 21 Thus, it con-
cluded, "concerns raised by the potential ramifications of a judicial deci-
sion on global warming in this case would sufficiently encroach upon
113. 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
114. Id. at 452-55; see also U.S. CONST. art. V.
115. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 214 (1962). For opposing points of view as to how the
political question doctrine applies to the constitutional amendment process, compare Laurence H.
Tribe, A Constitution We Are Amending: In Defense of a Restrained Judicial Role, 97 HARv. L.
REv. 433, 433-36 (1983), with Walter Dellinger, The Legitimacy of Constitutional Change: Re-
thinking the Amendment Process, 97 HARV. L. REv. 386, 387 (1983).
116. No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007); see also U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
117. Second Amended Compl. at 2, California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ,
2007 WL 2726871 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007).
118. Id. 40.
119. Id. 1.
120. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
121. Gen. Motors Corp., 2007 WL 2726871, at *13; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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interstate commerce, to cause the Court to pause before delving into such
areas so constitutionally committed to Congress." 122
Pause it did. The court concluded that the plaintiffs' claims in-
volved areas textually committed to Congress under the Commerce
Clause. It reasoned that a state's control over interstate markets for
automobiles is "subordinate to the federal power over interstate com-
merce."1
23
It also expressed a concern tantamount that under the dormant
Commerce Clause, insofar as states are "constrained by the need to re-
spect the interests of other States."' 124 The court was uncomfortable with
the notion of fashioning a remedy that could implicate commerce in
other states:
[R]ecognizing such a new and unprecedented federal common law
nuisance claim for damages would likely have commerce implica-
tions in other States by potentially exposing automakers, utility com-
panies, and other industries to damages flowing from a new judi-
cially-created tort for doing nothing more than lawfully engaging in
their respective spheres of commerce within those States. 1
25
Next, it held climate issues constitutionally committed to the "for-
eign policy" roles of the coordinate branches because they have
"weighed in" on the issue of climate change. 126 The court maintained
that inaction by the coordinate branches is sufficient to constitute "for-
eign policy determinations regarding the United States' role in the inter-
national concern about global warming.' ' 127 It concluded that congres-
sional inaction signaled a deliberate decision "to refrain from any unilat-
eral commitment to reducing [GHG] emissions domestically unless de-
veloping nations make a reciprocal commitment," and that the President
has reached the same result because, according to EPA, unilateral domes-
tic action "would impede that diplomatic objective.' 128 Thus, the court
concluded, plaintiffs' federal question common law raised a non-
justiciable political question.
29
Another court facing similar issues declined to find any constitu-
tional commitment of climate issues to the coordinate branches. It none-
theless used the second prong of the political question doctrine to dismiss
the lawsuit, as discussed below in Part IV. In Connecticut v. American
122. Gen. Motors Corp., 2007 WL 2726871, at *14.
123. Id. at* 13.
124. Id. (citing Healy v. Beer Institute, 491 U.S. 324 (1989); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1,
194-96 (1824)).
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Electric Power Co., Inc., 130 a collection of states and private conservation
organizations sued the nation's five largest emitters of carbon dioxide
under federal common law and state public nuisance law to redress the
effects of climate change. 31 The states claimed to have brought the suit
for injunctive relief to address, inter alia, "irreparable harm" to the
health, safety and well-being of their 77 million citizens.'32 Plaintiffs
claimed that the power companies' annual emissions of 650 million tons
of carbon dioxide-which constitute roughly "one-quarter of the U.S. []
power sector's [CO 2] emissions" and 10 percent of global emissions by
humans-contribute to global climate change by trapping atmospheric
heat. 133 Accordingly, plaintiffs asked the court to "enjoin[] each of the
Defendants to abate its contribution to the nuisance by capping its emis-
sions of carbon dioxide and then reducing those emissions by a specified
percentage each year for at least a decade."' 34 It also asked that the court
"assess and measure available alternative energy resources," and recon-
cile its relief with U.S. foreign and domestic policy.
135
As criticized in Part IV below, while the court held that the political
question doctrine rendered the case non-justiciable, it did not do so be-
cause it found any constitutional commitment of the issue to the elected
branches. Instead, it applied the prudential prong of the doctrine, finding
it impossible to decide the case without an initial policy determination
from the elected branches. Even though the elected branches lack a co-
gent climate policy, the court reasoned that "deliberate inactions"' 36 is
informed by issues of national security, the environment, and foreign
policy, which counsel non-interference by the judicial branch.
137
C. Criticism of Application ofBaker's Textual Formulation in Climate
Cases
The court's application of the first prong of the political question
doctrine to foreclose review in California v. General Motors Corp. is
incorrect for two reasons.
First, there is no "textual commitment" of climate issues to the
elected branches. Simply, for this prong to apply, the commitment must
be "textual," not inferential. The Constitution must textually address the
matter at hand. It does not. Thus, this prong does not apply. While cli-
130. 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). The defendants are the American Electric Power
Company, the Southern Company, the Tennessee Valley Authority, Xcel Energy and Cinergy Cor-
poration.
131. Id. at 267. The plaintiffs included California, Connecticut, Iowa, New York, New Jersey,
Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin, and the City of New York. Id.
132. Id. at 268.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 270.
135. Id. at 272.
136. Id. at 273.
137. Id. at 274.
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mate cases have political dimensions, it bears repeating Justice Bren-
nan's instruction from Baker v. Carr that "political cases" are not "politi-
cal questions" cordoned off from judicial review.
Second, the precedent that informs use of this prong is inapposite to
climate cases. Unlike the Constitution's specific consignment of con-
gressional districting to Congress under the Guaranty Clause in Cole-
grove, the process for Presidential negotiation and Senate ratification of
treaties under the Treaty Clause in Goldwater v. Carter, the process for
Senate conviction of impeachable offenses under the Impeachment
Clauses in U.S. v. Nixon, and the process for amending the U.S. Constitu-
tion under Article V in Coleman v. Miller, the Constitution does not as-
sign climate issues to either political branch.
To be sure, a federal court applied this reasoning in concluding
there is a lack of a textual constitutional commitment to the coordinate
branches for addressing a related, complex environmental concern with
political dimensions. In Barasich v. Columbia Gulf Transmission Co.,
138
the plaintiffs alleged that defendants' network of nearly 10,000 miles of
petroleum pipelines in south Louisiana so altered the hydrology and
physiology of more than one million acres of marshlands that it deprived
inland communities "of their natural protection from hurricane winds and
accompanying storm surge," thereby exacerbating the adverse affects of
Hurricane Katrina and resulting in personal injury, death, and property
damage. 139 Defendants argued that the political question doctrine de-
prived the court of jurisdiction to hear the claims.
1 40
The court rejected the idea that there might be a commitment of the
claims to the elected branches in the text of the Constitution: "Here, the
defendants do not contend, and the Court does not find, that there is a
textually demonstrable commitment of coastal erosion questions to a
coordinate political department.'
4 1
IV. WHY CLIMATE CASES ARE NOT PRUDENTIALLY COMMITTED
The second prong of the Baker v. Carr formulation inquires as to
whether, in the absence of a constitutional commitment of an issue to an
elected branch, federal courts ought to exercise restraint as a matter of
political comity and prudence. In particular, the second prong holds that
a matter is not justiciable if it engenders (1) a "lack of judicially discov-
erable and manageable standards," (2) an "impossibility of deciding the
case without an initial policy determination of the kind clearly for nonju-
dicial discretion," (3) an impossibility of a court's undertaking independ-
138. 467 F. Supp. 2d 676 (2006).
139. Id. at 679-80.
140. Id. at 680.
141. Id. at 682.
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ent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate
branches of the government," (4) an "unusual need for unquestioning
adherence" to a political decision made by the elected branches, or (5)
"the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements"
by the coordinate branches. 42 Judicial treatment in the climate context
has focused on the first two of these, that is, the existence of standards
and the need for antecedent policy determination by the elected branches.
A. Existence of Judicially Discoverable/Manageable Standards
1. Standard
The lack of constitutionally judicially discoverable and manageable
standards has served to thwart judicial involvement in other contexts in
which neither the Constitution nor the courts have developed standards,
including political gerrymandering, naturalization and military policies.
For example, the Court has held that claims of malapportionment of
state legislative districts are justiciable due to the existence of judicially-
established standards construing the Equal Protection Clause. In the
fountainhead case of Baker v. Carr, voters in Tennessee complained that
the malapportionment of the Tennessee General Assembly violated the
Equal Protection Clause "by virtue of the debasement of their votes.'
143
Even though the Tennessee Constitution allocated representation in the
General Assembly on the basis of population, the assembly had not re-
apportioned its districts since 1901, despite a dramatic population shift
from rural to urban centers amply populated by racial and ethnic minori-
ties. The plaintiffs asked the Court to enjoin further elections until dis-
tricts could be reapportioned "by mathematical application of the Ten-
nessee constitutional formulae" to match U.S. Census figures. 44 Follow-
ing Colegrove, the lower court declined to enter the political thicket.
145
In reversing, the Supreme Court distinguished Colegrove, noting
that the Republican Guarantee Clause applies to apportionment of fed-
eral-not state-legislative districts: "this challenge to an apportionment
presents no nonjusticiable 'political question."",146 That the matter in-
volves a political process is immaterial: "[T]he mere fact that the suit
seeks protection of a political right does not mean it presents a political
question. Such an objection 'is little more than a play upon words."
14 7
In considering the "contours" of the doctrine, the court observed that "it
is the relationship between the judiciary and the coordinate branches of
142. Id. at 680.
143. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 188 (1962).
144. Id. at 195.
145. Id. at 196-97.
146. Id. at 209.
147. Id.
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the Federal Government, and not the federal judiciary's relationship to
the States, which gives rise to the 'political question.""10
48
The Court has held that challenges to disproportionate apportioning
of federal congressional districts under the Guaranty Clause are judi-
cially unmanageable. 49 In Luther v. Borden,150 two competing groups
laid claim to being the rightful government of the State of Rhode Island
following a disputed statewide election. In finding the challenge to the
election results non-justiciable, the Court held that the "Guaranty Clause
is not a repository of judicially manageable standards
.. to identify a State's lawful government.'
15' In Vieth v. Jubelirer,5
a plurality of the Court rejected a claim of political gerrymandering due
to the lack of any "judicially discernible and manageable standards" to
determine what would constitute constitutionally equitable voting dis-
tricts.
Furthermore, lower courts have also relied on the lack of "any" ju-
dicial standards in dismissing cases under the political question doctrine.
Some circuit courts have concluded that state challenges under the Natu-
ralization Clause 153 to federal immigration programs are non-justiciable
due to the lack of standards for assessing the constitutionality of immi-
gration policies.154 Others have held that the lack of judicially discover-
able standards renders challenges to military policies unreviewable, in-
cluding those involving military aid' 55 and action, 5 6 and deployment of
weapons. 157
2. Application in Climate Cases
The court in California v. General Motors Corp. incorrectly in-
voked the first component of the prudential prong of the political ques-
tion to dismisss plaintiffs' federal public nuisance claims, holding that
there is a lack of applicable judicially discoverable or manageable stan-
dards. Plaintiffs argued that a long lineage of federal common law
causes of action in environmental pollution cases well supplied judicially
discoverable standards. 158 The plaintiffs portrayed the case as one of
148. Id at 210.
149. The Guaranty Clause reads: "The United States shall guarantee to every State in this
Union a Republican Form of Government." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
150. 48 U.S. 1 (1849).
151. Baker, 369 U.S. at 223.
152. 541 U.S. 267, 281 (2005).
153. The Clause gives Congress the authority "to establish [a] uniform rule of Naturalization."
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4.
154. See, e.g., Texas v. United States, 106 F.3d 661 (5th Cir. 1997).
155. See, e.g., Crockett v. Reagan, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
156. See, e.g., DaCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146 (2d Cir. 1973).
157. See, e.g., Greenham Women Against Cruise Missiles v. Reagan, 591 F. Supp. 1332
(S.D.N.Y. 1984).
158. California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755, 2007 WL 2726871, at *2 (N.D. Cal.
Sep. 17, 2007).
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"simple nuisance" well suited for traditional principles of tort law.1 59
Thus, plaintiffs contended that courts, rather than legislative bodies, are
better equipped to decide whether defendants' actions constitute an "un-
reasonable interference with a right common to the general public."'
160
Moreover, plaintiffs argued that the court is better equipped to reach the
merits and mete relief than the elected branches. 161
The court was unconvinced. It found inapposite a line of cases dat-
ing back 170 years based on differences in remedy, legal framework and
circumstances. First, the court found the cases inherently distinguishable
because the remedy requested in each was for "equitable remedies to
enjoin or abate the nuisance," and not legal relief.162 Second, it found a
"legal framework" lacking, insofar as the court "is left without guidance
in determining what is an unreasonable contribution to the sum of carbon
dioxide ... or in determining who should bear the costs....,, 63 Third, it
found the prior cases inapplicable "because none of the pollution-as-
public-nuisance cases implicates a comparable number of national and
international policy issues."'164 Fourth, it found the "multiple worldwide
sources of atmospheric warming across myriad industries and multiple
countries" made the prior cases distinguishable. 65 Instead, it determined
that the prior cases "involve primarily issues of local concern involving a
state or public entity seeking equitable relief from a source-certain nui-
sance in a neighboring state."'166 Thus the court concluded that it "is left
without a manageable method of discerning the entities that are creating
and contributing to the alleged nuisance."' 167 Last, it seemed resigned
that the issue of allocating responsibility is simply beyond judicial com-
petence "given the myriad sources of global [GHGs] and the
'[s]ubstantial scientific uncertainties [that] limit [the] ability to... sepa-
rate out those changes resulting from natural variability from those that
are directly the result of increases' in human emissions of GHGs.
168
Central to the court's application of the political question doctrine
in Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co. is that plaintiffs sought
an abatement order to have the court determine how, when and by whom
CO 2 emissions would be reduced. The court felt these tough choices
involving whose ox to gore is best left to the political branches. Left
159. Id.
160. Id. at *8 (quoting In re Oswego Barge Corp., 664 F.2d 327, 332 n.5 (2d Cir. 1981)).
161. Id.






168. Id. at *14 (alteration in original) (quoting Control of Emissions from New Highway
Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 52922-02 (Sept. 8, 2003)).
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open was the extent to which federal courts may calculate monetary
damages attributable to C0 2 emissions in a public nuisance action.
Would the result have been any different had the states in Connecti-
cut v. American Electric Power Co. sought monetary damages instead of
injuctive relief, thereby not raising the same social choice issues that so
concerned the court?
The court in California v. General Motors Corp. 169 answered no. In
General Motors, the State of California asked the court "to create a quo-
tient or standard in order to quantify any potential damages that flow
from Defendants' alleged act of contributing thirty percent of Califor-
nia's carbon dioxide emissions., 170 The court dismissed the action, con-
cluding that the political question doctrine precludes the judicial branch
from determining the representative portion of monetary damages for
which defendants are liable for causing and contributing to global cli-
mate change.
The court determined it could not reach a ruling that is "principled,
rational, and based upon reasoned distinctions.' ' 71 Thus it held judicial
review would be "inconsistent with the Framers' insistence that our sys-
tem be one of checks and balances,"' 172 and because each factor is "inex-
tricable" from plaintiffs' claims, they presented non-justiciable political
questions. 173
3. Criticism of Application of Baker's "Judicial Standards" Formu-
lation to Climate Cases
General Motors' application of the "judicial standards" aspect of
the prudential component of the political question doctrine is incorrect
for two reasons. First, it seems to ignore that two centuries of common
law amply supply judicial standards for deciding whether there is an "un-
reasonable [use or] interference with a right common to the general pub-
lic.' ' 174 As the court noted in Barasich v. Columbia Gulf Transmission
Co.,1 75 that the courts-and not the Constitution or Congress-supply the
standard is immaterial.
Second, whether judicially discoverable and manageable standards
already exist is not dispositive of whether such standards are available.
For example, in Vieth, in which a plurality held that courts cannot fash-
169. Id. at *1.
170. Id. at *8.
171. Id. at * 15 (quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278 (2004)).
172. Id. at *16 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power
Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
173. Id.
174. Id. at *8 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Oswego Barge
Corp., 654 F.2d 327, 333 n.5 (2d Cir. 1981)).
175. 467 F. Supp. 2d 676 (2006).
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ion standards for deciding whether voting districts are unconstitutionally
apportioned, four Justices believed such standards already exist, 176 while
a fifth refused to agree that all future political gerrymandering cases are
nonjusticiable. 177 Thus, even if no court has yet "fashioned" standards
for deciding how to apportion responsibility for climate, this does not
mean that it cannot and should not be done.
B. Need for Initial Policy Determination
1. Standard
Outside the climate context, the case law is devoid of meaningful
juridical application of this formulation from Baker v. Carr.
2. Application in Climate Cases
Some federal courts have declined to hear climate cases, incorrectly
citing the need for an initial policy determination by the elected
branches. For example, in Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co.,
the defendants contended that having the court "resolve an environ-
mental policy question with sweeping implications for the nation's econ-
omy, its foreign relations, and even potentially its national security,...
put[s] the cart before the horse., 178 It maintained that federal courts
should exercise judicial restraint in "resolving questions of high policy,
which are for the political branches.' 79
The court agreed, holding that that plaintiffs' climate claims raised
"non-justiciable" political questions because they require the court to
make "initial policy determinations" best left to the other political
branches of government. 80 The court found itself paralyzed to address
climate claims due to the "the impossibility of deciding without an initial
policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion.''
It distinguished the "typical" air pollution case under federal com-
mon law. These include Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.,182 which
involved balancing between environmental protection and economic
development, factors that drive decisions about the type and timeframe
of pollution control equipment.183 At bottom, the court concluded that
176. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 317 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
177. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
178. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 271.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 272.
181. Id. (quoting Vieth, 541 U.S. at 278).
182. 206 U.S. 230, 239 (1907).
183. See id. at 239; Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 272.
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the case was sufficiently dissimilar from most air pollution cases as to
render it non-justiciable. 1
84
The court in American Electric Power Co. wanted no part of this
hot potato. It found plaintiffs' allegations "extraordinary," and "patently
political.' 8 5 It noted that the "scope and magnitude of the relief Plain-
tiffs seek reveals the transcendently legislative nature of this litiga-
tion."'1 6 It believed the claims would require the court to balance envi-
ronmental, economic, and "other" foreign policy and national security
interests, without direction from the elected coordinate branches of gov-
ernment. 8 7 The court also agreed with defendants that CO 2 reduction
required coordinated domestic and international action.
88
Thus, the court concluded that it was impossible for it to hear the
claims without an "initial policy determination" by the elected branches
"before a non-elected court can properly adjudicate a global warming
nuisance claim.'
189
Curiously, under "elected branches," the court included the EPA,
which it noted "has been grappling with the proper approach to the issue
of global climate change for years."' 90 As "grappling" proof that the
court should refrain from making an "initial policy determination," it
endorsed the following from EPA: 191
It is hard to imagine any issue in the environmental area having
greater "economic and political significance" than regulation of ac-
tivities that might lead to global climate change. The issue of global
climate change . . . has been discussed extensively during the last
three Presidential campaigns; it is the subject of debate and negotia-
tion in several international bodies; and numerous bills have been in-
troduced in Congress over the last 15 years to address the issue. Uni-
lateral [regulation of carbon dioxide emissions in the United States]
could also weaken U.S. efforts to persuade key developing countries
to reduce the [greenhouse gas] intensity of their economies. Un-
avoidably, climate change raises important foreign policy issues, and
it is the President's prerogative to address them. Virtually every sec-
tor of the U.S. economy is either directly or indirectly a source of
[greenhouse gas] emissions, and the countries of the world are in-
volved in scientific, technical, and political-level discussions about
climate change.
184. See Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 272.
185. Id. at 271 n.6.
186. Id. at 272.
187. Id. at 274.
188. Id. at 273.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. (citations omitted).
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The court also interpreted congressional silence as tacit acceptance
that the courts ought not get involved:
The explicit statements of Congress and the Executive on the issue of
global climate change in general and their specific refusal to impose
the limits on carbon dioxide emissions Plaintiffs now seek to impose
by judicial fiat confirm that making the "initial policy determina-
tions" addressing global climate change is an undertaking for the po-
litical branches. 
192
Thus, the court concluded that the m6lange of environmental, eco-
nomic, foreign policy and national security implications of the case "pre-
sent non-justiciable political questions that are consigned to the political
branches, not the Judiciary."'
193
The court in General Motors reached the same result for different
reasons. It believed that the CAA's scheme for regulating emissions,
when fused with other federal schemes concerning fuel efficiency, sug-
gests climate cases require an initial policy determination from the
elected branches.
The court started with emissions. Title II of the Clean Air Amend-
ments Act of 1970 (CAA) required that new "light duty vehicles" (essen-
tially passenger cars 194) reduce hydrocarbon and carbon monoxide emis-
sions, and then nitrogen oxides, by 90 percent within five and six years,
respectively.' 95 After initially objecting strenuously to the imposition of
emission standards, automobile manufacturers were achieving them by
the 1980s, largely due to the installation of advanced catalytic convert-
ers. 196
The EPA has a preeminent role in establishing tailpipe emission
standards. The EPA may establish tailpipe emission standards for addi-
tional pollutants than those mentioned above for "any air pollutant...
which in [its] judgment cause[s], or contribute[s] to air pollution which
may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare."' 
97
Title II does not leave the business of emission standards solely
with EPA. Unlike most environmental laws, the CAA not only allows
states to implement standards and ensure their achievement, but provides
192. Id. at 274.
193. Id.
194. See Natural Res. Def Council v. EPA, 655 F.2d 318, 322 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
195. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676, 1690, 1692 (1970).
196. For a helpful discussion of this period, see Holly Doremus, Constitutive Law and Envi-
ronmental Policy, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 295, 345-46 (2003); see also Whitman v. Am. Trucking
Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 492 (2001) (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting role of catalytic converter technol-
ogy in helping to achieve national air quality standards).
197. 84 Stat. 1676.
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them the capacity to establish standards as well, in a kind of microcosmic
reflection of dual federalism.'
98
Following a statutory scheme that evolved from the advent of the
original Clean Air Act,' 99 the CAA both precludes and invites state tail-
pipe emission standards. Section 209(a) explicitly preempts states from
adopting "any standard relating to the control of emissions from new
motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines. 2 °° Yet section 209(b)
allows California to achieve a "waiver" from federal standards provided
it finds that its own standards "will be, in the aggregate, at least as pro-
tective of public health and welfare as applicable Federal standards," and
that EPA determines that they are (1) not "arbitrary and capricious" con-
sidering feasibility and costs, (2) not inconsistent with federal tailpipe
emission standards under section 202, and (3) that California needs its
own more stringent standards to meet a local "compelling . .. condi-
tion[]. ' ' 0
Other states may adopt their own tailpipe emission standards, so
long as they are identical to California's standards. Section 177 allows
other states to adopt and enforce standards "identical to" any for which
EPA has granted a waiver to California, as long as the standards are
adopted at least two years prior to the applicable model year.202 This
overlapping regulatory scheme is a compromise "between the states,
which wanted to preserve their traditional role in regulating motor vehi-
cles, and the manufacturers, which wanted to avoid the economic disrup-
tion latent in having to meet fifty-one separate sets of emissions control
requirements. ,,203
In 1999 a group of watchdog and public interest groups petitioned
EPA to engage in rulemaking to set emission standards for GHGs under
Title II of the CAA.2°4 EPA denied the petition in 2003, maintaining that
198. This happened incrementally. Congress's initial foray into regulating vehicle emissions,
Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 89-272, 79 Stat. 992 (1965), explicitly recog-
nized the need for, but did little to unseat state primacy concerning motor vehicle licensing and
operation, and did not preempt state efforts respecting emissions. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of
the United States, Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conservation (MVMA 111), 17 F.3d 521, 524-25
(2d Cir. 1994); Motor & Equip. Mfrs. Ass'n, Inc. v. E.P.A. (MEMA 1), 627 F.2d 1095, 1101 (D.C.
Cir. 1979).
199. The Air Quality Act of 1967 set forth the framework for establishing national standards.
Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485 (1967). Yet it also preserved state author-
ity, such as California had already exercised, to establish more stringent standards, provided it could
show a compelling need and that its standards were consistent with the Act. Id at 501.
200. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7543(a) (West 2008).
201. § 7543(b).
202. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7507 (West 2008). Fourteen states have adopted California's emission
limitations. See generally CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, AIR RESOURCES
BOARD, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS: CLIMATE CHANGE EMISSION REDUCTION STANDARDS
FOR VEHICLES (2007), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/factsheets/ccfaq.pdf.
203. MEM1, 627 F.2d at 1109.
204. Petition for Rulemaking and Collateral Relief Seeking the Regulation of Greenhouse Gas
Emission from New Motor Vehicles under Section 202 of the Clean Air Act, Control of Emissions
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the Clean Air Act does not authorize it to regulate emissions to address
global climate change and that it has discretion not to regulate based on
policy considerations, including foreign policy.
20 5
This prompted the State of Massachusetts and a litany of mostly
downwind "blue" states and environmental organizations to challenge
EPA's inaction, contending that it improperly exercised its discretion in
denying petition by several states calling for rulemaking to regulate car-
bon dioxide and three other greenhouse gas emissions-methane, nitrous
oxide, and hydrofluorocarbons-from new motor vehicles under Title II
of the Clean Air Act.206
In Massachusetts v. EPA, °7 the Court disagreed with EPA's bases
for denying the rulemaking petition. The Court decided three issues.
First, that petitioners (namely, Massachusetts) demonstrated standing
under Article III of the U.S. Constitution to challenge EPA's inaction.20 8
The Court held that states enjoy "special solicitude" in demonstrating
standing.0 9 Second, the Court held that greenhouse gas emissions con-
stitute an "air pollutant" under the Clean Air Act's "capacious definition
of 'air pollutant.' 2 '0 Last, it held that EPA "offered no reasoned expla-
nation" and that it was arbitrary and capricious for the agency to refuse
to decide if these emissions "endanger public health or welfare" due to
policy considerations not listed in the Clean Air Act, mainly foreign pol-
icy.211 Justice Scalia thought the Court should have deferred to EPA in
what he said was a "straightforward administrative law case," and that it
had "no business substituting its own desired outcome for the reasoned
judgment of the [EPA]. 212
The court in General Motors then turned to efficiency. Efficiency
standards for automobiles, known as "corporate average fuel economy"
or "CAFE" standards,21 3 are set under the auspices of the Energy Policy
From New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922, 52,922-23 (Sept. 8, 2003), avail-
able at http://www.icta.org/doc/ghgpet2.pdf.
The International Center for Technology Assessment (CTA) is a non-profit, bi-partisan
organization committed to providing the public with full assessments and analyses of
technological impacts on society. CTA is devoted to fully exploring the economic, ethi-
cal, social, environmental and political impacts that can result from the applications of
technology or technological systems.
International Center for Technology Assessment, About Us, http://www.icta.org/aboutlindex.cfm
(last visited Mar. 26, 2008).
205. 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922, 59,933.
206. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1446 (2007),
207. Id. at 1438. For a captivating account of her role in this case, see Lisa Heinzerling, Cli-
mate Change in the Supreme Court, 38 ENvTL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008).
208. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1453.
209. Id. at 1454-55.
210. Id. at 1462 (majority opinion).
211. Id. at 1462-63.
212. Id. at 1478 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
213. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 898 F.2d 165, 167 (D.C. Cir.
1990). See generally Amendment to Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act, Pub. L. No.
94-163, § 301, §§ 501-12, 89 Stat. 901, 901-16 (1975).
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and Conservation Act (EPCA), which Congress enacted in response to
the energy crisis of the 1970s.214 EPCA's aim is to "provide for im-
proved energy efficiency of motor vehicles. 215 When Congress enacted
EPCA in 1975, CAFE standards stood at roughly 14 miles per gallon of
gasoline (mpg). The EPCA required CAFE standards achieve 18 mpg by
1978, and further improve to 27.5 mpg by 1985, roughly doubling fuel
efficiency fleet-wide.216 EPCA authorizes the Secretary of Transporta-
tion, and its designee the National Highway Traffic Safety Administra-
tion (NHTSA),217 to adopt different standards thereafter.218 Section
32902(f) provides that when "deciding maximum feasible average fuel
economy under this section, [NHTSA] shall consider technological fea-
sibility, economic practicability, the effect of other motor vehicle stan-
dards of the Government on fuel economy, and the need of the United
States to conserve energy. 219
The average fuel economy standard for passenger automobiles re-
mains at 27.5 mpg, the standard enacted in 1975 and in place since
model year 1985.220 It was not until 2006 that NHTSA set CAFE stan-
dards for light trucks, which run from 2008 to 20 10.22 1 Basically, the
emission standards for light trucks are 22.5, 23.1 and 23.5 for model
years 2008, 2009 and 2010, respectively. 222 The NHTSA's standards for
light duty trucks are due to expire with the 2010 model year. Unlike the
CAA and emissions, EPCA specifically preempts state fuel efficiency
standards.223
The court in General Motors held that the Clean Air Act's "com-
prehensive state and federal scheme to control air pollution in the United
States," coupled with the Energy Policy and Conservation Act's "com-
prehensive response to the energy crisis of the 1970's," when "read in
conjunction with the prevalence of the international and national debate,
and the resulting policy actions and inactions ... would require an initial
214. Energy Policy and Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 94-163, 89 Stat. 871 (1975); see also
Gen. Motors, 898 F.2d at 167 (discussing EPCA's legislative history).
215. § 2(5), 89 Stat. 871.
216. § 301, § 502(a)(1), 89 Stat. 901; Gen. Motors, 898 F.2d at 167.
217. Delegation to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administrator, 49 C.F.R. § 1.50
(2008).
218. See S. REP. No. 94-516, at 119, 153-54 (1975) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1975
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1956, 1959-60, 1994-95.
219. 49 U.S.C.A. § 32902(f) (West 2008).
220. § 32902(b)(4)(A).
221. Average Fuel Economy Standards for Light Trucks Model Years 2008-2011, 71 Fed. Reg.
17566 (Apr. 6, 2006) (codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 523, 533, and 537).
222. Id. at 17568. "Reformed" standards, which take into account a light truck's wheelbase
and track width, are 22.7, 23.4 and 23.7 mpg for model years 2008, 2009 and 2010, respectively. Id.
at 17624.
223. 49 U.S.C.A. § 32919(a) (West 2008). Section 32919(a) provides that
When an average fuel economy standard prescribed under this chapter is in effect, a State
or a political subdivision of a State may not adopt or enforce a law or regulation related
to fuel economy standards or average fuel economy standards for automobiles covered by
an average fuel economy standard under this chapter.
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policy determination of the type reserved for the political branches of
government., 224  Considering this "legislative landscape," the court
mused that it should not "inject[] itself into the global warming
thicket.
, 225
The court also found support for its holding from the Supreme
Court's standing analysis in Massachusetts v. EPA.226 EPA argued that
Massachusetts lacked standing, given the relatively dissipated effect of
requiring EPA to act-reducing greenhouse gas emissions by less than
five percent annually at best-and the tenuous connection between cli-
mate change and Massachusetts' costs due to shoreline loss and health
care.
227
On behalf of the Court, Justice Stevens upheld Massachusetts'
standing, finding that states enjoy "special solicitude" in the standing
analysis.228 The majority emphasized the fact "[t]hat these climate-
change risks are 'widely shared' does not minimize Massachusetts' in-
terest in the outcome of this litigation,', 229 suggesting a more commodi-
ous interpretation of the "injury in fact" component of constitutional
standing.
In addition, the majority accorded a similarly capacious treatment of
the causation and redressability components of standing. It concluded
that incremental increases in carbon dioxide emissions as a result of the
EPA's failure to regulate fulfilled the causation element, 230 and with re-
spect to redressability, "[a] reduction in domestic emissions would slow
the pace of global emissions increases, no matter what happens else-
where."23'
The majority's "special solicitude" veneer for state standing drew a
rebuke from Chief Justice Roberts, who questioned Stevens' "state so-
licitude" standard as an "implicit concession that petitioners cannot es-




The court in General Motors found support from all comers of the
majority's opinion in Massachusetts v. EPA for its determination that the
lack of initial policy precludes climate cases. First, it decided that the
Supreme Court's reasoning that state plaintiffs are entitled to "special
solicitude" in standing analysis supported its political question analysis:
"[Massachusetts v. EPA] further underscores the conclusion that policy
224. California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 3:06-CV-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871, at *24,
*27, *29 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007).
225. Gen. Motors Corp., 2007 WL 2726871, at *24, *29.
226. 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).
227. Id. at 1453, 1456-57.
228. Id. at 1455.
229. Id. at 1456.
230. Id. at 1457.
231. Id. at 1458.
232. Id. at 1466.
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decisions concerning the authority and standards for carbon dioxide
emissions lie with the political branches of government.2 33 The court
concluded that Massachusetts v. EPA's "special solicitude" for state
standing supports the idea that policymaking about climate ought to be
left to the federally elected branches.234
Next, the court concluded that the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the Clean Air Act in Massachusetts v. EPA shows states have "surren-
dered" federal common law claims to EPA and the federal government,
including policy.
2 35
Finally, it determined that Massachusetts v. EPA does "not sanction
the justiciability of the interstate global warming damages tort claim now
before this Court., 236 Instead, the court construed the Supreme Court's
recognition of California's right to sue EPA for action to be a tacit rejec-
tion of the same state's ability to sue private parties for damages unre-
lated to EPA action.
3. Criticism of Application of Baker's "Initial Policy Determina-
tion" Prong
The courts in American Electric Power and General Motors misap-
plied this prong in at least three respects. First, the most salient criticism
of using this aspect of Baker to avoid the "global warming thicket" is
that it is patently wrong to conclude that the elected branches have yet to
make an initial policy determination.
233. California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 3:06-CV-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871, at *30
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007).
234. Id. at *33-34 (internal citations omitted). The court wrote:
Underpinning the Supreme Court's standing analysis is the concept that the authority to
regulate carbon dioxide lies with the federal government, and more specifically with the
EPA as set forth in the CAA. Also inherent in the Supreme Court's reasoning is the prin-
ciple that any State that is dissatisfied with the federal government's global warming pol-
icy determinations may exercise its "procedural right" to advance its interests through
administrative channels and, if necessary, to "challenge the rejection of its rulemaking
petition as arbitrary and capricious." Thus, such an approach emphasizes that initial pol-
icy determinations are made by the political branches while preserving a framework for
judicial review of those determinations.
Id.
235. Id. at *35-36 (internal citations omitted). The court wrote:
The underpinnings of the Supreme Court's rationale in Massachusetts only reinforce this
Court's conclusion that Plaintiffs current tort claim would require this Court to make the
precise initial carbon dioxide policy determinations that should be made by the political
branches, and to the extent that such determination falls under the CAA, by the EPA.
Because the States have "surrendered" to the federal government their right to engage in
certain forms of regulations and therefore may have standing in certain circumstances to
challenge those regulations, and because new automobile carbon dioxide emissions are
such a regulation expressly left to the federal government, a resolution of this case would
thrust this Court beyond the bounds of justiciability. Plaintiff has failed to offer an ade-
quate explanation of how this Court would possibly endeavor to make the initial policy
determinations that would be both necessary and antecedent to a resolution of this case.
Id.
236. Id. at *36.
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To the contrary, there is direct evidence that the elected branches
have adopted a policy to reduce GHGs. Black's Law Dictionary defines
"policy" to include "[t]he general principles by which a government is
guided in its management of public affairs. 2 37 As evidenced by aver-
ments from the White House,238 the State Department, 3 9 and the EPA, 240
the United States has clearly adopted and currently adheres to a "general
principle" to reduce emissions of GHGs. 24 1 Legislative acquiescence to
this policy is evidenced by the Senate's ratification of the UNFCCC, and
by the numerous enactments to study climate change.24 2 Indeed, in his
dissent in Massachusetts v. EPA, Chief Justice Roberts perhaps put it
best: "[Global warming] is not a problem that has escaped the attention
of policymakers in the Executive and Legislative branches of our Gov-
ernment, who continue to consider regulatory, legislative and treaty-
based means of addressing global climate change. 2 43
Second, allowing states and individuals to pursue federal common
law causes of action is consistent with the policy of reducing GHG emis-
sions. Injuctive and legal relief constitutes not an establishment of initial
policy but instead an implementation of existing policy.
244
Third, deciding whether the "political question doctrine" applies has
little to do with whether the underlying policy issue is "complex," invites
social inefficiency, or is "political" in nature. Most people would agree
that issues of climate change are controversial, complex, and invite ac-
tion by the elected political branches. They might recognize that there
237. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1196 (8th ed. 2004). Furthermore, Black's Law Dictionary
directs the reader to the term "public policy," which means "[b]roadly, principles and standards
regarded by the legislature or by the courts as being fundamental concern to the state and the whole
of society." Id. at 1267.
238. The White House, News & Policy, Policies in Focus, Energy,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/energy/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2008) (addressing U.S. policy in
"confronting climate change" and energy security).
239. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, USA ACTIONS TO ADDRESS, ENERGY SECURITY, CLEAN
DEVELOPMENT AND CLIMATE CHANGE, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/96165.pdf (addressing domestic and international U.S. policy on climate change) (last
visited Mar. 26, 2008).
240. EPA, Council on Environmental Quality, http://www.whitehouse.gov/ceq/global-
change.html#2 (last visited Mar. 26, 2008) (addressing domestic U.S. climate change policy); see
also Control of Emissions From New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922, 52,925
(Sept. 8, 2003). In explaining why it should not regulate automobile emissions, the EPA stated that
President Bush has "established a comprehensive global climate change policy designed to... take
sensible steps in the interim to reduce the risk of global climate change." Id
241. Pawa & Krass, supra note 63, at 461.
242. The fact that the United States does not agree with the proposals made under the Kyoto
Protocol does not inveigh the premise that the Unites States has an overall emissions reduction
policy. Federal policies can be inferred. See Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro Ed Altri-Gestione
Motonave Achille Lauro In Administrazione Straordinaria, 937 F.2d 44, 50 (2d Cir. 1991) ("given
the Executive Branch's repeated condemnation of international terrorism, we believe that any initial
policy that might conceivably be required has already been made.").
243. 127 S. Ct. 1464 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
244. Alice Kaswan, Climate Change and the Courts, 28 No. 5 ANDREWS ENVTL. LITIG. REP.
* 12 (2007). Professor Kaswan explains that our country has a "long tradition of relying on the
courts to make important policy determinations" when courts are faced with common law claims.
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should be more socially efficient means of assigning and allocating CO 2
caps, imposing timelines for the development of pollution control
equipment, and reconciling both with U.S. policy, rather than through
litigation. Furthermore, they might feel that the elected political
branches should take action, and that party politics informs climate
change policy.
Yet acknowledging that climate policy is "political" in nature does
not counsel in favor of using the political question doctrine to subvert
climate cases due to some perceived lack of initial policymaking by the
elected branches. A "political" issue and a "political question" are two
different things. The former allows judicial oversight; the latter suggests
that overriding separation of powers concerns warrant judicial restraint.
Because climate change claims involve public, domestic and foreign
policy and political matters, "it is tempting to jump to the conclusion that
such claims are barred by the political question doctrine., 245 Yet as the
Supreme Court observed when it adopted the modem test for identifying
non-justiciable political questions, "'it is error to suppose that every case
or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cog-
nizance. ' 
24 6
V. GENERAL CRITICISMS OF APPLYING THE POLITICAL QUESTION
DOCTRINE TO CLIMATE CASES
Applying the political question to climate cases warrants additional
criticism surrounding whether the doctrine is constitutionally legitimate,
consistent with the role of the courts, and consonant with regular rejec-
tion of the doctrine in other contexts.
A. Basic Illegitimacy of the Political Question Doctrine
While extensive critical exegesis of the doctrine's origins and justi-
fications is beyond the scope of this article, it is important to appreciate
that it has invited wide criticism. First, the doctrine itself is not tethered
to any language in the Constitution. Inherently a matter of constitutional
theory and interpretation, the political question doctrine seems at war
with the text of the Constitution, which grants federal courts "judicial
authority" to resolve "cases and controversies" without any mention of
limitation as to "political questions., 247 Hence, the political question is a
gloss on judicial authority in a separation of powers rubric; the Constitu-
245. Id. at * 15 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
246. Id. at *15-16 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962)).
247. U.S. CONST. art. 111, § 2, cl. 1.
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tion does not admit of any jurisdictional bar to prevent federal courts
from ruling on "political questions" or the like.248
Second, the doctrine seems to be inconsistent with an originalist's
view of a tripartite constitutional system with coordinate legislative, ex-
ecutive and judicial branches "checking" each other's power.249 To be
sure, 200 years ago in the nation's quintessential "political" case, Chief
Justice John Marshall famously wrote that "[i]t is emphatically the prov-
ince and duty of the [courts] to say what the law is." '250
Third, the doctrine is unnecessary. There is no constitutionally-
founded reason for federal courts to duck controversial issues so as to
protect the legitimacy of the court's decisions: "[T]he federal courts'
legitimacy is quite robust, [] there is no evidence that particular rulings
have any effect on the judiciary's legitimacy, and [] in any event, the
courts' mission should be to uphold the Constitution and not worry about
political capital. 251
Fourth, the doctrine is incongruous with political theory that extols
judicial restraint in the face of action by the elected branches. It instead
"confuses deference with abdication." 252 Thus, despite marking what
most consider is the nation's quintessential "political" case, the Court in
Marbury v. Madison did not evoke the political question doctrine in
reaching the issue of whether Mr. Marbury was entitled to the commis-
sion awarded him by President Adams that James Madison, President
Jefferson's Secretary of State, refused to serve. 3
Fifth, at least applied to stop state action, it seems to work a rent in
the fabric of federalism. States have long turned to federal courts to help
resolve disputes with other states, with industry and with individuals.
The political question doctrine denies states the constitutional access to
federal venues to address matters left unattended by the federal govern-
ment. In such instances, the doctrine seems to starve the states of the
ability to protect the very sovereignty and dignity the Tenth Amendment
"reserved. 254
Sixth, it fails to recognize the public/private law dichotomy in our
political system. Public laws generally cannot and are not intended to
provide rights and remedies for private harm. Likewise, private common
248. See Louis Henkin, Is There a "Political Question " Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597, 624-25
(1976).
249. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 131-32 (As-
pen Law & Business 2d ed. 2002); see also LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
viii (2d ed. 1988) ("The highest mission of the Supreme Court... is not to conserve judicial credi-
bility.").
250. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
251. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 249, at 132.
252. Id.
253. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 146-47.
254. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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law is not foreclosed when the elected branches have failed sufficiently
to provide private redress.
B. Inconsistency with Federal Judicial Functions
The reasoning exhibited in the American Electric Power and Gen-
eral Motors cases seems unduly solicitous of the elected branches. It
leaves little, if any, judicial role in resolving complex tort actions based
on transboundary pollution problems in the absence of action by the
elected branches--even though such circumstances are those in which
judicial involvement is most apropos. The negative manifestations of
this undue deference to the political branches in climate cases are six-
fold.
First, it endorses judicial abdication as a legitimate response to leg-
islative and executive impotency. Responses to climate change invite
responses by "virtually every sector of the U.S. economy," and they are
not limited solely to congressional and executive responses.255 As Pro-
fessor Kaswan notes:
The courts' use of the political-question doctrine not only creates the
threat of a legal vacuum when the political branches are paralyzed, it
also ignores the common law's critical role in the evolution of the
law. As victims respond to serious environmental problems by going
directly to the courts, they create political pressure for more compre-
hensive and appropriate legislative solutions. Historically, the threat
of common law liability gave affected industries an incentive to sup-
port, rather than resist, more comprehensive environmental regula-
tion by the political branches.
25 6
Second, it assumes too much by deciding that inaction in the politi-
257cal branches equates to a policy decision. This reasoning strips the
courts of jurisdiction in all matters in which Congress and the Executive
are at a standstill. On the contrary, lack of action in the elective branches
may just as readily suggest the opposite result, that is, it is for the courts,
and not Congress and the President, to fulfill their traditional interstitial
role of providing common law relief in those instances where statutory or
regulatory relief is not available.
This reasoning also seems inherently inconsistent. While the court
in American Electric Power found inaction in the political branches to be
indicative of a need for initial policy by the elected branches, the court in
General Motors seemed to conclude that inaction suggests that the politi-
255. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
256. Kaswan, Climate Change and the Courts, supra note 244 at * 12 ("The very complexity of
the issues at stake, and the power of the affected interest groups, could hobble political responses for
some time. Courts do not have the luxury of delay.").
257. Id.
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cal branches have already made an initial policy determination to which
the courts should defer: "The political branches' actions and deliberate
inactions in the area of global warming further highlight this case as one
for nonjudicial discretion. 258 Moreover, the court seemed to conclude
that once the elected branches "addressed the issues" of global climate
change-no matter how-the courts are rendered powerless:
An examination of the political branches' consideration of the issues
surrounding global climate change counsels against an initial policy
determination to be made by the courts. As early as 1978, and as re-
cent as the current administration, the elected branches of govern-
ment have addressed the issues of climate change and global warm-
ing.... [R]eductions in carbon dioxide emissions is an issue still un-
der active consideration by those branches of government.
25 9
Third, it reflects a false presumption that a problem that vexes the
other branches is indicative of one in which the court should avoid the
political thicket: "Looking at the past and current actions (and deliberate
inactions) of Congress and the Executive within the United States and
globally in response to the issue of climate change merely reinforces my
opinion that the questions raised . . . are non-judiciable political ques-
tions. 26°
Fourth, it incorrectly assumes that political paralysis in the elected
branches is due deference. Yet courts are not only permitted to adjudi-
cate a dispute involving a matter already subject to public law. On the
contrary, private law causes of action are an important element in our
federal and state adjudicative machinery.
Fifth, reliance on Massachusetts v. EPA to support the doctrine's
application to climate seems dubious at best. If anything, Massachusetts
v. EPA reinforces rather than reduces state authority to address climate
change. For example, rather than interpreting the "special solicitude"
analysis in Massachusetts v. EPA to support climate cases, the court in
General Motors held that it provides "convincing force" in support of
just the opposite.26' Furthermore, rather than reading Massachusetts v.
258. California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 3:06-CV-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871, at *24
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007).
259. Id.
260 Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 273.
261. Gen. Motors Corp., 2007 WL 2726871, at *36-37 (internal citations omitted). The court
observed:
[T]he Supreme Court's analysis on the issue of standing counsels with convincing force
to the contrary. As noted above, a State has standing to pursue its "procedural right"
through administrative channels, and if necessary, to "challenge the rejection of its rule-
making petition as arbitrary and capricious" as did the plaintiffs in Massachusetts.
Unlike the procedural posture of Massachusetts, the current case is not before the Court
by way an administrative challenge to an EPA's decision, but rather as an interstate
global warming damages tort claim. Plaintiff's argument essentially ignores this proce-
dural distinction.
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EPA to suggest that the elected branches have made "initial policy de-
terminations" about global climate change, it reached the opposite re-
sult,262 utterly ignoring the first paragraph of Chief Justice Roberts' dis-
senting opinion.
Last, it improperly concludes that federal courts should steer clear
of factually complex cases involving transboundary pollution. In Ameri-
can Electric Power, for example, the court was unwilling to impose pol-
lution control requirements for what would have been hundreds of coal,
oil and gas fired facilities of various ages and geographic distribution.
Yet this seems to run counter to a rich history of cases in which federal
courts have imposed injunctions in cases involving transboundary pollu-
tion, 263 even those subject to international negotiations and treaties264
described above. This point is especially poignant insofar as the Su-
preme Court found that the tradition of federal courts hearing state com-
mon law causes of action for public nuisance supports its decision that
states are entitled to "special solicitude" for standing purposes. Such
solicitude seems to evaporate, however, when the common law cause is
one in public nuisance for climate change.
C. Inconsistency with Reasoning in Other Contexts
Using the political question doctrine to hinder federal common law
causes of action to address climate change is also inconsistent with ap-
plied jurisprudence in other contexts, particularly involving transbound-
ary pollution for which Congress has not provided equitable or legal re-
lief authority.265 For example, in In Re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether
Products Liability Litigation,266 the plaintiffs brought a public nuisance
claim due to groundwater contamination from Methyl Tertiary Butyl
Ether (MTBE) and Tertiary Butyl Alcohol (TBA). The defendants
claimed the political question doctrine barred the action, based on the
Id.
262. Id. at *37 (internal citations omitted). Here, the court says:
Similarly, the Court finds Plaintiff's attempt to equate this Court's decision on justiciabil-
ity with the EPA's decision on whether to regulate carbon dioxide emissions to be prob-
lematic. The EPA's global warming carbon dioxide policymaking determinations are
statutorily governed by the CAA, and are therefore not analogous the justiciability prin-
ciples which govern the issues now before the Court.
Id.
263. Brenner, supra note 67, at 421.
264. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 273 n.9.
265. See, e.g., McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 502 F.3d 1331, 1364-65 (1lth Cir.
2007) ("As the case appears to be an ordinary tort suit, there is no impossibility of deciding without
an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion.") (internal quotations
omitted); Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro Ed Altri-Gestione Motonave Achille Lauro In Admin-
istrazione Straordinaria, 937 F.2d 44, 49 (2d Cir. 1991) ("The fact that the issues before us arise in a
politically charged context does not convert what is essentially an ordinary tort suit into a non-
justiciable political question.").
266. 438 F. Supp. 2d 291 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
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"'relevant economic, environmental, energy and security interests impli-
cated by plaintiffs' effort to ban MTBE.'
2 7
The court rejected this argument. As with GHGs, it noted that Con-
gress had studied but did not regulate the use of MTBE and TBA. 268 It
drew a distinction between judicial policymaking and judicial review of
cases and controversies: "[d]efendants have blurred the line between a
determination of whether defendants are liable for water pollution...
and a policy determination regarding the composition of the country's
fuel supply.
'" 269
Similarly, in McKay v. United States270 landowners brought a suit
against a nuclear weapons facility. In reversing the lower court's dis-
missal on political question grounds, the Tenth Circuit explained that
"political aspects present in ... the decision to manufacture nuclear
components [does not] rule out all the possible remedies which are avail-
able to people who are physically hurt or materially hurt.",271 Succinctly,
the court concluded, "the political question theory ... [does] not [] pre-
vent individual tort recoveries.,
272
This is especially true for cases, like General Motors, where the
plaintiffs seek money damages. For example, in Koohi v. United
States, 273 the Ninth Circuit determined that the political question doctrine
is not implicated in tort claims where the "plaintiftf] seek[s] only dam-
ages for [its] injuries. '274 Instead of turning the case away under the po-
litical question doctrine, it held that "[d]amage actions are particularly
manageable. 275
All of this suggests that the political question doctrine is not well
suited to disable the use of federal common law causes of action for cli-
mate change.
CONCLUSION
The effects of climate change are disproportionately absorbed by
states, individuals, and discrete, insular minorities and others who are
compromised in the democratic bazaar. Federal common law causes of
action for public nuisance provide a potential means for addressing these
effects. Nonetheless, electing not to "enter the global warming thicket,"
some federal courts have incorrectly invoked the political question doc-
267. Id. at 300 (citation omitted).
268. Id. at 301.
269. Id. at 300; see also Klinghoffer, 937 F.2d at 49 (distinguishing between political assess-
ment of terrorism and allocation of liability).
270. 703 F.2d 464, 465 (10th Cir. 1983).
271. Id.
272. Id. at 470.
273. 976 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir. 1992).
274. Id. at 1332.
275. Id.
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trine in declining to entertain common law causes of action for public
nuisance seeking abatement or damages for the effects of climate change.
This article concludes that these courts have been too quick to embrace
the idea that the doctrine serves as a bar to such actions. There is no
constitutional or prudential justification for relegating climate change
entirely to the political branches. The political question doctrine does
not prevent courts from entering this thicket.





This article explores the challenges facing governments in creating
a market for carbon dioxide (and other greenhouse gases, or GHGs),
offers some suggestions for how that market might best be created and
managed, and suggests how the creation of a carbon market helps us
better understand the role of governments in making sure that markets
reflect more of the true costs of the goods that are exchanged in those
markets than typically occurs. It addresses four questions: (1) How are
Carbon Emissions Market Externalities? (2) How Can Markets Reflect
the True Costs of Carbon Emissions? (3) What Is Required for an Effec-
tive Carbon Cap-and-Trade Program? and (4) How Can Carbon Trading
Help Make Markets Work More Effectively?
I argue that, in an economic system that largely relies on markets, as
the U.S. and global economies do, environmental quality is greatly de-
pendent on our ability to design and carry out public policies that ensure
prices of goods reflect all of the costs, including environmental ones, that
are involved in producing, using, and disposing of goods. Our failure to
ensure that markets work well-that prices accurately reflect true costs-
is at the heart of most environmental problems. Once markets are work-
ing as well as we can make them, there may still be the need for policies
that redistribute or otherwise alter market results, and environmental
justice inquiries will be a central concern, but our primary environmental
law and policy challenge is to figure out how to make markets work bet-
ter.
I. How ARE CARBON EMISSIONS MARKET EXTERNALITIES?
Climate science is extraordinarily complex, permeated by many un-
certainties about the causes, consequences, distribution, and timing of
climate change. One way to try to make some sense of this remarkably
complex issue is to look for conclusions drawn by groups of scientists
who seek to find consensus among experts. Their reports are a much
more helpful guide in developing policy responses than relying on indi-
vidual studies, because the synthesis reports are, in theory at least, based
on studies that have undergone additional peer review and scrutiny.
t Professor, Public Policy Program, Department of Political Science, Brigham Young
University; Ph.D., Cornell University; J.D., Brigham Young University J. Reuben Clark Law
School; gary bryner@byu.edu.
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The most important such scientific consensus-building body is the
United Nations' Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, or IPCC.'
In 1988, the General Assembly of the United Nations asked the World
Meteorological Organization and the UN Environment Programme to
create a panel of scientists to study the risk of anthropogenic climate
change and to provide "balanced, objective policy advice" to govern-
ments of the world to address the threat.2 Three working groups were
established to examine (1) climate science, (2) likely impacts of climate
change, and (3) options for mitigating or reducing the threat. 3 The IPCC
was created in response to this request. Thousands of scientists from
around the world have written reports and thousands more have served as
reviewers. These scientists are nominated by their governments to serve
on IPCC panels. All the scientists have donated their time and none has
been paid for the work completed. The reports are written by a team of
authors who are recognized as leading experts in the field in which they
write and work from peer-reviewed scientific and technical literature.
Reports are themselves subject to broad peer review and produced
through a transparent process that also involves government officials
from countries around the world to agree to the summary language.
Each report includes a "summary for policymakers" to ensure the analy-
sis is relevant to the policy making process. This combination of peer
reviewed science and political efforts to secure broad acceptance of the
major conclusions has allowed the IPCC to bridge the worlds of science
and politics. 5
1. The IPCC was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in October 2007, along with former Vice
President Al Gore, for its work in raising awareness around the world of the threat of climate
change. Press Release, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC Expresses Surprise and
Gratitude at Announcement of Nobel Peace Prize (Oct. 12, 2007), http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/press-
releases/pr- 12october2007.pdf.
2. Id.
3. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 16 YEARS OF SCIENTIFIC
ASSESSMENT IN SUPPORT OF THE CLIMATE CONVENTION 2 (2004), available at
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/lOth-anniversary/anniversary-brochure.pdf [hereinafter IPCC, SCIENTIFIC
ASSESSMENT).
4. Union of Concerned Scientists, The IPCC: Who Are They and Why Do Their Climate
Reports Matter?, http://www.ucsusa.org/global-warming/science/the-ipcc.html (last visited Mar. 28,
2008).
5. Since uncertainty is a key theme in the climate research reviewed by IPCC working
groups, their reports seek to carefully express the amount of evidence available and the degree of
agreement among scientists. The level of agreement is described from low to high, as is the amount
of evidence. The level of confidence seeks to reflect agreement among scientists about the correct-
ness of a model or analysis and the language used is as follows:
Very high confidence at least 9 out of 10 chance of being correct
High confidence about 8 of 10 chance
Medium confidence about 5 of 10 chance
Low confidence about 2 of 10 chance
Very low confidence less than 1 out of 10 chance
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, GUIDANCE NOTES FOR LEAD AUTHORS OF THE
IPCC FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT ON ADDRESSING UNCERTAINTIES 3-4 (2005), available at
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The first IPCC report was submitted to the UN General Assembly in
1990 and led to negotiations that culminated in the 2002 Framework
Convention on Climate Change signed by attendees of the Rio Earth
Summit.6 The report argued that there was a significant likelihood that
human emissions of carbon dioxide and other heat-trapping greenhouse
gas emissions were warming the average temperature of the earth and
that climate-based disruptions are already occurring in different regions
and will become even more disruptive in the future.7  The fourth report
or assessment, like the earlier versions, was the result of a tremendous
amount of scientific effort.8  Working Group I's February 2007 report,
for example, was based on the work of some 600 contributing authors in
40 countries, more than 30,000 comments from external reviewers, and
editing of the summary report for policy makers by representatives from
113 governments. 9 The report concludes that scientific research leads to
a "very high confidence that the global average net effect of human ac-
tivities since 1750 has been one of warming" and that "[w]arming of the
climate system is unequivocal." 10
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/supporting-material/uncertainty-guidance-note.pdf. Likelihood is used to
reflect the probability of a particular outcome having occurred or occurring in the future. The prob-
ability range and corresponding terms used in the reports are as follows:
Virtually certain >99% probability of occurrence
Very likely >90% probability
Likely >66% probability
About as likely as not 33 to 66% probability
Unlikely <33% probability
Very unlikely <10% probability
Exceptionally unlikely <1% probability
These terms are used throughout IPCC reports in italics in order to make as transparent as possible
the judgments made by authors about the scientific research they synthesize and assess. Id.
6. IPCC, SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at 1.
7. Id. at3.
8. Reports issued by the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change are the most im-
portant summary assessments of climate change science. The Fourth Assessment Report, actually
issued in a series of reports throughout 2007 and culminating in a synthesis report in November,
includes work done by three groups: WORKING GROUP 1, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON
CLIMATE CHANGE, THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS (Susan Solomon et al. eds., 2007), available at
http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/ar4-wgl.htm [hereinafter WORKING GROUP I, PHYSICAL SCIENCE
BASIS] (examining the interaction of human and natural factors that contribute to climate change);
WORKING GROUP I1, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, IMPACTS, ADAPTATION,
AND VULNERABILITY (Martin Parry et al. eds., 2007), available at
http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/ar4-wg2.htm (focusing on how climate change affects natural and
human systems, their vulnerability to these changes, and their capacity to adapt); and WORKING
GROUP III, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, MITIGATION (Bert Metz et al. eds.,
2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/ar4-wg3.htm (examining the scientific, techno-
logical, environmental, economic, and social aspects of mitigation, including technologies and
policies that are most likely to reduce the magnitude of change); see also INTERGOVERNMENTAL
PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT (Rajendra K. Pachauri
et al. eds., 2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/ar4-syr.htm [hereinafter IPCC,
SYNTHESIS REPORT].
9. WORKING GROUP I, PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, supra note 8, at v, vii.
10. Id. at 3, 5.
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The November 2007 synthesis report stated that "[o]bservational
evidence from all continents and most oceans," the authors of the report
wrote, "shows that many natural systems are being affected by regional
climate changes, particularly temperature increases."1 Most of the ob-
served increase in globally-averaged temperatures since the mid-
twentieth century is very likely due to the observed increase in anthropo-
genic GHG concentrations.1 2 It is likely there has been significant an-
thropogenic warming over the past fifty years averaged over each conti-
nent (except Antarctica).13 Emissions from humans have very likely con-
tributed to sea level rise, likely contributed to changes in wind patterns
and extra-tropical storm tracks and temperature patterns, increased tem-
peratures of extreme hot nights, cold nights, and cold days, and more
likely than not contributed to the increased risk of heat waves, droughts,
and the frequency of heavy precipitation events. 14 Anthropogenic warm-
ing over the last three decades has likely had a discernible influence at
the global scale on observed changes in many physical and biological
systems.15 These changes are very unlikely to be due to natural variabil-
ity.
16
Particularly significant is the conclusion of the 2007 report that
"discernible human influences now extend to other aspects of climate,
including ocean warming, continental-average temperatures, temperature
extremes and wind patterns" and its emphasis on current evidence con-
cerning the effects of global warming, including rising arctic tempera-
tures, sea level rise, warming of the permafrost, more intense and longer
droughts, an increase in heavy precipitation events, and an increase in
intense tropical cyclone activity. 7 Many climate scientists have con-
cluded that the nature, magnitude, and extent of the impacts of global
warming are so large and threatening and the atmospheric life-time of
GHGs is so long that immediate action is required to begin to reduce
emissions over time, that it is prudent to reduce the risk of climate
change and irrational not to take preventative steps to reduce that risk.
Many scientists believe the IPCC reports issued in 2007 likely understate
the threats, while a few continue to argue that the risks may be over-
stated. The melting of ice at the poles and the collapse of ice sheets, for
example, have occurred much more rapidly than scientists predicted. 8
While there are tremendous uncertainties, the unambiguous trend in the
steady increase in scientific research confirms the seriousness of the
11. IPCC, SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 8, at 2.
12. Id. at5.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 6.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. WORKING GROUP I, PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, supra note 8, at 5-10.
18. Doug Struck, At the Poles, Melting Occurring at Alarming Rate, WASH. POST, Oct. 22,
2007, at A10.
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threat of disruptive climate change. Uncertainties can cut both ways, and
the disruptions caused by growing levels of GHGs may be much greater
than anticipated. Taking actions to reduce the threat, as well as helping
those who must adapt to these disruptive changes, will likely be one of
the most important collective tasks of the 21 st century.
The 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC), to
which most of the countries of the world, including the United States, are
signatories, commits those nations to "stabilization of greenhouse gas
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate system."' 9  There is no
agreement on what concentration level would ensure that the FCCC goal
of preventing "dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate
system" be met, 20 but leading climate scientists argue that, given the evi-
dence that global change is already doing damage, it is not likely that
"any level equivalent to more than a doubling of the pre-industrial CO 2
concentration could plausibly be considered compliant with the conven-
tion.' Much of the scientific debate has centered on the conclusion that
temperature increase should be kept to no more than two degrees Centi-
grade in order to ensure that the impacts of climate change will be rela-
tively modest. An atmospheric CO 2 concentration of 450 parts per mil-
lion (ppm) (current levels are about 425 ppm) would likely be required to
satisfy the FCCC goal.2 2
In order to stabilize the CO 2 concentration at 450 ppm, these scien-
tists have concluded that emissions will need to be cut by 60-80 percent
of 1990 levels by mid-century.23 This goal is fraught with uncertainties
because of feedback mechanisms that are not well understood or difficult
to predict. But if the average temperature increases by more than two
degrees Centigrade, scientists fear the planet would enter into uncharted
waters, where the temperature would be hotter than it has been for hun-
dreds of thousands of years and would create an environment much dif-
ferent than the one in which current life has evolved. The policy chal-
lenge is to regulate markets so that prices are high enough to ensure that
they include the costs of keeping emissions at safe levels.
19. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 2, May 9, 1992, 31 I.L.M.
849 (1994).
20. Id
21. John P. Holdren, The Energy-Climate Challenge: Issues for the New US. Administration,
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II. How CAN MARKETS REFLECT THE TRUE COSTS OF
CARBON EMISsIoNS?
Carbon emissions permeate modem economic life. Very few goods
and services escape the use of electricity produced from fossil fuels or
transportation powered by those fuels. The following figure, based on
the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) inventory of greenhouse
gas emissions, illustrates the broad scope of those emissions. About one-
third comes from the generation of electricity; transportation sources are
responsible for about 28 percent, industrial sources contribute 19 percent,
and agricultural, commercial, and household sources emit the balance.24
The EPA reports emissions in terms of teragrams of CO 2 equivalent; in
2005, total U.S. GHG emissions were 7,260 Tg CO 2, an increase of 16.3
percent since 1990 (one teragram equals 1,000,000,000,000 grams).
Emissions of CO 2 increased by 20.3 percent during those years, while
methane and nitrous oxide emissions fell by 11.5 and 2.8 percent, respec-
tively.26 U.S. emissions were partly offset by carbon sequestration in
biological life such as forests, urban trees, and agricultural soils that off-
set 11.4 percent of the total emissions.27
Figure 128
Key Sources of Direct U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions
by Economic Sector (2005)
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24. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS
EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 1990-2005, at ES-14 (2007), http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/
downloads06/07CR.pdf.
25. Id. at ES-3.
26. Id. at ES-4.
27. Id. at ES-4-6.
28. STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 110TH CONG., CLIMATE CHANGE
LEGISLATION DESIGN WHITE PAPER: SCOPE OF A CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM 7 (2007), available at
http://energycommerce.house.gov/ClimateChange/WhitePaper. 100307.pdf.
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There are a number of ways we might try to reduce carbon emis-
sions and their role in climate change. We could enact laws and imple-
ment policies that ban certain products that release high levels of carbon,
as we did in enacting amendments to the Clean Air Act in 1990 to ban
products that use certain chlorofluorocarbons and threaten the strato-
spheric ozone layer, in response to the Montreal Protocol. 29 We can re-
duce the release of carbon by imposing efficiency standards on sources
of carbon emissions, such as the corporate average fuel efficiency
(CAFt) standards imposed on motor vehicle manufacturers or efficiency
standards for appliances, industrial equipment, lighting, and buildings.3 °
We can subsidize low carbon energy sources such as wind, solar, and
hydropower, and encourage people to use less energy or cleaner forms of
energy through educational campaigns. We can require electricity pro-
ducers to shift to cleaner burning fuels, such as natural gas, and to se-
quester carbon emissions rather than releasing them into the atmosphere.
We can also act to ensure that energy prices include the costs result-
ing from the carbon emissions from energy production and use. This
approach, as well as those listed above, are not mutually exclusive. A
combination of approaches can and will need to be pursued to reduce
carbon emissions. But in an economic system dominated by markets,
and fundamentally organized by markets, it makes a great deal of sense
to focus on correcting those markets so they reflect the true costs of pro-
ducing energy. Economic theory is simple, straightforward, and compel-
ling here, and does not even require a supply and demand chart. Markets
promise to produce decisions about production and consumption that
reflect the interests of consumers and promote the most economically
efficient use of the available resources. If markets reflect all the costs
associated with goods and services, and consumers have perfect informa-
tion about the costs and benefits of alternatives, then markets will be able
to produce the benefits they promise. The task of law and policy is to
ensure that, as much as possible, true cost prices dominate and accurate
information is available, because producers also have an incentive to
maximize their profits by externalizing as many costs as possible.
Well-functioning markets can also appeal to advocates of fairness
and justice in that externalities impose burdens and harms on individuals
who do not benefit from transactions that fail to reflect true costs; in the
case of climate change, for example, they may bear some or many of the
burdens such as disruptive changes to their environment, but they receive
few of the benefits that buyers and sellers enjoy. Residents of island
nations that are threatened by rising sea levels largely do not benefit from
29. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7671 (West 2008); Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the
Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 26 I.L.M. 1541.
30. The most recent energy legislation, enacted by Congress in December, 2007, included all
of these measures as a way to reduce energy consumption and to reduce GHG emissions. Energy
Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, 121 Stat. 1492 (2007).
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the jobs, salaries, air conditioning, heating, transportation, and products
that also produce carbon emissions, or at least do not enjoy the benefits
in proportion to the burdens they face. Reducing those externalities is a
moral imperative as well as an economic one.
The two most widely discussed ways of internalizing the costs of
carbon into markets are carbon taxes and carbon cap-and-trade programs.
Carbon taxes can take a variety of forms, from taxes on fuels, calculated
based on their carbon content, to taxes imposed on those who consume
energy and other goods and services implicated in carbon emissions.
Cap-and-trade programs set a ceiling or cap on total allowable emissions,
allocate allowances or permits to carbon sources that set a cap on their
individual emissions, and then allow the sources to meet their cap by a
combination of reducing their emissions and buying excess allowances
from other sources that have reduced their emissions beyond their cap
and have extra allowances to sell.
Carbon taxes are an attractive policy option to help reduce GHG
emissions, despite the political barriers imposed by the idea of raising
taxes. If they are sufficiently high, carbon taxes can create clear incen-
tives to reduce emissions. Unlike emission standards that, once met,
provide no incentive for further innovations, taxes provide a continuous
reason to find ways to reduce emissions. Taxes can raise revenue that
can finance investments in energy conservation, improved efficiency,
and renewable energy sources. They can help produce more efficient
markets by ensuring that prices include more of the total costs of produc-
ing and using goods and services. Compared to a cap-and-trade policy,
carbon taxes can be relatively simple to explain and easy to design and
implement. The level of the tax can be raised and lowered as needed to
ensure the necessary reductions in emissions are achieved. In sum, car-
bon taxes have significant benefits:
* Simpler to design and implement and easier to understand and ex-
plain;
* Can be put in place more quickly;
" Less likelihood of cheating;
" Predictability in energy prices;
" Can address more sectors of the economy;
* Creates a revenue stream that can be used to reduce other taxes or
fund energy efficiency and renewables or pay for mitigation;
* Easy to adjust up or down if necessary to achieve environmental
and economic goals.
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Cap-and-trade approaches to reducing GHG emissions have some
serious shortcomings. The compliance costs are uncertain and difficult
to plan for in business and government decision making. The design of
the program is complex, involving difficult choices such as at what level
the cap should be set, to whom the allowances allocated under the cap
should be given, whether allowances should be sold or distributed for
free, and how long the allowances should last before they expire. The
implementation of a program is just as daunting, requiring accurate
monitoring and reporting of emissions, enforcement of allowance caps,
and the imposition of sanctions for violations. Once allowances are allo-
cated, they are difficult to retrieve if too many are distributed because
their distribution can create expectations of rights of ownership that are
difficult to reverse. Allocation decisions must be made within a context
of uncertainty, and adjustments are difficult to make. Cap-and-trade
programs have significant benefits as well:
e They do not suffer from the political opposition generated by calls
to raise taxes;
* Cap-and-trade programs like acid rain have been successful in
achieving their goals at lower cost than expected;
" They can be integrated with international cap-and-trade programs;
" Allowances can be auctioned to fund clean energy projects;
" If accurately set, the cap ensures environmental protection goals
are achieved; carbon tax may not achieve that goal;
* The resulting market sets the price of carbon, and channels re-
sources to projects more efficiently.
There are tremendous challenges involved in designing and imple-
menting an effective cap-and-trade program to reduce the threat of cli-
mate change. But if those challenges can be addressed, it is an important
part of the overall effort to reduce the threat of climate change. A cap-
and-trade approach focuses on the key issue of what is required in order
to secure a healthy environment. While it is difficult to know what ex-
actly the cap should be, it focuses attention on the need to make policy
decisions based on the best scientific evidence we have. Contrary to the
argument made by tax advocates that we need policies with fixed eco-
nomic costs and who reject cap-and-trade becauso the costs are uncer-
tain, we need to give priority to trying to determine what is required to
secure a stable climate, rather than setting an arbitrary limit on the
amount of money to be spent on climate stabilization. Cap-and-trade
discussions begin with the right question, even if the answer is not al-
ways clear.
As is true of a carbon tax, a cap-and-trade program seeks to ensure
that markets reflect true costs. A carbon tax that reflects the true cost of
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emitting carbon in producing goods and services would help achieve that
purpose, but it is difficult to know what level of taxation does that. If a
cap is well enough designed so that it will achieve the environmental
goal, it then establishes a market mechanism for determining true costs.
Prices for goods and services containing carbon, for example, if they are
determined in a market shaped by such a carbon cap, will reflect at least
the climate change-related costs. One major problem here, of course, is
that there is not an unambiguous cap for climate change; there is no point
at which we shift from no climate change to climate change, but it is a
matter of degree. But we do have an emerging agreement among climate
scientists, discussed above, that, at least for now, our goal ought to be an
80 percent reduction in GHG levels, from 1990 levels, by 2050, in order
to keep the concentration of GHGs at no more than 450 ppm and the
temperature rise at no more than two degrees Centigrade. 31 Setting the
cap there, then auctioning allowances to all sources so that total emis-
sions do not exceed the cap, allows markets to allocate scarcity in the
most economically efficient manner, and avoids the very difficult politi-
cal challenge of allocating emission allowances. Again, this is an impre-
cise calculation, fraught with difficulties and uncertainties, but it focuses
attention on securing environmental quality and then using markets to
achieve that goal, rather than putting an economic goal first.
Industries typically favor trading programs rather than taxes be-
cause trading programs usually distribute allowances for free. Taxes
represent clearly visible cost increases, and most politicians also shy
away from them. If a carbon tax could be uniformly applied to create a
level playing field, it might be attractive to industries because it would
make their compliance efforts much simpler than a cap-and-trade
scheme. But a carbon tax would reward some industries and fuels, while
penalizing others, and the creation of winners and losers make the poli-
tics of designing a carbon tax very dicey. Both cap-and-trade and carbon
tax policies are difficult to design and implement in the face of powerful
interests' ability to exert political pressure.
III. WHAT IS REQUIRED FOR AN EFFECTIVE CARBON CAP-AND-TRADE
PROGRAM?
Carbon trading programs typically trace their origins to the federal
acid rain program. The Clean Air Act of 1990 established a cap-and-
trade system to reduce acid rain-producing emissions from coal-fired
power plants.32 The heart of the acid rain emissions trading system is the
idea of a cap on total emissions projected, by the year 2010, to result in a
reduction of sulfur dioxide emissions of ten million tons from 1980 lev-
els.33 The targets of the acid rain program are likely to be met, and at a
31. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
32. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-7671q (West 2008).
33. Id. § 7651.
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much lower cost than expected if the cap-and-trade program had not
been developed and implemented. The following figure summarizes the
success of the acid rain program. Research suggests that the problem of
acid deposition is far from solved, and that many lakes, streams, and
forests continue to suffer from the effects of sulfur dioxide emissions.
The problem requires further study but it appears that the cap may have
been too low, or the goal of one cap may not adequately take into ac-
count the variety in the susceptibility of different areas to the effects of
acid rain.34 These problems highlight how critical it is to devise a cap
that will ensure the environmental goal is achieved, and that is no small
task for climate change.
Figure 235
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In the United States, carbon cap-and-trade proposals are being de-
veloped at the regional and national level. The Northeastern states and
Eastern Canadian provinces have formed the Regional Greenhouse Gas
36Initiative (RGGI) that is a cap-and-trade program for power plants.
The Midwest GHG Accord (MW GHG Accord), involving northern
Midwest states, is in its earliest stages.3 7 The Western Climate Initiative
(WCI), also early in its development, is developing a cap-and-trade pro-
gram for Western states and provinces.38 In Congress, the leading carbon
cap-and-trade bill is the Lieberman-Warner bill, passed by the Senate
34. ELLEN BAUM, CLEAN AIR TASK FORCE, UNFINISHED BUSINESS: WHY THE ACID RAIN
PROBLEM IS NOT SOLVED 1 (2001), http://www.catf.us/publications/reports/AcidRainReport.pdf
(explaining that acid rain is still a problem for Atlantic salmon populations in Nova Scotia, lakes in
Canada and New York, streams in Virginia, fish diversity in Northern Pennsylvania, and red spruce
and sugar maples in the Northeast).
35. Environmental Defense Fund, The Cap and Trade Success Story,
http://www.edf.org/page.cfm?tagID=1085 (last visited Mar. 28, 2008).
36. See Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, http://www.rggi.org/ (last visited Mar. 28, 2008).
37. See MIDWESTERN GOVERNORS ASSOCIATION, MIDWESTERN GREENHOUSE GAS ACCORD
(2007), available at http://www.midwestemgovemors.org/resolutions/GHGAccord.pdf.
38. See The Western Climate Initiative, http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org/ (last visited
Mar. 28, 2008).
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Environment & Public Works Committee in December 2007, and await-
ing further action in 2008. 39 Several bills have been introduced in the
House, but had not been reported out by a committee as of February
2008. The leading committee with jurisdiction over the issue is the
House Energy & Commerce Committee. To move the debate forward,
the Committee is issuing a series of white papers; the first paper, issued
in 2007, focuses on the design of a carbon cap-and-trade program.4°
The most developed carbon program is the European Union Emis-
sions Trading System (EU ETS). 41 The EU is made up of 27 member
states. Its powers are more limited than that of the U.S. federal govern-
ment; the EU issues directives and members and member states enact
laws and issue regulations that bind sources within their boundaries.
Phase I of the EU ETS was a pilot phase, from 2005-07;42 in 2008, phase
II began.43 It is a binding program designed to help the EU meet its
GHG reduction target under the Kyoto Protocol, which takes effect from
2008-12.44 The progress so far in developing or implementing these
trading programs provides a number of important lessons to guide a dis-
cussion of what we should focus on in designing an effective carbon
trading program.
Pre-empting States. One key question is whether there should be a
national trading system or whether we should encourage regional pro-
grams. A national system is essential in developing an effort that en-
gages the entire country, but in the absence of a federal program, re-
gional programs provide opportunities to experiment with alternative
approaches. A major problem with regional programs is that they may
reduce emissions within the participating states, but emissions may in-
crease outside of the boundaries. For example, if states agree to limit
production of electricity from conventional coal-fired power plants,
power from such plants might continue to be produced outside the sys-
tem. If the regional program is designed to incorporate all of the states
within an electricity transmission network, this problem of leakage can
be minimized. More broadly, a national carbon trading program can
allow states to continue to experiment, but careful coordination is re-
39. America's Climate Security Act of 2007, S.B. 2191, 110th Cong. § 4(7) (2007), available
at http://lieberman.senate.gov/documents/acsabill.pdf
40. STAFF OF H.R. COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, CLIMATE CHANGE
LEGISLATION DESIGN WHITE PAPER: APPROPRIATE ROLES FOR THE DIFFERENT LEVELS OF
GOVERNMENT (2008), available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/ClimateChange/white%20
paper/o20st-lcl%20roles%20fmal%202-22.pdf.
41. See European Union Emissions Trading System, http://www.euets.com/ (last visited Mar.
28, 2008).
42. Judit Zegnhl, EC Toughens up for Next Phase of Emission Trading, European Union
Emissions Trading System, Oct. 16-22, 2006, available at http://www.euets.con/index.php?
page=news&newsid=42&l = 1.
43. Id.
44. Id; see also Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Convention on Climate Change, Dec.
10, 1977 37 1.L.M. 22 (2007).
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quired to ensure regional systems develop common approaches that can
eventually be integrated.
This is part of a broader question of whether a state carbon program,
to include regulatory standards such as emission limits on motor vehi-
cles, should be preempted by federal legislation. The Senate bill protects
state innovations from federal preemption, while Chairman of the House
Energy & Commerce Committee John Dingell (D-MI) strongly favors
preempting states in order to have one national standard.45 Most industry
groups have lobbied hard for a national standard, but state authority is
critical in allowing states to continue to experiment with alternative ap-
proaches and to promote policy innovation.
Developing Accurate Inventories. Another key issue is the devel-
opment of an accurate inventory in order to determine the allocation of
allowances and selecting a baseline from which reductions are calcu-
lated. On May 8, 2007, more than 30 states signed on as charter mem-
bers of The Climate Registry, a collaboration aimed at developing a
common system for entities to report greenhouse gas emissions.46 Cana-
dian provinces and Native American nations have joined the effort.47
There are a host of important issues involved in fashioning accurate
GHG inventories. For example, the World Business Council for Sustain-
able Development and the World Resources Institute's Greenhouse Gas
Protocol Initiative suggests the following principles to guide GHG ac-
counting and reporting:
* Define boundaries that appropriately reflect the GHG emissions of
the business and the decision-making needs of users.
o Account for all GHG emissions sources and activities within the
chosen organizational and operational boundaries. Any specific ex-
clusions should be stated and justified.
e Allow meaningful comparison of emissions performance over
time. Any changes to the basis of reporting should be clearly stated
to enable continued valid comparison.
9 Address all relevant issues in a factual and coherent manner, based
on a clear audit trail. Important assumptions should be disclosed and
appropriate references made to the calculation methodologies used.
45. STAFF OF H.R. COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, supra note 40, at 25.
46. Press Release, The Climate Registry, Dozens of States Join the Climate Registry to Track
Greenhouse Gas Emissions (May 8, 2007), available at http://www.theclimateregistry.org/
TheClimateRegistryPressRelease.pdf.
47. Id.
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* Exercise due diligence to ensure that GHG calculations have the
precision needed for their intended use, and provide reasonable as-
surance on the integrity of reported GHG information.
48
Another challenge is defining and verifying emissions throughout
the life cycle of a product. Emissions can occur from the processing of
raw materials purchased for manufacturing, as a result of the production
of the electricity used in manufacturing components, and from the trans-
portation, use, and disposal of products, and from other activities. These
complex calculations must be broad and inclusive to ensure emissions
are not excluded. 49  Reporting and monitoring mechanisms need to be
efficiently integrated with requirements under environmental laws in
order to minimize the costs of participating in the program.
Determining the benchmark is also difficult. The generation of
GHG reduction credits is based on the calculation of the level of GHGs
that would have been emitted in the absence of a project. This is a hypo-
thetical figure that is difficult to calculate. There is a strong incentive for
sources and nations to inflate their GHG inventory in order to be in a
position to claim more reduction credits. Governments may be hard
48. WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE, THE GREENHOUSE GAS PROTOCOL: A CORPORATE
ACCOUNTING AND REPORTING STANDARD 7 (2001), http://www.wbcsd.org/web/publications/ghg-
protocol.pdf. A related issue centers on defining the boundaries of a firm's emissions. The World
Resources Institute report suggests that companies use organizational boundaries for determining
GHG emissions responsibility that are consistent with boundaries established for financial reporting.
Id. at 14-15. They recommend that emission inventories include emissions over which companies
have "significant control" and represent direct emissions as well as indirect ones resulting from the
electricity they purchase. Id. at 43. Control is defined as "the ability of a company to direct the
operating policies of another entity/facility. Usually, if the company owns more than 50 percent of
the voting interests, this implies control." Id. at 15. Significant influence is a function of the follow-
ing factors: (1) "the company owns voting interests of between 20 and 50 percent"; (2) "the com-
pany has the power to participate in the entity's/facility's financial and operating policy decisions";
and (3) "the company has a long-term interest in the entity/facility." Id. The reports recommend the
following emissions be reported, as detennined by the specific business and industry context and
based on accepted financial and accounting standards:
* All GHG emissions from those entities/facilities which are defined as being con-
trolled-wholly owned and not wholly owned but controlled;
" The equity share emissions from jointly controlled assets/entities; and
" The equity share of emissions from entities/facilities over which the reporting com-
pany has significant influence but does not control.
Id. at 15-16.
Direct emissions include production of electricity, heat, and steam; physical or chemical process-
ing; transportation of materials, products, waste, and employees; and fugitive emissions. Id. at 21.
Indirect emissions include emissions associated with the generation of imported or purchased elec-
tricity, heat, and steam, and should be reported separately. Id. Other indirect emissions that could
be reported include employee business travel; transportation of products, materials, and waste;
outsourced activities, contract manufacturing, and franchises; emissions from waste generated by the
reporting company that actually occur at other sites not owned by the company, such as methane
from landfills; emissions from the use and end-of-life phases of products and services produced by
the reporting company; employees commuting to and from work; and production of imported mate-
rials. Id.
49. See CHRISTOPHER P. LORETrI ET AL., PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, AN
OVERVIEW OF GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSION VERIFICATION ISSUES 39 (2001),
http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/emissions-verification.pdf
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pressed to be able to calculate accurate baselines. There will be strong
incentives to establish generous baselines and credits. The calculation of
credits requires certifying bodies to be able to ensure that reductions are
permanent and additional. Should projects aimed at reducing local air
pollution be eligible for funding as a source of GHG credits? Should
projects planned for other reasons be part of the baseline? Should gov-
ernments be able to claim credits for reducing subsidies, reforming
prices, deregulating economic sectors, and restructuring energy produc-
tion?
Setting a Cap. Setting the cap on total emissions is a critical deci-
sion. Deciding what GHGs to include is critical here. Most trading pro-
grams just include CO 2; the Senate bill includes all six GHGs.5° One
option is to aim for the goal of an 80 percent reduction by 2050, with
intermediate goals or benchmarks to ensure progress. A number of states
have already set caps, and the size of the caps and deadlines vary greatly,
as shown in the following table:
Table 151
GHG Caps and Dates
Year Cap
2100 75% cut: RI
2050 75-80% cut: CA, CO, CT, FL, MA, ME, MN, NJ, NM, OR NH
& VT, no date
50-60% cut: AZ (by 2040), IL, WA
2035 25% below 1990 levels: WA
2025 back to 1990 levels: FL; back to 2000 levels: VA; 30% cut: MN
2020 back to 2000 levels: AZ; back to 1990 levels: CA, HI, IL, NJ,
WA
10% cut below 1990 levels: MA, ME, NM, NY, OR, RI, VT;
20% cut below 2005: CO
2017 back to 2000 levels: FL
2015 15% cut: MN
2012 back to 2000 levels: NM
2010 back to 2000 levels: CA; back to 1990 levels: CT, MA, ME,
NH, RI, VT
50. America's Climate Security Act of 2007, S.B. 2191, 110th Cong. § 4(15) (2007), avail-
able at http://lieberman.senate.gov/documents/acsabill.pdf.
51. PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 101, STATE ACTIoN 3,7,
available at http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/101_States.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2008).
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Determining Who Is Required to Hold Allowances. RGGI only ap-
plies to fossil-fuel fired electric generating units > 25 megawatts (Mw) of
power.52 The EU ETS regulates downstream installations-those that
actually release emissions. This includes 11,500 large stationary sources
and installations; motor vehicles are not included; airplanes may be
added later.53 The Senate bill covers 87 percent of total emissions; the
House bill focuses on large sources. 54 While there are hundreds of thou-
sands of GHG emitters, most of the emissions come from major sources,
so the regulatory task is not quite as daunting as it might appear, as dem-
onstrated by the following figure.
Figure 355
Large Emitters of CO2 from Fossil Fuel Combustion in Each
Manufacturing Industry
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Allocating Initial Allowances. A major issue is whether allowances
should be auctioned or distributed for free. Auctioning allowances has
52. REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE MODEL RULE at 21 (2007), available at
http://www.rggi.orgidocs/model-rule-corrected-1_5_07.pdf.
53. Peter Zapfel, European Commission, Webinar Regarding the EU Emission Trading
Scheme, available at www.climatechange.utah.gov/docs/Webinar 5.ppt (last visited Mar. 28, 2008).
54. America's Climate Security Act of 2007, S.B. 2191, 110th Cong. §§ 3101, 3201 (2007),
available at http://lieberman.senate.gov/documents/acsabill.pdf.
55. STAFF OF H.R. COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, supra note 40, at 17.
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many advantages. Allowances are allocated through a market mecha-
nism, promoting their efficient allocation. Sources that have reduced
emissions voluntarily are not punished, because they now need to pur-
chase fewer allowances, while those that have put off reductions have to
buy more. The revenues from the auctions can be used to subsidize
emissions-reducing activities, fund research and development, help meet
adaptation costs, and for other relevant purposes. Auctions can raise
prices of high-emitting processes and facilities and encourage reductions.
But auctions are strongly opposed by industries that naturally prefer their
free distribution, and many carbon trading programs anticipate an initial
free distribution, with auctions to come later. RGGI is proposing at least
25 percent of the allowances be allocated for consumer benefit and/or
strategic energy purpose (end use energy efficiency) and 75 percent be
left up to states.56 Under the EU ETS, national allocation plans distribute
allowances; up to five percent were auctioned in phase I; up to 10 per-
cent in phase II.57 The Senate bill gives less than 50 percent of allow-
ances to states for load serving electricity generating entities and farmers
and foresters for sequestering; the balance goes to regulated sources; 15
years into the program, over 70 percent are to be auctioned; the balance
are to be given to states and entities above, and not to specific facilities.58
Determining Whether to Allow Offsets. Offsets are allowances or
credits that regulated entities can purchase by investing in projects that
emit fewer GHGs, such as electricity-generating windmills, or that se-
quester carbon, such as tree plantations. Sources may find it cheaper to
pay for these offset programs than to reduce their emissions. From the
perspective of economic efficiency, for example, trading should be as
broad as possible and be open to as many parties as possible. But trading
also poses the problem of appearing to allow sources to buy credits from
others rather than reducing their emissions. There are also concerns that
trading will allow sources to invest in carbon sequestration projects with
uncertain or only temporary benefits rather than actually reducing their
emissions.
Projects aimed at reducing GHG emissions or increasing carbon
sinks may create incentives for increased emissions/decreased sinks
elsewhere. For example, if some sources shift away from using coal, that
might deflate coal prices and stimulate increased use by others. Carbon
sequestration may be pursued through investments in plantations that
displace farmers and encourage them to move to other areas and cut
down trees for croplands. One of the cheapest ways of generating GHG
credits is to invest in the protection or expansion of carbon sinks, such as
56. RGGI, OVERVIEW OF RGGI 4, http://www.rggi.org/docs/mourggi-overviewl12 20
05.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2008).
57. EU ETS, Auction 2006, The Auction's Legislative Background,
http://www.euets.com/index.php?page=75&l=l (last visited Mar. 28, 2008).
58. §§3101,3201.
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planting trees and no-till cultivation. But this raises numerous problems,
such as how to determine what the baseline is of carbon sequestration
before a project is pursued, so that credits can be accurately calculated.
Under RGGI, offsets are limited to specific kinds of projects, inde-
pendent verification is required, and they can come from other RGGI
states or other states that have signed memoranda of understanding with
RGGI officials.59 Each source may cover up to 3.3 percent of its total
obligation with offsets; if prices reach $7/ton, offsets can satisfy five
percent of total obligations; if they reach $10/ton, offsets can be used for
up to 10 percent of the obligation.60 Offsets under the EU ETS are gov-
emed by the Kyoto Protocol, which requires that offsets are permanent,
verifiable, and additional (beyond business as usual and clearly demon-
strated to be an additional step taken expressly to reduce GHGs).6  No
offsets are allowed for nuclear power or carbon sinks; limited offsets are
available for hydropower, and all offsets must be less than 13.5 percent
of the national cap.62 The Senate bill allows sources to meet up to 15
percent of their cap from offsets; an additional 15 percent can be credits
from foreign markets if EPA-certified; and another 15 percent can be
borrowed from future year caps; the term of loan is 5 years with 10 per-
cent interest.63
The experience under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)
illustrates how emissions trading programs can fail. According to Victor
and Cullenward, about one-third of all CDM pipeline credits have been
generated by controlling trifluoromethane or HFC-23, a byproduct from
manufacturing. 64 In the industrialized nations, plants have installed de-
vices to remove the emissions. However, in the developing countries,
manufacturers have not installed the equipment in order to keep their
emissions high and to position themselves to sell credits to EU sources
looking for ways to offset their emissions. These companies are ex-
pected to make profits of more than $12 billion through 2012.65 If the
wealthy countries would have simply paid for these companies to install
HFC-23 controls, the total cost would only have been $136 million.66
Simply because a market mechanism is in place, there is no guarantee
that it will operate efficiently.67
59. REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATTVE MODEL RULE, supra note 52, at 63.
60. Id.
61. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 44, at Art. 3.
62. Zapfel, supra note 53.
63. America's Climate Security Act of 2007, S.B. 2191, 110th Cong. §§ 2301-2303 (2007),
available at http://lieberman.senate.gov/documents/acsabill.pdf.
64. David G. Victor & Danny Cullenward, Making Carbon Markets Work, ScI. AM., Sept. 24,
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Deciding Whether to Include a Safety Valve. A safety valve is a
mechanism that ensures prices of allowances that sources buy to meet
their obligations do not exceed a certain price. It has been a key issue in
congressional debates as industry groups lobby for limits on the cost of
the program. While it brings some certainty to compliance costs, safety
valves threaten to violate the idea of an environmentally-determined
emissions cap. They may represent a political compromise between the
environmental protection goal and keeping a lid on compliance costs, but
that comes at the price of reducing the efficiency of the market. RGGI
deals with the issue by allowing offsets, as described above. 68 If prices
are > $10/ton, sources can buy international offsets that are regulated
under the Kyoto Protocol. The EU ETS does not include a safety valve.
Ensuring Accurate Monitoring, Compliance, and Enforcement. Ef-
fective enforcement that creates incentives for compliance is critical to
the success of carbon trading. But there are conflicting imperatives to be
balanced. Simple rules, minimal transaction costs, and other factors lead
to maximizing the volume of trading and the consequential benefits,
while effective compliance and enforcement places limits and costs on
the process. Sanctions for noncompliance must be developed. Who
should bear responsibility for non-fulfillment of conditions-the buyer?
the seller? government? It may be possible to devise insurance schemes,
funded by charges imposed on each transaction that can be used to pur-
chase credits to meet shortfalls. The system could include extra credits
to be used for such a purpose. Sanctions for failure to comply with con-
ditions could include a prohibition on future trading and reduction of
subsequent allowances by the number of credits in dispute. Generators
of credits may be required to demonstrate that real reductions have been
produced before trading can occur, as is the case in other commodity
markets, where producers must show that the product is available and
certify its quality. This requires strong political will to sanction parties
that fail to meet their obligations.
Enforcement provisions in existing trading programs vary consid-
erably. The RGGI, for example, is based on a three-year compliance
period. Allowances can be banked for future use, but borrowing from
future years' allowances is prohibited.69 Under the EU ETS, sources
must monitor and report annual emissions by March 31 for the previous
year.70 Emissions are based on calculations for different kinds of fuel.7'
68. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
69. Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Public Review Model Review Draft, 3/23/06, sec.
XX-6.6, available at http://www.rggi.org/docs/publicreview-draft mr.pdf.
70. Council Directive 2003/87/EC 2003 O.J. (L275 25.10.2003) of the European Parliament
and of the Council, Oct. 13, 2003, establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance
trading within the Community and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC (as amended by Council
Directive 2004/1/EC 2004 O.J. (L338 18 13.11.2004)) art. 15.
71. Id. annex IV.
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Self reporting is subject to third party verification.72 Sources must sur-
render allowances by April 30 for the previous year.73 The failure to
surrender allowances results in a fine of 100 euros/allowance and the
source must eventually surrender the allowance. 74 The name of non-
compliant companies is published (the "name and shame" penalty).
75
One of the biggest challenges to carbon trading is bringing develop-
ing countries into the regime. Given the volume of emissions from
China, India, and others, this is absolutely essential. And including the
developing countries in a regulatory program is a prerequisite for support
from members of Congress and others for U.S. involvement in a global
program. But these countries largely lack the kind of effective govern-
mental regulatory infrastructure and capacity that is required for an effec-
tive program. It is hard to envision a global carbon trading program
working until this key challenge is addressed. Otherwise, we run the risk
of leakage-i.e., that emissions might be reduced in one area but simply
increase in another.
IV. MAKING MARKETS WORK
Market forces largely drive the decisions about what goods and ser-
vices are produced, how they are produced and used, and what their envi-
ronmental consequences are. Making markets work better, by ensuring
that prices include more of the true costs of producing and consuming
goods and services, is essential in producing a more ecologically sustain-
able economic system. Because greenhouse gas emissions permeate the
economy, climate policies must be able to reach and reshape virtually all
sectors of the economy. A broadly based cap-and-trade program or a
carbon tax can provide the basic structure for ensuring markets do a bet-
ter job of taking into account the costs of carbon emissions. Generating
support for such an expensive political intervention into markets, one
that will raise prices significantly and will produce significant opposi-
tion, requires a clear understanding of the intersection of public policies
and markets.
Markets are inescapably located in and constrained by the natural
world. Natural resources are exhaustible and natural systems are, over-
all, irreplaceable. Capitalism is entirely dependent on the resources of
the natural world and its ability to process wastes, and only economic
activity that is consistent with ecological conditions and limits is ulti-
mately sustainable. For some, their faith in markets gives no room for
doubt about the viability of a world characterized by profound and grow-
ing inequality made acceptable by the promise of endless economic
72. Id. art. 16.
73. Id. art. 15.
74. Id. art. 16.
75. Id.
[Vol. 85:4
2008] GREENHOUSE GASES AND THE CARBON MARKET 981
growth. Effective governance is required to rescue capitalism from un-
sustainable environmental and economic trends, but part of the problem
with capitalist ideology is its commitment to weakening government, the
very thing on which its future depends.
Discussions of politics and markets often focuses on the differences
between political and market allocation of scarce resources. Politics is
denigrated as irrational, plagued by political calculations, pressures, and
incentives that are aimed at currying favor with powerful industries, in-
sulating and protecting industries rather than forcing them to compete,
and dominated by subsidies and pork barrel spending that are economi-
cally inefficient. Markets, in contrast, are paragons of virtue, designed to
provoke innovation, reduce costs, and expand choices.
Characterizing politics and markets as polar opposites is an attrac-
tive strategy for those who wish to reduce political decision making and
unleash private power, but it fundamentally misstates the nature of mar-
kets. Many markets fail to produce the benefits promised because they
do not work well; their prices do not reflect the true costs of goods and
services, because powerful interests that can externalize costs on third
parties have a strong incentive to do so. Excluding some costs increases
profits and expands market share, while imposing costs on other interests
that are powerless to protect against them, or are so widely disseminated
that there is little incentive to protest.
A more helpful approach looks at the intersection of politics and
markets and their inviolability. Effective markets require strong and
capable institutions to ensure that the benefits promised by markets are
realized, and are not amid the relentless push to maximize profits. Mar-
kets require strong and effective governmental institutions to assign
property rights, monitor emissions, and enforce requirements. Policy
design and implementation are essential in ensuring that carbon markets
produce the benefits they promise. If effective markets can be con-
structed and maintained, they can play a major role in reducing the threat
of climate change. Well-functioning markets are clearly only part of the
prescription. Regulations, subsidies, research, education, and other poli-
cies are also needed. And even if well functioning markets are estab-
lished, additional policies will be required to deal with the distributional
consequences of markets. Policies will need to address the impacts of
climate change and help those who suffer its disruptions adapt. Well-
functioning markets are part, but only part, of the broad set of actions
humankind will likely need to pursue throughout the century as it finds
ways to secure a healthy planet for all forms of life.
CONCLUSION
Carbon trading is only part of an efficient and effective response to
reducing the threat of climate change. Investments in energy and materi-
als efficiency, conservation, pollution prevention, renewable energy, and
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more efficient resource use make sense for economic and environmental
reasons apart from climate change. Because GHGs, once released, may
stay in the atmosphere for a hundred years or longer, immediate, precau-
tionary action is prudent as well as a long term risk reduction strategy.
The longer we wait to reduce the threat of climate change, the larger the
problem grows and the narrower our options become; the sooner we act,
the more options we will have in the future. Carbon trading programs
can produce valuable experience about how market-based systems can
work to find the most cost-effective ways to reduce GHG emissions and
help secure a stable climate.
CARBON MARKETS IN CONTEXT: INTO WHICH




Carbon markets should be analyzed in the context of their potential
as a practical and efficient means of reducing the ecological footprint of
humans on the earth.'
An equation for measuring that ecological footprint was first devel-
oped in the 1970s in the course of a debate between Paul Ehrlich, Barry
Commoner, and John Holdren.2
That equation3 measures the human ecological footprint (I) as the
multiple of total population (P), ecological impact per unit of consump-
tion (U), and consumption per capita (C): I = PUC.
t Professor of Law, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. The author wishes to
acknowledge the research assistance of Kevin Aoun, J.D. Candidate, University of Denver Sturm
College of Law, 2010.
1. See BARRY COMMONER, THE CLOSING CIRCLE: NATURE, MAN AND TECHNOLOGY 291
(Alfred A. Knopf ed., 1971); PAUL R. EHRLICH, THE POPULATION BOMB (19th prtg., 1970) (Paul R.
Ehrlich is a Bing Professor of Population Studies in the Department of Biologic Sciences at Stanford
University.); ROBERT M. HARDAWAY, POPULATION, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 17 (1994)
(citing DANIEL D. CHIRAS, ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE: ACTION FOR A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE 5
(1991)); Paul R. Ehrlich, Human Natures, Nature Conservation, and Environmental Ethics, 52
BIOSCIENCE 1, Jan., 2002, (Magazine), at 31; Paul R. Ehrlich & John P. Holdren, Impact of Popula-
tion Growth, 171 SCIENCE 3977, Mar. 26, 1971, (Magazine), at 1212-17; Paul R. Ehrlich & John P.
Holdren, Population and Panaceas: A Technological Perspective, 19 BIOSCIENCE 12, Dec., 1967,
(Magazine), at 1065; David Harrison, Jr., & Daniel Radov, Clean Air: Law, Policy and Practice,
SN038 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 201 (2007) (discussing emissions trading for air quality and climate change in
the United States and Europe); John P. Holdren, Population and the Energy Problem, 12
POPULATION & ENV'T 3, 231 (1991) (John P. Holdren is Professor of Environmental Science and
Public Policy at Harvard University.); Frederick A.B. Meyerson, Commentary, Population, Carbon
Emissions, and Global Warming: The Forgotten Relationship at Kyoto, 24 POPULATION & DEV.
REV. 115, 115-30 (1998).
2. See Holdren, Population and the Energy Problem, supra note 1, at 242-49.
3. Holdren's original equation used the letter "A" to represent consumption per capita, and
"T" to represent impact per unit of consumption, rendering I = PAT. See id. at 242-43; see also
COMMONER, supra note 1; PAUL R. EHRLICH & ANNE H. EHRLICH, THE POPULATION EXPLOSION 58
(1990) (Anne Ehrlich is a Senior Research Associate in Biologic Sciences at Stanford University);
INSTITUT NATION, CONSEQUENCES OF RAPID POPULATION GROWTH IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
161-90 (1991) (discussing Barry Commoner, Rapid Population Growth and Environmental Stress);
Thomas Dietz & Eugene A. Rosa, Effects of Population and Affluence on C0 2 Emissions, 94 PROC.
NAT'L ACAD. SCI. U.S.A. 1, 175 (1997) (Thomas Dietz is a Professor in the Department of Sociol-
ogy and Anthropology at George Mason University; Eugene A. Rosa is a Professor in the Depart-
ment of Sociology at Washington State University.); Paul R. Ehrlich & Anne H. Ehrlich, The Popu-
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I. THE "U" FACTOR
Environmental policy and spending to date has placed the greatest
emphasis on the "U" component, spending billions globally to reduce the
pollution generated by individual units of consumption. For example,
catalytic converters have been mandated for cars in the U.S. and scrub-
bers mandated for factory or power industry smokestacks. That this em-
phasis may be have been misdirected was first recognized by former
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) director Lee Thomas, who ob-
served that much of such environmental policy, to a significant degree,
has merely transferred pollution in "one medium [such as the air] to an-
other [such as soil or water] .... At best it is misleading-we think we
are solving a problem and we aren't. At worst, it is perverse-it in-
creases [rather than reduces] pollution."4
An example of the latter is the catalytic converter which, while re-
ducing hydrocarbon emissions by a modest 12 percent, increased noxious
oxide emissions by 28 percent.5
Hopes for an escape from this "circle game" have been generated by
calls for use of "alternative energy sources" to reduce the pollution gen-
erated by each unit of production-thus the call for use of electric cars,
bio-fuels, and solar or wind-generated power. Only recently have such
agendas been called into question, as bio-fuels have been shown to re-
quire high levels of energy input in proportion to output (and thereby
putting a strain on world food supplies); 6 electric cars have been shown
to rely upon electricity produced either by carbon-emitting power plants,
or worse, nuclear power; 7 solar farms have been attacked for ravaging
the landscape8 and windmills assailed as "Cuisinarts for birds"9 and
4. HARDAWAY, supra note 1, at 43.
5. Id. at 162.
6. See Jacqueline Lang Weaver, The Traditional Petroleum Based Economy: An "Eventful"
Future, 36 CuMB. L. REV. 505, 578-79 (2005/2006) (Jacqueline Lang Weaver is an A.A. White
Professor of Law at the University of Houston Law Center.); see also Paul R. Ehrlich, Anne H.
Ehrlich, & Gretchen C. Daily, Food Security, Population and Environment, 19 POPULATION & DEV.
REV. 1, 7-18 (1993); Mario Giampiertro, Sergio Ulgati, & David Pimentel, Feasibility of Large-
Scale Biofuel Production, 47 BIOSCIENCE 9, Oct., 1997, (Magazine), at 587-96; John Manual, Battle
of the Biofuels, 115 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPECTIVES 2, A93-A95 (2007); David Tilman, Jason Hill, &
Clarence Lehman, Carbon-Negative Biofuels from Low-Input High-Diversity Grassland Biomass,
314 SCIENCE 1598, Dec., 2006, (Magazine), at 1598-1600 (David Tilman, Jason Hill and Clarence
Lehman are all Professors in the Department of Ecology, Evolution and Behavior at the University
of Minnesota. Jason Hill is also a Professor in the Department of Applied Economics at the Univer-
sity of Minnesota).
7. See Taly L. Jolish, Negotiating the Smog Away, 18 VA. ENvTL. L.J. 305, 330 (1999); see
also Lester B. Lave, Chris T. Hendrickson, & Francis Clay McMichael, Environmental Implication
of Electric Cars, 268 SCIENCE 5213, May, 1995, (Magazine), at 993-95 (Lester B. Lave is a Higgins
Professor of Economics and Industrial Administration; Chris Hendrickson is a Professor and Associ-
ate Dean of Engineering; and Francis McMichael is a Blenko Professor of Environmental Engineer-
ing at Carnegie Melon University).
8. Avi Brisman, The Aesthetics of Wind Energy Systems, 13 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 6-8
(2005); see also PETER HARPER, Why I Hate Wind Farms and Think There Should Be More of Them,
in ENERGY ALTERNATIVES 106, 107 (Helen Cothran ed., Greenhaven Press 2002); Stephen G. Bell,
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worse than the ravages of strip mining, "Salvador Dali's worst night-
mare";10 geothermal schemes have been attacked as raising the risks of
catastrophic earthquakes;" and clean water power produced by dams has
been decried as threatening delicate and fragile ecosystems.'
2
A dramatic example of the latter was the case of Tennessee Valley
Authority v. Hill,'3 in which the Supreme Court upheld the shutting down
of the virtually completed Tellico Dam and Reservoir Project, which
would have provided a clean energy alternative to coal-burning and nu-
clear plants and improved economic conditions for impoverished resi-
dents of the area surrounding the dam. Despite the fact that over 100
million dollars had already been expended on this attempt to find an "al-
ternative energy source," the Court shut down the dam on grounds that
the dam would have threatened one of 130 known species of "snail
darter" 4-this during a period of human history in which the unchecked
expansion of the human race is causing the extinction of an entire living
species every day and the extinction of one vertebrate species every nine
months.15
While no one would discourage the continuing quest for alternative
energy sources, it is becoming increasingly clear that the notion that any
such source is ever going to permit the pollution-free but exponential
expansion of the human race is largely illusory.
In any case, even if miraculous new technological developments
were to permit a significant reduction in the pollution emitted by indi-
vidual units of consumption, the exponential expansion of the number of
units to accommodate an ever-expanding human race more than offsets
Comment, The Way the Winds are Blowing These Days: The Rapid Growth of Wind Energy and
Legal Hurdles of North Carolina's General Statutes, 8 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 117, 125 (2006).
9. Brisman, supra note 8, at 70; Morgan Winn Tingley, Effects of Offshore Wind Farms on
Birds: Cuisinarts of the Sky or Just Tilting at Windmills? 54 (March 2003) (unpublished B.A.
thesis, Harvard University); see also HARPER, supra note 8, at 107.
10. See Maria Goodavage, Battling Safe Windmills: Bird Deaths in Turbines Spur Outcry,
USA TODAY, May 27, 1993, at 3A.
11. Darlene A. Cypser & Scott D. Davis, Liability for Induced Earthquakes, 9 J. ENVTL. L. &
LITIG. 551, 557-58 (1994) (Cypser is a private practitioner in Boulder, CO; Davis is a geophysicist
with the U.S. Geological Survey at the Center for Earthquake Research and Information.).
12. N. Leroy Poff, J. David Allan, Mark B. Bain, James R. Karr, Karen L. Prestegaard, Brian
D. Richter, Richard E. Sparks & Julie C. Stromberg, The Natural Flow Regime, 47 BIOSCIENCE 769,
769 (1997) (Leroy Poff is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Biology at Colorado State
University; David Allan is a Professor at the School of Natural Resources & Environment at the
University of Michigan; Mark Bain is a Professor in the Department of Natural Resources at Cornell
University; James Karr is a Professor in the Departments of Fisheries and Zoology at the University
of Washington; Karen Prestegaard is an Associate Professor in the Department of Geology at the
University of Maryland; Brian Richter is national hydrologist at the Nature Conservancy in Hayden,
Colorado; Richard Sparks is the Director of the River Research Laboratories at the Illinois Natural
History Survey; Julie Stromberg is an Associate Professor in the Department of Plant Biology at
Arizona State University).
13. 437 U.S. 153, 172 (1978).
14. Id. at 171-72.
15. CHIRAS, supra note 1, at 5.
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any reduction in pollution per unit. Thus, even if the pollutant emissions
of automobiles could be reduced by 10 percent, the production of mil-
lions of additional automobiles to serve the needs of China and India
alone would more than offset the reduction in emissions from individual
automobiles far into the foreseeable future.
16
In short, environmental efforts directed primarily toward reducing
the pollution emitted by individual units must inexorably lead to the tak-
ing of one step forward and three steps backward in the quest for reduc-
ing mankind's ecological footprint on the earth.
II. THE "C" FACTOR
There is a growing political pop-trend toward placing significant
environmental hopes on reducing the "C" component of Holdren's equa-
tion by urging or mandating the reduction of consumption per capita.'
7
In fact, however, the notion of reducing consumption per capita is
not a new idea. Indeed it was tried-though involuntarily-in the 1930s
all around the world. It was called the Great Depression, and most peo-
ple did not like it.' 8 The resurrection of this idea, first popularized by Al
Gore in his book Earth in the Balance, comes at an unfortunate time
when millions of people in the Third World and developing countries are
striving to emerge from poverty and achieve a better life. Proponents of
pursuing the "C" agenda are especially horrified at the prospect that mil-
lions of consumers in China and India may soon be driving cars and liv-
ing a lifestyle previously enjoyed in the developed world. Indeed, when
it was reported in early 2008 that an automobile manufacturer in India
planned to produce a four passenger car listing for $2,500 that would
make cars available to millions of people around the world who could
not previously afford it, the New York Times ran an editorial decrying
the environmental impact of so many former poor people driving cars.'
9
Other environmentalists pushing the "C" agenda attempt to avoid
the perception of such cynical elitism by asserting that the burden of re-
ducing consumption should fall primarily on the "rich" in the developed
16. World Business Briefing Asia: India: Honda to Expand Car Output, N.Y. TIMES, July 4,
2006, at C6 (noting that Honda plans to double its national output); Michelle Maynard & James
Brooke, Toyota Closes in on G.M; Signs Point Toward Japanese Maker Being the Top Seller Soon,
N.Y. TIMES, December 21, 2005, at Cl. GM plans to increase its production in China by 15-20
percent making China GM's second biggest market behind the United States. Brooke, supra note
16, at C2.
17. AL GORE, EARTH IN THE BALANCE: ECOLOGY AND THE HUMAN SPIRIT (1992); Michael
P. Vandenberg & Anne C. Steinemann, The Carbon Neutral Individual, 82 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1673,
1702 (2007) (Michael Vandenberg is a Law Professor and Co-Director of the Regulatory Program at
the Vanderbilt Center for the Study of Religion and Culture; Anne Steinemann is a Professor of Civil
and Environmental engineering and Public Affairs at the University of Washington). Meyerson,
supra note 1, at 115-30.
18. See generally MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA JACOBSON SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, 1867-1960 299-419 (1963).
19. Editorial, The Other Nano, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2008, at A22.
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nations rather than on those hoping to emerge from poverty in the devel-
oping nations, apparently in the hopes that critics of such an agenda
would not recognize that for every high consuming westerner there are
thousands of poverty-stricken humans striving for a better life in the de-
veloping nations. Such cynicism was only exacerbated when Al Gore,
taken to task for traveling by private jet and heating his palatial 10,000
square foot homes at the same time as he was urging lesser mortals to
"cut their consumption," responded by claiming that he had "purchased"
on the carbon market the right to pollute and spew excess carbon into the
atmosphere.2 0
Perhaps most illustrative of this agenda is the goal set by the Inter-
national Panel on Climate Change, which proposed a ceiling of 2.8 bil-
lion tons of carbon in the atmosphere.2 ' Under this ceiling, each human
on earth would be allotted an average of .53 tons of carbon a year, or
about the same level as "Burkina Faso, the 13th poorest country in the
world.
' 22
In short, directing environmental policy toward the "C" factor is
neither practical, nor humane. In the mid-1980s, Romanian dictator
Ceausescu could simply order that the heat be cut off all across the coun-
try in the middle of winter in order to "reduce consumption., 23 But the
notion that such mandatory reductions in consumption are practical in
any society which values human dignity and respects the dreams of the
teeming millions in the developing world for a better life is as illusory as
the quest for environmental salvation in the "U" factor of Holdren's
equation.
III. THE "P" FACTOR
The sole remaining factor in the Holdren equation is population.
However, so seductive have been the political appeals of those whose
agenda rests on emphasizing the "U" and "C" components of Holdren's
equation, that very few of the "10,000 hopelessly decentralized (envi-
ronmental) groups competing for funds' 24 even recognize the "P" factor
20. Press Release, Tennessee Center for Policy Research, Al Gore's Personal Energy Use Is
His Own Inconvenient Truth: Gore's Home Uses More than 20 Times the National Average (Feb.
26, 2007), available at http://www.tennesseepolicy.org/main/article.php?article id=367;
CBSNews.com, Gore Defends Mansion's Power Consumption, Feb. 28, 2007,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/02/28/politics/main2522844.shtml; Peter Schweizer, Gore
Isn't Quite as Green as He's Led the World to Believe, USA TODAY, Dec. 12, 2006, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/editorials/2006-08-09-gore-greenx.htm.
21. See HARDAWAY, supra note 1, at 163.
22. Id. (citation omitted).
23. Avner Ben-Ner & J. Michael Montias, The Introduction of Markets in a Hypercentralized
Economy: The Case of Romania, 5(4) J. OF ECON. PERSP. 163, 164-65 (1991) (Avner Ben-Ner is a
Professor of Industrial Relation at the University of Minnesota; Michael Montias is a Professor of
Economics at Yale University); Ronald H. Linden, Socialist Patrimonialism and the Global Econ-
omy: The Case of Romania, 40(2) INT'L ORG. 347, 352, 362, 366 (1986).
24. Robert M. Hardaway, Environmental Malthusianism: Integrating Population and Envi-
ronmental Policy, 27 ENVTL. L. 1209, 1217 (1997) (citation omitted).
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
as fundamental to any realistic plan for reducing mankind's ecological
footprint on the earth. Government too has neglected the "P" compo-
nent, preferring to spend billions on the more politically acceptable,
though largely futile, "C" and "U" agendas.
For both government and private environmental groups, the reason
for avoiding the "P" agenda may be the same. Environmental groups
find it far easier to raise funds by distributing lavish color brochures
showing heart-rending pictures of bludgeoned baby seals than by raising
sensitive population-related issues such as family planning, abortion, or
illegal immigration. For many of these 10,000 environmental groups,
ranging from the Xerces society, which promotes the preservation of
snails and slugs, to the National Campaign to Stop Radiation Exposed
Food, the top priority has become self-perpetuation of themselves as
active entities. As environmentalist Tom Wolf has observed:
The environmental organizations courted disaster when they "suc-
ceeded" American style. When they got too big, too rich and too re-
mote from the environmental effects of their actions. Most of all
when we abandoned moral appeal for fund-raising appeals, when we
substituted holy war against the infidel for the sweet science of sway-
ing souls. Like our competitors in organized religion, especially the
televangelists, we enviros lost our credibility when we bought into
the junk mail business. When the salvation we offered lost out to our
insatiable need for money. Poverty, chastity and obedience wilted
before the prospect of empire and power, "careers" in the institution-
alized environmental movement.
25
Meanwhile, every one third of a second (about the speed a machine
gun flies its bullets) the planet makes room to accommodate one addi-
tional human being. To accommodate each additional human, 2,000
cubic meters of scarce fresh water must be drawn every year and 207
gigajoules of energy produced.26 To accommodate these new humans,
100 acres of rainforest are destroyed every minute and one entire species
sacrificed every day.27 Each new human's waste products include his
share of 270,000 metric tons of methane dumped annually into the
world's oceans, and 30,000 metric tons of sulfur and 80,000 metric tons
of carbon monoxide released into the atmosphere. 8 When he dies, his
epitaph is written on a monument of waste and garbage 4,000 times his
body weight.29
It has been estimated that simply making voluntary family planning
programs available to every woman in the world would stabilize both the
25. Tom Wolf, The Rise and Fall of the Environmental Movement, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 24 1991,
at M6 (ellipses indicating deletions are omitted).
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population and the ecological footprint of mankind 3° -without imple-
menting mandatory controls of the kind implemented in China and India.
However, cultural, religious, and legal obstacles worldwide continue to
31inhibit the implementation of such programs.
In countries where religious or cultural concerns constrain making
family planning programs available, governments decline to take on such
challenges and instead take the course of least resistance by exporting the
excess humans for whom they cannot provide-a course of action made
possible only by the refusal of the human-importing countries such as the
U.S. to enforce their own immigration laws.3 1
Despite evidence that countries that lack family planning services
have the highest abortion rates,33 while countries permitting abortion on
demand but making family planning services available to all (such as
Holland) have the lowest abortion rates, 34 many countries around the
world persist in criminalizing abortion and denying family planning ser-
vices to the poor. Even in the U.S., laws forbid granting funds to poor
mothers to have abortions or to plan their families.35
Despite so much opportunity for moderating the ecological footprint
of mankind on the earth by addressing the "P"' factor in Holdren's equa-
tion, few environmental groups are willing to give up the junk mail busi-
ness to take up the cause of family planning or illegal immigration. Even
such high profile environmental groups as the Sierra Club continue to
refuse to raise population-related issues in such areas as immigration.36
In 1992, a sign posted at William Clinton's election headquarters
read, "It's the economy, stupid.
' 37
30. Id. at 165.
31. See, e.g., JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 24 (1994); Paula Abrams, Population Control and Sustainability:
It's the Same Old Song but with a Different Meaning, 27 ENVTL. L. 1111, 1113 (1997); Albert P.
Blaustein, Arguendo: The Legal Challenge of Population Control, 3 LAW & SOC'Y REv. 107, 109
(1968); Reed Boland, The Environment, Population, and Women's Human Rights, 27 ENVTL. L.
1137, 1157 (1997); Johnson C. Montgomery, The Population Explosion and United States Law, 22
HASTINGS L.J. 629, 629 (1971); Amartya Sen, Fertility and Coercion, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1035,
1041 (1996).
32. See Nicholos R. Montorio, Note, The Issue of Mexican Immigration: Where Do We Go
from Here, 6 J. INT'L BUS. & L. 169, 186 (2007); Lou Dobbs, Enforce the Immigration Laws We've
Got, CNN.com, Jul. 16, 2004, http://www.cnn.com/2004/US/07/16/broken.borders/index.html.
33. See HARDAWAY, supra note 1, at 110.
34. Id. (citation omitted).
35. Id. at 111 (citation omitted); see also Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
36. SIERRA CLUB, SIERRA CLUB CONSERVATION POLICIES-POPULATION (Nov. 17, 2007),
available at http://www.sierraclub.org/policy/conservation/population.pdf (containing no position on
immigration levels or on policies governing immigration into the United States).
37. Gwen Ifill, The 1992 Campaign: Political Memo; Clinton's 4-Point Plan to Win the First
Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1992, at A21.
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It is now time for a sign to be posted in the halls of both government
and the representatives of the environmental movement: "It's the popu-
lation, stupid."
As a tool for reducing the carbon emissions of units of consump-
tion, carbon markets fall clearly with the "U" factor of Holdren's equa-
tion, and as such run the risk of becoming mired in the self-defeating
"circle game" about which former EPA director Lee Thomas expressed
such concern.
Nevertheless, keeping in mind that even if carbon markets do noth-
ing more than transfer carbon emissions from the air to the soil, they may
nevertheless be of some value, even if for no other reason than by help-
ing to clear the air, they may buy humankind time in dealing with global
warming, which is largely a function of greenhouse gases.
But do carbon markets work? In analyzing that question, it is im-
portant to recognize that the challenge is to quantify the advantages and
disadvantages of carbon markets so that current markets can be evaluated
and a realistic, efficient, and fair plan devised for future implementation
in countries where no such plans are currently implemented.
The two main "Cap and Trade Schemes" '38 currently implemented
are the U.S. Acid Rain Market39 and the European Emissions Trading
Scheme (EU ETS).40 Both of these schemes, typically described as "Cap
38. In a cap-and-trade program, "a State (or country) caps its total emission of a certain pol-
lutant at some target amount." Nadia Zakir, Emission Trading Initiatives: Responding to Climate
Change through Market Forces, ABA BUSINESS LAW TODAY, August 2007, available at
http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/blt/2007-07-08/zakir.shtml. The cap defines the total number of
emission allowances an emitting firm has the right to emit, each allowance correlates to a specific
quantity of a pollutant. Id. The initial policy formulation will determine whether allowances are
sold through an auction, directly, or indirectly. See id. Those emitting firms that are able to produce
below their allowance level can sell their excess allowances to firms where it is uneconomical to
reduce their carbon emission. See id. Therefore, carbon emissions are reduced through the place-
ment of a market value on the right to pollute. See id.; see also STEPHEN BYGRAVE & MARTINA
BosI, LINKING PROJECT-BASED MECHANISMS WITH DOMESTIC GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSION
TRADING SCHEMES 11 (2004); DALLAS BURTRAW, KAREN PALMER & DANNY KAHN, ALLOCATION
OF CO 2 EMISSIONS ALLOWANCES IN THE REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM
1 (2005); Harrison & Radov, supra note 1, at 264-66; ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
TOOLS OF THE TRADE: A GUIDE TO DESIGNING AND OPERATING A CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM FOR
POLLUTION CONTROL 1 (2003).
39. Eric Shaffner, Comment, Repudiation and Regret: Is the United States Sitting out the
Kyoto Protocol to Its Economic Detriment?, 37 ENVTL. L. 441, 454 (2007); Eric C. Bettelheim,
Richard L. Sandor & Ian R. Swingland, An Overview of a Free-Market Approach to Climate Change
and Conservation, 360 PHILOSOPHICAL TRANSACTIONS: MATHEMATICAL, PHYSICAL, AND
ENGINEERING SCIENCE 1607, 1612 (2002) ("Direct monitoring of emissions is used by to verify that
the cap is achieved and to insure the value of tradable allowances.").
40. The EU ETS was established as a cost effective mechanism to comply with the commit-
ment made by the European Union to the Kyoto Protocol. See Council Directive 2003/87/EC, art. 1,
2003 O.J. (L 275) 32. The program is designed to regulate 46 percent of the EU's CO2 emissions.
Justin Guest, Project Based Mechanisms & the European Emissions Trading System, COMMODITIES
NOW, September 2003, at 1, available at http://www.commodities-now.com/content/market-
areas/general/ma-article-5.pdf?PHPSESSID=34967b. The directors established an allowance alloca-
tion policy that was consistent with the Member State's obligation under the EU Burden Sharing
Agreement. See Council Directive 2003/87, art. 11, 2003 O.J. (L 275) 36 (EC). Within the first two
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and Trade" schemes, are based on governmental establishment of emis-
sions targets, which may be met by covered industries either through
actual compliance with those targets or by purchase of the rights to ex-
ceed emission targets from other industries whose emissions are below
the established emissions targets.4'
Voluntary cap and trade programs currently implemented include
the Chicago Climate Exchange Program and the Kyoto Protocol Clean
Development Mechanism. Pending mandatory programs are the Re-
gional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, the California Global Warming Solu-
tions Act, and the Climate Stewardship Act of 2007.
The purported advantages and disadvantages of each of these mar-
kets are currently undergoing considerable debate. Advocates of these
programs cite the provision of economic incentives for industries to in-
novate in finding technological means of reducing carbon emissions and
42
thereby serving the ultimate goal of reducing world carbon production.
Critics cite the economic burden on industry and the inevitable economic
burden placed on consumers, as well as instability caused by volatile
carbon markets, including misallocated investment incentives triggered
by uncertainties in the future costs of carbon emission rights.43
Accordingly, a sub-debate has focused on the relative economic
merits of a carbon market and a direct carbon excise regimen imposed on
industry, since both would presumably provide incentives for innovation
in carbon reducing technologies and both would result in a reduction of
global emissions of greenhouse gases.
Eric Toder, of the Urban Institute and Urban-Brookings Tax Policy
Center, has recently released several studies analyzing the distributional
effects of a carbon tax, and compared those effects with those of cap and
trade programs, and found that since "any quantity restriction (cap and
trade) implies a change in the market prices because the permits are
scarce," it follows that a "tax equal to the permit price would generate
phases, allowances are distributed on the basis of grandfathering or using industry benchmarks.
Harrison & Radov, supra note 1. The allowances are then bought, sold, and traded in a carbon
market. See, e.g., Council Directive 2003/87, art. 12, 2003 O.J. (L 275) 36 (EC); EU ACTION
AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE, EU EMISSIONS TRADING: AN OPEN SYSTEM PROMOTING GLOBAL
INNOVATION 9 (2007), available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/pdf/bali/euaction.pdf.
41. See, e.g., EU ACTION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE 3, 9 (2007), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/pdf/bali/eu action.pdf; U.S. EPA, CAP AND TRADE: ACID
RAIN PROGRAM BASICS 1-2, http://www.epa.gov/airmarkt/cap-trade/docs/arbasics.pdf (last visited
Mar. 22, 2008).
42. E.g., Environmental Defense Fund, The Cap and Trade Success Story, Feb. 12, 2007,
http://www.edf.org/page.cfm?taglD = 1085.
43. See ARTHUR LAFFER & WAYNE WINEGARDEN, THE ADVERSE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF
CAP-AND-TRADE REGULATIONS 2, 4-5, 7, 13-14, 16 (2007), available at
http://www.arduinlaffermoore.com/PDF/CapandTradeEconomic_
Analysis September 2007.pdf.
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the same reduction in consumption."" He therefore concludes that "cap
and trade proposals affect consumers the same way as a carbon excise
tax that is equal to the market-determined permit price.
' ' 5
In other words, the same carbon-reducing effects can be achieved
through either cap and trade or carbon excise taxes, depending only upon
the target caps set in cap and trade and the amount of tax set under an
excise protocol.
What is clear from such studies, however, is that both carbon mar-
kets and carbon excise taxes have the potential of imposing enormous
economic costs on society depending on the target levels of carbon emis-
sions set under cap and trade or the amount of the tax set under a carbon
excise tax program. If the levels are set low or the taxes high, the reduc-
tion in carbon emissions is likely to be greater, but the effects on an
economy more severe. If the levels are set high and the taxes low, the
effects on the economy will be less severe, but the effect on carbon re-
duction relatively minimal. In the end, political considerations will de-
termine the amount of amount of tax or emissions levels, just as they
determine the imposition of any other tax.
In either case, the question must be asked whether society's re-
sources are best spent on the "U" component of Holdren's equation, par-
ticularly when such expenditures in the past have been shown to have
such a relatively insignificant impact on mankind's ecological footprint
on the earth. For all the billions spent on this component, carbon produc-
tion today is greater than at any time in the history of the earth. The no-
tion that we can save the earth by taking one step forward (by modest
linear reductions in carbon emissions of individual units of consump-
tion), while at the same time taking three steps backward (by increasing
exponentially the number of individual units) is akin to rearranging the
deck chairs on the Titanic.
Although the Titanic analogy has become much overused, it is par-
ticularly descriptive of current environmental policy. Governments are
busy transferring toxic wastes from the first class to third class compart-
ments, or shuffling carbon from the air to the engine room. Demagogic
ship officers are engaged in encouraging passengers not to use so many
chairs, or advocating that more people be squeezed on to each chair,
while others busy themselves in producing more chairs. Still others
scurry about trying to find the dwindling supply of chairs per person.
Meanwhile the entire ship is sinking under the weight of an exponen-
tially expanding population.
44. Dr. Eric Toder, Urban Institute and Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center, Address at the
Denver University Law Review Symposium: Who Should Pay for Reducing Global Warming? 1
(Feb. 15, 2008) (transcript on file with author).
45. Id. at5.
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CONCLUSION
For every dollar governments expend on the "U" component, only
pennies are spent on the "P" component, the subcomponents of which are
family-planning programs, government funding of abortions, tax reform
that encourages family planning rather than rewards and subsidizes large
families, and enforcement of immigration laws that would encourage
human-exporting countries to deal with population pressures within their
countries by addressing the rights of women, as well as lowering the
cultural, legal, and economic barriers to family planning, rather than by
taking the course of least resistance of exporting their excess humans to
developed countries.
If any real progress is to be made in protecting the global environ-
ment for our children and grandchildren, these priorities must be re-
versed.






This article will primarily discuss the European Union's Green-
house Gas Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), which it launched in
January 2005 as a market-based solution to provide incentives for curb-
ing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.' Although this was the first com-
prehensive multinational greenhouse gas emissions trading program cov-
ering installations in each of the EU's then 25 member states, the United
States fifteen years earlier had initiated an innovative national sulfur di-
oxide (SO2 ) emissions trading program under Title IV of the Clean Air
Act amendments of 1990. 2 That program was aimed at reducing sulfur
emissions and the resulting acid rain, which "represents a threat to natu-
ral resources, ecosystems, materials, visibility, and public health.' '3 Un-
der Title IV, the acid decomposition control program requires significant
reductions in sulfur dioxide emissions from 1980 levels.
Subsequently, the 1997 Kyoto Protocol,4 which was negotiated un-
der the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change,5 established emissions reductions commitments for industrial-
ized states to an average 5.2 percent reduction below the benchmark
1990 concentration levels by the 2008-2012 period. The Kyoto Protocol
includes international emissions trading among other "flexibility mecha-
nisms" to help countries meet their commitments to effectuate green-
Vice Provost and Evans Distinguished Professor, University of Denver; Thompson G.
Marsh Professor of Law and Director, International Legal Studies Program, University of Denver.
This is an adapted version of my presentation at the Denver University Law Review's Symposium on
Global Climate Change: Integrating Environmental Justice into Policy, Regulation, and Litigation,
on February 15, 2008.
1. Council Directive 2003/87/EC 2003 O.J. (L275 25.10.2003) of the European Parliament
and of the Council, Oct. 13, 2003, establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance
trading within the Community and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC (as amended by Council
Directive 2004/1/EC 2004 O.J. (L338 18 13.11.2004)) [hereinafter Directive 2003/87/EC].
2. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7651 (2008). See generally Revisions to the Permits and Sulfur Dioxide
Allowance System Regulations Under Title IV of the Clean Air Act, available at
http://www.epa.gov/EPA-AIR/1998/August/Day-03/a20605.htm.
3. § 765 1(a) (U.S. Congressional finding).
4. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Dec.
10, 1997), U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/197/7/Add.2 (final version), entered into force Feb. 6, 2005, re-
printed in 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998) [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol], available at
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf. See generally MICHAEL GRUB ET AL., THE
KYOTO PROTOCOL, A GUIDE AND ASSESSMENT (1999).
5. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S.
107, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 848 (1992), entered into force March 21, 1994 [hereinafter UNFCCC].
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house gas reductions. The EU ETS is designed for EU member states to
comply collectively with their commitments to reduce emissions under
the Kyoto Protocol. Thus, while the EU commitment is to be observed
collectively, the targets may vary for member states.
The U.S. Acid Rain Program (ARP) is a model that has been fol-
lowed by several countries, 6 as well as the Kyoto Protocol itself and the
EU. Thus it seems appropriate to briefly review the U.S. and Kyoto ex-
periments on emissions trading before discussing the EU program.
I. U.S. AND KYOTO EMISSIONS TRADING
The Clean Air amendments of 1990 established an overall national
limit on sulfur dioxide emissions and an allowance trading program7 to
regulate S02 from power plants. The sulfur trading program was divided
into two phases-Phase I began in 1995 and Phase 1I in 2000. The na-
tionwide ceiling on emissions by electric utilities was set at 8.90 million
tons and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was authorized to
8allocate annual emissions to firms in tons per year.
Compliance can be achieved through an emissions allocation and
transfer system. The cap-and-trade program also extends to effectuate
reductions in nitrogen-oxide emissions. Both of these programs have
emissions monitoring rules that are stringent and impose severe penalties
that are automatically assessed if there are not enough allowances to
cover a source's emissions at the end of the year. Starting in 2000, the
program covers virtually all steam-electric utility units in the U.S.
The ARP has been considered a great success. In its 2005 Progress
Report on the ARP, the EPA stated:
After 11 years of implementation, monitoring, and assessment, the
ARP has proved to be an effective and efficient means of meeting
emission reduction goals under the Clean Air Act. A 2005 study es-
timated the program's benefits at $122 billion annually in 2010,
while cost estimates are around $3 billion annually (in 2000).
9
Commentators Joseph A. Kruger and William A. Pizer concluded in
2004:
The U.S. SO2 program is widely acclaimed as a success. It has re-
sulted in early emissions reductions (spurred by the program's bank-
6. See, e.g., A. Denny Ellerman & Barbara K. Buchner, The European Union Emissions
Trading Scheme: Origins, Allocation, and Early Results, I REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL'Y 66, 68
(2007) ("Emissions trading programs in the United States were closely followed by many in Europe
.") (referring to the UK, Danish, and Dutch systems).
7. § 7651b.
8. Id. § 7651b(a)(1).
9. UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ACID RAIN PROGRAM 2005
PROGRESS REPORT, available at www.epa.gov/airmarkt/progress/docs/2005report.pdf.
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ing provision), a sharp drop in acid deposition throughout the eastern
United States, and lower-than-expected costs. The structure of the
program has been influential in the design of the Kyoto framework
and the European Emissions Trading System .... 10
The Kyoto Protocol established binding reduction targets and time-
tables for Industrialized (Annex I) Parties, mandating that they reduce
emissions by a varying percentage below 1990 levels." It also provided
for measurement, reporting, and review of information, 12 which is an
important starting point for building a compliance regime through later
amendment. Reduction targets were set for GHGs over a five-year initial
commitment period between 2008 and 2012, to be followed by subse-
quent commitment periods. 13 The European Union was initially opposed
to emissions trading, which was strongly advocated by the United States
as a means of meeting the Kyoto commitments during the negotiation
phase. However, the parties compromised, and hence the Protocol in-
cluded several market-based flexibility mechanisms to achieve compli-
ance in a cost-effective manner. These mechanisms are international
emissions trading, joint implementation, and the Clean Development
Mechanism. 14
At the United States' insistence, and notwithstanding opposition
from the EU, the Protocol ultimately included the free market trading of
emissions.1 5 The "target-based" emissions trading allows Annex I de-
veloped countries to purchase emissions credits from other Annex I par-
ties that reduce their GHGs more than required.1 6 Thus, states that emit
less than their quota of GHGs are able to sell their emissions credits to
polluting states that need them to meet their commitments.
The United States was also successful in furthering its "market-
based flexibility" approach, as the Protocol provides for Joint Implemen-
tation (JI), under which a country with an emission reduction commit-
ment under the Kyoto Protocol is able to acquire credits for projects re-
ducing GHG emissions or enhancing sinks in any other country with a
commitment. 17 JI projects earn Emission Reduction Units (ERUs), each
equivalent to one metric ton of CO 2.'
8 Developed countries can thus
10. Joseph A. Kruger & William A. Pizer, Greenhouse Gas Trading in Europe, The New
Grand Policy Experiment, ENVIRONMENT, Oct. 1, 2004, at 8, 14, available at
http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/lGI -123629147.html.
11. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 4, art. 3, 1.
12. See id. art. 3, 3.
13. Id. art. 3, 1.
14. See id. art. 6, art. 12, art. 17.
15. Id. art. 17.
16. See Citizens for Global Solutions, Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol,
http://www.globalsolutions.orglissues/climate-changeand kyotoprotocol (last visited Mar. 17,
2008).
17. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 4, art. 6.
18. UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, UNEP YEAR BOOK 2008: AN OVERVIEW
OF OUR CHANGING ENVIRONMENT 26, available at http://www.unep.org/geo/yearbook/yb2008/.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
trade among themselves, provided they meet several conditions. One
such condition is that the trade must produce reductions in addition to
any that would have otherwise occurred.' 9 Also, the parties are able to
obtain credits through trading only if they are also taking measures to
reduce emissions domestically.
20
JI was directed especially at countries with economies in transition.
A supervisory committee under the direction of the states party to the
Protocol oversees the J1 mechanism. 21 Since it is only in 2008 that the
first ERUs will be issued for a crediting period,22 no project evaluation is
yet possible.
During the negotiations, the EU had argued that its member nations
should be able to share their emissions limit collectively, so long as the
overall EU reductions were met. In response, the United States was able
to persuade the negotiating parties to include a provision which allows
any group of countries to fulfill their target-based commitments jointly.23
Thus, a regional emissions trading or multinational "bubble" is permit-
ted.
Another free market mechanism successfully advocated by the
United States and also by developing countries is the Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM), which is designed to effectuate reductions in carbon
emissions while allowing Annex I developed countries to engage in JI-
type project-based credits either by governments of or private parties in
Annex I countries. 24 Thus, Annex I countries may earn credits by assist-
ing developing countries as they reduce their emissions. Emission-
reducing projects in developing countries can earn CERs that can be sold
to buyers in industrialized countries.
The credits that can be earned and traded are called Certified Emis-
sions Reductions (CERs), and are measured in metric tons of CO 2
equivalent. 25 Thus, the purpose of the CDM is to assist developing coun-
tries in achieving sustainable development while allowing Annex I coun-
tries flexibility in meeting their emissions reduction targets under the
Protocol. Similar to JI, CDM requires emissions reductions to be sup-
plemental to those that would have otherwise occurred without the pro-
ject. CDM projects include several energy efficiency projects and those
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See Guidance on the Implementation of Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol, available at
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop 13/application/pdf/cmpartsixkp.pdf (last visited Mar. 17,
2008).
22. See UNFCCC, Joint Implementation, available at
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/joint-implementation/items/1674.php (last visited Mar.
17, 2008).
23. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 4, art. 4.
24. Id. art. 12.
25. Id.
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that reduce non-CEO industrial greenhouse gases, as well as aforestation
and reforestation projects.26
While the CDM program was launched in November 2001, the first
project was registered about three years after that, and the first CERs
were issued in October 2005.27 An Executive Board under the direction
of the states party to the Protocol oversees the CDM. 28 The United Na-
tions Environment Programme (UNEP) reports that 852 projects had
been registered in 49 countries as of the end of November 2007 and 2600
projects are currently in the global pipeline; the number of expected
CERs will be more than $2.5 billion by the end of 2012, while as of Oc-
tober 2007, $85.9 million of CERs have been issued by the CDM Execu-
tive Board. 9
II. THE EU TRADING SCHEME
As to the EU developments, with its 27 member states, trading in
carbon emissions, under which allowances and credits are bought and
sold, has become a prominent part of the EU's response to the challenge
of climate change. The aim of the EU emission trading scheme is to help
EU member states to achieve compliance with their commitments under
the Kyoto Protocol. As the European Community had ratified the Kyoto
Protocol jointly with its member states, the EU is obligated to reduce its
GHG emissions by eight percent over the 2008-2012 period, compared to
its 1990 emissions.30
The EU scheme works on a cap-and-trade basis and is designed to
result in both economic and environmental gains. And it could become a
credible and central tool for future climate mitigation following the
European Union's "Green Agenda," which was unveiled on January 23,
2008, in Brussels under the flashy title, "20 20 by 2020-Europe's Cli-
mate Change Opportunity. ' 31 This gives the EU the high moral ground
and also is likely to turn carbon emissions into a mainstream commodity.
The EU's initiative on climate change and renewable energy for
2020 began with the European Commission's proposals "calling for a
quantum leap in the EU's commitment to change. 32 The European Par-




30. Directive 2003/87/EC, supra note 1, at 1.
31. See Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to
the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the
Committee of the Regions, 20 20 by 2020-Europe's Climate Change Opportunity, COM (2008) 30
final (Jan. 23, 2008) [hereinafter 20 20 by 2020].
32. Commission of the European Communities, Commission Staff Working Document, Impact
Assessment, SEC (2008) 85/3, at 2 (Jan. 23, 2008) [hereinafter Impact Assessment].
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liament33 was in support of taking definitive steps to curb greenhouse gas
emissions and developing renewable energy sources in addressing cli-
mate change. In March 2007 the European Council agreed to set precise,
legally binding targets establishing two key targets: 1) a reduction of 20
percent in GHGs by 2020 and to increase it to 30 percent if under an
international agreement other developed countries commit to "compara-
ble emission reductions and economically more advanced countries to
contributing adequately according to their responsibilities and respective
capabilities"; 34 and 2) a 20 percent share of renewable energies in EU
energy consumption by 2020.35 The Council had called upon the Euro-
pean Commission in February "to bring forward proposals which create
the right incentives for forward-looking low-carbon investment deci-
sions. 36
The European Council's invitation to the European Commission to
present concrete proposals for implementing a new approach to the EU
energy and climate change issues reflected an acknowledgement of and a
response to the evolving and growing public opinion in Europe that a
new European approach to energy and climate policy was needed.
Hence, there was a political consensus for the change. As the European
Commission noted:
The resolve of the European Council was a signal to our international
partners that the EU was ready to turn words into deeds. This paid
dividends at the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Bali
in December 2007. The European Union was able to play a pivotal
role in securing agreement on the roadmap towards a new compre-
hensive agreement on cutting emissions to be reached by 2009. This
reinforced the EU's determination to press on with its commitment to
fighting climate change, to show that it was ready to give force to its
conviction that developed countries can and should commit to a 30 %
cut in emission levels by 2020. The EU should continue to take the
lead in the negotiation of an ambitious international agreement.
37
The Commission responded to the Council's call by presenting
three policy proposals: 1) a proposal for a Directive on the promotion of
renewable energy; 2) a proposal for amending the EU Emissions Trading
33. See European Parliament Resolution on Climate Change, EUR. PARL. Doc. P6_TA 0038
(2007).
34. 20 20 by 2020, supra note 31, at 2.
35. Id.
36. Council Conclusion of 20 February 2007, EU Objectives for the Further Development of
the International Climate Regime Beyond 2012, available at http://register.consilium.
europa.eu/pdf/en/07/stO6/st06621.enO7.pdf, cited in Commission of the European Communities
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending Directive
2003/87/EC so as to Improve and Extend the Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance Trading System
of the Community, COM (2008) 16 final 2008/0013 (COD), at 3 (Jan. 23, 2008), available at
http://www.aem.cz/svse/data/080123_eu ets draflijroposal.pdf [hereinafter Commission Proposal
for a New Directive].
37. 20 20 by 2020, supra note 31, at 3.
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Directive reviewing the EU ETS; and 3) a proposal on sharing the mem-
ber states' efforts to meet the EU GHG reduction commitment in sectors
not covered by the EU ETS, such as transport, buildings, services, agri-
culture, small industrial installations, and waste.38 The discussion here
will be limited to the Commission proposal relating to amendment of the
EU Emissions Trading Directive.
The Commission based its proposals on five key principles: 1) the
targets must be met and thus the proposals must be sufficiently strong
and effective to be credible, accompanied by mechanisms for monitoring
and compliance; 2) the effort required from member states must be fair;
3) the cost must be minimized; 4) the EU must continue its efforts be-
yond 2020 to meet the target of curbing global emissions by 50 percent
by 2050; and 5) the EU must actively promote a comprehensive interna-
tional agreement to cut GHG emissions.39
The EU ETS program is to run in two phases, from 2005 through
2007 in the first phase, and in the second phase from 2008 through 2012,
which coincides with the five-year period of Kyoto commitment. The
2003 Council Directive, 40 under which EU ETS became operative, estab-
lished a regulatory framework for the implementation of a mandatory
GHG allowance trading scheme in its member states so as to promote
reduction of GHG emissions in an economically efficient and cost-
effective manner.
To summarize selected major provisions of the Directive, operators
of installations listed under Annex I must hold a permit from a competent
authority authorizing GHG emissions. 41 Such operators are under moni-
toring and reporting requirements for their GHG emissions. 42 These op-
erators must surrender allowances equal to the verified emissions of the
total emissions of the installation in each calendar year of the EU ETS.43
Each member state is required to develop a National Allocation Plan
(NAP) stating the total quantity of allowances that it intends to allocate
to installations subject to approval by the Commission. 44 These allow-
ances can be transferred between any persons in the Community.45
Member states are required to make decisions regarding their NAP that
are consistent with their obligations under the EU and under the Kyoto
Protocol.46 Member states are required to distribute, free of charge, at
38. Impact Assessment, supra note 32, at 2.
39. 20 20 by 2020, supra note 31, at 4-5.
40. Directive 2003/87/EC, supra note 1.
41. Id. art. 4.
42. Id. art. 6.2(c), (d).
43. Id. art. 6.2(e).
44. Id. art. 9.
45. Id. art. 12.1(a).
46. Id. art. 9, Annex 111.
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least 95 percent of allowances in Phase I and at least 90 percent of allow-
ances in Phase 11.
47
Thus, under EU ETS, operators are required to surrender allowances
to cover their actual GHG emissions during the previous calendar year.4 8
However, operators can trade the emission allowances they have been
allocated. 49 Companies can sell allowances if they cut their own emis-
sions and they can buy them if they find themselves with insufficient
allowances to cover their emissions. Thus, a reduction by companies of
their emissions results in their earning an income stream from the sale of
allowances. This, it is hoped, will stimulate innovation and push change
where it is most cost-effective. However, if operators find cutting emis-
sions more expensive than buying extra allowances, they will have to
purchase them. Each allowance gives operators the right to emit one ton
of CO2 equivalent during a specified period. Up to five percent of allow-
ances may be auctioned in the first phase of the program and up to ten
percent in the second phase. 0 National governments allocate allowances
to companies under this "cap-and-trade" system and the Commission
approves the national plans. 5'
Initially, in the first phase of trading period, from 2005 to 2007,
only CO2 emissions are covered, and those also from large emitters in the
power and heat generation industry and in selected energy-intensive in-
dustrial sectors, such as combustion plants, oil refineries, coke ovens,
iron and steel plants, and factories making cement, glass, lime, bricks,
ceramic, pulp, and paper.52 Nearly 10,500 installations in the 27 member
states of the EU, accounting for around 50 percent of the EU's CO 2
emissions and about 40 percent of its overall GHG emissions are cov-
ered.53 During the second phase, from 2008 through 2012, nitrous oxide
emissions are also being included.54
The EU ETS is linked with the Kyoto Protocol's flexibility mecha-
nisms-the CDM and JI-which are project-based. Thus, European
industry can use credits from the CDM and JI to help them comply with
their obligations under the system. By allowing this linkage, the EU
provides tangible support to developing countries in their efforts to
achieve sustainable development. Also, banking and borrowing are per-




51. Id. art. 24.
52. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, EU ACTION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE-EU EMISSIONS
TRADING: AN OPEN SYSTEM PROMOTING GLOBAL INNOVATION 7 (2007). The facts and figures in
this pertaining to the EU ETS regulatory scheme are derived from European Commission publica-
tions.
53. Id.
54. See Directive 2003/87/EC, supra note 1, Annex II.
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missible. During the first phase, the necessary infrastructure for monitor-
ing, reporting, and verification, including registries, was established.
After reviewing the ETS, the European Commission noted that the
ETS
needs to be strengthened and updated if it is to meet its new objec-
tives. The incentive effect of the current ETS has been cushioned by
the generous number of allowances handed out in the first phase
(2005-2007). The structure of the ETS, with national allocation
plans, has raised the risk of distortions in terms of competition and
the internal market. The scope of the ETS, in terms of the sectors of
the economy covered and the gases included, has also limited its abil-
ity to drive emission cuts.
55
The Commission stated that its proposed amendments 56 to the EU
ETS Directive are guided by three overall objectives:
1. Fully exploiting the potential of the EU ETS to contribute to the
EU's overall greenhouse gas reduction commitments in an economi-
cally efficient manner.
2. Refining and improving the EU ETS in the light of experience
gathered.
3. Contributing to transforming Europe into a low greenhouse-gas-
emitting economy and creating the right incentives for forward look-
ing low carbon investment decisions by reinforcing a clear, undis-
torted and long-term carbon price signal.
57
As to the scope of the ETS, the Commission proposed to expand its
coverage with the inclusion of greenhouse gases other than CO2 and all
major industrial emitters. 58 In light of its conclusion that "[t]he emis-
sions trading system should only be extended to emissions which are
capable of being monitored, reported and verified with the same level of
accuracy as applies under the monitoring, reporting and verification re-
quirements currently applicable under the Directive," 59 the Commission
did not include shipping. Industrial plants emitting less than 10,000 tons
of CO2 would not have to participate in the ETS,6° provided alternative
measures were in place to ensure that they adequately contribute to re-
duction efforts.
55. 20 20 by 2020, supra note 31, at 5.
56. For the text of the revised Directive, see Commission Proposal for a New Directive, supra
note 36, at 12.
57. Id. at 3.
58. Id. at 5.
59. Id. at 4.
60. Id. at 5.
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The Commission proposed to replace the national allocation plans
by a harmonized ETS covering the whole Union having common rules.
Noting that "in the absence of comparable constraints for industry in
third countries, there may arise a risk of 'carbon leakage', i.e. relocation
of greenhouse gas emitting activities from the EU to third countries and
thereby increasing global emissions,' the Commission proposed that
the power sector would be subject to full auctioning from the start of
2013 .62 Most other industrial sectors, including aviation, would be sub-
ject to full auctioning gradually and they are to reach full auctioning by
2020.63 Member states are to handle auctioning and their treasuries
would benefit by the auctioning revenues.
64
Noting the need for linking with other emission trading systems to
build a global carbon market, but stressing harmonization, the Commis-
sion proposed that under the new ETS,
companies will still have access to CDMs, but the use of credits gen-
erated by such mechanisms will be limited to the levels used in the
current ETS period. This would leave room for access to this
mechanism to be increased once an international agreement is
signed-central to allowing the EU to step up swiftly to the more
challenging 30% GHG reduction in the event of an international
agreement. Freeing up access to this mechanism would also be an
incentive for third countries to sign up to an international agreement,
in the knowledge that European investment technology could flow as
a result.
65
The Commission had taken this step after noting that, while CDMs
had proved useful in cutting emissions, there was "a risk that too gener-
ous a use of CDMs can dilute the effectiveness of the ETS by increasing
the supply of credits and thereby cutting demand for allowances, and
reducing the incentive for governments and companies to promote emis-
sion reductions at home. 66
The Commission also acknowledged that since the revised ETS is to
cover less than half of the GHG emissions, the remaining emissions,
such as buildings, transport, agriculture, waste, and industrial plants fal-
ling under the threshold for inclusion in the ETS, must be covered
through national commitments under an EU framework. 67 It set the tar-
get of a 10 percent reduction in emissions from 2005 levels in these sec-
61. Id. at 8.
62. Id. at 15.
63. Id. at 9.
64. Id. at 7-9.
65. 20 20 by 2020, supra note 31, at 6-7; see also Commission Proposal for a New Directive,
supra note 36, at 10-11.
66. 20 20 by 2020, supra note 31, at 6.
67. Id. at 7.
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tors. 68 Although EU measures such as tougher standards on CO2 emis-
sions from cars and fuel would be applicable, member states are to de-
termine the measures to be taken and sectors where they would like to
concentrate their efforts.
6 9
Thus the EU's new agenda, which must be endorsed by the Euro-
pean Parliament and by member states to become effective, extends the
scope of the ETS with the inclusion of greenhouse gases other than CO2
and all other major industrial emitters. Allocations are to be reduced
year by year so as to allow for emissions covered by the ETS to be re-
duced by 21 percent from 2005 levels by 2020.70 Full auctioning is
aimed at making older, dirty ways of power generation, such as coal
burning, so expensive that they are prohibitive. This could encourage
new investments across the European power sector in new and cleaner
technologies, such as wind, carbon capture, and carbon sequestration.
Until now allowances were given away, which was a major shortcoming
in the first phase. In the sectors not involved in the carbon trading
scheme, such as transport, farming, and construction, national caps are to
be imposed.
Under the new agenda, the EU threatens to limit severely the trade
in certified emission reduction credits after 2012 if there is no compre-
hensive global successor treaty to the Kyoto Protocol. If no new CERs
are admitted into Europe after 2012, the UN-approved carbon reduction
projects will be severely affected, for under the new ETS companies will
still have access to the Clean Development Mechanism, but the use of
credits generated by this mechanism will be limited to the levels used in
the current ETS period. Access to this mechanism will only be increased
after an international agreement is reached.
Jose Manuel Barroso, the President of the European Commission,
announcing reforms to the ETS in its third phase after 2012, said that
"Europe would not allow other countries to exploit its virtuous stance on
carbon. ''71 Without an international agreement, which is the best way to
tackle the problem, he added, "There is no point in Europe being tough if
it just means production shifting to countries allowing a free-for-all on
,,72emissions.
The EU's tough measures would include forcing importers to buy
carbon permits on the ETS and restrictions on the import of additional
CER credits after 2012 unless "a satisfactory international agreement is
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 6.
71. Carl Mortished, European Move to Tighten Carbon Trade Permits Threatens UN plan,
THE TIMES (London), Feb. 4, 2008, at 44.
72. Id.
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reached."73  That successor agreement would purportedly include the
United States, Japan, China, India, and the emerging markets, without
which the price of European carbon permits will soar.74
CONCLUSION
The carbon emission trading market for carbon quotas and credits is
very sensitive to a slowdown in economic activity, for it cuts production,
which means reduction in emissions. Unless there is a comprehensive
global agreement on the reduction of carbon emissions, the market will
remain complicated, as intense lobbying, both political and corporate,
will continue. What about the credibility of this market? Who will
monitor and police the system, effectively and intemationally?-that is,
who will verify the carbon quota and credit entitlements? Obviously it
must be done by national governments and the United Nations. The sub-
prime mortgage crisis is a good example of the failure of the needed ef-
fective regulatory mechanism. Mechanisms should be such that a long-
term, credible carbon price is achieved which encourages companies to
invest in low carbon-neutral energy generation.
What have we learned? The first phase of ETS, 2005-2007, which
the EU calls the "learning phase," was not a success story. Lobbyists
succeeded in getting the EU to allocate carbon credits and allowances to
industries too generously. Thus they did not need to buy permits. ETS
allowances were given away, resulting in what critics have characterized
as massive windfalls for energy-intensive industries.
Phase II began on January 1, 2008, and goes until 2012. It sets
tougher targets, although most allowances are still handed out free to
industry. During this phase, tighter limits are to be imposed on the num-
ber of credits allocated within Europe, but companies will still be able to
import credits from the developing countries, which provides them little
incentive to achieve emissions reductions.
Finally, the carbon market has seen considerable volatility and price
fluctuations for both CERs and allowances, although there is growing
interest among investors in the U.S., Canada, Australia, and Japan. Con-
sequently, both the regulated and the unregulated sectors have witnessed
a great deal of activitiy. To ensure the emergence of a healthy carbon
market, it is essential that policy-makers establish mechanisms to gather
accurate market-relevant emissions data and release it in an orderly and
transparent manner. They must set the caps consistent with the scientifi-
cally credible level of environmental performance and impose strict pen-
alties for fraud or noncompliance They must also give companies
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enforcement must also be ensured and strict penalties must be imposed
for fraud or noncompliance. The 2007 World Bank study entitled, "State
and Trends of the Carbon Market 2007" aptly stated: "The key elements
for well-functioning carbon markets include: competitive energy mar-
kets; common, fungible units of measure; standardized reporting proto-
cols of emissions data; and transferability of assets across boundaries. 75
75. KAREN CAPOOR & PHILIPPE AMBROSI, WORLD BANK, STATE AND TRENDS OF THE
CARBON MARKET 2007, at 6, available at http://carbonfinance.org/docs/CarbonTrends_2007-
FINAL_-_May_2.pdf (2007) (citation omitted).
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